Double leverage cycle,interest rate,and financial crisis

We view mortgage as a risky derivative of its underlying house collateral and combine no-arbitrage valuation with equilibrium valuation approaches to develop a dynamic model of leverage cycle and interest rate. This model provides a unified explanation to pro-cyclical optimism, asset prices, and leverage, and counter-cyclical volatility and interest rate. In addition, the model shows that tightening funding margin in the mortgage securities market dampens optimism, asset prices, and leverage, whereas it raises volatility and interest rate in the housing market. A double leverage cycle leads to more volatile markets and a severe leverage cycle, thus resulting in worse financial crises.     

The management of interest rate risk during the crisis: Evidence from Italian banks

We use a unique dataset to analyze how Italian banking groups managed their exposure to interest rate risk during the recent financial crisis. First of all, we document that on average the interest rate risk exposure – measured by duration gap approach – has been limited and well below the alert level enforced by regulators. Second, our econometric results indicate a relation of substitutability between banks’ on-balance-sheet interest rate risk and their use of interest rate derivatives suggesting that banks used these two instruments to curb their overall interest rate risk exposure in case of an increase in interest rates. Furthermore, we also find robust evidence of a negative correlation between banks’ interest rate risk and liquidity risk.     

Market response to syndicated loan announcements from high-profile failed and acquiring banks during the global financial crisis

Previous studies that have examined the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on syndicated loans have ignored potential differences between lending banks by explicitly or implicitly aggregating all lenders together and focusing on borrower characteristics. One must jointly consider both borrower and lender to fully understand the complex role of the syndicate during this period. We consider the identity of the lender, with a focus on five major US banks that failed and their five corresponding acquirers. Our results highlight the distinct roles of investment and commercial banks and facilitate an understanding of relationship and transactional-based lending.     

The funding of subsidiaries equity,double leverage and the risk of bank holding companies

Banking groups exploit double leverage when ‘debt is issued by the parent company and the proceeds are invested in subsidiaries as equity’. Financial authorities have frequently raised concerns about the issue of double leverage because this type of intra‐firm financing appears to allow for both the arbitrage of capital and the assumption of risk. This article focuses on the relationship between double leverage and risk‐taking within banking groups. First, we discuss this relationship based on an examination of balance sheet figures. Second, we analyze a large sample of United States Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) from 1990–2014. The results show that BHCs are more prone to risk when they increase their double leverage, namely, when the stake of the parent within subsidiaries is larger than the stand‐alone capital of the parent. This paper's primary implication for policymakers is that the regulators of complex financial entities should more efficiently address the issue of double leverage, thereby limiting the potential negative consequences that arise from corporate instability.     

What explains the value premium? The case of adjustment costs,operating leverage and financial leverage

This paper empirically examines and compares the different theoretical predictions on how adjustment costs, operating and financial leverage influence the value premium. Consistent with Ozdagli (2012), financial leverage plays a dominant role, supported by adjustment costs (which represent the degree of investment irreversibility). Specifically, the observed value premium is driven by the financial leverage differences between value and growth firms, partially neutralized by investment irreversibility. The relation between the value premium and investment irreversibility is contrary to the intuition in Zhang (2005) and Cooper (2006). Operating leverage does not significantly influence the value premium.     

浅议商业银行的财务危机及其化解策略

财务危机是指商业银行经营过程中由于费用成本过大,收入减少,或资产出现严重损失,造成财务亏损或资不抵债的一种经济现象。化解商业银行财务危机的紧急有效措施是采取减员增效、压缩节支等手段,而从根本上解除财务危机在于不断提高商业银行的经营质量,做到既好又快地发展。     

Capital regulation,deposit insurance and bank risk: International evidence from normal and crisis periods

In this paper, we examine the impact of capital regulation on bank risk and the moderating role of deposit insurance on the relationship between capital regulation and bank risk during both normal and crisis periods. Using an international sample of banks from 111 countries, our results show that stringent capital regulation reduces bank default risk, in general, during normal growth period, and this effect is not conditioned by the existence of explicit deposit insurance. Further, stringent capital regulation in place during the pre-crisis period reduces bank default risk during the crisis period, and this effect is stronger for countries with explicit deposit insurance during the pre-crisis period. These results have important policy implications to design the optimal bank regulations.     

A model of a systemic bank run

This paper provides a model of the view that the 2008 financial crisis is reminiscent of a bank run, focussing on six stylized key features. In particular, core financial institutions have invested their funds in asset-backed securities rather than committed to long-term projects: in distress, these can potentially be sold to a large pool of outside investors at steep discounts. I consider two different motives for outside investors and their interaction with banks trading asset-backed securities: uncertainty aversion versus adverse selection. I shall argue that the version with uncertainty averse investors is more consistent with the stylized facts than the adverse selection perspective: in the former, the crisis deepens, the larger the market share of distressed core banks, while a run becomes less likely instead as a result in the adverse selection version. Therefore, the outright purchase of troubled assets by the government at prices above current market prices may both alleviate the financial crises as well as provide tax payers with returns above those for safe securities.     

欧洲主权债务危机给我国商业银行带来的机遇与挑战

本文对以希腊主权债务问题为代表的新一轮欧洲主权债务危机进行了专题研究,辩证地分析了危机给我国商业银行发展带来的挑战与机遇,并对下一步应采取的措施与转变等提出了相应的政策性建议。     

Assessing the effectiveness of financial reporting harmonization for emerging market banks: The case of Banco Serfin

In the last decade there has been a proliferation of financial crises in emerging markets. To some extent, the suddenness and magnitude of some of these crises have been blamed on poor financial reporting standards for bank loan losses. As a result, prior to providing countries with “financial bailout” funds, international investors and international financial organizations have increasingly required that countries harmonize their bank financial reporting standards with international financial reporting standards.Given this trend, this case requires students to assess the effectiveness of efforts to harmonize loan financial reporting (with International Financial Reporting Standards) for Mexican banks during (and after) the country’s financial crisis of the late 1990s. Students are required to assess the extent to which both pre-crisis standards as well as new, post-crisis standards complied with international financial reporting standards. They are also required to assess the impact of the new standards on the reporting practices for loans of one particularly troubled financial institution. Through the examination of this institution’s accounting practices for loans, students obtain a familiarity of the shortcomings of emerging markets’ banks’ loan financial reporting as well as the factors which influence the adoption of international financial reporting standards by emerging market banks.     

Impact of the subprime crisis on bank ratings: The effect of the hardening of rating policies and worsening of solvency

This paper studies the impact of the subprime crisis on the ratings issued by the rating agencies in evaluating the solvency of banks. After ascertaining a significant worsening of ratings after the crisis, the paper hypothesises the possibility that this worsening is due not exclusively to a deterioration in the banks’ credit quality, but also to a change in the behaviour of the rating agencies. The study designs a methodology to separate the observed change in ratings into two multiplicative components: one associated with the deterioration of the banks’ solvency itself and another associated with the change in the agencies’ valuation criteria. The methodology is applied to the Spanish Banking System during the period 2000–2009. The results obtained show that the observed lowering of ratings (10.88%) is explained (75%) by the deterioration in the solvency of the banks, but also (25%) by the hardening of the valuation criteria adopted by the agencies. This shows the procyclical character of ratings.     

Has the financial system become safer after the crisis? The changing nature of financial institution risk

Six years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the question of whether the U.S. financial system has become less risky remains unanswered. On the one side, new regulations including Dodd-Frank and Basel III have made improvements by requiring higher bank capital, and financial institutions themselves have reduced risk-taking activities. On the other side, it has been argued that “the fundamental risks remained and the efforts of regulators and politicians were simply rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic.” (Baily and Elliott, 2013) This paper highlights the changing nature of financial institution risk from 2005 to 2011. It finds that while these institutions have become less risky individually after the crisis, the financial market has become more vulnerable to systemic contagion. The causal inference that the crisis and the post-crisis legislation have gradually changed the nature of financial institution risk is drawn from a quasi-experimental design. This finding suggests that the ever more integrated financial system might experience more synchronized contractions in future crises, providing empirical support for the proposals of the inter-bank collective regulation of banks by Acharya (2009) in addition to the intra-bank collective regulations as in Froot and Stein (1998) and BIS (1996, 1999).     

Bank funding structures and risk: Evidence from the global financial crisis

This paper analyzes the evolution of bank funding structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and studies the implications for financial stability, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 banks in the U.S. and Europe during 2001–09. The results show that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. The likelihood of bank failure also increases with pre-crisis bank risk-taking. In the cross-section, the smaller domestically-oriented banks were relatively more vulnerable to liquidity risk, while the large cross-border (Global) banks were more vulnerable to solvency risk due to excessive leverage. In fact, a 3.5 percentage point increase in the pre-crisis capital buffers of Global banks would have caused a 48 percentage point in their probability of failure during the crisis. The results support the proposed Basel III regulations on structural liquidity and leverage, but suggest that emphasis should be placed on the latter, particularly for the systemically-important institutions. Macroeconomic and monetary conditions are also shown to be related with the likelihood of bank failure, providing a case for the introduction of a macro-prudential approach to banking regulation.     

An additional analysis of estimation techniques for the degree of financial leverage

This study compares three different empirical proxies for the financial leverage component of a systematic risk‐composition model employed in prior financial research. We consider one static accounting measure and two elasticity‐based measures. We find that the traditional static accounting measure of financial leverage provides statistically different estimates of financial leverage when compared to estimates from elasticity‐based measures of the degree of financial leverage. The findings are important because the elasticity‐based models for the degree of financial leverage have clear theoretical links to market‐based models of systematic risk, while the static accounting measure of financial leverage does not. Practitioners and researchers should carefully consider why they are estimating financial leverage and choose the appropriate method for doing so given the goals and potential consequences for biased estimation.     

The impact of monetary policy announcements on the stock price of large European banks during the financial crisis

Since 2007, the European Central Bank responded decisively to the challenges posed by the global financial crisis, reducing key policy interest rates to unprecedented low levels and intervening with non-standard policy measures (i.e., monetary easing and liquidity provision). This paper aims to assess the impact of ECB monetary policy announcements on the stock price of large European banks. As a first step, an event study is conducted in order to measure cumulated abnormal returns (CARs) around the announcements over June 2007–June 2013; the second step is a regression analysis aimed at identifying the determinants of CARs. Results show that banks were more sensitive to non-conventional measures than to interest rate decisions, and that the same type of intervention may have a different impact depending on the stage of the crisis. In addition, banks with weaker balance sheets and operating with high-risk were more sensitive to monetary policy interventions.     

The relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk in banks

This paper investigates the relationship between the two major sources of bank default risk: liquidity risk and credit risk. We use a sample of virtually all US commercial banks during the period 1998–2010 to analyze the relationship between these two risk sources on the bank institutional-level and how this relationship influences banks’ probabilities of default (PD). Our results show that both risk categories do not have an economically meaningful reciprocal contemporaneous or time-lagged relationship. However, they do influence banks’ probability of default. This effect is twofold: whereas both risks separately increase the PD, the influence of their interaction depends on the overall level of bank risk and can either aggravate or mitigate default risk. These results provide new insights into the understanding of bank risk and serve as an underpinning for recent regulatory efforts aimed at strengthening banks (joint) risk management of liquidity and credit risks.     

A theoretical model of bank lending: Does ownership matter in times of crisis?

The present study investigates theoretically the lending responses of government-owned and private banks in the event of unexpected financial shocks. Our model predicts that public banks provide more loans to the real sector during times of crisis, compared to private banks which cut down on lending and increase liquidity holdings. We put forth three reasons for this heterogeneous behavior. First, the objective of public banks, in contrast to their private peers, is not only to maximize profits given risks, but also to stabilize and promote the recovery of the economy. Second, public banks may suffer less deposit withdrawals or avoid a bank run in a severe crisis, because the state has better access to additional funds making a recapitalization more likely. And finally, public banks may suffer less deposit withdrawals due to their higher credibility in promising a future recapitalization in the case of a severe crisis.     

The impact of opacity on bank valuation during the global financial crisis: A channel analysis

Prior literature suggests that opacity in the banking industry is mainly caused by a lack of informativeness in the assessment of the quality of bank assets. Examining a sample of bank holding companies in the United States, we find that there is a negative relationship between opacity and bank valuation during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis. We further attempt to identify two potential channels through which opacity negatively affects bank valuation during the financial crisis: a cash flow channel and an expected return channel. We show that one channel flows from bank profitability, measured by return on equity and return on assets, confirming a cash flow channel, whereas an expected return channel, proxied by the implied cost of capital, only works for small banks. Overall, this study sheds light on the relationship between in-transparency and bank value discount during a global recession.     

The relative influence of competitive intensity and business strategy on the relationship between financial leverage and performance

This study empirically investigates the effects of competitive intensity and business strategy on the relationship between financial leverage and the performance of firms. Based on a sample of US manufacturing firms, this study confirms the hypothesis that the cost of debt is higher for product differentiation firms than cost leadership firms. Furthermore, the results indicate that competitive intensity has a negative effect on the leverage-performance relationship, suggesting that competition acts as a substitute for debt in limiting manager's opportunistic behavior. These findings reinforce the need to consider moderating factors such as strategic choice and the environment in which a firm operates when investigating the effects of leverage on performance.