Gender preference and transfers from parents to children: an inter-regional comparison

This paper examines whether parents exhibit gender preference in the allocation of family resources to their adult children. Gender preference is defined in the context of an altruistic model for inter-vivos transfer from parents to children extended to include educational investment. Data from the Health and Retirement Study (United States) and the Korean Longitudinal Study of Ageing are used to show that the degree of gender preference differs across these culturally distinct regions. Among Korean families, empirical results point to male preference as sons receive larger inter-vivos transfers and attain higher levels of education compared with daughters. In contrast, the evidence pertaining to gender preference among American families points to daughter preference as inter-vivos transfers and educational investment is generally higher among female adult children.     

Family Transfers Involving Three Generations

Most models of family transfers consider only two generations and focus on two motives: altruism and exchange. They also assume perfect substitution between inter-vivos downward transfers and bequests. Based on French evidence, we show that parent-to-child transfers belong to three distinct categories (investment in child's education, financial assistance, wealth transmission), and advocate a three -generation framework. Thus, transfer behavior of parents toward their children is strongly influenced by the behavior of their own parents. There is also some evidence of the Cox and Stark demonstration effect: parents help their own parents, expecting to receive comparable support from their children. Such behavior can be regarded as indirect reciprocity : the beneficiary does not give back to the initial giver but to a third person of another generation.
JEL classification : D 10; D 31; D 63; D 64     

Descent rules and strategic transfers. Evidence from matrilineal groups in Ghana

Traditional descent systems can roughly be divided into patrilineal and matrilineal. In the latter, a man's heir is not his own child but rather his sister's son. The paper examines the implications of this social norm for the pattern of inter-vivos transfers using household level data from rural Ghana, where the largest ethnic group is traditionally matrilineal. In particular, it tests the predictions of a model of strategic behavior according to which children should respond to the threat of disinheritance by increasing transfers to their parents during lifetime to induce a donation of land before the default (matrilineal) inheritance is enforced. I find that the credibility of customary norms enforcement, as proxied by the presence of a nephew in the father's household, significantly increases the probability of receiving transfers from children for Akans but not for the other groups. The effect is specific to nephews and not to other co-resident boys. This pattern of behavior can affect asset accumulation decisions across generations.     

Free‐Riding and the Provision of Public Goods in the Family: A Laboratory Experiment*

We examine the provision of family public goods using experimental economics methods. With sufficient altruism and shared resource arrangements, families can provide the efficient level of family public goods. Becker's Rotten Kid Theorem asserts that transfers from altruistic parents will induce children to maximize family income even if children are not altruistic toward other family members. Consistent with altruism, parents and children contributed more to a public good when in groups with family members than when in groups with strangers. In contrast to the predictions of the Rotten Kid Theorem, however, children's behavior fell short of maximizing family income.     

Bequests,gifts, and education: links between intergenerational transfers

We study the channels parents use to make transfers to their children. First, we focus on the relationship between investments in education and property transfers. Second, we turn to how property transfers are divided between inter vivos gifts and bequests. We use a Swedish dataset that is superior to previously used data as it contains information on both gifts and inheritances received from parents. We estimate models for the probabilities of having university education, receiving gifts, and receiving inheritances. In addition, we estimate models for gift and inheritance amounts. We find that the more resources parents have, the higher the likelihood of transfers, and that the correlation between receiving inter vivos gifts and inheritances is very high. Finally, women are more likely to have university education and to receive gifts, and daughters receive gifts of larger amounts than sons, although there are no differences in terms of inheritance.     

Intergenerational transfers in Philippine rice villages. Gender differences in traditional inheritance customs

The author presents findings from a study of education, land, and nonland asset transfers from parents to children in 344 households in five rice villages in the Philippines. A model with family fixed effects is developed which explains transfers better than either individual heterogeneity or observed parent and child characteristics without family fixed effects. Analysis revealed that families facing different land constraints exhibit significantly different patterns of educational investment in children. In a subsample with completed inheritance, daughters receive less education, land, and total inheritance, but are compensated with nonland assets. Parents also exhibit preferential behavior toward children of the same gender such that daughters of better educated mothers receive more land, nonland assets, and total inheritance. Better educated fathers, however, give land preferentially to sons, but favor daughters in education.     

Do First‐Time House Buyers Receive Financial Transfers from Their Parents?*

Using Danish longitudinal data with information about wealth for a sample of first‐time house buyers and their parents, we test whether there are direct financial transfers from parents to children in connection with the house purchase, or in connection with unemployment spells occurring just after the purchase, when children typically hold few liquid assets. First, we document that child and parent financial resources are correlated. Then, we introduce conditioning variables and exploit the panel aspect of the data to also condition on fixed unobserved factors, which arguably govern preferences and/or productivity. We find no evidence of direct financial transfers.     

TRANSFERS FROM MIGRANTS TO THEIR CHILDREN: EVIDENCE THAT ALTRUISM AND CULTURAL FACTORS MATTER

This paper focuses on the determinants of financial inter vivos transfers by migrants living in France in 2003 to their adult children. From a theoretical viewpoint, such transfers may be explained either by altruism or by exchange. While parents would direct their assistance to their less well off children under altruism, support should be channeled to children who live nearby their parents under the exchange motive. We assess the relevance of these two motives using the French PRI survey. Unequal sharing is frequently observed and children are more likely to receive financial transfers when they are in poor circumstance, but not necessarily when living in proximity to parents. We also emphasize the role of cultural factors as determinants of the parental allocation among children. Muslim parents, in particular, are more likely to make transfers to sons than to daughters.     

should Transfers To Poor Families Be Conditional On School Attendance? A Household Bargaining Perspective*

This article considers the welfare implications of transfers to poor families that are conditional on school attendance and other forms of investment in children's human capital. Family decisions are assumed to be the result of (generalized) Nash bargaining between the two parents. We show that, as long as bequests are zero, conditional transfers are better for children than unconditional transfers. The mother's welfare may also be improved by conditional transfers. Thus, conditioning transfers to bequest‐constrained families have potentially desirable intergenerational and intragenerational welfare effects. Conditioning transfers to unconstrained families make every family member worse off.     

私人代际转移动机研究*——基于CHARLS的实证分析

经济学家对代际的物质和时间转移的兴趣引发了人们对转移动机的研究与思考。传统的解释有两种：利他主义与交换互惠。本文利用CHARLS数据，对中国的代际转移动机进行实证研究，发现受传统文化的影响，中国的代际转移更多地表现出利他主义倾向，同时示范效应也有所体现，即个体在照顾父母的同时也在教育自己的孩子赡养父母，以期退休后得到子女的照顾。相对西方国家来说，我国养老金体系的压力较小。但随着老龄化的加剧和生育率的下降，为了缓解未来独生子女赡养双方父母的压力，应当在减少挤出私人代际转移的基础上完善社会保障体系，提高我国老年人口的生活质量。     

Self-enforcing exchange among generations: Implications for consumption and mobility

A three-generation OLG model with one-directional altruism and two-directional intra-family transfers is presented. Adults invest in their children's education and make transfers to their elderly parents. However, due to lack of altruism, adults with high earnings do not share consumption equally with their elderly parents but spend a larger share of their earnings on own consumption and on their children's education. This allows the model to be consistent with three empirical observations that are difficult to reconcile with traditional altruistic frameworks of intergenerational social interactions and mobility: (i) consumption is not perfectly shared between members of an extended family, (ii) consumption is not equally persistent over the lifecycle as across generations, and (iii) the intergenerational persistence of earnings is particularly high at the top end of the earnings distribution.     

Accounting for the Changing Role of Family Income in Determining College Entry

In this paper, I analyze the determinants of college enrolment and the changes in these determinants over time. I propose a quantitative life‐cycle model with college enrolment. Altruistic parents provide financial support to their children. Using counterfactual experiments, I find that 24 percent of all households are financially constrained in their college decision. Constraints become more severe over time. I show that my model is consistent with a narrow college enrolment gap between students from rich and poor families, as previously reported in the empirical literature. The estimation of enrolment gaps is a popular reduced‐form approach for measuring the fraction of constrained households. My results suggest that these reduced‐form estimates are misleading, and that a structural model of parental transfers is needed to correctly identify constrained households. Further, I show that parental transfers are an important driver behind the changing role of family income as a determinant of college entry, a fact that is well documented for the US economy.     

Can conditional cash transfer programs serve as safety nets in keeping children at school and from working when exposed to shocks?

Income shocks on poor households are known to induce parents to take their children out of school and send them to work when other risk-coping instruments are insufficient. State dependence in school attendance further implies that these responses to short-run shocks have long-term consequences on children's human capital development. Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs, where the condition is on school attendance, have been shown to be effective in increasing educational achievements and reducing child work. We ask the question here of whether or not children who benefit from conditional transfers are protected from the impacts of shocks on school enrollment and work. We develop a model of a household's decision regarding child school and work under conditions of a school re-entry cost, conditional transfers, and exposure to shocks. We take model predictions to the data using a panel from Mexico's Progresa experience with randomized treatment. Results show that there is strong state dependence in school enrollment. We find that the conditional transfers helped protect enrollment, but did not refrain parents from increasing child work in response to shocks. These results reveal that CCT programs can provide an additional benefit to recipients in acting as safety nets for the schooling of the poor.     

Borrowing constraints,parental altruism and welfare

This paper investigates the welfare impact of a borrowing constraint that does not allow children to borrow against future income. In an overlapping-generations model with altruistic parents, the inability to borrow increases children’s savings and parental transfers, raising children’s welfare as well as average welfare in the short-run and in the long-run.Additionally, the borrowing constraint raises aggregate savings and, hence, physical capital. Consequently, when prices are flexible, the positive welfare impact of the constraint is higher.     

Survival of the gene,intergenerational transfers and precautionary saving

This paper provides a model of bequest and investment in children's human capital at low incomes. It posits that parents and children are linked through their common concern of grandchildren and intergenerational transfers provide a material basis for the perpetuation of the family line. The model characterizes intergenerational strategic interactions in a dynamic game theoretical framework. Moreover, it explores intergenerational uncertainty as a source of precautionary saving. In contrast with the existing literature, the model implies that there are qualitative differences between precautionary saving from one's own income uncertainty and precautionary bequests from children's income uncertainty.     

Gifts,bequests and family incentives

In this note, we use the theory of incentive contracting to characterize the pattern of financial transfers within the family. Using an altruistic model based on bounded rationality with one parent and two children, we show that the parent may provide a lower gift to the less well-off child, while bequests are always compensatory.     

子女移居国外对家庭代际支持的影响分析

利用北京地区子女移居国外的老年人家庭生活状况调查数据,采用改进的合作群体理论模型,分别从老人和子女角度综合考察了子女移居国外、其老年父母在国内居住的家庭代际支持的影响因素。子女移居国外减少了老人的日常照料;移民子女的代际关系存在向西方"接力模式"演变的趋势。留守国内的老年人对经济支持的需求得到满足,而获取日常照料的关键因素则是子女数量、居住关系以及子女的孝道意识;子女之间的分工按照资源配置最优原则和互惠原则进行,其中"养儿防老"模式被取代,女儿发挥着更为重要的作用。     

Are Family Transfers Crowded Out by Public Transfers?

We give an account of an overlapping–generations experiment with multiple families in which voluntary transfers can take the form of support to the elderly or grants to children. Support to the old is a purely intergenerational (intra–family) transfer, whereas grants to children also involve an element of intra–generational (inter–family) redistribution through a compulsory pension system. Our data show that higher compulsory inter–family transfers lead subjects to place relatively more emphasis on support instead of grants: grants are crowded out, but support is not significantly affected. The efficiency of voluntary transfers increases, however. Furthermore, if subjects give transfers, they do not use tokens of direct reciprocity; evidence of indirect reciprocity in transfer behavior can only be obtained for the case where compulsory transfers are high.
JEL classification : C 91; H 55     

Promises,policies and pocketbook voting

Do voters respond to political parties׳ promises or to their past actions? We use a suitable sequence of events in Swedish politics to provide the first answer to this question. In the 1994 election campaign the Social Democrats proposed major cuts in transfers to parents with young children, whereas in the 1998 campaign they promised to increase transfers. The Social Democrats won both elections and delivered on both promises. Using voting among parents with slightly older children as counterfactual, we find that voters with young children responded markedly to economic promises rather than to implemented policies.     

Opting out and topping up reconsidered: Informal care under uncertain altruism

We study the design of public long‐term care (LTC) insurance when the altruism of informal caregivers is uncertain. We consider non‐linear policies where the LTC transfer depends on the level of informal care, which is assumed to be observable, while children's altruism is not. Our policy encompasses two policies traditionally considered in the literature: topping up policies consisting of a transfer independent of informal care, and opting out policies entailing a positive transfer only if children fail to provide care. We show that both total and informal care should increase with the children's level of altruism. This is obtained under full and asymmetric information. Public LTC transfers, on the other hand, may be non‐monotonic. Under asymmetric information, public LTC transfers are lower than their full information level for the parents whose children are the least altruistic, while it is distorted upward for the highest level of altruism. This is explained by the need to provide incentives to highly altruistic children. In contrast to both topping up and opting out policies, the implementing contract is always such that social care increases with informal care.