Employee Protection and Corporate Innovation: Empirical Evidence from China

Through an analysis of survey data gathered from private firms in China, this study examines the impact of employee protection on corporate innovation ability. The results indicate that firms with more advanced employee protection have stronger innovation ability. Furthermore, the positive relationship between employee protection and corporate innovation ability is more pronounced in those enterprises with labor unions. Finally, a firm’s political connections strengthen the influence of employee protection on corporate innovation. These empirical findings highlight the positive consolidating effects of labor unions and political connections and will be of value to policy makers in emerging markets in gauging the important drivers of corporate innovation ability.     

The interface of market and nonmarket strategies: Political ties and strategic competitive actions

We focus on corporate political connections as a critical nonmarket strategy and propose that political ties can facilitate firms’ strategic competitive actions but may also hurt the outcomes of such actions, depending on whether the ties are associated to central versus local political actors. Studying China's television manufacturers at the onset of deregulation and globalization, we find that central and local political ties have contrasting effects on firms’ competitive actions and their performance outcomes. To further shed light on theoretical mechanisms, we examine the impact of China's WTO accession on firm actions and contrast domestic-based and internationalization competitive actions.     

Resignation of officials as independent directors and firm performance

In 2013, the Chinese government implemented Rule No. 18, which suspended the directorships of incumbent government officials and precluded those who retired within the past three years from serving as independent directors for listed firms. The surprise implementation of Rule No. 18 triggered a wave of resignations among official independent directors (OIDs). The event provided a unique opportunity to examine the impacts of the political connections of board members on firm performance. We applied a difference-in-difference technique to empirically investigate the effect of OID resignations on firm performance from the perspectives of resource dependence theory and social capital theory. The results indicate that the resignation of OIDs had a significantly negative effect on firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q and firm leverage. This also confirmed the importance of independent directors’ political connection on firm performance, as discovered in prior research. However, this influence varied across OIDs’ heterogeneity, external environment and firm ownership. The results indicate that political connections may not be necessary channels for firms to achieve success.     

Political Connections,Government Intervention and Acquirer Performance in Cross‐border Mergers and Acquisitions: an Empirical Analysis Based on Chinese Acquirers

The extant literature suggests that the political connections enjoyed by Chinese acquiring firms have both positive and negative effects on their performance in cross‐border mergers and acquisitions (CBMA). We employed firm‐level data on Chinese acquirers from 2001 to 2012, demonstrating that the effect of political connections on mergers and acquisitions performance is determined by external government intervention. Holding the level of political connections constant, the greater the degree of government intervention is, the worse the acquirer's performance in cross‐border mergers and acquisitions will be. We also demonstrated that political connections affect acquirer performance in cross‐border mergers and acquisitions through the channel of preferential access to bank financing, and the acquiring firms' high cash holdings, which are encouraged by the ease of bank financing, have a negative effect on acquirer CBMA performance. Using the Blinder‐Oaxaca decomposition, we investigated changes in the Chinese acquirers' performance following changes in the external policy environment in 2008 and the effect of political connections and other factors on this change.     

Political Connection,Ownership Structure,and Corporate Philanthropy in China: A Strategic-Political Perspective

This paper investigates whether philanthropic giving decisions and amount of charitable giving are related to firms’ political connections and ownership type. To this end, Chinese firms listed on either the Shenzhen or Shanghai stock exchange between 2004 and 2011 are examined, where government interference in the business sector is prevalent, state ownership structure is dominant, and corporate political connections prevail. Our analyses show (1) a significant and positive relationship between political connections and the likelihood and extent of firm contributions; (2) a significant and negative relationship between state ownership and extent of firm contributions; and (3) a stronger relationship between political connections and corporate philanthropy in non-state-owned firms. These findings with regard to the relationship between corporate giving, political connections, and ownership type have important implications for understanding corporate giving behavior in China and in emerging markets in general.     

Performance feedback and export intensity of Chinese private firms: Moderating roles of institution-related factors

Building on the behavioral theory of the firm and institutional view, we examine how performance feedback (i.e., a focal firm’s performance relative to its industry peers) affects export intensity and how institution-related factors moderate this relationship. Using a sample of Chinese private manufacturing firms, we find that positive performance feedback lowers export intensity while the relationship between negative performance feedback and export intensity is insignificant. Moreover, outperforming firms are likely to decrease their export intensity even more when they are located in regions of better institutional development or have political connections. Underperforming firms with political connections tend to increase their export intensity. These findings enrich our understanding of the export behavior of emerging market firms.     

The Relation between Abnormal Main Fund Movements and Subsequent Earnings Management: Political Costs and Political Connections

Movement of major fund1 flows has great impact on capital markets, especially in China. This study investigates the relationship between abnormal main fund movements and firm’s earnings management behavior, specifically, whether the abnormal main fund movements cause firms to keep a low profile for “self-protection” from being detected by the government. The empirical results of this study suggest that: (1) The mandatory disclosure of the “Top-ten circulating stockholders” requirement does not only reduce information asymmetry between investors and listed firms, but also strengthens and improves the efficiency of related government regulations in detecting disclosure of false information. This, in turn, increases the risk of being detected for firms with earnings management activities. (2) After abnormal main fund movements, relevant firms significantly reduce the level of earnings management to avoid attention from the public and regulatory agencies. (3) Using political connections as a proxy for the “shield effect” to mask political cost, we show that the negative relation between abnormal main fund movements and earnings management exists only for the subsample of firms without political connections. This paper provides a new angle for political cost study, and suggests that traditional political cost hypothesis should be further generalized.     

Political instability,access to private debt,and innovation investment in China

We provide evidence from China that access to loans positively affects the probability that a firm will invest in innovation. However, the positive effect of private debt on innovation investment is significantly moderated by political instability. The cost of political instability on innovation is less severe when the entrepreneur has political connections to party leaders. Furthermore, we show that political connections increase the probability that an entrepreneur has access to direct governmental support for innovation investment. These findings are more pronounced for technology intensive industries.     

Institutional Investors,Political Connections,and the Incidence of Regulatory Enforcement Against Corporate Fraud

We investigate two under-explored factors in mitigating the risk of corporate fraud and regulatory enforcement against fraud, namely institutional investors and political connections. The role of institutional investors in the effective monitoring of a firm’s management is well established in the literature. We further observe that firms that have a large proportion of their shares held by institutional investors have a lower incidence of enforcement actions against corporate fraud. The importance of political connections for enterprises, whether in a developed market such as the United States or an emerging market such as China, has been established by previous studies. However, we find evidence of another positive effect of political connections: they may reduce the incidence of enforcement action against corporate fraud. We also find that political connections play a more significant role in reducing regulatory enforcement incidents against non-state-owned enterprises and firms in weaker legal environments, whereas institutional ownership plays a more important role in reducing regulatory enforcement incidents against state-owned enterprises.     

The Impact of CEO Characteristics on the Internationalization of SMEs: Evidence from the UK

This study analyses the role of chief executive officers (CEOs) in the internationalization of small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs). Specifically, it examines the impact of CEOs' demographic characteristics on the internationalization of SMEs. Based on upper echelons theory, resource‐based view and information processing theory, it is hypothesized that CEO characteristics like age, education, tenure, and political connectedness affect SMEs' international performance. Using the panel data analysis of 283 UK SMEs for the period of 2005 to 2015, this study provides evidence that CEOs' political connections and educational level are positively related to firm internationalization, while age negatively influences firm internationalization. Tenure is found to have a curvilinear relationship with SMEs' internationalization. Copyright © 2018 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Leader narcissism and outward foreign direct investment: Evidence from Chinese firms

Researchers use the upper echelons theory to establish how leaders’ attributes affect firms’ outward foreign direct investment (OFDI), a proxy for foreign operations. This extant literature has largely ignored the impact of leaders’ psychological attributes, particularly, narcissism. We use a narcissism index of leaders of Chinese listed companies to examine the relationship between leader narcissism and firm-level OFDI for the period 2007-2017. We show that leader narcissism has a positive and significant impact on firm-level OFDI. In addition, we find that firms with state ownership and political connections show a greater positive effect of leader narcissism on the firm’s OFDI. Our results suggest that leader narcissism appears to be a stimulus to corporate OFDI, and thus in recruiting top corporate executives who are responsible for managing the international investments of the corporation, this psychological trait should be given special consideration in addition to other qualifications.     

Domestic political connections and international expansion: It's not only ‘who you know’ that matters

Former politicians on the board of directors bring to the firm domestic political connections and political knowledge. Previous research has mainly highlighted the role of contacts, without fully recognizing the role of political knowledge accumulated at home. By focusing on the effect of domestic political connections on foreign direct investment, we show that domestic political knowledge also shapes foreign expansion. We argue that contacts provided by former politicians may not be useful for foreign expansion whilst their political knowledge can be of help in countries with discretionary governments and with similar institutional environments to the one of the home country.     

政治关系、预算软约束与过度投资——基于民营上市公司的经验证据

文章以2007-2012年沪深两市A股民营上市公司为研究对象,考察在政治关系影响下民营企业的预算软约束和过度投资问题。研究发现,有政治关系民营企业存在预算软约束以及由此引发过度投资问题;在考察政治关系强度对预算软约束和过度投资的影响时,研究还发现,不同层级的政治关系对民营企业预算软约束和过度投资的影响程度不同,其中拥有省级政治关系的民营企业预算软约束和过度投资问题更为严重。本文对转变政府职能和完善市场机制具有重要的启示意义。     

Innovation quantity or quality? The role of political connections

Based on the heterogeneity of innovation quantity and quality, this study investigates the impact of political connections on enterprises' innovation. Using the data of Chinese listed enterprises from 2003 to 2015, we find that political connections have a positive impact on enterprises' innovation quantity, but they are detrimental to innovation quality. We further find that political connections weaken the promotion of government subsidies on innovation quality and even reduce the R&D intensity of enterprises, which serves as an essential determinant of innovation quality. The government can stimulate enterprises' innovation quality by improving marketization, intellectual property protection, and anti-corruption.     

The value of family control during political uncertainty: Evidence from Thailand's constitutional change in 2014

We examine the effect of family control on firm value and corporate decision during Thailand's constitutional change arising from the 2014 coup d'état. We find that Thai family firms perform poorly when compared to non-family firms during the period of political uncertainty. The effect is more pronounced when firms have high expected agency costs from outside investors. Further, we find that family firms delay their investments, hold less cash, pay smaller dividends and have poorer access to debt financing sources relative to non-family firms. The reductions in investment and financing activities may at least partially account for their underperformance. Our evidence is consistent with the view that family control enhances firms' survivorship by establishing political connections in times of political uncertainty at the expense of minority shareholders.     

民营企业政治关联及其效应研究

目前的中国正处于转轨时期,民营企业政治关联普遍存在。本文基于制度理论视角,在评述现有关于政治关联的研究前提下,分析了民营企业政治关联的产生根源和作用机理,认为民营企业政治关联作为一种非正式制度是适应当前制度环境的行为选择,也是通过合法性机制获得企业的经济利益和政治利益,从而促进企业成长。     

Do political connections matter in accessing capital markets? Evidence from China

We analyze the influence of political connections on firms' access to capital and the ensuing effect on the cost of raising capital. Using a dataset of 413 IPOs from 2009 to 2012, we exploit a research setting where government is still highly involved with the process. We find that firms rely on political connections to reduce IPO rejection risk as a firm's political connections are positively associated with the propensity of obtaining approval for an IPO. We further find that political connections are negatively associated with the cost of IPO and connected firms appear to perform better subsequent to their IPOs.     

The impact structure of social capital on corporate performance: Empirical evidence from listed companies in China

Vertical relationships with the government, particular relational capital and organizational social network capital, constitute corporate social capital (CSC). Using the empirical data of 97 listed companies in China, this paper examines the impact of CSC on corporate performance, finds that CSC has a positive impact on sales revenue but an insignificant impact on the improvement of ROA. More specifically, when a firm enlarges its sales revenue, the function of organizational network capital is stronger than that of a particular relational capital and that of governmental connections. The paper also finds that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have more advantages in using governmental connections, therefore leading to better social status than non-SOEs do, who have fewer advantages in using any particular relational capital. The article suggests that managers should appraise carefully the effectiveness of CSC, and combine it with other resources; firms should distinguish the structure of the impact of CSC on performance improvement in a dynamic way. With respect to the implication of this paper, it could help in analyzing firm behaviors in the transitional China. Translated from paper in International Symposium on Entrepreneur Research and Education, 2006, April (in Chinese)     

Social Capital,Informal Governance,and Post-IPO Firm Performance: A Study of Chinese Entrepreneurial Firms

Social capital can serve as informal governance in weak investor-protection regimes. Using hand-collected data on entrepreneurs’ political connections and firm ownership, we construct several original measures of social capital and examine their effect on the performance of entrepreneurial firms in China after their initial public offerings. Political connections or a high percentage of external investors tend to enhance firm performance, but intragroup related-party transactions commonly lead to performance decline. These forms of social capital have a strong influence on the performance of Chinese firms, whereas formal governance variables such as board size or board independence have little effect. Although social capital may serve as an informal governance mechanism and effectively substitute for formal governance mechanisms in an emerging market, this role of social capital raises several ethical concerns, notably the development of rent-seeking and crony capitalism.     

Political connections and entrepreneurial investment: Evidence from China's transition economy

Recent literature in entrepreneurship suggests that market and legal institutions matter for entrepreneurial investment. Yet, prior studies have focused on the role of formal institutions. Building on new institutional theory and political connections literature, this study aims to evaluate the role of political connections in entrepreneurial reinvestment in less developed and transition economies. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, it aims to demonstrate systematically how political connections affect entrepreneurial reinvestment. Second, it applies this relationship to a subsample group, i.e., Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), in order to empirically test whether political connections are more beneficial for large firms or SMEs. Third, it demonstrates that political connections substitute for, rather than complement, formal market and legal institutions. The empirical test uses a nationally representative sample of entrepreneurial firms from China's transition economy.