考虑渠道偏好的双渠道供应链定价研究

电子商务发展给企业带来利润的同时也带来了挑战,合理定价至关重要,本文考虑消费者对渠道偏好情况,研究在集中控制和分散控制的模式下,运用消费者效用以及Stackelberg博弈论,给出两种情况下的定价策略。     

非对称信息下双渠道供应链定价策略研究

针对需求信息非对称的环境下双渠道供应链中零售商和制造商的追求利益最大化的问题,研究了双渠道供应链的定价策略。通过构建数学模型求得了最优解,并且做了相应的数值分析。结果表明:同一渠道需求弹性系数对定价的影响大于交叉渠道需求弹性系数对定价的影响;双渠道供应链各参与者之间需求信息的共享更加有利于制定合理的定价,并取得更高的收益。     

电子商务环境下营销渠道结构研究

本文根据电子渠道由谁建立并提供什么服务原则,总结出四种电子商务环境下的渠道结构,并对每一种结构模式进行了分析,以使读者了解电子商务环境下渠道结构变化给企业带来的影响。     

竞争环境下零售商双渠道选择与定价策略

在竞争环境下,分别建立零售商单渠道和双渠道的Stackelberg模型,运用逆序归纳法求最优解,然后进行对比分析得出相关结论。研究表明,在满足一定条件下,零售商选择双渠道策略有利于利润的增加,并且,实施差异化定价策略能实现利润最大化。此外,双渠道线上和线下价格随着市场需求量的增加而增加,但随着价格弹性系数值的增加而减少。因此,建议零售商实施线下与线上融合的双渠道经营模式,采取差异化定价策略,提供个性化商品和服务,这样既能更好地满足顾客的需要,又能实现企业利润最大化。     

互联网环境下企业面临双渠道下的定价策略分析

<正>近些年互联网技术迅速发展,越来越多消费者也开始选择网络渠道进行购物。对于企业来说,在原有单一分销渠道的基础上建立新的网络直销渠道,不仅可以提高企业产品的销量,还可以降低企业成本。     

Internet拥堵的差别定价策略研究

伴随着Internet的普遍接入，拥堵正逐渐成为阻碍有效使用Internet网络资源的严重障碍。现有文献多从效用最大化和社会福利最大化出发，复杂地推导出一种价格机制。本文通过构造一个多用户差别定价模型，利用消费者剩余和生产者剩余的概念，简明直观地证明了差别价格能够提高经济效率，这是一种新的视角和解决方法。     

电子商务环境下双渠道闭环供应链协调定价模型

在电子商务环境下运用博弈理论研究了具有零售渠道和直销渠道的闭环供应链的定价与协调问题。分析和比较了分散决策与集中决策对双渠道闭环供应链节点企业定价决策和利润的影响,发现分散决策将导致一定的效率损失。为弥补这种效率损失,设计了一个两部收费制契约,以实现双渠道闭环供应链的协调。     

电子商务环境下双渠道闭环供应链协调定价模型

在电子商务环境下运用博弈理论研究了具有零售渠道和直销渠道的闭环供应链的定价与协调问题。分析和比较了分散决策与集中决策对双渠道闭环供应链节点企业定价决策和利润的影响,发现分散决策将导致一定的效率损失。为弥补这种效率损失,设计了一个两部收费制契约,以实现双渠道闭环供应链的协调。     

浅析内部控制要素的结构及其逻辑关系

本文以COSO年报告（1992）为基础，结合《企业内部控制基本规范》的要求，对内部控制五要素的结构、功能、相互之间的逻辑关系进行了分析和阐述．提出了如何用内控要素结构及其逻辑关系去健全完善内部控制的建议。     

石油化工企业寡头垄断分析

寡头垄断是指一种商品的生产和销售由少数几家大厂商所控制的市场结构.在寡头垄断条件下,少数几家大厂商供给整个行业的绝大部分产品,其中每一个大厂商在整个市场上都占有相当大的份额,足以影响市场供求关系和价格.本文以中石油和中石化为研究案例,通过建立古诺模型,分析垄断企业的定价策略,进而对寡头垄断进行利弊分析.     

Strategic Choice of Channel Structure in an Oligopoly

The traditional wisdom holds that the benefits of a decentralized channel structure arise from downstream competitive relationships. In contrast, in their 2007 paper in the Accounting Review, Arya and Mittendorf show that the value of decentralization can also come from the upstream relationship when the downstream firms convey internal strife (decentralization) to an upstream input supplier. This paper demonstrates that the Arya and Mittendorf result continues to hold irrespective of the market structure of the upstream input market. However, if the upstream market is monopolized and the monopoly supplier follows a uniform price policy, decentralization may not result from the centralization–decentralization game. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Input Suppliers,Differential Pricing,and Information Sharing Agreements

It is common for firms to systematically share information with their input suppliers. Although such agreements with horizontal rivals have been analyzed, there has been little work examining vertical sharing, and that analysis has focused on suppliers that set uniform prices. However, there has been a systematic change in the US policy toward vertical relationships in the past decades: both FTC inaction and courts rulings have curtailed the effect of Robinson‐Patman, a law meant to prevent differential pricing. Furthermore, it is not clear if differential pricing reflects the suppliers' or the buyers' power. The interaction of these effects is examined.     

Endogenous Social Comparisons and the Internal Organization of Firms

Should workers of a firm be organizationally integrated to realize benefits from benchmarking? Or should they be separated to preclude horizontal social comparisons? This paper highlights a trade‐off that arises if social comparisons in firms are endogenous. We analyze a principal multi‐agent model in which the principal trades off the reduction of agents' risk exposures by use of relative performance evaluation and the thereby induced social comparisons for which agents must be compensated. Contrary to standard theoretical predictions, relative performance evaluation is optimal only if the performance measures are sufficiently correlated relative to the agents' regard for others. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Endogenous mergers under multi-market competition

This paper examines a simple model of strategic interactions among firms that face at least some of the same rivals in two related markets (for goods 1 and 2). It shows that when firms compete in quantity, market prices increase as the degree of multi-market contact increases. However, the welfare consequences of multi-market contact are more complex and depend on how two fundamental forces play out. The first is the selection effect, which acts to increase welfare, as shutting down the relatively more inefficient firm is beneficial. The second opposing effect is the internalisation of the Cournot externality effect; reducing the production of good 2 allows firms to sustain a higher price for good 1. This works to increase prices and, therefore, decrease consumer surplus (but increase producer surplus). These two effects are influenced by the degree of asymmetry between markets 1 and 2 and the degree of substitutability between goods 1 and 2.     

企业集团逆向回收渠道选择策略研究

随着环保意识和可持续发展意识的增强,废旧产品的回收再利用越来越受到人们的广泛关注。一个具有旧产品回收再造功能的企业集团存在两种逆向回收渠道结构:一是上游回收模式,即上游子公司直接从消费者手中回收旧产品;二是下游回收模式,即下游子公司直接从消费者手中回收旧产品。研究结果表明,上游回收模式优于下游回收模式,而且,在上游回收模式下,集团的利润、旧产品回收率均随着下游产品替代程度的增强而增大。上游回收模式也优于不具有旧产品回收再造功能的渠道结构。     

不同组织结构内部资本市场运行机制比较

本文在吸收国内外学者关于内部资本市场组织载体、运行机制等研究成果的基础上，从组织结构视角研究内部资本市场运行机制问题，分析了M型、H型组织结构内部资本市场在企业总部融资方式、内部资金分配方式、内部信息传递渠道、激励约束机制和内部资本市场运作方式方面存在的共性，比较了内部资本市场参与主体的性质、企业总部的控制力强度、资金分配中介、“内部人控制”问题对内部资本市场运行的影响方面存在的差异。     

Platform Pricing Structure and Moral Hazard

We study pricing by a two‐sided platform when it faces moral hazard on the sellers' side. In doing so, we introduce an equilibrium notion of platform reputation in an infinite horizon model. We find that with transaction fees only, the platform cannot eliminate the loss of reputation induced by moral hazard. If registration fees can be levied, moral hazard can be overcome. The registration fee determines the participation threshold of sellers and extracts them, whereas (lower) transaction fees provide incentives for good behavior. This provides a motivation for platforms to use registration fees in addition to transaction fees.     

在线渠道下消费者品牌选择的状态依赖行为探究

状态依赖是传统渠道下消费者品牌选择呈现动态性的重要原因.在线渠道下,消费者品牌选择的状态依赖依然存在,并具有独特性.本文在传统渠道下状态依赖研究的基础上,探讨在线渠道下消费者品牌选择的正向状态依赖(结构性状态依赖和习惯持续性)以及负向状态依赖(寻求差异行为)的行为,并对未来研究提出了建议.     

Choice of Treatment Intensities by a Nonprofit Hospital Under Prospective Pricing

Under prospective pricing, payers for health care essentially use price regulation of hospitals as a way of indirectly regulating the provision of treatment intensity. This paper presents a theory of how a nonprofit hospital selects treatment intensities for its products given the payer's choice of prices and then determines how the payer should select prices in light of this theory. The main result is that, in equilibrium, the ratio of price to marginal cost will vary across products inversely with the elasticity of demand with respect to treatment intensity. This means that, generally, the hospital will earn positive (negative) accounting profit on products with low-(high-) intensity elasticities of demand.     

商业银行内部控制建设的现实选择

商业银行的“内控建设”已初见成效,但还存在诸多问题。本文分别从内部控制建立和运行两方面分析了商业银行内部控制建设存在的问题和现实选择,并指出商业银行的“内控建设”重在执行。