所有权性质、CEO任期与会计稳健性

以高阶理论为基础,运用声誉机制理论、任期五阶段模型、任职期限理论、职业生涯关注等相关理论,以我国2010~2014年 A 股上市公司为样本,实证研究了 CEO 现有任期和预期任期对会计稳健性的影响,并进一步研究了产权性质差异对两者关系的调节效应。研究发现,CEO 现有任期与会计稳健性呈倒U 型关系,CEO 预期任期与会计稳健性正相关。与非国有上市公司相比,在国有上市公司中,CEO 现有任期和预期任期对会计稳健性的影响都更强。     

CEO任期与盈余管理相关性的实证研究

文章选择A股上市公司2004—2011年的数据,结合CEO声誉机制理论对CEO任期及盈余管理的影响进行实证研究。研究结果表明,CEO任期与盈余管理程度显著负相关,CEO任期越长,企业的盈余管理程度越大。在CEO任期的初期,盈余管理程度增加。随着任期的增加,在CEO任期的中间时期盈余管理的程度有所下降。而在CEO离任的前一年,盈余管理程度较大。文章最后针对研究结果提出了改善盈余管理程度的政策建议。     

中国CEO投资峰会

中国的传统产业正处在一个非常重要的发展阶段，这个阶段，正是在资本的推动下完成的。在海外资本的参与下，中国的传统产业正在发生裂变，谁拿到钱谁就有机会以几何级数的速度增长，超过自己曾经崇拜的对手，并让对手更加恐慌。     

CEO和CFO任期交错与会计信息质量的关系研究

随着市场经济的不断完善,CFO的地位开始从战略的角度全面参与公司管理,成为CEO的真正决策伙伴。作为公司的两大关键性人物,CFO与CEO任职期间的交错直接影响着公司的盈余管理水平,同时也影响到公司对外公布的会计信息质量。本文的研究发现丰富了高层梯队理论,盈余管理和会计信息质量等相关领域的文献;同时,对于如何提高公司的会计信息质量,以及CEO与CFO任命等人力资源管理决策方面也有重要的启示意义。     

CEO过度自信与企业创新投资影响研究

随着传统的理性人假设无法解释很多实际现象而受到质疑,越来越多的学者开始接受不完全理性假设,开始研究人的非理性因素对企业管理的意义。正是在这种背景下,过度自信作为人类最稳固的心理特征开始受到国内外学者的重视,也逐渐形成了管理者过度自信理论。本文正是基于管理者过度自信理论,着眼于探讨企业最高管理者CEO的过度自信特性会对企业的创新投资的影响。在实证数据研究的基础上,本文发现过度自信的CEO会增加创新投资。     

CEO过度自信对企业投资和非效率投资的影响——基于企业自由现金流调节作用的实证研究

本文研究了CEO过度自信对企业投资和非效率投资的影响,以及企业自由现金流对二者之间关系的影响。研究结果表明,CEO过度自信对企业投资和非效率投资都具有促进作用,同时,企业自由现金流也可以直接或间接促进企业投资和非效率投资。     

市场竞争、资本配置与上市公司过度投资研究

企业投资行为直接关系到上市公司利润的产生与完成,有效的投资行为可以帮助企业把握市场发展动向、提高资金的配置效率以及降低企业的财务风险.本文针对目前国内上市公司投资决策能力不强以及存在过度投资行为的状况,探讨市场竞争、资本配置与上市公司过度投资之间的影响机理.通过对2010-2013年沪深两市工业类上市公司进行实证研究证实:市场竞争程度直接负向影响上市公司过度投资行为,市场竞争程度直接正向影响企业资本配置的效率,企业资本配置的有效性直接负向影响上市公司过度投资行为,同时市场竞争还可以通过对资本配置的影响间接影响上市公司的过度投资行为.     

管理者任期、晋升激励与研发投资研究

本文在委托代理理论的分析框架下,着重运用高层梯队理论和心理契约理论,以我国2008—2012年上市公司为样本,考察了在晋升激励的作用下,管理者的既有任期和预期任期对研发投资的影响。结果发现:管理者既有任期与研发投资呈倒U型关系;管理者预期任期与研发投资正相关;晋升激励在既有任期影响研发投资中起到了正向调节作用,但在非国有公司中强于国有公司;晋升激励在预期任期影响研发投资中尚未起到调节作用,但在非国有公司中却起到了负向调节作用。这些研究结论对于深入理解企业的研发投资行为,以及完善管理者晋升激励机制和加强人力资源管理都具有一定的启示意义。     

CEO财务经历与资本结构决策

本文以发生CEO变更事件的中国上市公司为研究样本,利用双重差分模型,检验了CEO的财务经历对资本结构决策的影响。实证结果表明:财务经历CEO显著提高了公司的负债水平,加快了资本结构的调整速度,并降低了资本结构偏离目标的程度,这说明财务经历的CEO对公司资本结构决策具有重要且正面的影响。同时,我们发现,只有在第一大股东持股比例较低的情况下,财务经历CEO才能对资本结构决策有显著影响,这表明财务经历的CEO对资本结构的优化是有一定条件的。     

CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验

本文利用逐步回归和路径分析方法 ,检验了我国上市公司CEO薪酬的激励制约机制和激励制约效果。结果发现 :(1)决定CEO薪酬增长的因素主要是营业利润率变动 ,决定CEO薪酬下降的因素则主要是总资产净利率变动 ,这表明在我国上市公司的CEO薪酬层面已体现了一定的激励制约机制 ;(2 )增加CEO薪酬对提高企业的规模和股东财富均有一定的促进作用 ,但降低CEO薪酬却不仅不能提高企业规模和股东财富 ,反而会对其产生一定的负面影响 ,这不仅说明CEO薪酬也具有“工资刚性”特征 ,而且说明我国上市公司的CEO薪酬也仅有单方面的激励效果 ,而没有预期的制约效果 ;(3)无论是增加或降低CEO薪酬 ,CEO均不存在盈余管理或利润操纵的机会主义行为 ,这表明CEO进行盈余管理或利润操纵的动机不应该是为了增加其公开性薪酬 ,而应该是居于除公开性薪酬以外的其他目的。     

Audit Firm Tenure and Audit Quality in a Constrained Market

We examine the relation between audit quality and audit firm tenure in the Iranian audit market, which is constrained by government policies that create intense competition for clients among many small audit firms. We develop arguments that these circumstances create cost pressures that entrench low audit quality and render auditors' plans more predictable to managers wishing to misstate their accounts. Using publicly available data for the audits of listed companies in Iran prior to mandatory audit firm rotation and the incidence of misstated financial reports identified by the Iranian Association of Certified Public Accountants Inspection Office, we find that the likelihood of a misstatement is lowest in the first two years of audit firm tenure. We also find that the likelihood of misstatement is not associated with the year preceding a mandatory audit firm rotation, suggesting outgoing auditor effort is not sensitive to the prospect of subsequent revelations of deficiencies. Although our results from a pre-mandatory rotation period show that frequent rotations appear to improve the financial reporting quality in our sample, we are wary of interpreting these results as support for the mandatory audit firm rotation policy in Iran. Rather, we suggest this is a peculiar consequence of deficiencies in audit quality inherent in the Iranian market.     

Capital expenditures and firm performance: evidence from a cross‐sectional analysis of stock returns

Using a simple two‐period model of investment, we show that there should be a nonlinear relation between a firm's investment‐to‐capital ratio and its subsequent stock returns. This prediction finds substantial empirical support. The evidence indicates that the slope of the investment function is negative at low investment levels, close to zero at intermediate investment levels and negative at high investment levels. Our results, which are robust to the use of narrowly‐ and broadly‐defined measures of capital investment, pose a challenge to the hypothesis that the negative cross‐sectional correlation between investment and stock returns is attributable to some sort of overinvestment phenomenon.     

Firm Performance and CEO Reputation Costs: New Evidence from the Venezuelan Banking Crisis

When searching for outside directors, the performance of the candidate as a manager of other firms is important. Using a sample of Venezuelan banks during a systemic crisis, we find that the outside directorships of chief executive officers (CEOs) are negatively affected by banks' performances, measured by their default risk. Our results suggest that a CEOs' personal monitoring talents are what is being purchased when CEOs are appointed as outside directors. In addition, the negative effect of firms' performances on their CEOs' reputations is significantly stronger in an emerging market, suggesting that CEO reputation helps to control for managerial agency costs when other governance mechanisms are absent. The size of the bank has a positive effect on CEO reputation, which partially offsets the negative reputation effect of the bank risk.     

Zombie Board: Board Tenure and Firm Performance

We show that board tenure exhibits an inverted U‐shaped relation with firm value and accounting performance. The quality of corporate decisions, such as M&A, financial reporting quality, and CEO compensation, also has a quadratic relation with board tenure. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that directors’ on‐the‐job learning improves firm value up to a threshold, at which point entrenchment dominates and firm performance suffers. To address endogeneity concerns, we use a sample of firms in which an outside director suffered a sudden death, and find that sudden deaths that move board tenure away from (toward) the empirically observed optimum level in the cross‐section are associated with negative (positive) announcement returns. The quality of corporate decisions also follows an inverted U‐shaped pattern in a sample of firms affected by the death of a director.     

Strategic Investment by a Regulated Firm

A government's choice of regulatory stringency can depend on investments that a firm made in earlier periods. The regulated firm may therefore invest strategically, to effect the government's choice of regulation. To reduce its payment of emissions taxes, the firm may therefore reduce emissions below their socially optimal level. In contrast, a firm subject to regulation by quantity wants to reduce the stringency of regulations. A firm which invests little thereby reduces the marginal social cost of reducing emissions, and so can induce government to weaken its regulations.     

农村人力资本投资结构与内生经济增长

本文从理论上构建了农村人力资本投资结构(包括私人和公共)对农村经济增长影响的模型,运用我国四大经济地区面板数据分析了农村私人和公共教育投资与健康投资对人力资本增量的促进作用,以及人力资本增量对农村经济增长的内在影响并加以检验.结果主要表明:农村人力资本投资结构对人力资本增量,人力资本增量对农村经济增长都具有一定的正向作用;农村私人和公共人力资本投资相对强调了教育投资而轻视了健康投资;私人人力资本投资产出效率高于公共人力资本投资产出效率;四大地区农村人力资本投资额与结构都存在较为明显的差距.     

公司的资本成本与投资理性——来自沪深上市公司的证据

本文对我国上市公司的投资行为及其影响因素进行了实证研究。结果表明：（1）上市企业的投资决策受资本成本的约束显著，符合市场理性；（2）企业投资对内部现金流、外部负债融资和股权融资都具有敏感性，但回归系数依序递减，可能说明了不同融资形式的成本差异；（3）产品市场需求增长为企业带来了有价值的投资机会，具有拉动企业投资的显著作用。     

Calculating The Cost of Capital of an Unlevered Firm For Use in Project Evaluation

The adjusted present value requires an estimate of the cost of equity of an unlevered firm. Traditional approaches for calculating this cost assume that firms maintain a constant market-value percentage of debt when in fact firms typically use a book-value percentage of debt. In this paper, we present an approach to correctly estimate the cost of equity of an unlevered firm whenever the firm fails to maintain a constant market-value-based leverage ratio. We also demonstrate that both the Modigliani and Miller (1963) and Miles and Ezzell (1980) approaches may yield substantial valuation errors when firms determine debt levels based on book-value percentages. In contrast our method makes no errors as long as managers know the marginal tax benefit of debt.     

政治关系、地区经济增长与企业投资行为

本文以2007～2008年我国沪深主板市场上586家民营上市公司为样本,实证研究了政治关系对企业投资行为的影响。经验结果显示:(1)从整体上看,相比于没有政治关系的民营上市公司,具有政治关系的民营上市公司的投资支出更多;(2)经济增长影响了政治关系作用的发挥,良好的经济增长弱化了政治关系对企业投资行为的影响;(3)政治关系与投资支出之间的关系在不同规模公司之间存在差异,政治关系对投资支出的影响在小公司中更加显著。