Youth Wages, Risk, and Tertiary Finance Arrangements*

Human capital earnings functions typically explain a small fraction of the total variation in earnings. The considerable uncertainty associated with expected future earnings streams enhances the desirability of a loans scheme for higher education possessing income contingent characteristics on the repayment side. The Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) possesses this feature The profitability of higher education even after taking account of the HECS suggests there is scope for higher student contributions. Other possible modifications to the HECS include higher repayment rates, a change to the tax base, and a minimum repayment amount     

Taxes,Tuition Fees,and Education for Pleasure

The fact that education provides both a productive and a consumptive (nonproductive) return has important and, in some cases, dramatic implications for optimal taxes and tuition fees. Using a simple model, we show that when the consumption share in education is endogenous and tuition fees are unconstrained, the optimal tax/fee system involves regressive income taxes and high tuition fees. A progressive labor income tax system may, on the other hand, be a second‐best response to politically constrained, low tuition fees. Finally, the existence of individuals with different abilities will also move the optimal income tax system toward progressivity.     

Tuition fees: User prices and private incentives

This paper studies the aggregate and distributional implications of introducing tuition fees for public education services into a tax system with income and consumption taxes. The setup is a neoclassical growth model where agents differ in capital holdings. We show that the introduction of tuition fees (a) improves individual incentives to work and/or save and (b) can be both efficient and equitable. The focus is on the role of tuition fees as an extra price and how this affects private incentives.     

The Design of Optimal Education Policies

This paper studies the education policy chosen by a utilitarian government. In the model, households differ in their income and in their children&'s ability; income is observed by the government, but ability is private information. Households can use private education, but cannot borrow to finance it. The government can finance education with income tax, but at the cost of blunting the individuals' incentive to exert labour market effort. The optimal education policy we derive is elitist: it increases the spread between the educational achievement of the bright and the less bright individuals, compared to private provision. It is also such that the education received by less bright individuals depends positively on their parental income. Finally, the optimal education policy is input regressive, in the sense of Arrow (1971, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 38, 175–208): households with higher income and brighter children contribute less in tuition fees towards the cost of the education system than households with lower income and less bright children.     

Higher Education: Subsidizing Tuition versus Subsidizing Student Loans

We use a simple two‐period equilibrium framework to explore the effects of two different subsidization regimes for higher education on the formation of human capital and on the distribution of incomes. Individuals finance their investments in higher education through income‐contingent education loans as well as subsidies from the government. The subsidy is tax‐financed. We compare an egalitarian subsidy scheme, which reduces by a uniform amount the tuition charged to students, with a student loan subsidy which is proportional to the student's debt service obligation. We show that both types of subsidies reduce the economy‐wide underinvestment in higher education and lead to a more equal income distribution. Furthermore, according to some social welfare criterion, the student loan subsidy regime dominates the tuition subsidy regime if the subsidy level is predetermined, while the converse is true if the subsidy level constitutes a choice variable of the government.     

Education for all. A welfare-improving course for Africa?

In this paper, we argue that the case for universal compulsory education for sub-Saharan Africa might have been overstated. We capture the African situation through a heterogeneous-agent model, in which high costs of education relative to income and the skill premium cause the economy to stagnate in a low steady state with minimal educational attainment. We calibrate the model to available data from the sub-Saharan African countries to study education policies. We find that a tax and in-kind subsidy scheme that effectively redistributes resources from households with lower ability children to those with higher ability children outperforms enrollment-maximizing policies such as the abolition of child labor and compulsory education.     

Testing sensitivity of student enrollment with respect to tuition at an institution of higher education

This study was conducted to measure the impact of H-University's (HU's) tuition increases on enrollment. Based on an internal survey, this study attempts to explain the sensitivity of student enrollment to tuition variations. In addition, this paper develops an aggregate enrollment model and uses the common economic variables such as tuition, income, wage rates, financial aids, and unemployment rates to explain the sensitivity of demand. The most significant finding of this study is that tuition consideration seems to have a relatively small effect on students' decisions. Actually, enrollment at HU (a private institution) have increased despite higher tuition rate. Possible justifications could be proposed, such as the necessity of higher education and the fact that higher education is a continued investment in human capital, in which the more relevant decision factor is the corresponding expected rate of return and not just the cost of investment. Presented at the International Atlantic Economic Society's Conference, Vienna, Austria, March 2003.     

“PAY IT FORWARD” AND HIGHER EDUCATION SUBSIDIES: A MEDIAN VOTER MODEL

Since 2012, at least 24 states have considered legislation on Pay It Forward (PIF) models of higher education finance (which enable students to pay the price of college upon departure from an institution, as opposed to paying upfront tuition). This paper proposes a theoretical model of PIF policies within a framework in which voters belonging to different income groups vote over the level of subsidies to higher education. We analyze the impact of two types of potential PIF policies—a deferred tuition approach and an income share approach—on college access and on voting equilibria over subsidy levels. The results show that college access is enhanced by PIF policies. The equilibrium level of subsidies depends crucially on the pattern of income distribution, in particular on the relationship between mean income and the income of the median income group, and on whether higher education widens or narrows the distribution of income. We show that the equilibrium level of subsidies to higher education will not necessarily decline under PIF, and may increase in some circumstances due to changes in college access for low‐income groups. (JEL I22, I23)     

Employment- and growth effects of tax reforms

Since the mid-1990s almost all OECD countries have engaged in fundamental reforms of their tax systems. There is a trend towards higher social security contributions and lower tax rates on personal and corporate income. This paper explores whether these tax policy measures are effective means for reducing unemployment and accelerating economic growth. Using a Pissarides type search model with endogenous growth, we analyze how savings and the incentive to create new jobs are affected by revenue-neutral tax swaps between wage income taxes, payroll taxes, capital income taxes and taxes levied on capital costs. In our framework, cutting the capital income tax (reducing the double taxation of dividend income) financed by a higher payroll tax turns out to be superior, such a policy mix fosters both employment and growth. Most other tax reforms imply a trade-off between employment and growth.     

A quantitative analysis of Turkish Private Education Reform

A recent education policy Turkish government is wishing to undertake is to shut down all private supplementary education centers (SECs) unless SECs manage to convert into a private school. With this policy, the government is willing to increase equality of opportunity among students. We show quantitatively that the policy, in fact, leads to a decrease in equality of opportunity since SECs are given the option to convert into private schools. We use a political economy model of education at which households, heterogeneous with respect to exogenously set income, choose among a continuum of private schools differentiated by tuition and a public school. Households choosing the public school can privately supplement their child's education spending in any amount. Public school is free of charge, and its spending is financed by income tax revenue collected from all households. Income tax rate is determined by majority voting. Achievement of a child depends only on educational spending. We calibrate the model's parameters by matching certain targets from 2013 Turkish data. We then exogenously restrict the supplemental education spending to zero in a counterfactual experiment. We find that variance of achievement (or inequality of opportunity) increases by 23.51% and mean achievement decreases by 1.74%.     

The determination of public tuition fees in a mixed education system: A majority voting model

We study the determination of public tuition fees through majority voting in a vertical differentiation model where agents' returns on educational investment differ and public and private universities coexist and compete in tuition fees. The private university offers higher educational quality than its competitor, incurring higher unit cost per trained student. The tuition fee for the state university is fixed by majority voting while that for the private follows from profit maximization. Then agents choose to train at the public university or the private one or to remain uneducated. The tax per head adjusts in order to balance the state budget. Because there is a private alternative, preferences for education are not single‐peaked and no single‐crossing condition holds. An equilibrium is shown to exist, which is one of three types: high tuition fee (the “ends” are a majority), low tuition fee (the “middle” is a majority), or mixed (votes tie). The cost structure determines which equilibrium obtains. The equilibrium tuition is either greater (majority at the ends) or smaller (majority at the middle) than the optimal one.     

Optimal fiscal decentralization: Redistribution and welfare implications

The literature has been inconclusive regarding the welfare effects of fiscal decentralization (FD), defined here as the extent to which local governments collect and spend local tax revenues. We present an original model to investigate formally the distributional and welfare implications of FD. In contrast to the standard approach that compares the implications of full FD with that of centralization, we consider that the central government chooses the level of FD to maximize welfare in a heterogeneous country. Noncooperatively, local governments choose their tax collection effort to maximize local utility. We show that an increase in the tax rate leads optimal FD to increase so as to compensate for the welfare loss from decreasing optimal local tax effort. Hence, welfare and income distribution improve in FD at its intermediate, rather than extreme, levels. We coin this result as the decentralization-Laffer curve. As regional spillovers increase, FD is less desirable as it deteriorates welfare and income distribution. This finding provides a novel support for the decentralization theorem and contributes to the fiscal policy debate.     

税收成本、非税成本与企业组织形式选择——基于经济模型的研究框架

基于税收考虑的企业组织形式选择也称为最优企业组织形式税务筹划,即选择某种企业组织形式寻求最有效的税务筹划决策,税收成本和非税成本是影响这种有效选择的主要因素。不考虑非税成本时,企业组织形式偏好选择经济模型主要受企业所得税税率、股权转让所得的个人所得税税率、经营所得的个人所得税税率等变量影响。非税成本中的转换成本、牺牲非税优势的成本、协调与沟通成本等也是影响经济模型的重要因素。     

Should educational expenses be deductible?: A comparison of tax bases in a model where education is a choice variable

The paper studies the design of an educational policy within the context of an optimal taxation model where individuals are free to choose how much education to acquire, and also have a discrete labor-leisure choice. A linear income tax and tax deductibility of educational expenses are the only instruments available to the government, whose goal it is to use these instruments so as to maximize the utility of the worst off individual in society. The main focus of the study is how large a fraction of educational expenses should be deductible. A variation of this fraction has several opposing effects. The optimal size of the fraction depends therefore in a complicated way on the distribution of ability, the costs of producing education, and the effect of education on wages and productivity. There is no general case either for no deductibility or for full deductibility.     

Homeownership,Mobility, And Local Income Redistribution

Regions are characterized by different homeownership rates. Homeowners and renters differ in their mobility costs, renters having lower mobility costs. This paper analyses how the presence of those different types of households affects income sorting and tax differences between local jurisdictions. To this aim, we analyze a model of local income redistribution with mobile (renter) and immobile (homeowner) households. Linear income taxes finance a lump sum transfer. Policies are determined endogenously through voting. In such a framework, if there are no or only few homeowners, no income‐sorting equilibrium exists. Above a certain threshold for the homeownership rate we find an inverted U‐shaped relationship between tax differences and homeownership rates, such that tax differences between jurisdictions are highest for intermediate homeownership rates.     

Optimum Taxation of Each Year's Income

In this paper, a two‐type, two‐period model of optimum income taxation is investigated. I assume full commitment and that current income determines the agents' tax burden in each period. It is shown that such a tax system does not allow one to implement the optimal long‐term tax contract and that it implies positive marginal tax rates at the upper end of the income distribution.     

THE REDISTRIBUTIVE IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE INCOME MAINTENANCE SCHEMES: A MICROSIMULATION STUDY USING SWISS DATA

Taking a benchmark scenario, the current situation in Switzerland, and using a microsimulation technique, we compare the effectiveness of various income maintenance schemes for reducing inequality and poverty. A full negative income tax allowance designed to eliminate poverty is shown to reduce income inequality most drastically. An integrated federal linear tax rate of 62 percent is required to make it viable. Aggregate work hours are reduced by approximately 10 percent and average disposable income falls by 9.3 percent under such circumstances. A participation income restricted to adults in employment and covering 50 percent of subsistence costs is however shown to result in an unambiguous social welfare improvement over the current situation in Switzerland.     

An assessment of the impact of tax incentives relative to socio-economic characteristics on charitable giving in Canada

This research examines the effectiveness of the Canadian tax incentive system for charitable giving while attempting to deal with two persistent methodological problems in past research. The Heckman selection model and the ordered probit model are used to examine the Canadian tax incentive system with 2010 survey data. The results imply that the effect of the tax credit systematically increases with an increase in donation expenditure suggesting that the higher tax credit for larger donations is more effective than the lower tax credit for smaller donations. While the results suggest that the current tax policy is effective, socio-economic characteristics, such as wealth, household income, and university education, appear to have a greater impact on donations.     

Are Higher Education Subsidies Second Best?

An optimal taxation framework is considered in which part of the population can take advantage of investment in higher education. It is shown that social welfare can sometimes be increased by supplementing linear income taxes with a subsidy to material investment in higher education, but that social welfare can never be increased by supplementing a non‐linear income tax with such a subsidy.     

Is partial privatization of universities a solution for higher education?

This paper accounts simply for the link between higher education and the productive economy through educated workers. We study a model of vertical successive monopolies where students/workers acquire qualification from a University then “sell” skilled labor to a monopoly which itself sells its final product to consumers, linking through quality the education sector to the labor and output markets. We determine the optimal share the State should keep in the University to compensate for the market imperfections, while taking into account the inefficiencies of public management. The resulting partially privatized University fixes the tuition fees so as to maximize a weighted sum of profits and social welfare. We derive the optimal public share under the hypothesis that the State may subsidize the tuition fees/University losses, then under the constraint that the University should make a nonnegative profit. We prove that in both cases, the State should keep a substantial share (higher under the first hypothesis) in the University, unless public management is too inefficient in which case the University's management should be completely private.