REIT Leverage and Return Performance: Keep Your Eye on the Target

This article examines U.S. REIT leverage decisions and their effects on risk and return. We find that the speed at which REITs close the gap between current debt levels and target leverage levels is 17% annually. REITs that are highly levered relative to the average REIT tend to underperform REITs with less debt in their capital structure. However, REITs that are highly levered relative to their target leverage tend to perform better on a risk‐adjusted basis than under‐levered REITs. Taken together, our results show that REIT leverage has significant return performance effects conditional on deviations from target leverage.     

Risk and Return on Real Estate: Evidence from Equity REITs

We analyze monthly returns on an equally weighted index of eighteen to twenty-three equity (real property) real estate investment trusts (REITs) that were traded on major stock exchanges over the 1973–87 period. We employ a multifactor Arbitrage Pricing Model using prespecified macroeconomic factors. We also test whether equity REIT returns are related to changes in the discount on closed-end stock funds, which seems plausible given the closed-end nature of REITs.
Three factors, and the percentage change in the discount on closed-end stock funds, consistently drive equity REIT returns: unexpected inflation and changes in the risk and term structures of interest rates. The impacts of these variables on equity REIT returns is around 60% of the impacts on corporate stock returns generally. As expected, the impacts are greater for more heavily levered REITs than for less levered REITs. Real estate, at least as measured by the return performance of equity REITs, is less risky than stocks generally, but does not offer a superior risk-adjusted return and is not a hedge against unexpected inflation.     

Option Trading and REIT Returns

This article examines the relation between option trading volume and real estate investment trust (REIT) market performance. Specifically, we find that option volume increases are followed by decreases in returns. Furthermore, the portion of option volume that is orthogonal to REIT characteristics drives the observed return predictability relation, thereby suggesting that the return predictability of option trading is (at least partially) attributable to information‐based explanations. Finally, consistent with informed traders favoring option market activities due to short‐sale costs and/or constraints, we find option based return predictability is more evident within REITs than non‐REITs, even though firms within this industry are generally viewed as informationally transparent.     

An Empirical Study of Derivatives use in the REIT Industry

We examine the use of derivatives in the real estate investment trust (REIT) industry. Tax considerations and speculative motives should not be important factors here, as REITs pay no corporate income tax and their speculative activities are limited by regulations. We find that 41 % of REITs use interest-rate derivatives, although the amount of derivatives on average is not high. Our principal results are that larger REITs and mortgage REITs are more likely to use derivatives. However, in terms of the amount of derivatives, REITs that are smaller and have a larger amount of debt tend to use more derivatives. We interpret the results as evidence supportive of substantial entry costs for hedging and financial-distress costs being a major consideration for the level of hedging. REITs with greater ratio of market to book value of assets also tend to use more derivatives. However, this result is not robust across different sample sets. We therefore view this as weak evidence supporting the agency-cost explanation for hedging. Additional analysis on interest-rate risk and hedging activities finds that mortgage REITs tend to increase their hedging activities when interest rates decrease, while the opposite is true for equity REITs. We interpret this as evidence consistent with prepayment risk being a major factor for mortgage REITs, while equity REITs primarily hedge to control funding costs.     

A Comparative Anatomy of Residential REITs and Private Real Estate Markets: Returns,Risks and Distributional Characteristics

Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) are the only truly liquid assets related to residential real estate investments. We study the behavior of U.S. Residential REITs over the past three decades and document their return characteristics. REITs have somewhat less market risk than equity; their betas against a broad market index average about 0.58. Decomposing their covariances into principal components reveals several strong factors. Residential REIT characteristics differ to some extent from those of the S&P/Case‐Shiller (SCS) private real estate markets. This is partly attributable to methods of index construction. Our examination of REITs suggests that investment in residential real estate is far more risky than what might be inferred from the widely followed SCS series. Although the SCS and REITs indicate little support for being able to predict each other, there is strong evidence of self‐predictability for the series.     

How Do Firms Finance Nonprimary Market Investments? Evidence from REITs

This study explores the impact of investment characteristics, mainly investment location relative to the firm's primary market, on financing choices by real estate investment trusts (REITs). Using a large sample of commercial property acquisitions, we show that REITs are 4–8% less likely to use secured (mortgage) debt when acquiring properties in their primary markets than elsewhere. The documented evidence supports a demand‐side story for the relation between investment characteristics and financing. Moreover, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that REITs avoid mortgage financing in their primary markets to preserve operational flexibility in those markets.     

Inside Ownership, Risk Sharing and Tobin's q-Ratios: Evidence from REITs

We investigate relations among inside ownership, managerial expenses, risk sharing and equity valuations. Our engine of analysis—Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)—provides a unique and rich framework for analysis since we can calculate extremely accurate measures of asset replacement costs, and hence relative valuation (Tobin's q ). Further, the nature of the financial statements allows us to examine the impact of insider ownership on agency costs since we can accurately measure the costs of the entire management team. Our results show that firms with greater insider holdings tend to invest in assets with lower systematic risk and use less debt in their capital structure. At the same time, managerial expenses are lower as inside ownership increases. Finally, higher levels of insider ownership are associated with higher relative valuation as measured by both higher premiums to net asset value and higher multiples of cash flows. The results have implications for the design of optimal management contracts for both REITs and firms in general.     

Industrial tail exposure risk and asset price: Evidence from US REITs

In this study, we investigate the impact of industry-based tail dependence risk on the cross-section of stock returns. To this end, we propose a novel tail risk dependence measure (industrial tail exposure risk [ITER]), which captures the tail risk exposure of individual stocks to multiple industries. Using US equity real estate investment trusts (REITs) data from 1993 to 2020, we document that stocks in the highest ITER portfolio outperform stocks in the lowest ITER portfolio by 8.40% per annum. This positive return spread is significant even after controlling for well-known firm characteristics. The return premium of ITER is stronger for small, value, and highly levered stocks and is substantially high during recession periods. Finally, the effects of ITER are cross-sectionally more associated with REITs that have greater degrees of the following factors: bivariate tail exposure risks of major industries, exposure to local industry tail risk, geographical concentration, and ownership of home-biased investors. Overall, our results suggest that REIT investors are indeed averse to tail risks that are associated with various sectors.     

An Analysis of REIT Security Issuance Decisions

This article tests the ability of traditional capital structure theories to explain the issuance decisions of real estate investment trusts (REITs). For issuances made between 1997 and 2006, we find strong support for the market timing theory of capital structure. Controlling for past returns and growth, a REIT is more likely to issue equity when its price-to–net asset value ratio is high. This suggests that REITs issue equity in public markets when the cost of equity capital is lower in the public market than in the private market. Consistent with traditional market timing, REITs are more likely to issue equity after experiencing large price increases. We also find some support for REITs following the trade-off theory of capital structure. REITs are less likely to issue debt when proxies for expected bankruptcy costs are high.     

Asset Growth and Stock Performance: Evidence from REITs

In this article, we examine the impact of asset growth rates on the future stock performance of 308 publicly traded real estate investment trusts (REITs). We observe that fast‐growing REITs tend to underperform slow growing REITs. However, we find evidence that the growth effect is significantly less negative for REITs selling at a premium to net asset value. In addition, we observe the asset growth effect only in the subsample of REITs that engages in equity issuance over the next 12 months. The combined evidence suggests contemporaneous equity dilution, which has not been considered in previous studies, may provide an explanation for the underperformance of fast‐growing firms.     

Systematic Risk and Diversification in the Equity REIT Market

This paper employs stock market-based data to examine the systematic risk and diversification properties of publicly traded equity real estate investment trusts (REITs). A unique data sample is created by combining firm return data with information on their property type holdings and the location of their investments. The systematic risk of equity REITs appears to vary by the type of property in which they invest, with beta being significantly higher for retail-oriented REITs than for REITs owning industrial and warehouse properties. In addition, the stock market data provides no evidence that REIT diversification across property types or broad geographic regions actually results in meaningful diversification as reflected in a standard market-based measure—the R ² from a simple market model regression.     

Hedging grain price risk in the SADC: Case studies of Malawi and Zambia

We use simulation methods to examine the results of hedging maize food security imports into Malawi and Zambia on the South African Exchange (SAFEX). Results show that hedging using either futures or options can spread import costs over time, thereby reducing variability, and also possibly generating lower average costs. These benefits are increased if hedging only takes place when local prices are at less than import parity and also if the hedge is levered. However, problems will remain so long as intra-regional transport costs remain high.     

Measuring and Explaining Changes in REIT Liquidity: Moving Beyond the Bid–Ask Spread

This paper investigates changes in REIT liquidity since the REIT boom of 1993. We use trade-by-trade data for REITs traded on the major U.S. exchanges to estimate and compare Kyle's (1985) measure of inverse liquidity for the 1993 and 1996 time periods. For our full sample of equity REITs, there is a significant increase in REIT liquidity in terms of the median price impact of trades. The increasing importance of the self-advised, self-managed organizational structure is found to be a major factor driving increased REIT liquidity. Our results imply a decline in the asymmetric information faced by market-makers. Our investigation of the changes in the size distribution and resulting price impacts of REIT trades over the 1993–1996 period yields evidence of increased importance of informed traders to REIT price dynamics. Our findings of increased liquidity indicate that the increase in adverse-selection costs due to the presence of more informed traders is more than offset by the increase in market thickness as a result of an increase in the number of uninformed (liquidity) traders.     

CEO Overconfidence,REIT Investment Activity and Performance

This is the first article to study the effects of overconfidence on trading activity and performance in real estate. The article looks at Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), as their investments and divestments can be identified with precision. We look at the effect of CEO overconfidence on investment activity and separately investigate property acquisitions and dispositions. We find that REITs with overconfident CEOs tend to invest more; these REITs acquire more assets and are less likely to sell assets than their counterparts if they have enough discretionary cash. Valuable private information is not the main driver for CEOs to be net buyers of company shares: the shares of their companies perform relatively weakly. In addition, we find that overconfident managers have lower property investment performance measured by net operating income and gain on sale of real estate.     

Incentive Compensation and the Likelihood of Termination: Theory and Evidence from Real Estate Organizations

We analyze two managerial compensation incentive devices: the threat of termination and pay for performance. We first develop a simple model predicting that these devices are substitutes: when termination incentives are low, optimal contracts provide stronger pay‐for‐performance incentives. We then use data from real estate organizations to provide two independent tests of the model’s central prediction. First, we use the fact that chief executive officers of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and general partners of Real Estate Limited Partnerships (RELPs) perform similar tasks, yet organizational features of RELPs ensure that the latter are much harder to terminate. Consistent with the model, we find that pay‐for‐performance sensitivity is much higher for general partners of RELPs, where the termination threat is less credible. Second, we use a recent cross‐section of REITs to show that in property types where it is expected to be more costly to replace managers, those managers have stronger pay‐for‐performance incentives.     

Financial Flexibility and Investment: Evidence from REIT At‐the‐Market (ATM) Equity Offerings

This article examines changes in real estate investment around the establishment of at‐the‐market (ATM) equity programs by equity REITs. We document a significant increase in the rate of investment following an ATM program announcement and its subsequent use. However, we find that ATM access has a differential impact on the investment activity of REITs facing more significant financial constraints. We also provide further evidence that REITs with ATM programs generate positive long‐run returns in excess of that of similarly timed SEOs.     

Explaining the Variation in REIT Capital Structure: The Role of Asset Liquidation Value

We test the Shleifer-Vishny hypothesis that asset liquidation values influence both firm leverage and the choice of debt maturity. Using panel data on real estate investment trusts, we estimate a simultaneous equation model and find that firms specializing in the most (least) liquid assets use more (less) leverage and longer (shorter) maturities. The evidence also suggests that, for REITs, debt maturity and leverage are substitutes, consistent with the theory and predictions of Barclay, Marx and Smith.     

Real Estate and Economies of Scale: The Case of REITs

Building on past research in the economies-of-scale debate, we test for scale economies in real estate investment trusts (REITs) by examining growth prospects, revenue and expense measures, profitability ratios, systematic risk and capital costs. Overall, we find that large REITs are increasing growth prospects while succeeding at lowering costs, leading to a direct relationship between firm profitability and firm size. Additionally, we find an inverse relationship between equity betas and firm size, and for all cost of capital measures we find significant scale economies. Further evidence from the stochastic frontier analysis suggests efficiency opportunities appear possible through continued growth and consolidation in REITs.     

Banking Relationships and REIT Capital Structure

This article examines the evolution of real estate investment trust (REIT) capital structure in the new REIT era with a focus on the effects of banking relationships on REIT capital structure. Using a unique sample of REITs from 1992 to 2003, we find that, after controlling for firm characteristics, REITs with banking relationships are more likely to obtain long‐term debt ratings and subsequently issue public debt. Moreover, REITs with banking relationships tend to use less secured debt and have lower leverage. These findings support the notion that banking relationships facilitate REITs' access to the public debt markets and help explain why REITs shift from traditional mortgage financing to bank debt and public capital market financing. The results also support the proposition that firm leverage should be positively related to the amount of a firm's secured debt.     

Dividend Policies and Dividend Announcement Effects for Real Estate Investment Trusts

Previous research on real estate investment trusts (REITs) assumes that their dividend policies are determined solely by tax regulations. We observe, however, that REITs often pay out more dividends than are required by tax rules. This paper examines the dividend policies of REITs by drawing inferences from agency-cost theory and tests for the determinants of REIT dividend payout ratios. The study also considers whether the stock market responds differently to the dividend announcement effects of equity and mortgage REITs based on asymmetric information. Our results support agency-cost explanations for dividend policy and suggest a differential announcement effect.