The Effects of Trade Liberalization between Heterogeneous Countries on Endogenous Mergers

This paper examines the effects of trade liberalization on merger behavior. We endogenize merger choice among owners in an oligopolistic industry in asymmetric countries to analyze the consequences of trade cost reductions on competitiveness and welfare. In this context, the non‐cooperative game supports asymmetric market structures. We also find that trade liberalization is not necessarily pro‐competitive in countries with the competitive advantage, even if trade costs are completely abolished. Moreover, the tariff‐jumping explanation of international mergers does not necessarily apply. The welfare analysis shows that merger behavior can significantly alter any gains from liberalization. Countries should consider enforcing competition in regional agreements. Specifically, to avoid a reduction in domestic welfare following trade‐liberalizing reductions in trade costs, a high‐cost country's optimal policy may be to ban international mergers.     

INDUSTRY TRADE BALANCE AND DOMESTIC MERGER POLICY: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM U.S. MERGER POLICY FOR MANUFACTURING SECTORS

The literature on antitrust in an open-economy setting is inconclusive with respect to the role played by trade balance on the tenor of domestic merger policy. Using a panel dataset composed of U.S. merger reviews by industrial sector over the 1982–2001 period, I empirically test the impact of sectoral trade balance on the level of antitrust scrutiny. The results suggest that larger trade balances lead to more vigorous antitrust scrutiny; thus "strategic" merger policy does not appear evident, and consumer surplus appears to guide U.S. merger policy even under the lure of international competitive gains.     

On Mergers and Agglomeration

We formulate a model of mergers and acquisitions assuming a monopolistic competitive industry that exhibits agglomeration economies. We provide the conditions for the existence of a non‐trivial Nash equilibrium in the acquisition market at which the most productive firm acquires a range of less‐productive firms. Most importantly, we show that domestic merger and acquisition activities are international trade promotionary. We also show that such types of mergers and acquisition will improve the competitive position of foreign firms leading to an increase in their market share. In addition, domestic mergers and acquisitions will increase the number of imported varieties.     

Australian Company Mergers 1960-1970*

This study recorded 340 international mergers and 1992 domestic mergers in Australia in the period mid 1959-December 1970. In the 1,460 mergers for which price information was available, the total merger value amounted to $2,283.3 million. The merger movement was most intensive in the later years of the period, with $1,034.8 million being paid for 429 firms during 1968-1970. This compares with some 1,157 mergers transacted at a total cost of $558.4 million recorded by Mr Bushnell [2] in the period 1947-to mid 1959.²³ While mergers took place in almost all industries, they were not uniformly distributed. More than two-thirds of foreign take-overs occurred in manufacturing, compared with less than one-half of domestic mergers in manufacturing. Foreign companies have purchased the largest or leading Australian firms in their respective industries. Moreover, United States take-overs were important in basic chemicals and flour mill and cereal products; on the other hand, United Kingdom take-overs were prominent in beverages and malt, other industrial machinery and fabricated metal products. Among the foreign acquiring companies, merger activity was more concentrated in United Kingdom-based companies than among United States-based companies. For the period as a whole, domestic take-overs outnumbered foreign take-overs by more than 5·5 to 1. In examining the limited evidence for foreign take-over activity in the period 1946-59,²⁴ it is apparent that foreign firms have accounted for a much higher share of merger activity during the nineteen-sixties. In addition, mergers overseas have brought together the Australian subsidiaries of the merging companies. Mr Bushnell [2] rated the tax structure including all its ramifications as probably the single most important cause for mergers.²⁵ While tax factors have continued to play an important role in merger activity, it appears that, during the sixties, a far more important reason for mergers in many industries has been the so-called proliferation effect of mergers. As some firms, especially the multinationals, took over leading local companies making for cost and competitive advantages, invariably the smaller remaining independent firms were compelled to resort to mergers for defensive reasons. The owners of many of these firms, fearing a war of attrition, took advantage of avoiding risks by capitalizing future profits in the form of tax-free capital gains, by selling out before a situation emerged where their bargaining power would have been seriously eroded. Most of these firms disappearing into mergers, did so with partners closely related to their existing operations. Approximately three-fourths of domestic and foreign take-overs were of the broad horizontal class.     

Product differentiation, cost‐reducing mergers, and consumer welfare

Abstract.  Cost synergies are an explicitly recognized justification for a two‐firm merger, and empirical techniques are now widely used to assess the impact of cost‐reducing mergers on prices and welfare in the post‐merger market. We show that if the merger occurs in a vertically product differentiated market, then the merger will lead to a reduction in product offerings that limits the usefulness of pre‐merger empirical estimates. Indeed, we further show that in such markets, two‐firm mergers will typically lead to higher prices regardless of the merger's cost savings. JEL classification: L10, L41     

Mergers and capital flight in unionised oligopolies: Is there scope for a “national champion” policy?

Many policy makers seem to prefer domestic alternatives to cross-border mergers. We construct a model where cross-border mergers drive down union-set wages, domestic mergers have non-labour cost synergies and policy evaluators care more about workers than capital owners. Apparently, the stage is set for “national champion” policies to be sensible. However, we also introduce the possibility of capital flight by allowing a domestic firm to move production abroad. Restrictive cross-border merger policies can then seriously backfire, since they do not necessarily bring about a domestic merger — but capital flight instead.     

Mergers and Trade Policy under Oligopoly

For an oligopolistic industry, the effects of mergers on the domestic country's optimal trade policy are analyzed. If the domestic country pursues an optimal trade policy then it will always lose as a result of a foreign merger. The optimal domestic response to a foreign merger is to decrease (increase) the tariff if demand is concave (convex) and to increase the production subsidy. The foreign merger reduces foreign welfare when the domestic country pursues its optimal trade policy. The optimal domestic response to a domestic merger is to leave the tariff unchanged and to increase the production subsidy.     

Multidivisional firms, internal competition, and the merger paradox

Abstract.  Traditional modelling of mergers has the merged firms (insiders) cooperate and maximize joint profits. This approach has several unappealing results in quantity‐setting games, for example, mergers typically are not profitable for insiders, but are profitable for non‐merging firms (outsiders). We take a different approach and allow for a parent company that can play each insider off one another. In quantity‐setting games, with our approach mergers are profitable for insiders, unprofitable for outsiders, socially beneficial, and involve (in a non‐monopolizing merger) a small number of firms. Finally, we find that the optimal strategy depends on whether firms compete in quantity or prices. JEL classification: L000     

Trade Liberalization and the Profitability of Domestic Mergers

It is often thought that a tariff reduction, by opening‐up the domestic market to foreign firms, should lessen the need for a policy aimed at discouraging domestic mergers. This implicitly assumes that the tariff in question is sufficiently high to prevent foreign firms from selling in the domestic market. However, not all tariffs are prohibitive, so that foreign firms may be present in the domestic market before it is abolished. Furthermore, even if the tariff is prohibitive, a merger of domestic firms may render it nonprohibitive, thus inviting foreign firms to penetrate the domestic market. Using a simple example, the authors show that, in the latter two cases, abolishing the tariff may in fact make the domestic merger more profitable. Hence trade liberalization will not necessarily reduce the profitability of domestic mergers.     

Brotherhood of competition: Foreign Direct Investment and domestic mergers

We examine the effects of mergers on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and on shaping national policies regarding FDI. In this work we develop a partial equilibrium model of an oligopolistic industry in which a number of domestic and foreign firms compete in the market for a homogeneous good in a host country. It is assumed that the number of foreign firms is endogenous and can be affected by the government policy in the host country. The government sets the policy (subsidies) to maximise social welfare. We allow domestic mergers. Our main results suggest that when the host country government imposes discriminatory lump-sum subsidy in favor of foreign firms, a merger of domestic firms will increase the number of FDI if the subsidy level is exogenous. With an endogenous level of subsidy, a merger of domestic firms will decrease (increase) the welfare if the domestic firms are more (less) efficient.     

Tariff‐jumping FDI and domestic firms' profits

Abstract.  Studies of trade policy welfare effects often ignore the potential for tariff‐jumping foreign direct investment (FDI) to mitigate positive gains to domestic producers. Using event study methodology we find that affirmative U.S. antidumping decisions are associated with average abnormal gains of over 3% to a firm in the petitioning industry in the absence of tariff‐jumping FDI, but much smaller and statistically insignificant abnormal gains if there is tariff‐jumping FDI. We also find evidence that tariff jumping in the form of new plants or plant expansion has significantly larger negative effects on U.S. domestic firms' profits than other types of tariff‐jumping FDI. JEL Classification: F13, F23, L11     

International merger activity and the national regulation of mergers: A UK perspective

This paper traces out recent changes in the globalisation of merger activity and considers its implications for national and international regulation of mergers and joint ventures. It argues that a large proportion of mergers involve small firms which may have an important effect on the competitive process and that regulation of large mergers should be complemented by industrial and financial policies to encourage the growth of smaller independent firms.     

The closed‐loop effect and the profitability of horizontal mergers

Abstract.  We study the profitability of horizontal mergers in a dynamic competition context with sticky prices. It is shown that, when firms use open‐loop strategies, a merger is profitable only if the share of the market that merges is significant enough. In the case where firms use closed‐loop strategies we provide a method to conduct analytically the study of the profitability of horizontal mergers. We first prove the existence of an equilibrium of the game when a subset of firms merges. When firms use feedback strategies, mergers are profitable even when the share of the market that merges is arbitrarily small. JEL Classification:D4, L13     

Mergers and the market for organization capital

In this paper, mergers are an equilibrium outcome in which acquirers “marry” targets so as to gain access to their organization capital. Firms with lower learning costs about the new technology are not necessarily those that manage it best once it is mature. Since there are gains from trade, a market for organization capital can arise through mergers. This model generates a merger wave after a shock to technology and is consistent with several other stylized facts on mergers documented in the literature.     

Privatization and Strategic Mergers across Borders

We present a theoretical model to capture the role of privatization in the incentives for and implications of cross‐border horizontal mergers. Absent any merger incentives in an autarkic equilibrium, we show that a decrease in the degree of privatization will lower the incentives for diversification of international production. The incentives for diversification for any given degree of privatization will fall when the private and public firms are allowed to move sequentially rather than simultaneously. The presence of the public firm also introduces a new source of asymmetry in the incentives for cross‐border mergers: a reduction in the degree of privatization at home will dampen the potential gains from a take‐over of a home firm by a foreign firm but magnify the potential gains from a take‐over of a foreign firm by a home firm.     

提升利用外资质量:理论分析与对策思路

在提升利用外资质量上,现有研究更多地关注本土生产要素,尤其是劳动力素质的提高和外资开放领域的不断扩大对吸引高端FDI的重要作用。但从实践情况来看,现有的努力包括鼓励外资向高端投资的政策导向,似乎并没有如我们预期那样带动FDI向高端领域流入。尽管我国加入世界贸易组织以后,经济已经不是"出口导向型"经济而是开放型经济,但由于体制、机制、外资外贸政策等因素作用,来华投资的外资却表现出明显的"出口导向"特征,实际上把中国作为全球的加工厂,这就严重影响了中国利用外资水平和层次的提升。因此,发挥中国国内市场规模优势,破除各种体制机制等障碍因素,适时调整外资外贸政策,应当成为中国提升外资利用质量的着力点。     

Sequential mergers and competition policy under partial privatisation

We examine optimal merger and privatisation policies in a partially privatised oligopoly with differentiated goods. We first show that under the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, sequential mergers either emerge completely or do not emerge at all. Given this outcome, we derive the following policy implications. First, the level of social welfare can be U‐shaped with respect to the number of merged firm pairs. That is, given that there are some mergers that have already taken place, further mergers may actually lead to welfare improvement. However, these welfare‐improving mergers may not be privately profitable, implying that merger‐friendly policies are appropriate. Second, policymakers can halt privatisation in order to diminish the private incentive for further sequential (welfare‐deteriorating) mergers and improve welfare. Third, full nationalisation is never optimal unless the goods are homogeneous or independent. Our results are applicable to the Japanese life insurance industry and the partial privatisation of Japan Post Insurance.     

Horizontal Mergers in a Liberalizing World Economy

This paper is concerned with the effect of horizontal mergers in an open economy environment. It is found that, with the presence of economies of scale and imperfect competition, a domestic merger may bring about an additional gain to the country in that it shifts profit from foreign to domestic firms. Consequently, the condition on the degree of economies of scale for permitting domestic horizontal mergers would be weaker under an open economy than under a closed economy. Furthermore, the analysis shows that such mergers can also raise foreign welfare. Finally, the model is used to discuss the need to coordinate merger policies among trading partners in tandem with trade liberalization.     

NEW ZEALAND CREDIT UNION MERGERS

ABSTRACT ** : Research into the benefits of mergers in small financial institutions, in particular credit unions, is sparse. This study helps to fill this gap by analyzing recent intense merger activity in New Zealand credit unions. The major driver for these mergers was not the usual reason of attempting to increase efficiency for competitive purposes but rather enforced government action. Data envelopment analysis is used to explore changes in efficiency in merged credit unions between 1996 and 2001. Those credit unions not involved in merger activity are used as a control group. Overall, credit unions have become more efficient over the period, notably in those that undertook mergers. The Malmquist index indicates significant technological progress over the period but a slight regression in terms of efficiency.     

Merger policy,entry, and entrepreneurship

We assess the impact of merger policy on entry and entrepreneurship. When faced with uncertainty about its prospects, and foreseeing that it may wish to leave the market should profitability prove poor, a rational entrant considers possible exit routes. Horizontal merger reduces competition post-merger which, all else being equal, lowers welfare; but merger also provides a valuable exit route. By facilitating exit and thus raising the value of entry, more lenient merger policy may stimulate entry sufficiently that welfare is increased overall. We calculate the optimal merger policy in the form of a low, but positive, profitability threshold below which merger is permitted despite the adverse impact on post-merger competition. This may be viewed as an extension of the “failing firm defence” to include ailing, low profitability firms as well as imminently failing ones. Merger policy is compared with an entry subsidy, and the implications of strategic firm behaviour for the choice of merger policy are also examined.