上市公司盈余操纵内因分析

近年来 ,上市公司的盈余操纵行为比较严重 ,究其原因 ,除了外在影响因素外 ,内因也是非常重要的一方面。为了更有效地对上市公司的盈余操纵行为进行防范 ,对上市公司盈余操纵的内因进行分析就显得非常必要。内因主要有 :博弈的结果 ,信息不对称 ,公司治理结构不完善     

新准则下的盈余管理与盈余质量

新准则的颁布使得传统的盈余管理手段受到限制,可以从源头上防范盈余管理行为,对利润的操纵行为具有制约作用,提高了盈余数据信息质量,但同时新准则也为盈余管理提供了空间.本文从几个方面分析新准则下盈余管理方式及对盈余质量的积极和消极影响.     

媒体关注的治理效应及其治理机制研究

作为法律外的制度,媒体关注是否具有治理效应?其作用机制是什么?这些问题已成为当前财务学研究的热点问题。本文选择2004-2008年中国A股上市企业为研究样本,聚焦上市公司会计信息的披露问题,系统性分析了媒体关注、盈余操纵及应计误定价之间的关系。研究发现:(1)在控制内生性问题后,媒体关注和管理层盈余操纵存在显著负向关系,表明媒体关注度的提高有助于抑制管理层主观的盈余操纵行为;(2)通过"Mishkin检验"发现我国A股市场整体上存在应计误定价现象,并且这种应计误定价主要是由于操纵性应计误定价引起的,表明管理层的盈余操纵行为是应计误定价的重要成因;(3)通过多种方法联合检验发现媒体关注与应计误定价之间存在显著负向关系,表明媒体关注度的提高能够有效提高市场对会计盈余构成信息的定价效率,减少应计误定价情况的出现。总体来看,媒体关注具有深度治理效应,其作用机制是:媒体关注有效抑制了管理层盈余操纵行为,从而提高了会计信息质量并最终提升了市场对盈余构成信息的定价效率,减少了应计误定价情况的出现。     

资产减值与上市公司盈余操纵的探究

企业盈余操纵与盈余管理有本质区别,盈余操纵真正包含的是投机性的盈余管理和会计造假。笔者认为,符合准则范围内的会计政策选择均是合理的,可以称之为盈余管理,盈余操纵属于另一种性质,即其已经违背了准则要求,不符合法规的要求。文章通过分析新准则的具体规定,对上市公司利用这种行为的原因进行了剖析,同时提出了一些相应的对策。     

会计准则导向、盈余管理方式选择与公司业绩

体现会计准则导向的自由裁量权为公司盈余管理提供了一种借助工具。由于应计、真实和分类转移三类盈余管理方式之间存在替代关系,本文利用2007-2017年A股上市公司样本考察会计准则导向对盈余管理方式选择的影响。研究发现,在原则导向会计准则下,公司会优先选择分类转移盈余管理,其次是真实盈余管理,最后选择应计盈余管理。在原则导向下应计盈余管理成本大大增加,成为最后选择,而分类转移可以提升公司未来业绩成为优先选择,真实盈余管理大大损害了公司未来业绩成为次要选择。进一步研究发现,机构投资者可以有效识别分类转移行为而不能识别应计和真实盈余管理行为;分析师可以识别真实盈余管理行为而不能很好地识别应计和分类转移盈余管理行为。     

上市公司信息披露的文字主观叙述与盈余操纵——基于机器学习法提取主观模式的研究

选取2006-2016年沪深A股上市公司样本,研究上市公司是否会操纵文字信息披露,以更主观的方式叙述来配合上市公司的盈余操纵行为。利用机器学习法提取2-POS主观模式,构建了可量化的文字叙述的主观性指标,通过实证检验发现,处于财务重述前,即在盈余操纵隐藏期间,上市公司年报中使用的主观句比例更高、整体主观性分数也更高;进一步的研究发现,良好的外部市场环境和内部治理环境会抑制上市公司利用主观色彩更浓的信息叙述来配合其盈余操纵的行为。本文的研究既为上市公司操纵文字信息披露的动机提供了新的证据,补充了财务数据与文字信息披露关系的相关研究,也为监管部门加强信息披露监管以及外部信息使用者判断信息质量提供了新的实证依据。     

利润操纵现象的成因及对策探讨

随着中国经济的迅猛发展，证券市场的不断成熟，企业为了追求更高的利润，利润操纵问题也随之而来。那么，利润操纵行为是在怎样的背景下产生的?如何识别利润操纵行为?可以采用那些手段来有效地遏制这种行为?本就以上问题作了相应的阐述。     

论上市公司利润操纵的识别与防范

随着中国经济的迅猛发展，证券市场的不断成熟，上市公司为了追求更高的利润，利润操纵问题也随之而来。那么，利润操纵行为是在怎样的背帚下产生的？如何识别利润操纵行为？可以采用哪些手段来有效地防范这种行为？本文就以上问题作了相应的阐述。对上市公司利润操纵得出一些有建设意义的结论，从而为有效遏制我国上市公司利润操纵行为提供一些手段。     

浅谈资产减值会计计量问题研究

从本质上来说,资产减值会计是一种后续计量方法,它的应用主要是为了进一步修正历史成本计量,换句话说,重新计量并不是资产减值会计的主要目的。然而近些年来,随着我国会计实务的不断发展,资产减值计量也出现了一系列的问题,例如缺乏客观性等等。这些问题的存在极大地加剧了流动资产的不稳定性,增加了企业的利润操作行为扩大了盈余操纵空间。面对这一问题,资产减值准则明确规定,不应当随意转回已经确认了的,长期资产减值损失。从一定程度上来说该项政策的确定压缩了盈余操纵的空间,但是这种方法毕竟只是权宜之计,难以从根本上改变盈余操纵空间扩大化了的现状。本文从我国资产减值准则对计量属性的选择为切入点,系统的阐述了抑制企业盈余管理行为,充分反应企业资产真实情况的有效路径。     

浅析上市公司财务报告的粉饰动因以及解决建议

本文首先阐述了财务报告的涵义,以及财务报告的作用。其次在本文中分析了上市公司粉饰财务报告的动因以及在公认会计准则的范围内,公司管理层通过会计政策变更或会计估计变更等方法对利润表中的应计利润盈余进行人为管理。其中的一些行为会减少盈余,但另外的行为可以增加盈余。大股东的这盈余管理造成了对外部投资者决策行为的误导和财富掠夺效应,那么如何减少人为操纵财务利润的发生,本文将会提出一些浅显可行的建议。     

Real earnings management and the cost of new corporate bonds

We examine the association between real earnings management and the cost of new bond issues of U.S. corporations. We consider three types of real earnings management: sales manipulation, overproduction, and the abnormal reduction of discretionary expenditures. We find that overproduction impairs credit ratings and that sales manipulation and overproduction are associated with higher bond yield spreads. Overall, our results imply that credit rating agencies and bondholders perceive real earnings management as a credit risk-increasing factor and thus require high risk premiums.     

虚假业绩美化手段比较研究

通过对现金流操控与盈余管理、会计策选择以及财务舞弊的概念比较,发现会计政策选择和盈余管理行是公司在法律法规允许范围内选择能够有利于美化当期业绩的会计方法;会计舞弊是在惩罚成本小于获得收益时,公司萌生舞弊之念,提供虚假信息蒙蔽误导投资者;现金流操控行为既有在法律法规允许范围内的调整手段,又有违法的虚造手法,花样和手段之多令投资者难辨真假,危害更大。     

Hubris and Unethical Decision Making: The Tragedy of the Uncommon

The research theorizes how hubris impacts ethical decision making and develops empirical evidence that earnings manipulation is more likely at firms led by CEOs influenced by hubris. The theory posits that hubris impairs moral awareness by causing decision makers to ignore external factors that otherwise drive such awareness. Additionally, these individuals apply a flawed subjective assessment of the decision they face which further impairs moral awareness. The predicted result is that hubris leads managers to invoke an amoral decision process which causes a higher incidence of unethical behavior among these individuals. An empirical study investigates the relationship between CEO hubris and the unethical practice of earnings manipulation. This study finds a significant correlation between CEO hubris and earnings manipulation at the firms they lead, an outcome broadly consistent with the theory developed.     

Ethics and Disclosure: A Study of the Financial Performance of Firms in the Seasoned Equity Offerings Market

In this article, we examine the association between ethics and disclosure and the impact of this association on the long-term, post-issue performance of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). We argue that firms with extensive disclosure are less likely to face information problems, and more likely to lead to an active shareholder monitoring, and therefore, engage in fewer unethical activities, such as aggressive earnings manipulation, and have better long-term, post-issue performance. Consistent with these predictions, this study presents evidence that disclosure is negatively related to unethical earnings manipulation and positively associated with long-term, post-issue performance. In particular, we find that long-term, post-issue SEO underperformance is significantly less for firms with extensive disclosure and conservative earnings management than firms with less disclosure and aggressive earnings management. We interpret this evidence to mean that over the long run, the capital market values ethical financial reporting and corporate efforts to incorporate social responsibility into their decision-making processes, for example, by enhancing information transparency through voluntary disclosure.      

证监会处罚对公司盈余管理的影响后果及机制研究

以2001—2009年因财务舞弊而被证监会处罚的上市公司为样本,检验公司受罚前后的盈余管理行为变化,结果发现:违规公司受罚后的盈余管理行为不仅没有减少,反而更多地使用了较为隐蔽的盈余管理方式——构建真实的活动以规避证监会的处罚;就处罚强度和处罚引起的市场反应这两种影响机制而言,市场反应的作用相对更大,市场反应的弱化会对公司的盈余管理行为起反向的激励作用。     

董事会特征、盈余管理动机与非流动资产处置

本文以沪深两市2007-2014年发生非流动资产处置损益的A股上市公司为样本,分析处置非流动资产的盈余管理动机以及公司董事会特征对真实盈余管理的抑制作用。研究结果表明：上市公司为了实现扭亏的目标,存在利用非流动资产处置收益实施盈余管理的行为;董事会治理机制中,董事长与总经理两职合一、独立董事比例和董事会开会次数与真实盈余管理水平显著负相关;相对于民营上市公司,国有上市公司真实盈余管理动机更强,其董事长与总经理两职合一和独立董事比例抑制盈余管理的功能优于民营上市公司,而民营上市公司的董事会开会次数的监督功能更为有效。     

Do Non‐profit Organizations Manage Earnings toward Zero Profit and Does Governmental Financing Play a Role?

Prior research has documented earnings management in for‐profit settings. Non‐profit organizations are thought to pay less attention to the bottom line and earnings management research has therefore focused on the manipulation of expenses in order to improve efficiency ratios or taxable income, not reported earnings per se. Considering an institutional setting characterized by the absence of such ratios and the presence of important subsidies, management of the actual bottom line is analyzed in light of these subsidies. The results suggest that organizations drive their results toward zero profit, which is intensified by increased governmental funding when unmanaged results are positive. The relation between downward earnings management and the presence of subsidies is particularly evident for organizations whose accumulated reserves are high. Copyright © 2012 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

大股东对盈余指标存在选择偏好吗?

作为转轨经济中公司治理的核心,大股东制衡机制对盈余管理和盈利质量存在重要影响.本文选择每股收益和主营业务利润率作为两类不同盈余指标的代表,以来自中国股市的经验证据研究发现:(1)控股股东持股比例(第一大股东比例)越高,上市公司每股收益越高,而主营业务利润率越低;(2)其他大股东持股比例和对第一大股东(或前两大股东)的制衡度(或联合制衡度)越高,上市公司每股收益越低,而主营业务利润率越高.这表明,不同的大股东对不同类型的盈余指标存在选择偏好:控股股东可能偏好市场和投资者反应程度较为显著,盈余管理空间较大且相对易于操纵的盈余指标;而与之相反,其他大股东持股比例和大股东制衡度(或联合制衡度)越高,越有可能抵制控股股东的盈余管理或利润操纵行为.     

Auditor switching, earnings manipulation and auditor independence: Evidence from A-share listed companies in China

Based on data from Chinese A-share listed companies between 1999 and 2004, this paper examines the causes of auditor switching and its effects on the independence of successive auditors from the perspective of earnings manipulation. Results show that: (1) listed companies manipulate their earnings through replacing their auditor and the successive auditor fails to exercise necessary prudence; (2) for companies reporting profit in the year of auditor change, the formerly low discretionary accruals usually increase significantly after the switch mostly resulting from assets devaluation and adjustments to non-recurring items; (3) In contrast, for companies reporting losses in the year of auditor change, they take a “big bath” to adjust lower earnings of the same year. These findings indicate that auditor change is related to the conservatism of predecessor auditors and it damages the independence of successive auditors.      

Influence of dividend tax policy tied to investment horizon on stock price stability: Evidence from the 2015 dividend tax reform in China

We examine how the dividend tax cut policy tied to the investment horizon enforced on September 8, 2015, influences stock price stability in China's A-share market. As the new dividend tax policy waives the tax on cash dividends for investors holding a stock for more than a year, it encourages long-term investment behavior. From 2013 to 2017, we find that stock turnover, return volatility, and turnover volatility decrease after the policy enforcement, especially for stocks with high dividend yields. This result shows that dividend tax reforms increase investors' stock investment horizons and help stabilize the market. However, our findings demonstrate that stock crash risk increases after policy enforcement. Further analysis shows that earnings management through real activities manipulation for stocks with a higher dividend yield contributes to an increase in stock crash risk. Therefore, one externality of the dividend tax cut policy tied to the investment horizon is that top managers of firms with a higher dividend yield may take advantage of investors' passive longer-term investment behavior and engage in more earnings management. This result suggests that regulatory agencies should pay attention to top managers' earnings management behavior after enacting policies that encourage long-term investment.