Optimal Monetary Policy and Transparency under Informational Frictions

This paper examines the optimal monetary policy and central bank transparency in an economy where firms set prices under informational frictions. The economy is subject to two types of shocks determining the efficient output level and firms' desired markups. To minimize the welfare‐reducing output gap and price dispersion between firms, the central bank controls firms' incentives and expectations by using a monetary instrument and disclosing information on the realized shocks. This paper shows that an optimal policy comprises the disclosure of a linear combination of the two shocks and the adjustment of monetary instruments contingent on the disclosed information.     

How Control System Design Influences Performance Misreporting

This paper investigates reporting honesty when managers have monetary incentives to overstate their performance. We argue that managers who report about their performance will take into account how their report affects their peers (i.e., other managers at the same hierarchical level). This effect depends on the design of the organization's control system, in particular, on the reward structure and the information policy regarding individual performance reports. The reward structure determines if peers’ monetary payoff is increased or decreased when managers claim a higher level of performance. The information policy determines if managers will be able to link individual peers to their reports and affects the nonmonetary costs of breaking social norms. We present the results of a laboratory experiment. As predicted, we find that participants are more likely to overstate their performance if this increases the monetary payoff of others than if their reported performance decreases others’ monetary gains. In addition, overstatements are lower under an open information policy, where each individual's reported performance is made public, compared to a closed information policy, where participants only learn the average performance of the other participants. Our findings have several important implications for management accounting research and practice.     

Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?

To identify the most effective mechanisms for detecting corporate fraud, we study all reported fraud cases in large U.S. companies between 1996 and 2004. We find that fraud detection does not rely on standard corporate governance actors (investors, SEC, and auditors), but rather takes a village, including several nontraditional players (employees, media, and industry regulators). Differences in access to information, as well as monetary and reputational incentives, help to explain this pattern. In‐depth analyses suggest that reputational incentives in general are weak, except for journalists in large cases. By contrast, monetary incentives help explain employee whistleblowing.     

Relationship lending and the transmission of monetary policy

Repeated interactions allow lenders to uncover private information about their clients, decreasing the informational asymmetry between a borrower and his lender but introducing one between the lender and competing financiers. This paper constructs a credit-based model of production to analyze how learning through lending relationships affects monetary transmission. I examine how monetary policy changes the incentives of borrowers and lenders to engage in relationship lending and how these changes then shape the response of aggregate output. The results demonstrate that relationship lending prevails in equilibrium, smoothes the steady state output profile, and induces less volatile responses to certain monetary shocks.     

The interaction of incentives and information disclosure: the case of confidence interval information

Reliable risk assessment is critical for success in decision-making, but our assessment of risk is often hindered by inherent biases and limitations in our information processing capacities. Consequently, many have presumed that the disclosure of probabilistic or confidence interval (CI) information would aid our judgment of the uncertainty of an estimate. Empirical support for CI information disclosure, however, is generally lacking. Since human beings are goal-directed, the effectiveness of CI information disclosure may be contingent upon the motivation of an individual. This study, through a computer-based laboratory experiment, examines whether the effectiveness of CI information disclosure in an investment choice task setting is contingent upon the availability of performance-based monetary incentives. The results indicate that the disclosure of CI information can enhance or harm decision performance contingent upon the incentive condition: incentives are vital for realizing benefits from the disclosure of CI information. The implications of the findings are discussed.     

The German public and its trust in the ECB: The role of knowledge and information search

In this paper, we analyse the effects of objective and subjective knowledge about monetary policy, as well as the information search patterns, of German citizens on trust in the ECB. We rely on a unique representative public opinion survey of German households conducted in 2011. We find that subjective and factual knowledge, as well as the desire to be informed, about the ECB foster citizens' trust. Specific knowledge about the ECB is more influential than general monetary policy knowledge. Objective knowledge is more important than subjective knowledge. However, an increasing intensity of media usage, especially newspaper reading, has a significantly negative influence on trust. We conclude that the only viable way for the ECB to generate more trust in itself is to spread monetary policy knowledge.     

Monetary Policy and Price Responsiveness to Aggregate Shocks under Rational Inattention

This paper studies a general equilibrium model that is consistent with recent empirical evidence showing that the U.S. price level and inflation are much more responsive to aggregate technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks. Specifically, we show that the fact that aggregate technology shocks are more volatile than monetary policy shocks induces firms to pay more attention to the former than to the latter. However, most important, this work adds to the literature by analytically showing how monetary policy feedback rules affect the incentives faced by firms in allocating attention. A policy rule responding more actively to inflation fluctuations induces firms to pay relatively more attention to more volatile shocks, helping to rationalize the observed behavior of prices in response to technology and monetary policy shocks.     

Career concerns and peer effects in institutional tournaments: Evidence from ECB reserve currency portfolios

Using data on European Central Bank's (ECB's) reserve currency portfolios, we find that money managers react to relative rankings (i.e., own vs. peers’ performance) by adjusting portfolio active risk levels measured ex ante by actual deviations from their benchmark. This occurs in the absence of explicit incentives as no monetary reward is promised for winning this “tournament” among portfolio managers. We collect information on managers’ characteristics, including age, education, tenure, salary, and career path, and investigate the role played by implicit incentives. We provide evidence that both individual career concerns and institutional peer pressure contribute to the documented relationship between ranking and risk taking.     

Does better information about foreign shocks improve monetary policy?

This paper examines whether better information about foreign shocks leads to welfare-improving monetary policy using a stylised two-country New Keynesian general equilibrium model. We demonstrate that when terms of trade externality exist and national central banks have the incentives to shift terms of trade in their own favour, the equilibrium under imperfect information may be welfare superior relative to an equilibrium with perfect information. In addition, the welfare gains or losses from information sharing between central banks are found to be small for empirically plausible range of parameters for risk aversion and elasticity of labour supply.     

The role of financial journalists in the expectations channel of the monetary transmission mechanism

Monetary policy relies on managing the inflation expectations of the public in order to influence prices (inflation). Relying on the South African experience, we argue that most of the general public are exposed to the communication of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) only via the media. This state of affairs is fairly typical around the globe. We explored the role and biases of the journalists in transmitting the SARB’s communications to the rationally inattentive general public. Our aim was to obtain insights about the factors that influence media articles that deal with monetary policy issues. Using interviews and qualitative content analysis, we explored the extent of the journalists’ knowledge about inflation and monetary policy, their views concerning the credibility of the SARB, the sources of information they use, and the constraints and incentives they face in writing their articles.     

Worker Incentives in the Banking Industry

Journal of Financial Services Research - This study shows that monetary incentives together with performance disclosures lead to significant increases in effort and productivity in the multi-branch...     

Delegation and incentives

This article analyzes the relation between authority and incentives. It extends the standard principal‐agent model by a project selection stage in which the principal can either delegate the choice of project to the agent or keep the authority. The agent's subsequent choice of effort depends both on monetary incentives and the selected project. We find that the consideration of effort incentives makes the principal less likely to delegate the authority over projects to the agent. In fact, if the agent is protected by limited liability, delegation is never optimal.     

Transparency and incentives among peers

This article studies the effect of transparency among peers on the principal's cost of providing incentives. Using directed graphs to represent peer information, we show that under complementarity the cost of providing incentives is decreasing with the level of transparency within the organization. We also investigate the role of the architecture of the information in boosting incentives. In arguing that substitution impedes the benefits of transparency, we will compare function‐based teams with process‐based teams, showing that the latter are more effective in providing incentives.     

混频数据信息下的时变货币政策传导行为研究——基于混频TVP-FAVAR模型

现实经济环境中,货币政策操作受到金融市场及宏观经济信息的共同影响.如何基于混频大数据信息分析货币政策行为机制是需解决的现实问题.为此,本文提出一种混频时变参数因子增广向量自回归(MF-TVP-FAVAR)模型.基于宏观经济及金融市场等多维度混频数据信息的实证结果表明:首先,MF-TVP-FAVAR模型在宏观金融混频数据中提取的金融形势指数(FCI)能较好地表征宏观经济先行趋势,为货币政策的制定提供前瞻性信息.其次,混频TVP-FAVAR模型可以捕捉价格型和数量型货币政策传导的高频时变特征.与货币供应量相比,利率传导对产出的影响具有滞后性.利率传导随着利率市场化改革愈发畅通,而信贷传导机制因财政政策搭配等问题日渐受阻.再次,货币政策传导效果受到经济周期影响,无论产出效应还是价格效应,经济上行时期,货币政策传导机制都比经济衰退时期更加通畅.价格型和数量型传导机制在经济下行时的作用效果均会减弱,但数量型货币政策更易受到经济周期的影响.最后,货币政策对FCI的冲击响应具有时变性,说明金融市场信息冲击对我国货币政策调控具有结构性的动态影响.货币当局制定尤其是微调货币政策时应及时评估金融市场信息冲击的影响.     

Are CEOs incentivized to shelter good information?

Prior theoretical studies on the agency problem hold different opinions from the empirical literature on two questions: (a) Are CEOs incentivized to shelter good information? (b) Are CEOs incentivized to evenly shelter good and bad information? This paper demonstrates that CEOs with high pay‐performance incentives tend to successfully shelter good information rather than bad information. Furthermore, CEOs with high pay‐performance incentives shelter good information by using real earnings management and textual manipulation but not accrual‐based earnings management. These asymmetric information manipulation behaviors help to decrease corporate cash flow volatility as well as the jump and crash risk on the stock market.     

Configural Information Processing in Auditing: Further Evidence

An important issue in audit judgment research has been how auditors combine information in order to make judgments and, in particular, whether auditors ‘judgments involve configural cue usage. Some recent research (Brown and Solomon, 1990; 1991) has found that under certain conditions, many auditors were able to configurally process information. This paper extends this research by examining some conditions that may facilitate the development of auditors’ ability to configurally process available information. The study found that: (a) the proportion of auditors processing the information configurally was greater than chance; (b) for those that processed the information configurally, the form of the interaction was as predicted, that is, ordinal with a compensatory form; (c) increasing depth of processing by requiring subjects to provide explanations for their judgments did not have a significant effect on the number of auditors processing configurally; (d) the level of consensus was higher for auditors who processed configurally than for those who did not; and (e) the analysis of the explanations provided by configurai cue processors indicated that they saw the relevant cues as being substitutable.     

Using past experience to optimize audit sampling design

Optimal sampling designs for audit, minimizing the mean squared error of the estimated amount of the misstatement, are proposed. They are derived from a general statistical model that describes the error process with the help of available auxiliary information. We show that, if the model is adequate, these optimal designs based on balanced sampling with unequal probabilities are more efficient than monetary unit sampling. We discuss how to implement the optimal designs in practice. Monte Carlo simulations based on audit data from the Swiss hospital billing system confirms the benefits of the proposed method.     

Rational expectations and the role of monetary policy: A generalization

This paper investigates the effects of introducing the following two alterations into a multimarket, partial information, rational expectations model; (1) individuals in any market may sample currently more prices than just the current price on their own market; (2) they choose the amount of their current information so as to minimize the sum of the costs of getting information and of being off their full information demand and supply curves. Under those circumstances any change in the variance of aggregate excess demand shocks (whether caused by real or monetary elements) affects the equilibrium level of information in the economy, in addition to its other direct effects previously recognized in the literature. Among the issues dealt with are the implications of these alterations for the following: (1) the Lucas hypothesis on the slope of the Phillips curve; (2) the optimal monetary variance and the optimal money feedback rule; (3) the effect of the level of information and of aggregate variance on the distribution of relative prices and related issues.     

大稳健、大恐慌和大收缩

本文为英格兰银行负责货币政策的副行长查尔斯·比恩(Charles Bean)先生在2009年8月25日欧洲经济学协会熊彼特讲座上的主题演讲。与其他对于本轮危机的分析相比,本文有两个最显著的特点:一是视野更加开阔、观点更加平衡:二是分析框架更加规范、逻辑性强。本文所涉及的问题正是国际金融监管改革的核心。     

CEO incentives and earnings prediction

This study investigates whether information about Chief Executive Officer (CEO) incentives is useful for predicting future earnings. We find that in companies with higher CEO equity incentives, current year earnings are more informative of future earnings than in other companies. Additionally, in an earnings prediction setting, CEO incentives are shown to provide information about future earnings that is incremental to current earnings or earnings components. The predictive power of CEO incentives for future earnings is robust to the inclusion of other predictors of future earnings. Furthermore, we find that CEO incentives are predictive of “real” future earnings, as represented by operating cash flow and non-discretionary accruals, but not predictive of future discretionary accruals. Finally, we find that financial analysts do not incorporate information about CEO incentives when they forecast future earnings. This result suggests that incorporating CEO incentives can potentially improve analyst forecasts of future earnings.