政府限价与寡头垄断企业博弈定价模型研究

在信息不完全和信息完全两种情况下,利用两阶段动态博弈理论,对双寡头企业在自由竞争、限高价、限低价等不同限价情况下的博弈定价进行了研究。结果表明理性的高价企业会选择价格上限,而低价企业会选择下限。     

关于寡头垄断企业定价的一个博弈分析

价格竞争是寡头垄断市场竞争的主要手段，本文以“价格战”现象为研究背景，在寡头企业产品差异化的基础上，通过运用防降价均衡博弈模型来分析寡头垄断市场上寡头企业之问的价格竞争策略，最终由防降价均衡模型得出稳定的均衡价格而不会受到竞争对手降价的威胁，即寡头企业的最佳定价策略；从而能够有效地避免“价格战”及其所导致的寡头企业的恶性竞争，对寡头企业如何实施产品定价策略具有重要意义。     

带网络外部性寡头垄断的定价策略

1引言 许多产品当它们被独立起来时没有任何价值或者是价值非常小,但当他们组合起来形成一个网络时它们自生的价值在这个网络中会明显提高,在一般意义上把由于相互关联而带来产品价值的变化称为网络效应。     

电信寡头垄断市场的定价分析

对电信市场现状分析的基础上，应用经济学方法对寡头垄断市场的电信价格进行定性分析；然后以博弈论方法为基础，从技术创新的角度，对寡头垄断市场的电信价格进行深入分析；最后，就我国电信市场目前所遇到的问题提出自己的建议。     

寡头垄断:优化产业市场结构的选择

长期以来,人们从微观经济理论出发,认为竞争是有效的,垄断是无效的。但从世界范围内的产业发展来看,寡头垄断是当今国际市场结构发展的主流,为了优化中国产业市场结构,改善产业组织绩效,本文认为应对市场结构的效率进行重新认识,并提出了优化中国产业市场结构的选择。     

寡头垄断的保险市场及其监管

借鉴经济学中关于寡头垄断竞争的分析，可判断中国目前的保险市场已经进入寡头垄断阶段判断。在寡头垄断的格局下保险监管面临着必须破解的难题。解决此问题的方法是，在向偿付能力监管的过渡过程中，利用费率底线监管，在鼓励保险市场竞争的同时，限制保险市场的恶意竞争，促使中小保险公司走险种差异化的道路，使整个保险市场形成垄断主导、中小保险公司以差异求生存的市场格局。     

寡头垄断企业技术创新最佳技术含量的博弈分析

构建了双寡头垄断企业技术创新的收益函数和博弈模型,对双寡头垄断竞争企业的技术创新进行了定量分析,并与两企业合作创新的情况作对比,说明企业的技术创新有一个最佳的技术含量,而且技术含量越高的行业,越容易形成寡头垄断;并推翻了以往模型中得出的认为不合作对社会更有效率的说法。提出应鼓励企业,尤其是创新空间很大的企业之间进行合作,而不是一味地提倡竞争,并对模型进行了实例研究。     

寡头垄断行为模型的统一：推测变量法

推测变量法是哈佛学派SCP范式的理论基础。本文利用推测变量法对一些典型寡头垄断模型进行了统一,本质地 揭示了这些模型的差异但是推测变量取值范围的不同,并指出在实际运用推测变量法中所应注意的问题。     

寡头垄断模式下废旧产品回收定价的比较研究

面对2009年出口贸易下滑的局面,中国经济急需转型。中国制造商完善废旧产品的回收体系是进一步稳固"中国制造"地位,推动经济转型的重要保障。进一步探讨制造商通过何种定价模式获取最大利益具有非常重要的研究价值。在梳理相关研究文献的基础上,认为回收体系各参与方在追逐利益最大化的过程中出现了博弈和合谋两种寡头垄断市场行为。为此,以Mukhopadhyay模型为基础,在博弈和合谋两种不同条件下构建了双方利益最大化定价模型,通过计算,分析了回收定价决策中的各种影响因素,比较了博弈和合谋条件下各自的收益。结果表明,制造商和零售商通过契约实现合谋所获得的收益要远大于博弈状态下的收益。     

Cooperative oligopolistic pricing

The main purpose of the present paper is to show that the equilibrium price in an oligopolistic market with cooperative pricing but noncooperative production as a rule approaches neither the monopoly price (when there are few firms) nor the competitive price (when there are many firms). Instead it is equal to that price which maximizes collective sales revenues if the industry's demand curve is inelastic, while it is “almost” competitive if demand is elastic.     

Capacity-contingent nonlinear pricing by regulated firms

Second-best Pareto optimal pricing by a regulated firm subject to demand and capacity shocks is examined. Nonlinear price schedules for the firm's customers are obtained that are contingent on capacity realizations. The second-best Pareto optimal mechanism also is implemented by an allocation mechanism based on the consumer's choice of a minimum demand or firm power level. The optimal mechanism is implemented as well by a general form of priority pricing.     

Strategic nonlinear pricing

The objective of this paper is to examine the role of nonlinear strategies in a standard oligopoly framework. We demonstrate that nonlinear pricing may indeed emerge as an equilibrium strategy, but only when firms produce differentiated products, when one firm retains market power due to a cost advantage, or as part of an equilibrium in mixed strategies. In addition, we examine the role of nonlinear pricing in a spatial-competition framework. Our main conclusion is that in highly competitive markets, nonlinear pricing strategies are not likely to emerge as an equilibrium.     

Profit risk,market power and pricing decisions of large firms

We examine the response of price-setting firms to cyclical variations in demand and establish a set of conditions under which prices are adjusted countercyclically. We consider whether firms with market power attempt to reduce risk exposure through pricing policies.     

The design of voluntary agreements in oligopolistic markets

This paper analyses the conditions under which a group of firms have the incentive to sign a voluntary agreement (VA) to control polluting emissions even in the presence of free-riding by other firms in the industry. We consider a policy framework in which firms in a given industry decide whether or not to sign a VA proposed by an environmental regulator. We identify the features that a VA should possess in order to provide firms with an incentive to participate in the VA and to enhance its economic and environmental effectiveness. Under very general conditions on the shape of the demand schedule, we obtain the following results. First, a VA does not belong to the equilibrium of the coalition game when benefits from voluntary emission abatement are a pure public good, unless an industry emission target is set by the regulator. Second, in the presence of partial spillovers—i.e. when signatories obtain more benefits from the VA than non-signatories—a VA can belong to the equilibrium only if a minimum participation rule is guaranteed. Third, a VA with a minimum participation rule and a minimum mandatory emission abatement may improve welfare (and even industry profits) compared to a VA in which firms are free to set their own profit maximizing abatement level.     

Price discrimination using linear and nonlinear pricing simultaneously

Price discrimination practiced by using linear and nonlinear pricing simultaneously raises the average price for heterogenous consumers paying linear price but lowers for homogeneous group who pay nonlinear price. Discrimination lowers consumer surplus for both groups but increases total surplus.     

Temptation, self-control, and competitive nonlinear pricing

Standard pricing theories consider consumers without temptation. With temptation and costly self-control, consumers dislike choice sets with tempting alternatives. We study firms' strategy against such consumers, using Gul–Pesendorfer preferences and a game where firms compete by offering menus.     

Catalog competition and Nash equilibrium in nonlinear pricing games

We model strategic competition in a market with asymmetric information as a noncooperative game in which each seller competes for a buyer of unknown type by offering the buyer a catalog of products and prices. We call this game a catalog game. Our main objective is to show that catalog games have Nash equilibria. The Nash existence problem for catalog games is particularly contentious due to payoff discontinuities caused by tie-breaking. We make three contributions. First, we establish under very mild conditions on primitives that no matter what the tie-breaking rule, catalog games are uniformly payoff secure, and therefore have mixed extensions which are payoff secure. Second, we show that if the tie-breaking rule awards the sale to firms which value it most (i.e., breaks ties in favor of firms which stand to make the highest profit), then firm profits are reciprocally upper semicontinuous (i.e., the mixed catalog game is reciprocally upper semincontinuous). This in turn implies that the mixed catalog game satisfies Reny’s condition of better-reply security—a condition sufficient for existence (Reny in Econometrica 67:1029–1056, 1999). Third, we show by example that if the tie-breaking rule does not award the sale to firms which value it most (for example, if ties are broken randomly with equal probability), then the catalog game has no Nash equilibrium. This paper was written while the second author was Visiting Professor, Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, Universite Paris 1, Pantheon-Sorbonne. The second author thanks CES and Paris 1, and in particular, Bernard Cornet and Cuong Le Van for their support and hospitality. The second author also thanks the C&BA and EFLS at the University of Alabama for financial support. Both authors are grateful to Monique Florenzano and to participants in the April 2006 Paris 1 NSF/NBER Decentralization Conference for many helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper. Finally, both authors are especially grateful to an anonymous referee whose thoughtful comments led to substantial improvements in the paper. Monteiro acknowleges the financial support of Capes-Cofecub 468/04.