Spillover effects of banking systemic risk on firms in China: A financial cycle analysis

This paper investigates the spillover effects of banking sector risk on firms in China and explores the risk transmission channels from the perspective of financial cycle. We use the banking risk-taking and systemic risk as the proxies of financial booms and busts. Our study yields four main findings. First, the banking risk-taking reduces firm risk in financial booms. Higher financing costs and constraints, larger firm size and financing scale, and state ownership inhibit the spillover effects. Second, the banking systemic risk increases firm risk during financial busts. Higher financing costs and constraints, larger firm size and financing scale, and state ownership facilitate the spillover effects. Third, the magnitudes of banking risk spillovers vary across industries, and this effect is more pronounced in the manufacturing industry. Fourth, bank risk-taking affects firm risk differently through various channels in different leading periods. When leading 1 to 3quarters, banking risk-taking reduces firm risk, and channel variables inhibit the spillover effects. However, when leading 4 to 8 quarters, the rising bank risk-taking eventually increases firm risk, and channel variables amplify its spillover effects. Our study offers important policy implications for risk assessment and mitigation in the Chinese loan market.     

货币政策和银行风险承担：一种非线性关系

宽松的货币政策会通过估值、收入和现金流机制,追逐收益机制以及中央银行沟通和反应机制等渠道增加银行风险承担,通过风险转移机制降低银行风险承担,从而导致货币政策与银行风险承担之间可能存在复杂的非线性关系。本文使用面板阈值模型,基于我国银行业数据研究了货币政策对银行风险承担的影响,发现我国货币政策对银行风险承担的影响存在门限效应,即货币政策对银行风险承担的影响取决于货币政策基准利率偏离泰勒规则利率的程度。当这种偏离小于门限值时,宽松货币政策会增加银行风险承担;当这种偏离大于门限值时,宽松货币政策会降低银行风险承担。本文研究对更好地理解我国货币政策对银行风险承担及金融稳定的影响有一定参考意义。     

资本账户开放对企业投资效率的影响研究

依据2001—2017年95个国家的上市企业数据,考量资本账户开放对企业投资效率的作用。结果显示：资本账户开放能提高企业投资效率,缓解投资不足,抑制过度投资;机制检验表明,资本账户开放通过提高市场竞争、缓解融资约束以及提高风险承担水平三个渠道提高企业投资效率。异质性检验显示,流入方向的资本账户开放对企业投资效率的提升更大,资本账户开放主要提高了金融市场发展程度高的国家、外部融资依赖度高的行业以及高杠杆率企业的投资效率。鉴于此,建议有序开放资本账户,加快金融市场建设,积极融入全球资本市场发展。     

利率市场化背景下银行系统性危机的实证研究

从利率市场化的国际经验来看,无论是在发达国家还是发展中国家,其实施过程都容易导致不同程度的银行业危机。采用1973~2012年42个国家的面板数据,对利率市场化背景下的银行业危机进行的实证研究表明：利率市场化的推进将增加银行系统性危机发生的机率,特别是在存款利率市场化阶段,而严格的银行监管是抑制银行系统危机发生的有效方法;显性存款保险制度的设立无助于利率市场化后银行系统性风险的防范,甚至有可能会增加危机发生的机率;资本账户开放下进行利率市场化会增加银行系统危机发生的机率。利率市场化进程中允许开设民营银行不会增加银行系统危机的发生机率。     

存款保险制度对银行风险承担的影响—基于跨国微观角度的实证分析

金融危机后,全球加快了存款保险制度建设的步伐,2015年5月,我国成为全球第 114个建立显性存款保险制度的国家。本文基于全球80个国家的1122家上市银行的微观数据, 研究存款保险制度对银行风险承担的影响,研究发现：存款保险制度的建立增大了个体银行的 风险承担,表现为道德风险效应。此外,本文还研究了存款保险机构性质、存款保险基金管理 方式、风险差别费率、存款保险基金来源和共同保险这5个存款保险制度设计对银行风险承担 的影响。最后根据实证结论,提出相关政策建议。。     

Overlapping membership between risk management committee and audit committee and bank risk-taking: Evidence from China

Although overlapping membership between risk management committee and audit committee is prevalent in banks' boards, the existing literature focuses on the impact of a single board committee on bank risk-taking. Using a sample of Chinese listed banks from 2007 to 2020, we examine whether and how overlapping membership between risk management committee and audit committee influences bank risk-taking. The results show that overlapping membership between risk management committee and audit committee reduces bank risk-taking. Furthermore, the risk-averse role of overlapping membership between risk management committee and audit committee is stronger in banks with weaker monitoring intensity and higher information acquisition costs. When exploring the potential channels of monitoring and information, we find that overlapping membership between risk management committee and audit committee helps reduce executive earnings management and make conservative interbank liability decisions. Finally, compared with other overlapping member characteristics, the role of overlapping risk management committee chair and financial experts in reducing bank risk-taking is more evident.     

What is the net effect of financial liberalization on bank productivity? A decomposition analysis of bank total factor productivity growth

We employ a unique framework to quantify the net effect of financial liberalization on banks’ total factor productivity (TFP) growth through a decomposition analysis of two effects: a positive direct effect of financial liberalization on bank TFP growth; and a negative indirect effect operating through a higher propensity to systemic banking crisis. The empirical decomposition is based on a sample of 1530 banks operating in 88 countries over the period 1999–2011. We find that the net effect of financial liberalization on bank TFP growth is positive: the direct positive effect outweighs the negative one. An important policy implication flows from these findings.     

金融发展、银行关联与民营企业贷款研究

依据2010~2012年957个民营上市公司的面板数据,考量金融发展、银行关联与民营企业贷款之间的关系。结果发现,在金融发展不均衡的背景下,民营企业会通过银行关联来获得更多的贷款数额,特别是在金融发展水平相对较低的地区,银行关联对民营企业贷款的影响更加显著。因此,金融市场监管者应进一步深化金融体制改革,加快落后地区金融市场化的进程,拓宽民营企业融资渠道,降低民营企业融资成本。     

全球金融周期、美国货币政策与“三元悖论”

全球金融周期存在的背景下“三元悖论”是否依然成立充满争议。本文通过构建包含银行与金融摩擦的两国DSGE模型,为考察全球金融周期的形成提供了理论依据。美国货币政策通过资本流动传导到外围国金融市场,使外围国信贷利率、银行风险承担以及杠杆率与美国银行趋同,形成全球金融周期。金融渠道的传导速度快于实体经济渠道导致外围国国内经济周期与金融周期相背离,外围国想要稳定经济就不得不与美国保持同向的政策利率变化,货币政策独立性将不再存在。随着全球经济一体化进程加速,估值效应的作用越来越明显,浮动汇率制度并不能隔离全球金融周期的影响也无法保证货币政策的独立性。在资本账户开放的情况下,外围国金融市场越不发达,受全球金融周期的影响越大,货币政策越不独立。     

Post-crisis regulatory reforms and bank performance: lessons from Asia

Based on a large dataset from eight Asian economies, we test the impact of post-crisis regulatory reforms on the performance of depository institutions in countries at different levels of financial development. We allow for technological heterogeneity and estimate a set of country-level stochastic cost frontiers followed by a deterministic bootstrapped meta-frontier to evaluate cost efficiency and cost technology. Our results support the view that liberalization policies have a positive impact on bank performance, while the reverse is true for prudential regulation policies. The removal of activities restrictions, bank privatization and foreign bank entry has a positive and significant impact on technological progress and cost efficiency. In contrast, prudential policies, which aim to protect the banking sector from excessive risk-taking, tend to adversely affect banks’ cost efficiency but not cost technology.     

金融自由化实践的国际比较

金融自由化对发展中国家是一把"双刃剑",它在为发展中国家带来了好处的同时,也引发了很多负效应.原因在于发展中国家对金融自由化普遍缺乏足够的准备而仓促实施改革,国内金融制度与监管体系不健全,而金融市场过度开放又导致国际短期资本大量涌入.与发展中国家不同的是,发达国家的金融自由化改革却取得了较好的成效.与之相比,发展中国家目前处于两难的选择困境:如果不继续进行自由化,则在国际经济舞台上会更被动;如果进行自由化,却又由于前期的改革失败而无法准确把握好今后的战略措施.对此,发展中国家惟一正确的选择应当是结合国情,坚决地顺着金融自由化的方向走下去,不改革是没有出路的.     

金融开放与银行风险承担的异质性研究——基于98个国家的实证分析

金融开放是加剧银行业风险还是分散风险,是颇具争议的研究课题。本文借助Gygli et al.(2018)的金融开放指标,应用1999-2016年98个国家的跨国数据,检验了金融开放和银行风险承担的长期均衡和短期关系。从长期均衡关系来看,金融开放显著地提高了银行抵御风险能力,具有长期"促进效应";从短期关系来看,金融开放则存在一定"风险效应"①。进一步研究发现,短期"风险效应"与外资银行资产占比不存在关联,而与市场制度环境显著相关,即完善的制度环境有助于弱化"风险效应"。结合中国实际情况,文章支持"以开放促改革"的观点,强调完善市场制度环境的重要性,为政策制定者提供实证依据。     

How does deposit insurance affect bank risk? Evidence from the recent crisis

Deposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a financial system safety net to promote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive of depositors to monitor banks which lead to excessive risk-taking. We examine the relation between deposit insurance and bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to and during the recent financial crisis. We find that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis, bank risk is lower and systemic stability is greater in countries with deposit insurance coverage. Our findings suggest that the “moral hazard effect” of deposit insurance dominates in good times while the “stabilization effect” of deposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. The overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample we study remains negative since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared to the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. In addition, we find that good bank supervision can alleviate the unintended consequences of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during good times, suggesting that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring systemic stability.     

Shareholder protection and bank executive compensation after the global financial crisis

We use a hand-collected international database to analyze the change in the risk-taking incentives embedded in bank executive compensation after the onset of the global financial crisis. Our results reveal a reduction in both the risk sensitivity of stock option grants (vega) and total and cash pay-risk sensitivities in countries suffering systemic banking crises. This reduction is greater in countries with strong shareholder protection, especially in banks with good corporate governance, solvent banks, and banks that suffered a reduction in their specific investment opportunity set. The regressions control for government intervention, banking development, and crisis intensity. Our results confirm that the contracting hypothesis is more relevant in countries with stronger shareholder protection, and provide support for measures improving shareholder rights in the approval of bank executive compensation.     

How Theories of Financial Intermediation and Corporate Risk-Management Influence Bank Risk-Taking Behavior

This paper examines the rationales for risk-taking and risk-management behavior from both a corporate finance and a banking perspective. After combining the theoretical insights from the corporate finance and banking literatures related to hedging and risk-taking, the paper reviews empirical tests based on these theories to determine which of these theories are best supported by the data. Managerial incentives are the most consistently supported rationale for describing how banks manage risk. In particular, moderate/high levels of equity ownership reduce bank risk while positive amounts of stock option grants increase bank risk-taking behavior. The review of empirical tests in the banking literature also suggests that financial intermediaries coordinate different aspects of risk (e.g., credit and interest rate risk) in order to maintain a certain level of total risk. The empirical results indicate hedgeable risks such as interest rate risk represent only one dimension of the risk-management problem. This implies empirical tests of the theories of corporate risk-management need to consider individual sub-components of total risk and the bank's ability to trade these risks in a competitive financial market. This finding is consistent with the reality that banks have non-zero expected financial distress costs and bank managers cannot fully diversify their bank-related personal investments.     

Social capital and bank stability

Using a sample of public and private banks, we study how social capital relates to bank stability. Social capital, which reflects the level of cooperative norms in society, is likely to reduce opportunistic behavior (Jha and Chen 2015; Hasan et al., 2017) and, therefore, act as an informal monitoring mechanism. Consistent with our expectations, we find that banks in high social capital regions experienced fewer failures and less financial trouble during the 2007–2010 financial crisis than banks in low social capital regions. In addition, we find that social capital was negatively associated with abnormal risk-taking and positively associated with accounting transparency and accounting conservatism in the pre-crisis period of 2000–2006, indicating that risk-taking, accounting transparency, and accounting conservatism are possible channels through which social capital affected bank stability during the crisis.     

Openness,financial structure,and bank risk: International evidence

Using panel data from a large cross-country sample covering 97 countries over the period 1996–2017, we combine 2SLS procedure with system GMM estimation to study the relationship between openness, financial structure and bank risk. The main contribution of the paper is that we identified a new channel, i.e. the financial structure channel, through which financial openness reduces bank risk. In particular, we find that as financial openness increases, a country's financial system tends to be more market-based, and a more market-based financial system is associated with higher bank market power, better information sharing and more revenue diversification, all of which contribute to the reduction in bank risk. We also find that the effect of inflow restrictions on bank risk is more pronounced than that of outflow restrictions. These results highlight the importance of an appropriate design of a country's opening-up strategy to match the evolution of its financial structure to increase bank stability.     

Explaining when developing countries liberalize their financial equity markets

This paper is the first to explain when countries opened their financial equity markets and is the first to explain financial liberalization using a large sample of developing countries. We test several novel hypotheses. We find that equity markets are opened earlier in countries that trade more with developed countries and that have more developed financial markets. Equity markets are opened earlier in democracies, especially if the country's leader is a civilian. Our other findings are consistent with the literature, which has found greater financial market openness in countries receiving more FDI, in richer countries, and in democracies.     

Emerging themes in banking: Recent literature and directions for future research

This paper presents a review of the recent banking literature centred on the core themes of performance, risk and governance of financial institutions. We write this review against the backdrop of the recent financial crisis and the major changes it caused to banking sectors in many countries. Several themes emerge, but the overarching issue relates to the need to better understand bank risk-taking incentives and the implications for systemic stability. Specifically, there is a need for more work on: the role of safety net subsidies and how these relate to systemic risk; financial innovation and the adoption of new products and processes; and how innovative behaviour links to risk-taking, market returns and contagion. Future research could also be directed to provide a better understanding of the inter-connections between competition, capital, profitability, liquidity and risk.     

极端气候对商业银行风险承担的影响——来自中国地方性商业银行的经验证据

深化对气候相关金融风险的认识,对于促进绿色低碳发展,防范系统性金融风险具有重要意义。本文以2004—2018年期间281家中国地方性商业银行为样本,实证检验了极端气候对银行风险承担的影响及其机制。研究发现,极端强降水气候显著提升了银行风险承担,极端高温和极端低温气候对银行风险承担不存在明显影响。极端强降水主要通过给银行信贷主体带来经济损失,影响违约概率和银行信贷资产质量,进而影响银行风险承担水平;提高灾前的保险保障水平、强化碳减排机制以及确保银行资本的充足性均有利于弱化极端气候对银行风险承担的影响;相较于以地级和省会城市工商业和居民为主要服务对象的地方性商业银行,极端强降水对以“三农”为主要服务对象的县域地方性商业银行风险承担的影响更大。因此,提升商业银行应对极端气候风险意识,提高气候灾害保险保障水平,强化碳减排机制和银行资本充足管理,均有利于降低极端气候对银行风险的影响。