政治关联、研发投入与企业价值

立足于企业研发投入,以创业板上市公司为研究对象,本文对政治关联影响企业价值的具体途径进行了探讨.研究发现,政治关联会显著地降低企业价值.同时,研发投入是政治关联影响企业价值的途径,政治关联带来的资源优势会造成企业的短视行为,降低对创新方面的投入,从而减少企业价值.进一步地,基于不同的视角将政治关联进行分类之后的回归结果表明,研发投入只在政府委员类和地方级别类政治关联中才对企业价值有着中介作用,即更优渥的政治资源对企业价值的"诅咒"效应更明显.本文的研究结论,从侧面反映了我国政企关系的现状及其对企业创新的影响.     

政治关联与公司价值国内外研究新进展

近年来,政治关联与公司财务学的交叉研究已成为公司金融领域的一大热点研究问题。本文从政治关联的定义与度量,政治关联对公司价值的影响等方面,对该领域国内外相关研究进行了系统的梳理综述,并指出未来进一步研究的方向。     

董事会政治关联、投资者关系管理与企业价值——来自民营上市公司的经验证据

随着我国资本市场的不断发展,人们对投资者关系管理的重视程度逐渐增高.而作为公司治理核心的董事会,其政治关联是一种资源和非正式的制度替代机制,对企业的投资者关系管理水平产生怎样的影响？基于此,本文以2013-2015年深市A股民营上市公司为样本,研究董事会政治关联对投资者关系管理水平的影响以及投资者关系管理在提升企业价值方面的重要作用.     

政治关联与企业资源配置研究

近年来政治关联对企业资源配置问题的影响成为国内外学者关注的热点。目前相关研究普遍局限于研究政治关联对企业财务决策过程中资源配置的影响,而对资源配置效率影响的研究较为鲜见,也未能提供具体的影响路径,从而难以合理判断政治关联对国民经济的影响。为此,本文拟将在对政治关联与企业资源配置问题方面的文献进行回顾、梳理和评述的基础上,从政治关联对企业资源配置效率影响的作用机理、政治关联的治理机制、政治关联对企业应对宏观经济调控政策影响等角度,对进一步研究方向进行了展望。     

政治关联给企业带来的利弊及对策研究

作为一种重要的关系资源,政治关联已成为学术界研究的热点问题,通过研究可知政治关联对企业各个方面的经营活动产生了重大的影响。本文将分别阐述政治关联给企业带来的“利”与“弊”,并提出相关对策建议,为促进我国企业的健康发展提供思路。     

政治关联对公司价值的影响

本文以2009年沪市A股上市的所有民营企业为研究对象,依据政治关联的度量标准,将其分为两大类：有政治关联的民营企业和没有政治关联的民营企业。然后分别研究这两类企业的公司价值,并进行比较,以确定政治关联这一因素是否会对公司的价值产生影响。     

政治关联与研发投入:基于企业税负的视角

基于2008年至2013年沪深股市上市公司的数据,从税负的角度实证检验了政治关联对研发投入的作用。研究发现,政治关联不仅能直接促进企业加大研发投入,还会通过降低企业税负以间接促进企业提高研发支出水平。     

政治关联--高管薪酬对企业绩效影响探析

本文以企业政治关联为突破点,探究不同产权性质的企业的政治关联对高管薪酬的影响,以及对企业绩效的影响。研究发现,影响高管薪酬的其他经济因素被控制下,无论是国有企业和民营企业,有政治关联的高管会获得更高薪酬。在国有企业中,有政治关联的高管薪酬与企业绩效显著负相关;在民营企业中,有政治关联的高管薪酬与企业绩效显著正相关。     

Benefits of Downward Earnings Management and Political Connection: Evidence from Government Subsidy and Market Pricing

This paper examines the role of downward earnings management and political connection on the receipt of government subsidies and market pricing of subsidies. Using subsidies data hand-collected from Chinese listed firms over the period 2004–2014, the results show a significantly positive association between downward earnings management and the receipt of government subsidies. The results also reveal that a firm's political connection is conducive to securing subsidies for poor performers, but not for good performers. Market pricing analyses demonstrate that share markets value subsidies positively in general, but the effect is ameliorated in firms conducting downward earnings management. No discernible difference is found between the market pricing of subsidies received by firms with political connections and those without.     

Political connection,market frictions and financial constraints: evidence from China

This paper studies the relationship between market frictions and political connections in determining financial constraints. We develop a novel index to measure the depth of political connections (PC) at the firm level and provide robust empirical evidence that firms in China actively build PC to alleviate the costs of market frictions. Specifically, we find that firms facing severe market frictions are not as financially constrained as expected. This is because these firms also possess strong PC, which alleviate the costs of market frictions. We find that market frictions can significantly affect financial constraints in Chinese firms, but only for those firms with modest levels of PC.     

Accounting‐Based Probabilistic Prediction of ROE,the Residual Income Valuation Model and the Assessment of Mispricing in the Swedish Stock Market

Using Swedish stock market data, this study investigates whether an investment strategy based on publicly available accounting information can generate abnormal investment returns. The strategy involves two steps. First, an accounting‐based probabilistic prediction model of changes in the medium‐term book return on owners' equity (ROE) is estimated. Second, market expectations of changes in medium‐term ROE are assessed through observed stock prices and the residual income valuation model. Stock market positions over 36‐month holding periods are taken when the accounting‐based predictions of ROE and the market expectations differ. Over the period 1983–2003, the investment strategy generated values of Jensen's alpha corresponding to an average monthly excess return for a hedge position of up to 0.8% for a sample of manufacturing companies. In the main this hedge return was caused by strong positive returns to the long positions, and additional analyses show that the returns appear to have been affected by a positive market sentiment bias (i.e., positive ROE surprises being associated with stronger price reactions than negative ROE surprises) making out‐of‐sample inferences somewhat dubious. Furthermore, most of the investment returns accrued over holding periods up to around 1995, with no indications of market mispricing over the last third (1995–2003) of the investment period. The empirical results are consistent with market investors having become more sophisticated in their use of publicly available accounting information over time.     

Political connections of newly privatized firms

We investigate the extent of political connections in newly privatized firms. Using a sample of 245 privatized firms headquartered in 27 developing and 14 developed countries over the period 1980 to 2002, we find that 87 firms have a politician or an ex-politician on their board of directors. Politically-connected firms are generally incorporated in major cities, are highly leveraged, and operate in regulated sectors. The likelihood of observing political connections in these firms is positively related to government residual ownership, and negatively related to foreign ownership. Political fractionalization and tenure, as well as judicial independence are also key explanatory variables. Finally, politically-connected firms exhibit a poor accounting performance compared to their non-connected counterparts.     

Political promotion incentives and within-firm pay gap: Evidence from China

In this paper, we investigate how the promotion incentive of politicians affects the pay gap between executives and employees in local firms. We find that the promotion incentive of local politicians significantly reduces the within-firm pay gap. This effect is more pronounced for large firms, firms in regions subject to more government intervention, state-owned-enterprises, private firms with political connections, and firms with more geographically concentrated operations. Our findings are robust to the use of the loss of top-rank political connections and economics loss due to earthquakes as instrumental variables for the promotion incentive. Furthermore, a reduction in pay gap is mainly driven by an increase in employee pay, instead of a decrease in executive pay. Overall, this study sheds light on the determinants of within-firm pay gaps from the perspective of the career concerns of local politicians.     

政治联系与审计师选择

政治联系是中国资本市场民营上市公司普遍的重要特征之一,对审计师选择产生着重要的影响。本文依据民营上市公司2004至2007年高管的政治联系数据,实证研究了政治联系、政府官员类政治联系、代表委员类政治联系等不同的政治联系类型对审计师选择的影响。本文的实证研究结果表明:具有政治联系、政府官员类政治联系的民营上市公司倾向于选择非十大会计师事务所进行审计。     

政治联系与公司价值——基于对万向集团的研究(英文)

通过对很多公司调查研究,我们发现私企的政治联系可以增加公司价值。本文通过对万向集团的研究,讨论公司高管的政治联系与公司价值的关系。     

政治关联与我国民营上市企业的多元化投资

本文以2010年我国沪深民营上市企业为研究对象,研究民营上市企业的政治关联对民营企业多元化投资的影响.研究发现:1.民营上市企业的政治关联对其多元化程度的影响是显著为正的,当民营上市企业的政治关联划分为代表委员类政治关联、前政府官员类政治关联和政府行业协会类政治关联之后,只有代表委员类政治关联对民营上市企业多元化程度有...     

政府干预、政治关联与企业非效率投资——基于中国上市公司面板数据的实证研究

以2004~2009年间701家上市公司为样本,研究政府干预、政治关联对企业非效率投资行为的影响。研究发现:政府干预一方面会加剧有自由现金流量公司的过度投资,对国有企业过度投资的影响更为严重;另一方面可以有效地缓解融资约束企业的投资不足,尤其是国有企业的投资不足。这说明,出于自身的政策性负担或政治晋升目标,政府会损害或支持所控制的企业,这为政府"掠夺之手理论"和"支持之手理论"提供了实证支持。研究还发现,政治关联与过度投资和投资不足均负相关,这表明,政治关联可以作为法律保护的替代机制来保护企业产权免受政府损害,并为企业谋取利益。     

政治关系、地区经济增长与企业投资行为

本文以2007～2008年我国沪深主板市场上586家民营上市公司为样本,实证研究了政治关系对企业投资行为的影响。经验结果显示:(1)从整体上看,相比于没有政治关系的民营上市公司,具有政治关系的民营上市公司的投资支出更多;(2)经济增长影响了政治关系作用的发挥,良好的经济增长弱化了政治关系对企业投资行为的影响;(3)政治关系与投资支出之间的关系在不同规模公司之间存在差异,政治关系对投资支出的影响在小公司中更加显著。