Fiscal decentralization and government size: The role of democracy

This paper examines how the level of democracy in a country affects the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size. We argue that political regimes, proxied by their democracy levels, are important for different decentralization theories to predict the impact of fiscal decentralization on government size. We test this argument using panel data from 76 developed and developing countries during 1972–2013. We find strong and robust evidence that fiscal decentralization is negatively associated with government size and that a higher level of democracy tends to mitigate the negative impact of fiscal decentralization. Therefore, our study contributes to the literature by offering a novel insight on mixed results regarding the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size in the literature.     

Optimal fiscal decentralization: Redistribution and welfare implications

The literature has been inconclusive regarding the welfare effects of fiscal decentralization (FD), defined here as the extent to which local governments collect and spend local tax revenues. We present an original model to investigate formally the distributional and welfare implications of FD. In contrast to the standard approach that compares the implications of full FD with that of centralization, we consider that the central government chooses the level of FD to maximize welfare in a heterogeneous country. Noncooperatively, local governments choose their tax collection effort to maximize local utility. We show that an increase in the tax rate leads optimal FD to increase so as to compensate for the welfare loss from decreasing optimal local tax effort. Hence, welfare and income distribution improve in FD at its intermediate, rather than extreme, levels. We coin this result as the decentralization-Laffer curve. As regional spillovers increase, FD is less desirable as it deteriorates welfare and income distribution. This finding provides a novel support for the decentralization theorem and contributes to the fiscal policy debate.     

Constitutions, regulations, and taxes: Contradictions of different aspects of decentralization

The paper confronts different aspects of decentralization: fiscal decentralization, post-constitutional regulatory decentralization, and constitutional decentralization – using a single dataset from the Russian Federation of the Yeltsin period as a politically asymmetric country and a variety of indicators. It finds no robust correlation between different decentralization aspects; moreover, three processes of devolution appearing in the same country at the same time seem to be driven by different (though partly overlapping) forces. Hence, a specific aspect of decentralization is hardly able to serve as a proxy for another one or for the overall decentralization process.     

Fiscal decentralization and corporate investment: empirical evidence from China

This paper examines the effect of fiscal decentralization on levels and efficiency of corporate investment. The results indicate that as the extent of local government fiscal decentralization increases, the level of new investment by firms under their jurisdiction rises. Furthermore, fiscal decentralization has an impact on corporate investment by aggravating over-investment rather than alleviating under-investment, leading to a situation whereby fiscal decentralization is negatively associated with investment efficiency at the level of the firm. Finally, the impact of fiscal decentralization on over-investment, under-investment and investment efficiency is not different between state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises, suggesting that economic leverages are the dominant government intervention measures. The findings imply that fiscal decentralization is another determinant of firm-level investment and corporate investment efficiency, which broadens the existing literature on the economic consequence of fiscal decentralization, resulting in important implications for policy-making.     

Fiscal centralization and the form of corruption in China

Fiscal recentralization in China in the 1990s introduced incentives that changed the form of corruption at the local government level from the helping-hand to the grabbing-hand type. Against the background of the experience of China, this paper describes how the central–local government revenue-sharing rule introduces strategic considerations that affect the form of corruption and thereby economic growth. Information regarding the possibilities for substitution in the form of corruption is shown to be relevant for decisions regarding fiscal centralization. However, the consequences of the decisions made in China suggest that such information was either not available or was not taken into account.     

转移支付均等化条件分析——基于转移支付与地方经济增长的关系

文章运用近16年的转移支付数据验证了龚六堂2000年的观点,即中央政府对地方政府的转移支付率与地方经济增长率之间是"倒U型"的关系。并在此基础上进一步推导出地方经济增长和中央政府对地方政府的转移支付之间也存在着这样"倒U"关系。用这种关系解释两个问题:第一,转移支付对地方经济增长有部分正的刺激作用,无论是富裕地区还是贫穷地区,中央政府都应该对其地方政府给予转移支付,同时转移支付也不是越多越好,也应该有个量的限制,当地方政府的收益足够大时,转移支付对经济增长的刺激就不再那么明显,反而会抑制地方经济增长;第二,从新的角度分析转移支付均等化实现的条件,即富裕地区较贫穷地区较早的进入"倒U"曲线的边际收益递减阶段时,才可能实现均等化。     

财政分权、城乡收入差距与经济增长

利用1994年分税制后的经验数据,本文估计了一个包含增长方程、城乡收入差距方程和财政支出方程的联立方程模型,来估算财政分权对经济增长和城乡收入差距的影响。研究结果表明,财政分权使地方政府的财政支出显著增加,但财政支出的增加并不必然有利于经济增长和拉大城乡收入差距。如果在地方财政支出水平上升的同时,使科学教育和农业支出,特别是科学教育支出在总支出中的比重得以增加,将有可能在保持经济高增长的同时,使城乡收入差距得以缩小。     

Poverty,inequality and growth in Albania

This article studies the distribution of well‐being and, specifically, the degree of poverty and deprivation in Albania, in the years 2002 and 2005, using Living Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS). The distribution analysis is performed by applying both one‐dimensional and multidimensional approaches, in particular to better examine the link between economic growth, inequality and poverty in Albania. Furthermore, by estimating a non‐monetary indicator, as proposed by Bossert et al. ( 2007 ), and a nonlinear principal component model together with a probit model, the paper focuses on the multidimensional measures of poverty to address the relationship between poverty and socio‐economic factors. Our evidence shows that absolute poverty decreased from 2002 to 2005 while national relative poverty increased; economic growth reduced poverty in Albania over the observed period; and living in rural and mountain areas, being female, poorly educated and with a large family increased the probability of suffering from deprivation.     

中国的财政分权与经济增长——基于省级面板数据的实证

在Barro、Davoodi和Zou模型的基础上,本文构造了一个财政分权与经济增长关系的模型,并利用1980-2004年省级面板数据,采用随机效应回归方法,分阶段实证研究了我国财政分权对经济增长的影响.实证研究发现,财政分权总体上促进了我国的经济增长,而且我国财政分权的经济增长效应存在显著的跨区差异,东部地区的财政分权经济增长优势高于中西部地区.作者认为,财政分权体制下地方政府财政行为的差异与公共支出构成的差异是造成我国财政分权经济增长效应跨区差异的重要原因.     

Environmental decentralization and innovation in China

This paper investigates the spatial effect of environmental decentralization on innovation using the spatial Durbin model from 2006 to 2015 in China. The results not only confirm the local effect of environmental decentralization on innovation, but also exists the spatial effect after introducing the spatial weighed matrix. We also note that different types of environmental decentralization have different effects on innovation. The impact of the environmental decentralization of governance on innovation is stronger than that on finance in the local effect, while the spatial impact is opposite to the local effect. The policy implication is that the government should apply a special type of environmental decentralization to increase innovation. Enhancing environmental decentralization of finance for local and neighbor innovation and decreasing the environmental decentralization of governance are better for increasing innovation.     

开放经济条件下中国财政金融政策面临的挑战

开放经济条件下,中国财政金融政策面临着多方面的挑战:在多重宏观政策目标下,米德冲突不可避免,内外平衡目标之间的冲突将成为中国财政金融政策面对的首要挑战;开放经济条件下,财政政策与金融政策具有不同的效能和作用区域;时至今日,中国仍不完全具备采用IS-LM-BP分析框架的前提条件,利用传统的分析方法研究中国宏观经济问题可能会得出错误的结论.     

财政分权与地方政府行为异化

作为财政体制改革的后果,财政分权导致政府间财政竞争,并改变了财政均等状况。中国国情的特殊性,尤其是官员委任制以及以经济增长为核心的地方政府官员政绩考核体系,使得政府间财政竞争更易导致地方政府财政支出结构呈现结构性扭曲。因此,制订合理的政绩考核标准,并相应调整财政体制是规范地方政府行为的当务之急。     

Fiscal decentralization and tax collection: evidence from the rural property tax in Brazil

The present paper investigates whether the decentralization of the rural land property tax (ITR) in Brazil increases the aggregate volume of tax collection from this source. We apply a difference-in-differences strategy where treatment is defined as the switch from a federal administration to the decentral management of the ITR by a municipality. The panel data from 2002 to 2017 show that decentralization leads to an average increase in overall ITR collection by about 42% in the first year, which rises to 109% in the 8th year. Our results are robust to balancing with entropy weights, the anticipation of treatment as well as the multi-period staggered timing of the ITR decentralization. Due to these peculiarities of our research design, we show that the increase in ITR collection is related to a more efficient tax management, i.e., a rigorous implementation and charge of tax duties.     

Government size,decentralization and growth: empirical evidence from Italian regions

The aim of this study is to empirically assess the relationship among government size, decentralization and economic growth in Italian ordinary regions. The empirical analysis, based on a panel dataset on Italian regions, provides evidence in support of the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between public expenditure and economic growth, that depends on the degree of fiscal decentralization. In particular, according to our estimates on the specific Italian case, the optimal degree of decentralization is around 32%, while the optimal government size value is approximately 52%.     

Wealth inequality,governance and economic growth

Links between economic growth and inequality are of growing interest for researchers and policy makers. Previous studies of this relationship have focused mainly on inequalities in income rather than in wealth. Yet from many perspectives wealth inequality is arguably more important. Using a new panel data set from Credit Suisse for 45 sample countries over the period 2000–2012, this study investigates the effects of wealth inequality on economic growth. Empirical results from system GMM estimation suggest that the wealth inequality is negatively associated with cross-country economic growth. This result is robust to alternative estimators and measures of wealth inequality, as well as the econometric specification. Further empirical investigation reveals that impact of wealth inequality on growth is mitigated by better governance.     

The effects of economic growth on income inequality in the US

The paper analyzes the relation between growth and income inequality in the US during the post-war years (1953–2008). We show that the income of the top income groups is more sensitive to growth, defined broadly as current growth and changes in expectations of future growth, compared to the income of the lower income groups. We provide evidence that this increased sensitivity arises for two reasons: (a) the top income groups receive a large portion of their income from wealth, which is more sensitive to growth than labor income and (b) the top income groups receive a large portion of their labor income in the form of pay-for-performance (equity compensation), which is also sensitive to growth. Consequently, we conclude that growth and income inequality are positively associated.     

Regional economic growth disparities: A political economy perspective

Regional differences in economic growth have been observed within many countries. Our story emphasises three region-specific factors driving growth—capital, labour and political factors. Conditional on differences in production factor (i.e., labour and capital) variations across democratic states, what role do differences in underlying “political factors” across regions play in accounting for regional growth disparities? We build a political economy model of endogenous growth where regions have the same political institutions, but experience different (and estimable) distributions over voter political biases (i.e., our “political factors”). In our model, political factors affect regional productivity as a consequence of politico-economic equilibrium. We discipline our regional growth accounting exercises by calibrating/estimating each model to American state-level economic and political-survey data. We show that the capital factor is the predominant driving force behind growth in American states. Nevertheless, regional variations in distributions of voter's political biases also account a great deal for regional growth disparities. We also evaluate how much politics would have distorted agents' welfare and regional growth, were regional economies given the opportunity to live under an efficient social planner's allocation system; and, if agents were to live under the same democratic system but where all voters have equal voting influence.     

中国民营化的财政动因

在公有企业的产权重组中,政府主体追求财政效益最大化的动机往往是一个重要的推动因素,但迄今对这方面的研究仍很不充分,尤其缺少基于企业数据的验证。本文依据145户中国工业企业的调查数据就企业改制对政府财政收入的影响进行了检验。我们发现,产权重组显著提高了改制企业的纳税水平和创税效率。这符合政府主体追求财政效益最大化的本性。另外,本文发现产权重组对企业纳税的时间效应具有非线性特征,这是今后这方面研究需要注意的一个方面。     

Education policy and inequality: A political economy approach

Regression results show that more unequal societies tend to spend comparatively more on higher levels of education. In a two-period model with heterogeneous agents, this paper investigates the political determinants of this bias. In the first period, public education is financed by the incumbent government by issuing bonds. Investments in basic and higher education have conflicting effects on future labour income distribution and net returns to these investments depend on the tax and transfers system being selected in the following period through the democratic process. Our idea is that public investment in basic education, by decreasing future labour income inequality, may induce future policy-makers to redistribute resources through financial rents taxation, thus making unfeasible the issuing of debt to finance basic education. This will be the more probable the greater wealth inequality is.