Powerful Chief Executive Officers and Firm Performance: Integrating Agency and Stewardship Theory

Do agency and stewardship behaviors coexist at firms, or does one dominate the other? We use data from listed companies in China over the period 2007–2016 to show that powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) simultaneously incur self‐interested agency costs while acting as stewards to benefit the firm. In balancing the push‐and‐pull forces of stewardship and agency behaviors, powerful CEOs in Chinese firms ultimately improve short‐term and long‐term firm performance. Our results have important implications for understanding how CEOs affect firms and how cultural factors can motivate CEOs to work in the interest of the firm.     

Equilibrium Earnings Management,Incentive Contracts,and Accounting Standards*

In this paper, we model earnings management as a consequence of the interaction among self‐interested economic agents ‐ namely, the managers, the shareholders, and the regulators. In our model, a manager controls a stochastic production technology and makes periodic accounting reports about his or her performance; an owner chooses a compensation contract to induce desirable managerial inputs and reporting choices by the manager; and a regulatory body selects and enforces accounting standards to achieve certain social objectives. We show that various economic trade‐offs give rise to endogenous earnings management. Specifically, the owner may reduce agency costs by designing a compensation contract that tolerates some earnings management because such a contract allocates the compensation risk more efficiently. The earnings‐management activity produces accounting reports that deviate from those prescribed by accounting standards. Given such reports, the valuation of the firm may be nonlinear and s‐shaped, thereby recognizing the manager's reporting incentives. We also explore policy implications, noting that (1) the regulator may find enforcing a zero‐tolerance policy ‐ no earnings management allowed ‐ economically undesirable; and (2) when selecting the optimal accounting standard, valuation concerns may conflict with stewardship concerns. We conclude that earnings management is better understood in a strategic context that involves various economic trade‐offs.     

Accuracy of Relative Weights on Multiple Leading Performance Measures: Effects on Managerial Performance and Knowledge

Many firms that use multiple lead measures in their performance measurement systems do not validate the causal model linking these measures to future financial outcomes, and the cause‐and‐effect relationships in the model are often left to subjective estimates that may be prone to errors. Using an experiment, this study examines how the accuracy of assumptions about the relative importance of lead measures in a causal model affects managerial performance and knowledge, when managers are given the opportunity to learn over multiple periods. The results show that having inaccurate relative weights on lead measures improves performance, reduces performance variability, and enhances knowledge, relative to not having any weights. Furthermore, performance is similar under accurate versus inaccurate relative weights, whereas knowledge is better under inaccurate than accurate relative weights, providing no support for the biasing effects of inaccurate relative weights. The findings suggest that, at least under certain circumstances, managers benefit even if they are given inaccurate relative weights on lead measures, and they are able to correct those inaccuracies to reach a comparable level of performance and knowledge as if they had been given accurate relative weights.     

Discretionary Accounting Accruals,Managers' Incentives,and Audit Fees*

This paper examines the linkages between discretionary accruals (DAs), managerial share ownership, management compensation, and audit fees. It draws on the theory that managers of firms with high management ownership are likely to use DAs to communicate value‐relevant information, while managers of firms with high accounting‐based compensation are likely to use DAs opportunistically to manage earnings to improve their compensation. OLS regression results of 648 Australian firms show that (1) there is a positive association between DAs and audit fees; (2) managerial ownership negatively affects the positive relationship between DAs and audit fees; and (3) this negative impact is further found to be weaker for firms with high accounting‐based management compensation.     

Employee Stock Option Fair‐Value Estimates: Do Managerial Discretion and Incentives Explain Accuracy?*

We examine the determinants of managers' use of discretion over employee stock option (ESO) valuation‐model inputs that determine ESO fair values. We also explore the consequences of such discretion. Firms exercise considerable discretion over all model inputs, and this discretion results in material differences in ESO fair‐value estimates. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that a large proportion of firms exercise value‐increasing discretion. Importantly, we find that using discretion improves predictive accuracy for about half of our sample firms. Moreover, we find that both opportunistic and informational managerial incentives together explain the accuracy of firms' ESO fair‐value estimates. Partitioning on the direction of discretion improves our understanding of managerial incentives. Our analysis confirms that financial statement readers can use mandated contextual disclosures to construct powerful ex ante predictions of ex post accuracy.     

Managing Multinational Expansion and Related Diversification: The Case of Australian Consolidated Industries Ltd, 1939–72

This case study of Australian Consolidated Industries Ltd (ACI) adopts a Chandlerian framework to assess the management of its long‐term growth strategies. ACI’s multinational expansion in South–East Asia and its related diversification in the Australian packaging industry are examined. Contrary to established views regarding Australian manufacturers, management vigorously implemented Chandlerian growth strategies, but was less effective in developing managerial capabilities and implementing an appropriate organisational structure to support its strategies’ long run expansion. Management failed to anticipate the demand for managerial resources, encountered organisation design problems, and undermined design efficiency through interventionist procedures. These explanations may shed light on a problem common among some large Australian manufacturing firms.     

Credit Ratings and CEO Risk‐Taking Incentives

This study examines the sophistication of rating agencies in incorporating managerial risk‐taking incentives into their credit risk evaluation. We measure risk‐taking incentives using two proxies: the sensitivity of managerial wealth to stock return volatility (vega) and the sensitivity of managerial wealth to stock price (delta). We find that rating agencies impound managerial risk‐taking incentives in their credit risk assessments. Assuming other things equal, a one standard deviation increase in vega (delta) will lead to an approximately one‐notch (two‐notch) rating downgrade. In addition, we evaluate the significance of credit ratings in the design of CEO compensation. Our findings suggest that rating‐troubled firms will gear down managerial incentives of risk seeking. In particular, other things equal, a rating downgrade to the lower edge of the investment category (i.e., BBB?) in the immediate prior year will bring about an approximately 51 percent reduction of vega incentive from options newly granted to the CEO in the current year. However, we find no evidence that firms' rating concerns significantly affect delta. Given the significance of credit ratings in the marketplace and their close connection to accounting, the findings of the current study advance our understanding, not only of how sophisticated rating agencies are in incorporating forward‐looking information (i.e., vega and delta) into risk assessments, but of how influential the raters are in changing firms' compensation policies. The findings also have implications on the role of accounting in constraining excessive managerial risk taking with improved disclosures on managerial compensation.     

Managerial Discretion and Task Interdependence in Teams

This study investigates whether task interdependence in teams alters the effectiveness of managerial discretion in motivating team performance. Teams are particularly useful when employees' tasks are interdependent—that is, when the degree to which the increase in team performance resulting from a team member's effort depends on the effort and skills of the other team members. The reason is that the more interdependent tasks are, the more employees need to coordinate their actions and help one another to achieve their objectives. Prior research analyzing settings where task interdependence is absent suggests that providing managers with discretion over team bonus allocation can improve team performance relative to equal team bonus allocations because it strengthens the link between contributions to team output and rewards. Economic theory suggests that managerial discretion will also improve team performance when task interdependence is present and information is efficiently used. However, we use behavioral theory to predict that managerial discretion is less effective in the presence of task interdependence, because managers do not fully incorporate all relevant information into bonus decisions and because managerial discretion hurts coordination and helping, which is particularly problematic under task interdependence. We find that while discretion over compensation has a positive effect on team performance relative to equal bonus allocation when task interdependence is absent, it has a negative effect when task interdependence is present. Additional analyses provide support for our underlying theory. Results of our study contribute to both theory and practice by suggesting that, ironically, managerial discretion may be most useful when the potential benefits of employing teams are lowest and least useful when the potential benefits are highest. Our results help explain why firms often grant managers only partial or no discretion over team members' compensation.     

The Shielding of CEO Compensation from the Effects of Strategic Expenditures*

This study investigates whether and why compensation committees shield CEO compensation from income‐decreasing effects of strategic expenditures. We document that firms do shield recurring strategic expenditures such as research and development and advertising expenditures. We also find that firms shield research and development expenditures more than advertising expenditures. Our results are consistent with prior findings that suggest that compensation committees shield CEOs from nonroutine transactions such as restructuring charges and extraordinary losses. Using a two‐task principal‐agent framework, we show that such shielding improves the efficiency of the contract by making the shielded income measure more congruent with the principal's objectives.     

The Walk‐down to Beatable Analyst Forecasts: The Role of Equity Issuance and Insider Trading Incentives*

It has been alleged that firms and analysts engage in an "earnings‐guidance game" where analysts first issue optimistic earnings forecasts and then "walk down" their estimates to a level that firms can beat at the official earnings announcement. We examine whether the walk‐down to beatable targets is associated with managerial incentives to sell stock after earnings announcements on the firm's behalf (through new equity issuance) or from their personal accounts (through option exercises and stock sales). Consistent with these hypotheses, we find that the walk‐down to beatable targets is most pronounced when firms or insiders are net sellers of stock after an earnings announcement. These findings provide new insights on the impact of capital‐market incentives on communications between managers and analysts.     

To Guide or Not to Guide? Causes and Consequences of Stopping Quarterly Earnings Guidance

In recent years, quarterly earnings guidance has been harshly criticized for inducing “managerial short‐termism” and other ills. Managers are, therefore, urged by influential institutions to cease guidance. We examine empirically the causes of such guidance cessation and find that poor operating performance — decreased earnings, missing analyst forecasts, and lower anticipated profitability — is the major reason firms stop quarterly guidance. After guidance cessation, we do not find an appreciable increase in long‐term investment once managers free themselves from investors’ myopia. Contrary to the claim that firms would provide more alternative, forward‐looking disclosures in lieu of the guidance, we find that such disclosures are curtailed. We also find a deterioration in the information environment of guidance stoppers in the form of increased analyst forecast errors and forecast dispersion and a decrease in analyst coverage. Taken together, our evidence indicates that guidance stoppers are primarily troubled firms and stopping guidance does not benefit either the stoppers or their investors.     

Taking firms to the stock market: IPOs and the importance of large banks in imperial Germany, 1896–1913

Large universal banks played a major role in Germany's industrialization because they provided loans to industry and thereby helped firms to overcome liquidity constraints. Previous research has also argued that they were equally important for the German stock market. This article provides quantitative and qualitative evidence that although the market for underwriters was dominated by a small oligopoly of six large banks, there was still perceptible competition, which kept fees and short‐run profits low. Another interesting finding presented here is the absence of a signalling effect to investors. Neither underpricing nor the one‐year performance was different for the IPOs issued by one of the Big Six. Thus, although the German IPO business was in the hands of a small oligopoly, investors did not benefit from the lack of competition. One explanation is that the quality of IPOs on the German stock market of the time was very good in general as a result of the competition between underwriters, but also as a result of the tight regulation of underwriting, which ensured the quality of all firms on the German stock market.     

Organizational Membership and Environmental Ethics: A Comparison of Managers in State-owned Firms,Collectives, Private Firms and Joint Ventures in China

This study empirically examines the relationship between organizational type and the environmental, ethical orientation of managers in the People's Republic of China (PRC) on three dimensions—stewardship and long- and short-term utilitarianism. It was found that Chinese managers uniformly self-report strong ethical commitments to environmental protection. In addition, organizational type was found to be a significant predictor for the different ethical dimensions. Overall, managers in state-owned firms uniformly reported the strongest values. Managers in private firms, on the other hand, self-reported lower values and appeared relatively more skeptical of emergent utilitarian arguments that economic performance and environmental performance are compatible in the short term.     

Why Do Large Firms' Prices Anticipate Earnings Earlier than Small Firms' Prices?*

This paper presents evidence that the positive association between firm size and price leads of earnings is not solely a function of private search incentives for firm‐specific information. Specifically, we find that small‐firm prices also lag large‐firm prices with respect to industry‐wide information. Our empirical analysis extends Collins, Kothari, and Rayburn 1987 and Freeman 1987, who document that security‐price leads of earnings are positively associated with market capitalization. In particular, we examine the association between firm size and the timing of security returns for two components of annual earnings changes: the average change for a firm's industry and the firm's idiosyncratic change. We find that large firms' prices have a longer lead than small firms' prices with respect to both components. Large firms' early lead on industry‐wide earnings suggests that returns of large firms predict returns of same‐industry small firms. To test this implication, we construct a portfolio of long (short) positions in small firms when the prior month's returns of large firms in their industry are above (below) average for large firms in other industries. This zero investment portfolio earns 4.5 percent over 12 months.     

Tax Avoidance and the Implications of Weak Internal Controls

I examine whether corporate tax avoidance is associated with internal control weaknesses (ICWs) disclosed under the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX). ICWs disclosed under SOX are frequently related to a firm's tax function. When pervasive ICWs exist, the likelihood increases that these frequent tax‐related ICWs spill over from financial reporting issues to tax avoidance objectives. Thus, my research helps corporate stakeholders understand the implications of internal controls beyond simply financial reporting objectives. Results indicate that, on average, firms with a tax‐related ICW have a 4 percent higher three‐year cash effective tax rate relative to firms without any such weaknesses. Further estimates reveal that this negative relation stems from pervasive, company‐level tax ICWs. Analysis of remediation suggests a causal link. I find that after remediating tax‐related ICWs, firms report higher levels of tax avoidance in the future. Broadly, these findings support that internal control quality represents a proxy for internal governance, and thus the strength of alignment between managers and shareholders. Furthermore, tax‐related internal controls represent an important underlying determinant of tax avoidance with significant cash flow effects, and implications beyond financial reporting.     

Experience,Learning, and Returns to Scale

The experience curve is a tool for forecasting future decreases in average cost as a function of cumulative output/volume. The extent of an experience effect has profound implications for both pricing strategy and the focus on market share as a managerial objective. At the same time, the underlying sources of the experience effect are not well understood. This article demonstrates that, as commonly measured, experience effects are aggregated with the effects of increasing returns to scale. This implies that standard experience curve estimates are misspecified because they suffer from an omitted variable bias. Strategic implications of the experience‐scale link are discussed.     

Does FIN 48 Improve Firms' Estimates of Tax Reserves?

This paper examines whether the increased accounting guidance and reporting requirements of FIN 48 impact the adequacy and accuracy of tax reserves and the effect of auditor‐provided tax services on tax reserves. While we do not find FIN 48 affected the adequacy or accuracy of tax reserves on average, FIN 48 eliminated the differences in the tax reserve adequacy of firms with and without auditor‐provided tax services that existed prior to its adoption. We also find evidence of less premature releasing of tax reserves post‐FIN 48. Our evidence is consistent with an increase in the comparability of reserves for firms that do and do not purchase auditor‐provided tax services, consistent with one of the FASB's objectives for FIN 48.     

Multi-product firms,product mix changes and upgrading: Evidence from China's state-owned forest areas

Product selection matters for a firm's productivity and long-run growth. Recent theoretical and empirical studies indicate that an important margin of adjustment to policy reforms is the reallocation of output within firms through changes in product mix decisions. This paper examines the frequency, pervasiveness and determinants of product-switching and upgrading activities in firms located in China's state-owned forest areas during a period of gradual institutional and managerial reforms (2004–2008). We find that changes to the product mix are pervasive and characterized by adding or churning products rather than only shedding products. Moreover, changes in firms’ product mix have made a significant contribution to the aggregate output growth during our sample period. We also find that firms with different characteristics, human capital and market conditions differ in their propensity to diversify and upgrade product mix.     

Managers' Commitment to the Goals Contained in a Strategic Performance Measurement System*

A strategic performance measurement system (SPMS) is a set of causally linked nonfinancial and financial objectives, performance measures, and goals designed to align managers' actions with an organization's strategy. This study identifies and tests features unique to the cause‐effect structure of an SPMS likely to affect an important antecedent to managerial performance: goal commitment. Companies often set difficult goals for the multiple performance measures contained in an SPMS, but research shows difficult goals are significantly more likely to lead to performance gains if individuals are committed to achieving them. Two features central to the SPMS approach are predicted to affect goal commitment: (1) the strength of the cause‐effect links among the nonfinancial and financial performance measures contained in an SPMS and (2) managers' beliefs in their ability to achieve the SPMS nonfinancial goals. Results from an experiment conducted with experienced managers show both SPMS features have a positive effect on goal commitment.     

Abnormal Accruals and Managerial Intent: Evidence from the Timing of Merger Announcements and Completions

We examine acquiring managers' opportunistic reporting behavior around stock‐for‐stock acquisitions. Using the timing of merger announcements and completions to infer managerial intent, we show that acquirers with the most inflated earnings tend to announce mergers on Fridays, and that they manage earnings several quarters before the merger announcement date. Friday announcers exhibit a stronger negative association between pre‐merger announcement abnormal accruals and post‐merger announcement market performance than non‐Friday announcers. This effect is driven mainly by mergers that are completed relatively quickly after they are announced. Overall, the evidence supports the notion that some acquiring managers inflate earnings prior to announcing the mergers, and time the merger announcements to exploit investor inattention.