货币政策与财政政策的区域产业结构调整效应比较

本文运用1978—2007年东、中、西部的面板数据分析。货币政策和财政政策是否具有区域产业结构调整效应结果显示:第一,财政政策具有产业结构调整效应,而货币政策的产业结构调整效应并不明显。第二,货币政策在对第一和第三产业的效应方面强于财政政策,而财政政策则在对第二产业的效应方面具有优势。第三,货币政策和财政政策对三次产业的效应都存在比较明显的区域效应。第四,在东部地区货币政策和财政政策对第一产业和第二产业的效应相差非常悬殊,而对第三产业的效应则集中在高位;在中部地区货币政策和财政政策对第二产业的效应集中在高位;在西部地区货币政策对第一产业的效应集中在高位,而财政政策对第一产业的效应则集中在低位。     

The effect of monetary policy on output in EMU3: A sign restriction approach

This paper examines the effects of monetary policy shocks on output in the three largest euro area economies – Germany, France and Italy (EMU3) – by applying a new VAR identification procedure. The results show that monetary policy innovations are at their most potent in Germany. However, apart from Germany, it remains ambiguous as to whether a rise in interest rates concludes with a fall in output, showing a lack of homogeneity in the responses. Homogeneity in response to a monetary shock is crucial in a one-size-fits-all framework. Nonetheless, the lack of similarity between the responses, which is hypothesised to cause de-synchronised business cycles in optimal currency area literature, is often based on the premise that monetary policy itself is a major source of business cycle fluctuations. This paper concludes that monetary policy innovations play, at most, a modest role in generating fluctuations in output for the EMU3. Consequently, it is less important whether the effects of monetary policy are homogenous.     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and non-Ricardian consumers

The paper examines simple monetary and fiscal policy rules consistent with determinate equilibrium dynamics in the absence of Ricardian equivalence. Under this assumption, government debt turns into a relevant state variable which needs to be accounted for in the analysis of equilibrium dynamics. The key analytical finding is that without explicit reference to the level of government debt it is not possible to infer how strongly the monetary and fiscal instruments should be used to ensure determinate equilibrium dynamics. Specifically, we identify bifurcations associated with threshold values of steady-state debt, leading to qualitative changes in the local determinacy requirements.     

Discretionary policy in a monetary union with sovereign debt

This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policymakers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fiscal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady-state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However, if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with significant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.     

Optimal fiscal policy in a world liquidity trap

We construct a model of the international transmission of ‘liquidity trap’ shocks, and examine the case for international coordination of fiscal policy to respond to the liquidity trap. Integrated financial markets tend to propagate liquidity traps. In a global environment, fiscal policy may be effective in raising GDP when the economy is stuck in a liquidity trap, but it does so in a ‘beggar thy neighbor’ fashion; when one economy is in a liquidity trap, the cross country spillover effect of fiscal policy is negative. We examine the welfare optimizing policy response to a liquidity trap when countries coordinate on fiscal policy. Fiscal policy may be an effective tool in responding to a liquidity trap, although it is never optimal to use fiscal expansion sufficiently to fully eliminate a downturn. Moreover, there is little case for coordinated global fiscal expansion. For the most part, the country worst hit by a liquidity trap shock should use its own policies to respond, without much help from foreign policies.     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in the EMU when cyclical conditions are uncertain

This paper examines economic policy interactions in the Economic and Monetary Union when the assessment of cyclical conditions in real time is surrounded by uncertainty. On the basis of a simple stylised model it shows that with a Nash-type of interaction different views about the output gap on the side of the policy players—the Council of the European Union, the European Commission and the European Central Bank—can give rise to excessive activism with policy players pushing economic variables into opposite directions. It argues that the costs of such policy conflicts can be reduced by agreeing on a common assessment of the cycle, by constraining policy variables, and/or by increasing the weight of fiscally conservative institutions. An alternative option to sidestep policy conflicts ensuing from diverging views of the cycle is to take policy decisions sequentially, as is the case in a Stackelberg-type of interaction. The paper shows that for a given misperception of the cycle, the impact on the policy instruments and on output and inflation are generally smaller in the Stackelberg equilibrium as compared to a Nash outcome. Alternative allocations of roles—that is leader versus follower—are discussed and assessed.

Optimal simple rules for the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy

Stabilization policy involves joint monetary and fiscal rules. We develop a model enabling us to characterize systematic simple monetary and fiscal policy over the business cycle. We principally focus on the following question. What are the key properties of the joint simple rule governing the conduct of systematic stabilization policy? We find that conducting stabilization policy incorporates not only a set of monetary policy choices governed by the so-called ‘Taylor principle’ but also fiscal policy that gives considerable force to automatic stabilizers. Recent US and UK monetary and fiscal choices seem broadly consistent with this model. This result is found to be robust to a number of alternate modeling strategies.     

Toward a Taylor rule for fiscal policy

In DSGE models, fiscal policy is typically described by simple rules in which tax rates respond to the level of output. We show that there is only weak empirical evidence in favor of such specifications in US data. Instead, the cyclical movements of labor and capital income tax rates are better described by a contemporaneous response to hours worked and investment, respectively. We show that conditioning on these variables is also desirable from a normative perspective as it significantly improves welfare relative to output-based rules.     

Strategic monetary and fiscal policy interactions: An empirical investigation

This paper identifies leadership regimes in monetary-fiscal policy interactions in three countries, the UK, the US and Sweden. We specify a small-scale, structural general equilibrium model of an open economy and estimate it using Bayesian methods. We assume that the authorities can act strategically in a non-cooperative policy game, and compare different leadership regimes. We find that the model of fiscal leadership gives the best fit for the UK and Sweden, while in the US the Nash or non-strategic regime dominates. We assess the extent to which policy maker preferences reflect microfounded social preferences.     

Stepping on a rake: The role of fiscal policy in the inflation of the 1970s

The inflation of the 1970s in the US is often discussed as if the only type of policy action that could have prevented the inflation were monetary policy actions and the only type of policy errors that might have induced the inflation were monetary policy errors. Yet fiscal policy underwent dramatic shifts in the 1970s and economic theory makes clear that in an environment of uncertainty about future fiscal policy, monetary policy instruments may lose potency or have perverse effects. This paper documents the vagaries of fiscal policy in this period and argues that people at the time must have been uncertain about fiscal policy's future course. It also lays out a theoretical framework for understanding the effects of fiscal uncertainties on monetary policy and shows that fiscal variables have predictive value in dynamic models, even if traditional monetary policy indicators are included in the system.     

Optimal monetary and fiscal policies in a search theoretic model of monetary exchange

Search models of monetary exchange commonly assume that terms of trade in anonymous markets are determined via Nash bargaining, which generally causes monetary equilibrium to be inefficient. Bargaining frictions add to the classical intertemporal distortion present in most monetary models, whereby agents work today to obtain cash that can be used only in future transactions. In this paper, we study the properties of optimal fiscal and monetary policy within the framework of Lagos and Wright (2005). We show that fiscal policy can be implemented to alleviate underproduction while money is still essential. If lump sum monetary transfers are available, a production subsidy can restore the efficiency of monetary equilibria. The Friedman rule belongs to the optimal policy set, but higher inflation rates are also possible. When lump-sum monetary transfers are not available, equilibrium allocations are generally not first-best. Nevertheless, fiscal policy still results in substantial welfare gains. Money can be extracted from circulation via a sales tax on decentralized market activities, and the Friedman rule is only optimal if the buyer has relatively low bargaining power.     

Optimal choice of monetary policy instruments under velocity and fiscal shocks

This paper, in the spirit of Poole [Poole, William, 1970. The Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments in a Simple Macro Model. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 192–216.], studies how differently monetary and fiscal shocks influence the appropriate choice of the monetary policy regime. Velocity shocks are introduced by embedding a stochastic cash-in-advance constraint within the New Keynesian framework. In addition to optimal policy under discretion, three classic rules, interest rate targeting, monetary targeting, and the Taylor rule are ranked under both fiscal and velocity shocks. The non-stationarity of prices under the Taylor rule makes it inferior to the other rules under which prices are stationary. Monetary targeting, by stabilizing aggregate demand under fiscal shocks, outperforms interest rate targeting, while the latter provides a better insulation against velocity shocks. Monetary targeting (under fiscal shocks) and interest rate targeting (under velocity shocks) even outperform the optimal policy under discretion for sufficiently high intertemporal elasticities of consumption substitution.     

Floor systems for implementing monetary policy: Some unpleasant fiscal arithmetic

An increasing number of central banks implement monetary policy via a channel system or a floor system. We construct a general equilibrium model to study the properties of these systems. We find that a floor system is weakly optimal if and only if the target rate satisfies the Friedman rule. Unfortunately, the optimal floor system requires either transfers from the fiscal authority to the central bank or a reduction in seigniorage payments from the central bank to the government. This is the unpleasant fiscal arithmetic of a floor system. When the central bank faces financing constraints on its interest expense, we show that it is strictly optimal to operate a channel system.     

Optimal information acquisition and monetary policy

I study optimal monetary policy with an expectational AS curve and private agents who optimally choose their amount of information pertinent to predicting policy. Shocks with time-varying variance (ARCH) induce interesting information acquisition (IA) dynamics; optimal IA affects optimal policy and vice versa. Under discretion, IA dynamics cause time-varying effectiveness of policy because of the expectational AS curve; policy may be rendered completely ineffective. In policy game equilibrium, a fall in the shock’s variance typically induces less IA and raises welfare. In one exceptional case the opposite occurs, a result which does not require implausible unstable equilibria. An agent becoming informed increases the endogenous component of economic volatility; IA therefore has a negative externality. Under commitment policy’s effectiveness is again time-varying, but policy is never completely ineffective: commitment enables the central bank to credibly limit policy’s volatility; this limits private agents’ incentive to become informed, so limits expectation-induced policy neutrality.     

Monetary–fiscal policy interactions and fiscal stimulus

Increases in government spending trigger substitution effects—both inter- and intra-temporal—and a wealth effect. The ultimate impacts on the economy hinge on current and expected monetary and fiscal policy behavior. Studies that impose active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy typically find that government consumption crowds out private consumption: higher future taxes create a strong negative wealth effect, while the active monetary response increases the real interest rate. This paper estimates Markov-switching policy rules for the United States and finds that monetary and fiscal policies fluctuate between active and passive behavior. When the estimated joint policy process is imposed on a conventional new Keynesian model, government spending generates positive consumption multipliers in some policy regimes and in simulated data in which all policy regimes are realized. The paper reports the model's predictions of the macroeconomic impacts of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act's implied path for government spending under alternative monetary–fiscal policy combinations.     

Stochastic and structural fiscal policy in a monetary stationary economy

In the framework of a monetary asset pricing model which is simple enough to generate closed form formulae for equilibrium price functions the interactions between output, fiscal policy, and asset markets is investigated. With money yielding liquidity services in the exchange process real stock prices are negatively correlated with anticipated (stochastic) fiscal policy changes, while the impact of unanticipated (structural) fiscal policy on the stock market depends qualitatively on the ‘business cycle’ of the economy. It is shown that the monetary character of the economy, more precisely the role of money in the exchange process, is critical for the relationship between fiscal policy and real share prices. Moreover, while contingent fiscal policy measures may be successful in stabilizing the real interest rate on money they are incapable of achieving a stable term structure of the real rate on stocks. In contrast, uncontingently higher public expenditures generally promote the volatility of the real rates on financial assets.     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a post Keynesian open-economy model

Using a post Keynesian model, this study aims to analyze the stabilizing role of fiscal and monetary policies in an open economy with a managed exchange rate regime. The real exchange rate is modeled as an endogenous variable and inflation explained using the conflicting claims approach. The dynamic properties of macroeconomic equilibrium are evaluated in different regimes of fiscal and monetary policies. The main result of this study suggests that the preferred policy regime is the one in which economic authorities are complementary and fiscal policy plays an explicitly active role. In this regime, the fiscal policy must commit to the target for the rate of capacity utilization and the monetary authority must commit to the inflation target.     

Optimal fiscal and monetary policies in the face of rare disasters

This paper studies optimal fiscal and monetary policies in an economy exposed to large adverse shocks (rare disasters). We contrast optimal policies under commitment and discretion and identify several striking differences between these institutional environments. A government that can commit to its policy plans relies heavily on debt to smooth the adverse effects of large shocks over time. Lack of commitment seriously limits the government's ability to use debt as a shock absorber. Under discretion, an increase in debt leads to an increase in inflation expectations and therefore higher nominal interest rate distortions. Hence, the discretionary government keeps debt in close vicinity of its steady-state level, and the response of taxes, inflation, and interest rates to shocks is much more pronounced under discretion than under commitment. This is particularly relevant for large shocks and when the initial stock of government debt is already high at the time the shock occurs. We also argue that the adverse welfare effects of disasters are larger under discretion than under commitment, but these welfare differentials can be significantly reduced by making the discretionary government inflation averse.     

Labor immobility and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in a monetary union

It is believed that a common monetary policy in a monetary union will have identical effects on different countries as long as these countries have identical fundamentals. We show that, when there is specialization in production, the terms of trade react to the shock. The transmission mechanism of a monetary shock has in this case an additional channel, the terms of trade. This is the case even if state contingent assets can be traded across countries. For a reasonable parametrization, the differential on the transmission across countries is quantitatively significant when compared with the effect on the union's aggregates. Monetary shocks create cycles with higher volatility in “poor” countries than in “richer” ones.     

Structural VAR models for Malaysian monetary policy analysis during the pre- and post-1997 Asian crisis periods

This article conducts an in-depth investigation into building a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model and analysing the Malaysian monetary policy. Considerable attention is paid to: (i) the selection of foreign, policy and target variables; (ii) establish identifying restrictions and improve the estimates of impulse response functions; (iii) assess the importance of intermediate channels in transmitting monetary policy mechanism; and (iv) the way in which the 1997 Asian financial crisis affected the working of monetary policy. Malaysia is an interesting small open economy to study because, following this crisis, the government imposed capital and exchange rate control measures. The overall results suggest that the crisis and the subsequent major shift in the exchange rate regime have significantly affected the Malaysian ‘Black Box’. In the pre-crisis period, domestic variables appear to be more vulnerable to foreign monetary shocks. Further, the exchange rate played a significant role in transmitting the interest rate shocks, whereas credit and asset prices helped to propagate the money shock. In the post-crisis period however, asset prices play a more domineering role in intensifying the effects of both interest rate and money shocks on output, and the economy was insulated from foreign shocks.