Tax evasion and Ricardian equivalence

This paper studies whether the Ricardian equivalence holds in a context with tax evasion. In such a context, the degree of uncertainty becomes endogenous since agents control the distribution of their future income through their income report. We find that Ricardian equivalence holds when proportional fines are imposed on evaded taxes, but does not hold when the fines are on the amount of unreported income. We also show that it is possible to explain the empirical negative relation between tax rates and declared income when the path of government spending remains unchanged.     

Ricardian equivalence with uninformed consumers?

Empirical studies have shown that the majority of people are poorly informed about the size of government debts and deficits. This paper investigates whether it is nevertheless possible for households to mimic Ricardian behavior on the basis of those variables that they actually observe. In a simple two-period model, it is shown that imperfect information about government debt can lead to departures from Ricardian equivalence even if the households' estimates of debt are unbiased. The paper discusses why households face difficulties in obtaining relevant information about government debt.     

李嘉图等价定理的协整检验

李嘉图等价定理认为,政府支出是通过发行国债融资还是税收融资没有任何区别,即债务和税收等价.李嘉图等价定理的理论基础是生命周期假说,而且其成立存在诸多前提条件.通过对我国的居民消费、国债余额、国内生产总值的协整分析,认为李嘉图等价定理在我国并不成立.     

Heterogeneous Dynasties and the Political Economy of Public Debt

We consider a small open overlapping generations economy with descending altruism. Heterogeneity is introduced by assuming that each parent procreates a fixed proportion of selfish children. Altruistic parents can recognize the type of each child. There is no Ricardian equivalence and an active public intergenerational transfer policy is attractive to altruistic dynasty members, although there may be no unanimity among them. We display reasonable conditions for indirect preferences to be single-peaked and we apply the median voter theorem. We then describe political equilibrium paths and discuss their compatibility with the steady path of an underlying closed economy with autonomous labor productivity growth.
JEL classification : D 31; D 64; D 72; D 91; H 63     

李嘉图等价定理及其在中国的适用性分析

李嘉图等价定理认为,政府的财政收入形式的选择,不会引起人们经济行为的调整。但是,现代经济学家们并非完全同意李嘉图的见解,无论是对其必要条件的检验还是对其结论的检验都存在着争论。而通过实证分析我国1989—2004年的政府发债分别与消费和投资的关系,可以得出结论：从历史数据来看,李嘉图等价定理在我国并不适用。     

Performance Standards and Incentive Pay in Agency Contracts

When the presence of limited liability restricts a principal from imposing monetary fines on an agent in case of poor performance, the principal might use other kinds of punishment threats to deter the agent from shirking. We show that under the optimal contract in this case, the principal sets a performance standard and punishes the agent if the standard is not met, but rewards the agent on a profit-sharing basis if the standard is significantly exceeded. The optimal choice of performance standards for such contracts is discussed. It is shown that punishment threats, although inefficient, often help the principal to discipline the agent.
JEL classification : D 82     

Fiscal policy and private consumption behaviour: The Spanish case

In this article we analyse whether the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis is a valid approximation for Spains economic reality or whether there exist deviations from that situation which would be more in line with the conventional Keynesian perspective of the effects of debt on private consumption-savings decisions.Our aim is to contribute to the rather sparse empirical literature on the subject for the Spanish case. The analysis is based on annual aggregate data for Spain covering the years 1955 to 2000, and uses both the structural and the Euler equation approaches to test the neutrality proposition, and is thus to be considered as a generalization of foregoing work on the Spanish economy.The findings indicate that support for Ricardian equivalence is mixed, while we also find very little support for the Keynesian specification of consumption and fiscal policy.First revision received: March 2003 / Final version received: October 2003The authors wish to thank M. Ferré, J.M. González-Páramo, A. Marchante, P. Meguire, F. Pedraja, J.L. Raymond, J. Salinas and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions on this paper. We also thank the participants in the V Encuentro de Economía Aplicada (Oviedo, Spain, June 2002) and the XVII Simposio de Análisis Económico (Salamanca, Spain, December 2002) for their comments. Any remaining defects are our responsibility. We also are grateful to the Institute for Fiscal Studies of Spain (Ministerio de Hacienda, Secretaría de Estado de Hacienda) for its financial support.     

效率、公平、社会稳定与住房问题——基于世代模型的政治经济学分析

土地和住房是劳动者历史共同体的公共物品。社会是否能够按照效率与公平的原则解决住房问题,其本质是社会是否能够解决劳动者现实具体利益与历史一般利益的矛盾,即个体理性与国家理性的矛盾。公共权力通过经济制度对租金的抽取和使用是解决住房问题的基本途径,不同制度模式具有等价性。在社会稳定的约束条件下,公共权力对租金的抽取和使用并不必然保证住房问题的解决符合效率与公平的原则,为此社会还需要具备公共权力良好的政治性质、法律约束力以及劳动者对国家理性道德自觉的条件。     

The Austrian current account deficit: Driven by twin deficits or by intertemporal expenditure allocation?

The evidence presented in the paper rejects the twin deficit hypothesis for the Austrian current account balance during the last two decades. The results are based on an estimate of a vector error correction model including quarterly data for the current account balance and potentially relevant variables driving its dynamics. We compute the variance decomposition of the current account's forecast error and its generalized impulse responses to shocks in the innovations of the system. The results in favor of intertemporal expenditure reallocation cannot be reproduced within a second analysis including the current account and a measure of net output, however. The estimated implicit current account balance, interpreted as the discounted expected change in future net output, does not follow the actual behaviour of the current account. First version received: June 1999/Final version received: March 2001     

From ecological footprint to ecological rent: An economic indicator for resource constraints

This paper takes as a starting point a combination of an input-output model with a national Ecological Footprint account for Germany in the spirit of Wiedmann et al. [Wiedmann, T., Minx, J., Barrett, J., Wackernagel, M., 2006. Allocating ecological footprints to final consumption categories with input-output analysis. Ecological Economics. 56, 28-48]. Footprint as well as Biocapacity is dealt with at the industry level. Gross output of each industry and final demand for each industry can then be split up into a share that is reconcilable with Biocapacity and another share that corresponds to the ‘Ecological Deficit’. The Ecological Footprint concept is extended in this study by introducing the additional biocapacity necessary for sustaining the given level of economic activity. It is assumed that each industry had to rent the corresponding areas and to apply a given technology in order to make this additional land biophysically productive. That results in an additional technology for each industry leading to an increase in costs and prices. The new price level is directly linked to the share of output that corresponds to Biocapacity overshooting, which is defined by the ‘Ecological Deficit’. Economic indicators can be derived by measuring the income difference brought about by the price increase. This difference corresponds to a Ricardian rent which is due to resource constraints on output growth.     

Why do people rate? Theory and evidence on online ratings

The rapid growth of online retail in the last decade has led to widespread use of consumer-generated ratings. This paper theoretically and experimentally identifies influences that drive consumers to rate products and examines how those factors can create distortions in product ratings. By manipulating payoffs and effectively “deactivating” either the buyer or seller side of an artificial laboratory market, raters' behavior is decomposed into buyer-centric and seller-centric components. The cost of providing a rating also plays a major role in influencing rating behavior, with high and low quality sellers being rated more often than those of moderate quality.     

Intergenerational Altruism and the Environment

We construct an overlapping generations model of pollution externality in which individuals are altruistically linked to their offspring as in Barro (1974). It is shown that steady-state consumption may be a decreasing function of the intergenerational degree of altruism. Despite individuals' altruism, the competitive equilibrium is not optimal. We thus study the social optimum and show that it can be decentralized.
JEL classification: D 62; D 64; D 91