Do People Accurately Anticipate Sanctions?

We provide lab data from four different games that allow us to study whether people have accurate expectations regarding monetary sanctions (punishment/reward) and nonmonetary sanctions (disapproval/approval). Although the strength of the sanction is always predicted with some error (particularly in the case of monetary sanctions), we observe that (i) most subjects anticipate correctly the sign of the average sanction, (ii) expectations covary with sanctions, (iii) the average expectation is very often not significantly different than the average actual sanction, and (iv) the errors exhibit no systematic bias, except in those situations where rewards are frequent. In this line, we find some evidence that punishment is better anticipated than rewards.     

Are People Equally Other-Regarding When Selecting a Match Versus Choosing an Allocation?

There are many assignment processes in which agents are given the opportunity to unilaterally select a match. Resulting allocations can be inefficient if agents do not internalize the consequences of their choice on others. To test this formally, we study how other-regarding behaviors vary across two decision contexts: when subjects make a pure allocation decision; and when they select a partner. In both settings each subject's decision is final and it affects their payoff and that of other subjects in the same way. We find that subjects are more likely to sacrifice their own material well-being to increase that of others when dividing a pie than when selecting a partner in a large anonymous setting—even though the consequences on the material payoffs of others are identical. These findings suggest that in assignment processes with unilateral selection, efficiency can be improved by presenting the selection process as a choice between outcomes involving multiple individuals, instead of simply selecting a match for themselves.     

Shall the New EU Members Introduce the Euro? Some Macroeconomic Policy Effects

After the EU enlargement in 2004, there is a clear commitment of the EU and the new member states to aim at an enlargement of the euro zone within the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as well. This might have significant effects on the old EMU, the new members, and even on the global economy. The present paper analyzes some macroeconomic effects and particularly the impact on the effects of stabilization policies when switching to an enlarged euro zone under different assumptions about fiscal and monetary policy regimes in Europe and under alternative types of economic shocks. Also, the implications for the US of different European monetary regimes are evaluated. The results suggest that economic benefits for all countries are rather small. For the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), even disadvantages may dominate.     

Renting Goodwill in International Marketing Channels: An Analysis of Pricing Strategies and Bargaining Power

This paper investigates the pricing decisions of foreign manufacturers in international markets within a bargaining framework with asymmetric information and the rental of goodwill. The key findings are: first, the foreign manufacturer follows a mark-up pricing strategy in which its gross margin and the quality premium over the domestic product are shared with the importer. Second, a manufacturer–importer contract occurs only when the manufacturer’s bargaining power is within an admissible range which shrinks as transaction costs increase. Third, the domestic consumer will only purchase the foreign product if the importer’s goodwill in the domestic market is sufficiently large to signal quality. The paper contributes to the literature on exchange relationships between foreign manufacturers and importers.     

When Does Economic Growth Reduce Poverty and Strengthen the Middle Class? A State-Level,Sector-Specific Analysis of Peru

Using novel state-level data of Peru from 1997 to 2010, we investigate how growth in different sectors affects poverty rates and the middle class. Our results indicate that only the manufacturing sector seems to robustly decrease poverty. Growth in the service sector emerges as a meaningful predictor of a rising middle class. Allowing for regional differences, we find substantial variation across the 25 Peruvian states with large shifts in magnitudes, signs, and statistical importance. Beyond the immediate implications for Peru, these findings highlight the importance of analyzing the link between economic performance and poverty rates on a subnational level. Policy implications are likely to differ substantially, depending on the source of economic growth and regional particularities.     

INCOME INEQUALITY, RECIPROCITY AND PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS

This paper analyses the impact of income inequality on public good provision in an experimental setting. A sample of secondary school students were recruited to participate in a simple linear public goods game where income heterogeneity was introduced by providing participants with unequal token endowments. The results show that endowment heterogeneity does not have any significant impact on contributions to the public good, and that consistent with models of reciprocity, low and high endowment players contribute the same fraction of their endowment to the public pool. Moreover, individuals appear to adjust their contributions in order to maintain a fair share rule.     

Effort and Performance: What Distinguishes Interacting and Noninteracting Groups from Individuals?

We study how group membership affects behavior both when group members can and cannot interact with each other. Our goal is to isolate the contrasting forces that spring from group membership: a free‐riding incentive leading to reduced effort and a sense of social responsibility that increases effort. In an environment with varying task difficulty and individual decision making as the benchmark, we show that the free‐riding effect is stronger. Group members significantly reduce their effort in situations where they share the outcome but are unable to communicate. When group members share outcomes and can interact, they outperform groups without communication and individuals. We show that these groups do as well as the best constituent member would have done on his or her own.