Minimum capital requirements,bank supervision and special resolution schemes. Consequences for bank risk-taking

This paper analyzes the incentive effects of special bank resolution schemes which were introduced during the recent financial crisis. These schemes allow regulators to take control over a systemically important financial institution before bankruptcy. We ask how special resolution schemes influence banks’ risk-taking and whether regulators should combine them with minimum capital requirements. We model a single bank which is supervised by a regulator who receives an imperfect signal about the bank's probability of success. We find that capital requirements are better than resolution from a welfare point of view if the quality of the signal is low, if it is difficult for the bank to attract deposits, or if the project return is low.     

Capital regulation,deposit insurance and bank risk: International evidence from normal and crisis periods

In this paper, we examine the impact of capital regulation on bank risk and the moderating role of deposit insurance on the relationship between capital regulation and bank risk during both normal and crisis periods. Using an international sample of banks from 111 countries, our results show that stringent capital regulation reduces bank default risk, in general, during normal growth period, and this effect is not conditioned by the existence of explicit deposit insurance. Further, stringent capital regulation in place during the pre-crisis period reduces bank default risk during the crisis period, and this effect is stronger for countries with explicit deposit insurance during the pre-crisis period. These results have important policy implications to design the optimal bank regulations.     

National culture and bank risk-taking

We investigate the relation between national cultural values and bank risk. Despite the rigid transnational regulatory oversight of systemic European banks, we find evidence of an economically significant association between cultural values and domestic bank risk. Specifically, we report a positive (negative) association between the cultural values of individualism and hierarchy (trust) and domestic bank risk-taking. Consistent with our predictions, this relation weakened during the recent financial crisis and does not hold for global banks, regardless of the period under investigation. Our findings are robust to endogeneity tests that mitigate concerns regarding reverse causality and confounding effects affecting our conclusions.     

National culture and bank risk-taking: Contradictory case of individualism

Previous studies have reported a positive association between the cultural dimension of individualism and bank risk-taking. We hypothesize that this association is likely to be confounded by the omitted effects of corporate governance. Given the indicative evidence that such confounders are less likely to affect listed banks, we test this association for a global sample of 467 commercial listed banks from 56 countries. Our results show that the association between individualism and bank risk-taking is negative. This result is consistent with the cushioning hypothesis, the idea that people take on more risk in collectivist societies because they expect to receive help from the members of their social networks in the case of failure.     

Bank Competition and Financial Stability

Under the traditional “competition-fragility” view, more bank competition erodes market power, decreases profit margins, and results in reduced franchise value that encourages bank risk taking. Under the alternative “competition-stability” view, more market power in the loan market may result in higher bank risk as the higher interest rates charged to loan customers make it harder to repay loans, and exacerbate moral hazard and adverse selection problems. The two strands of the literature need not necessarily yield opposing predictions regarding the effects of competition and market power on stability in banking. Even if market power in the loan market results in riskier loan portfolios, the overall risks of banks need not increase if banks protect their franchise values by increasing their equity capital or engaging in other risk-mitigating techniques. We test these theories by regressing measures of loan risk, bank risk, and bank equity capital on several measures of market power, as well as indicators of the business environment, using data for 8,235 banks in 23 developed nations. Our results suggest that—consistent with the traditional “competition-fragility” view—banks with a higher degree of market power also have less overall risk exposure. The data also provides some support for one element of the “competition-stability” view—that market power increases loan portfolio risk. We show that this risk may be offset in part by higher equity capital ratios.

Political institutions and bank risk-taking behavior

This paper examines the impact of political institutions on bank risk-taking behavior. Using an international sample of banks from 98 countries over the period 1998–2007, I document that sound political institutions stimulate higher bank risk-taking. This is consistent with the hypotheses that better political institutions increase banks’ risk by boosting the credit market competition from alternative sources of finance and generating the moral hazard problems due to the expectation of government bailouts in worst economic conditions. While it is contrary to the hypotheses that better political institutions decrease banks’ risk by lowering the government expropriation risk and the information asymmetries between banks and borrowers. The results are robust to a number of sensitivity tests, including alternative proxies of bank risk-taking and political institutions, cross-sectional bank- and country-level regressions, endogeneity concerns of political institutions, country income levels, explicit deposit insurance schemes and sample extension from 1998 to 2014. I also examine the interdependence between political and legal institutions and find that political and legal institutions complement each other to influence bank risk-taking behavior.     

Deposit interest rates, asset risk and bank failure in Croatia

Financial deregulation, while beneficial in the long-term, seems to be linked to instability. Intense competition for deposits appears to be an ingredient in instability. We examine the aftermath of deregulation in Croatia, which included rapid growth of both deposits and deposit interest rates, followed by numerous bank failures.

Using panel regression techniques, we find evidence of “market-stealing” via high deposit interest rates. We connect high deposit interest rates to bank failure using logit models. High deposit interest rates were a reliable signal of risk-taking. When supervisory capabilities and powers are weak, deposit interest rate regulation may be worth considering.     

Financial statement comparability and bank risk-taking

This study examines the relationship between financial statement comparability and bank risk-taking. Our analysis of a sample of publicly listed U.S. banks over the 1994–2019 period shows that banks with more comparable financial statements are related to significantly less risk-taking. We also find that the negative relationship between comparability and risk-taking is more pronounced for firms with more severe moral hazard and agency problems. Our documented findings are robust across alternative measures of comparability and risk-taking and considering change analysis, after controlling for strength of corporate governance and using propensity score matching and two-stage least squares estimation to address endogeneity concerns. Our analysis also shows that the relationship between financial statement comparability and bank risk-taking is stronger for smaller banks than for larger banks. Overall, this study provides unique insights into the role of financial statement comparability in curbing risk-taking in the banking sector.     

Chair-CEO generation gap and bank risk-taking

Poor bank governance has disastrous consequences for economies as the 2007–2009 financial crisis has shown. In the aftermath, board diversity is identified as an effective mechanism to enhance bank governance. Diversity, creating cognitive conflict between board members, is expected to enhance board's independence of thought to better perform monitoring and advising functions. Age is a key demographic measure and age dissimilarity between the chair and the CEO in non-financial firms leads to better economic outcomes (Goergen, Limbach, & Scholz, 2015). In this paper, we examine whether chair-CEO age dissimilarity can mitigate banks' excessive risk-taking behaviour. Using a unique sample of 100 listed banks in Europe between 2005 and 2014, we find that age difference between the chair and the CEO reduces bank risk-taking. A chair-CEO generational gap –defined as a minimum of 20 years' age difference– has a larger impact in reducing risk-taking.     

Financial networks,bank efficiency and risk-taking

Networks with a core–periphery topology are found in many financial systems across different jurisdictions. Though the theoretical and structural aspects of core–periphery networks are clear, the consequences that core–periphery structures bring for banking efficiency stand as an open question. We address this gap in the literature by providing insights as to how the structure of financial networks can affect bank efficiency. We find that core–periphery structures are cost efficient for banks, which is a characteristic that encourages the participation of banks in financial networks. On the downside, we also show that core–periphery structures are risk-taking inefficient, because they imply higher systemic risk levels in the financial system. In this way, regulators should be aware of the excessive risk inefficiency that arises in the financial system due to individual decisions made by banks in the network.     

Financial markets development,business cycles,and bank risk in South America

In this paper, we examine whether banking crises or business cycles affect the influence of financial markets development on bank risk in a sample of 37 publicly listed commercial banks in seven South American countries over a 22-year period between 1991 and 2012. Banking crises in this region offer a natural setting in which the impact of financial markets development on bank risk is examined. We find that financial markets development improves banks’ capitalization ratio and reduces their exposure to non-traditional banking activities, suggesting that financial markets development on average reduces bank risk. In addition, banking crises and business cycles appear to moderate the impact of financial markets development on bank risk. In the aftermath of banking crises, banks appear to concentrate more on their core traditional banking activities.     

The impact of changes in bank ownership structure on the allocation of capital: International evidence

A new wave of bank privatizations in the past decade has significantly changed the ownership structure of banking systems around the world. This paper explores how these changes affect the allocation of capital within countries. Increases in domestic blockholder ownership of banks adversely affect the allocation of capital through increased lending activity to less productive industries and to those with less dependence on external finance. This result is more pronounced in countries with higher levels of corruption. I find some evidence that foreign presence improves capital allocation efficiency by increasing lending to more productive industries, primarily in common law countries.     

Is there a tradeoff between bank competition and financial fragility?

We use a model of mean-shifting investment technologies to study the relationship between market structure, risk taking and social welfare in lending markets. Introduction of loan market competition is shown to reduce lending rates and to generate higher investments without increasing the equilibrium bankruptcy risk of borrowers. Hence, there need not be a tradeoff between lending market competition and financial fragility. Such a tradeoff may not emerge either when banks compete by conditioning interest rates on investment volumes irrespectively of whether credit rationing takes place or not.     

保障金融安全的重要手段：银行监管关口前移

银行监管是对银行业金融机构监督和管理的简称。传统银行监管存在一些弊端,其中最明显的就是事后监管的问题。通过转变监管理念,将事后监管转为关口前移,施行前瞻性监管,会使银行监管水平提升到一个新的高度,确保金融安全。本文考察了传统银行监管存在的弊端,银行监管关口前移的重要意义,并就如何实现银行监管关口前移以保障金融安全提出了政策建议。     

Rethinking bank shareholder equity: The case of Deutsche Bank

We introduce and apply an innovative accounting approach to analyse the equity position of a European systemically important financial institution, Deutsche Bank, between 2001 and 2015. According to our findings, the actual contribution by shareholders to bank equity capital was limited, while shareholder payout policies, including share buybacks and trading on its own shares, were both material. These findings raise concerns on the actual capacity by shareholder equity to assure protection against (residual) risk and loss absorption. Customer and investor protections appear to lay with bank entity equity dynamics. These findings have implications for bank financial sustainability and resilience, company capital maintenance, and regulatory capital requirements. Further developments based upon this innovative methodology may improve on existing prudential and accounting regulations.     

金融发展、银行关联与民营企业贷款研究

依据2010~2012年957个民营上市公司的面板数据,考量金融发展、银行关联与民营企业贷款之间的关系。结果发现,在金融发展不均衡的背景下,民营企业会通过银行关联来获得更多的贷款数额,特别是在金融发展水平相对较低的地区,银行关联对民营企业贷款的影响更加显著。因此,金融市场监管者应进一步深化金融体制改革,加快落后地区金融市场化的进程,拓宽民营企业融资渠道,降低民营企业融资成本。     

后金融危机时代中国银行业金融创新与发展

金融创新既是国际银行业发展的大势所趋，也是中国银行业融入世界经济金融体系、提升整体实力的客观要求。本文首先从后金融危机时代金融创新的背景出发，总结了世界银行业金融创新的主要特点和趋势，然后重点对中国银行业金融创新的物质基础和制度基础进行分析，并指出中国银行业金融创新的主要问题，最后本文结合后金融危机时代国际金融监管的新理念，对中国银行业金融创新与未来发展提出相应的政策建议。     

Interest rate liberalization and capital adequacy in models of financial crises

We characterize the effects of interest rate liberalization on OECD banking crises, controlling for the standard macro prudential variables that prevail in the current literature. We use the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World database. We test for the direct impacts of interest rate liberalization on crisis probabilities and their indirect effects via capital adequacy. Over the period 1980–2012, we find that interest rate liberalization has a crises reducing effect, and it appears that the beneficial effects work by strengthening capital buffers. We also show that when controlling for liberalization, capital adequacy and liquidity, the main driver of financial crises is property price growth. Our results are invariant when we control for alternative sensitivity tests for robustness purposes.     

The welfare cost of bank capital requirements

Capital requirements are the cornerstone of modern bank regulation, yet little is known about their welfare cost. This paper measures this cost and finds that it is surprisingly large. I present a simple framework, which embeds the role of liquidity creating banks in an otherwise standard general equilibrium growth model. A capital requirement limits the moral hazard on the part of banks that arises due to deposit insurance. However, this capital requirement is also costly because it reduces the ability of banks to create liquidity. The key insight is that equilibrium asset returns reveal the strength of households’ preferences for liquidity and this allows for the derivation of a simple formula for the welfare cost of capital requirements that is a function of observable variables only. Using US data, the welfare cost of current capital adequacy regulation is found to be equivalent to a permanent loss in consumption of between 0.1% and 1%.     

中国金融市场化与开放进程对银行效率的影响研究——基于DEA的Malmquist指数方法

本文一方面结合我国金融市场化与开放进程的沿革路径,构建中国金融自由化指数;另一方面采用非参数的数据包络分析方法计算Malmquist指数,以此来衡量银行效率。在此基础上,我们对中国金融自由化进程与银行效率的内在关联展开计量分析。研究发现,伴随着中国金融市场化与开放政策的渐近推进和逐步深化,中国银行业的整体效率有了明显的改善。这其中受益良多的是股份制商业银行,而国有商业银行的效率虽有所改善,但成效并不明显。