Determinants and consequences of noncompliance with the 2013 COSO framework

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires firms to use a “suitable framework” as a basis for evaluating the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting. The COSO 1992 framework was the most commonly used suitable framework until it was superseded by the COSO 2013 framework. Because strict compliance with the updated framework was not enforced by regulatory authorities, a nontrivial number of firms did not comply in a timely fashion. We investigate determinants and consequences of noncompliance with the COSO 2013 framework following the supersession of the COSO 1992 framework. We find that noncompliance is positively associated with proxies for resource constraints, financial distress, and a weak internal control environment, and negatively associated with auditor industry specialization, board size, and audit committee accounting expertise. Further tests suggest that following supersession of the 1992 framework, investors view quarterly earnings surprises of the noncompliant firms to be less credible and that noncompliance increases regulatory scrutiny. Finally, we find some evidence that accounting conservatism increases after supersession of the 1992 framework for compliant firms relative to noncompliant firms, suggesting that noncompliance can delay the potential benefits of implementing the updated framework.     

An accountability framework for financial statement auditors and related research questions

We address the following overarching questions: What kind of accountability framework could regulators use to (a) motivate auditors to improve audit quality, and (b) evaluate how well auditors have carried out their duties? We draw on research in accounting, economics, psychology, and neuroscience to critique the accountabilities, incentives, and learning opportunities embedded in auditors’ extant regulatory environment. We first establish that forward-looking estimates are the basis for most financial statement information and that some of these estimates are highly uncertain, which increases the challenges faced by auditors. We propose an accountability framework with two dimensions: rewards versus penalties and processes versus outcomes. We show that auditors’ current regulatory accountabilities generally are in the form of penalties rather than rewards and primarily depend on audit outcomes rather than attributes of auditors’ judgment processes. We provide evidence from a range of disciplines that questions the suitability of the present system for improving the quality of auditors’ judgments and the quality of evaluations of those judgments made by inspectors. We identify four potential changes for improvement in audit quality based on our framework. Each of these identified changes has an impact on one or both of the two dimensions in our framework. For each of these changes, we outline JDM research questions that could be addressed to inform our overarching questions and to provide empirical evidence to help refine our accountability framework and improve audit quality.     

The Future of Banking Regulation in Developed Countries: Lessons from and for Europe

If the bank regulatory structure in developed countries, particularly those in the EU (as well as the US), were not changed, considerable private and social costs could be incurred. We first outline the current EU regulatory framework and describe and analyze recent bank crises and failures. Based on this record and on the (beneficial for consumers) changes in EU banking regulation, on new data on bank capital/asset ratios in ten European countries, and on an analysis of market and technological changes, we conclude that the present regulatory structure is unlikely to achieve banking stability in the future. We then propose and describe a regulatory framework that can deal effectively with this situation and show how it would affect EU banks.     

全球稳定币的系统性风险:监管挑战与应对

2008年次贷危机至今,全球宏观审慎监管框架始终着眼于防范传统金融机构的系统性风险,却忽视了新兴的全球稳定币及其所引发的支付方式变革.全球稳定币诱发系统性风险的路径不仅包括因为替代法币支付功能从而加剧金融功能的脆弱性,还包括加深金融结构集中度与金融网络复杂性.同时,全球稳定币给既有的“宏观审慎监管”框架造成监管信息滞后...     

Market Efficiency, Thin Trading and Non-linear Behaviour: Evidence from an Emerging Market

Emerging markets efficiency has been widely investigated, with mixed results. However such evidence is only reliable if the methodology adopted accounts for the institutional features of the market. Unlike previous studies this paper corrects for thin trading and incorporates possible non-linear behaviour and regulatory changes. Using Istanbul Stock Exchange data we show that in its early years the exchange was characterised by non-linear behaviour and inefficient pricing. However, regulatory changes encouraged participation, improved information quality and led to prices impounding information more rapidly, suggesting markets become efficient with high trading volume, reliable information and an appropriate institutional framework.     

Taming the blockchain beast? Regulatory implications for the cryptocurrency Market

This paper uses a unique dataset of 120 regulatory events from five classes to test the relevance of the regulatory framework for cryptocurrency value. Time-series market-wide estimates and panel estimates for 300 individual coins and tokens show statistically and economically significant impact of anti-money laundering and issuance regulation. Tighter regulation and more active role of government decrease cryptocurrency prices, evidencing that potentially lower risks and wider adoption commonly attributed to the establishment of the regulatory framework do not compensate for respective efficiency and consumer utility losses. The market is generally efficient in reflecting regulatory information in cryptocurrency prices.     

Auditor Independence in Canada: A Historical Perspective — From Shareholder Auditors to Modern‐Day Audit Committees*

This paper uses the theoretical framework of Goldman and Barlev (1974) to examine auditor independence in Canada. It traces the historical development of the auditor's role in the 19th century and the beginning of the auditor's relationship with shareholders and management. It shows how, following the separation of management from shareholding, management's ability to influence auditors undermined auditor independence. The paper traces attempts by legislators and regulatory bodies to limit management's influence over auditors and to correct the asymmetry of their relationship. It notes that recent changes to legislation and rules of professional conduct are no longer proactive, but are reactions to corporate scandals in Canada and the United States. The paper argues that although future changes will occur to redress the imbalance, only structural changes are likely to provide a real solution to auditor independence problems. However, it is likely that such changes will be resisted by the accounting profession.     

Capitalisation of Intangibles — A Review of Current Practice and the Regulatory Framework

This paper reports on capitalisation practices of Australian managers for a large sample of firms in the 1993–97 period, and on accounting regulatory issues in relation to intangibles during and after this period. The data show diversity in capitalisation practices in 1993–97, which we suggest is a consequence of abstract conceptual bases for capitalisation decisions under the Australian regulatory framework. The analysis indicates the framework retains traditional emphasis on conservatism and reliable measurement while providing managers with substantial accounting discretion to capitalise intangible assets. We conclude there is an imperative for research investigating capitalisation decisions for intangibles to guide any further regulation.     

Development of Accounting Regulatory Framework in China: An Empirical Evaluation

In China, the government has long been involved in directly regulating accounting work. The rule-based accounting regulations have been formulated for different industry and business ownership structure by the central government since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949. Remarkable changes have, however, taken place in Chinese accounting which have resulted from the wide-ranged economic and accounting reforms in the last two decades. Recently, an accounting regulatory framework based on accounting standards has been introduced, with great efforts to develop a set of practical accounting standards. A survey study was conducted to empirically investigate the prevailing perceptions of the users and providers of business accounting in respect of four major conceptual and practical issues underlying the construction of the accounting regulatory framework in the changing business environment in China. The study results demonstrate that the respondents from various interest groups possessed mixed views. They generally endorsed the current progress in the accounting reforms. On the other hand, the majority of the respondents were supportive of further changes in reshaping accounting regulatory framework to accommodate the growth of market-oriented economy in China.     

银行大额风险敞口监管框架的发展与实践

巴塞尔委员会《大额风险敞口测算与控制监管框架》提出了针对单一或一组关联交易方大额风险敞口的监管框架,形成了协调统一的大额风险敞口监管指引。文章分析了大额风险敞口监管框架的演进历程、新版框架的主要内容,以及此前监管要求的发展,并介绍了各国的监管实践。     

英国新建宏观审慎的金融监管框架及启示

英国金融体系未能幸免于2008年国际金融危机的冲击,暴露出英国金融监管框架同样存在明显缺陷。为此,英国政府决心对其金融监管框架进行改革,将基于系统整体的宏观审慎监管与传统的基于单个金融机构的微观审慎监管结合起来。文章介绍了英国监管当局对其旧监管体系的反思,及新监管框架的结构与运行模式,并在此基础上总结了当前国际金融业监管新趋势对我国的启示。     

不动产投资信托(REITs)监管成本与制度完善 ——基于欧美制度比较的视角

文章采用收益成本分析(Benefit-Cost Analysis,简称BCA)框架,比较了美、欧和中国的REITs制度及其监管成本.在收益成本数据缺乏的情况下,采用概念性BCA的方法,从直接成本与间接成本两个维度,对三种制度的监管成本进行了比较.本文的研究发现,我国即将试点的基础设施REITs,由于结构复杂、代理链长,容易导致过高的监管成本.本文对REITs监管制度的比较研究,一方面是BCA方法在运用领域上的一个拓展,有助于提高我国监管部门对BCA方法的认识;另一方面,可以为我国基础设施REITs制度的完善提供参考.建议在监管制度建立和改革时引入事前BCA评估的制度,以提高我国监管制度的有效性和监管效率.     

Bank dividends,risk, and regulatory regimes

This paper investigates the relation between bank dividends and bank risk over the period 1984–2011, and assesses the existence of risk-taking and risk-shifting in the US commercial banking sector subject to regulatory regime changes. The introduction of PCA in 1992 and TARP in 2008 constitute significant regulatory regime changes, and provide the necessary framework to explore whether regime-dependent risk-shifting or risk-taking is present. We find strong evidence of risk-shifting and risk-taking over the post-PCA regime spanning the period 1992–2008. We interpret this evidence as indication of ineffectiveness of PCA in controlling risk-taking and risk-shifting. The finding of risk-taking just prior to the recent financial crisis suggests that risk-taking may be a factor contributing to this crisis. As risk-taking and risk-shifting are important aspects of bank behavior (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2009), these results are of interest to bank regulators and important to Basel III.     

The impact of the choice of VaR models on the level of regulatory capital according to Basel II

The Basel II framework allows the calculation of the capital requirements for market risk with Value-at-Risk models. Since no special model is prescribed in the framework, banks may use simple models with questionable assumptions concerning their underlying distributions. Our numerical analysis reveals that simple VaR models that perform noticeably worse than comparable simple models with more realistic assumptions may lead to a lower level of regulatory capital for banks. For this reason, banks have a major incentive to implement bad models. This is obviously contrary to the interests of regulatory authorities.     

Market discipline, financial crisis and regulatory changes: Evidence from Indonesian banks

Following the 1997/1998 financial crisis, Indonesian banks experienced major regulatory changes, including the adoption of the blanket guarantee scheme (BGS) in 1998, a limited guarantee (LG) in 2005, and changes in capital regulation in 1998 and 2001. We examine the impact of these regulatory changes on market discipline during the period 1995-2009. The price of deposits is used to measure market discipline in a dynamic panel data methodology on a sample of 104 commercial banks. We find a weakening of market discipline following the introduction of the BGS. The result is consistent with the deposit insurance scheme being credible in the lower capital requirement environment. The adoption of LG in a recovering economy also mitigates the role of market discipline. However, market discipline is more pronounced in listed banks than unlisted banks and in foreign banks than domestic banks. These results have important implications for banking regulation and supervision, particularly during a crisis period.     

金融监管体系的变迁历史及对中国的启示

一个国家金融监管体系的形成与发展跟该国银行业及金融市场的发展密切相关,并随着其国内金融结构的变化而不断更新变化。金融结构变化的主要推动力是层出不穷的金融创新,由于金融创新使得金融结构不断变化,而做为上层建筑的金融监管体系也通过不断变化,力图适应金融结构的变迁。本文在金融结构视角下对各国金融监管体系变迁的过程进行了考察,并从宏观层面归纳世界各国金融结构与金融监管体系变迁的大致规律,以期对中国目前进行的金融监管改革给出一些有意义的启示和具体的建议。     

Privatized Utilities and the 'Third Way'

The Government is planning new regulations to ensure that utility companies 'reflect a sense of social responsibility'. Their intention to overlay social objectives on the regulatory frameworks inspired by free market economics can be seen as an attempt to find a 'Third Way' policy for the utilities. Neoliberals would argue that social policy has no place in the privatized utility sector, which is now well established. Interference in regulatory processes to achieve social objectives is likely to be counter-productive by distorting prices and inhibiting the incentive system designed to achieve efficiencies. Rather than requiring the companies to act as instruments of government policy, the Government could achieve its social objectives through subsidies, or through the social security system, leaving the regulatory framework to operate unfettered.     

Modelling the economic value of credit rating systems

In this paper we develop a model of the economic value of credit rating systems. Increasing international competition and changes in the regulatory framework driven by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel II) called forth incentives for banks to improve their credit rating systems. An improvement of the statistical power of a rating system decreases the potential effects of adverse selection, and, combined with meeting several qualitative standards, decreases the amount of regulatory capital requirements. As a consequence, many banks have to make investment decisions where they have to consider the costs and the potential benefits of improving their rating systems. In our model the quality of a rating system depends on several parameters such as the accuracy of forecasting individual default probabilities and the rating class structure. We measure effects of adverse selection in a competitive one-period framework by parameterizing customer elasticity. Capital requirements are obtained by applying the current framework released by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Results of a numerical analysis indicate that improving a rating system with low accuracy to medium accuracy can increase the annual rate of return on a portfolio by 30–40 bp. This effect is even stronger for banks operating in markets with high customer elasticity and high loss rates. Compared to the estimated implementation costs banks could have a strong incentive to invest in their rating systems. The potential of reduced capital requirements on the portfolio return is rather weak compared to the effect of adverse selection.     

The regulations–risk taking nexus under competitive pressure: What about the Islamic banking system?

Does market power condition the effect of bank regulations and supervision on bank risk taking? We focus on three regulatory tools: capital requirements, the restriction of activities, and official supervisory powers. Employing 10 years of unbalanced panel data on 123 Islamic and conventional banks operating in the Middle East and Asia, we arrive at the following conclusions. First, banking market power strengthens the negative impact of capital regulation on bank risk taking. Second, our empirical results suggest that the negative effect of activity restrictions on stability is diminished when banks have greater market power. Finally, we do not find strong evidence that the negative effect of supervisory power on banks’ risk taking is conditioned by their competitive behavior. In further analysis, we differentiate between Islamic and conventional banks regarding their competition, as well as their risk behavior. The results differ according to the banking business model. These findings could be useful for bank regulators in light of the accomplishment of Islamic banks’ regulatory framework. Indeed, the adoption of Basel III represents a significant regulatory challenge, given that it does not take into account the specificities of Islamic banks.     

Pension regulation and the market value of pension liabilities: A contingent claims analysis using Parisian options

We analyze the market-consistent valuation of pension liabilities in a contingent claim framework whereby a knock-out barrier feature is applied to capture early regulatory closure of a pension plan. We investigate two cases which we call “immediate closure procedure” and “delayed closure procedure”. In an immediate closure procedure, when the assets value hits the regulatory boundary, the pension plan is terminated immediately. Whereas in a delayed closure procedure, a grace period is given to the pension fund for reorganization and recovery before premature closure is executed. The framework is then used to construct fair pension deals. Furthermore, we provide rules for deriving the optimal recovery period in pension regulation using utility analysis and interconnect the recovery period to the regulatory liquidation probability.