CEO stock options and analysts’ forecast accuracy and bias

This paper investigates the relationship between CEO stock options and analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy and bias. A higher level of stock options may induce managers to undertake riskier projects, to change and/or reallocate their effort, and to possibly engage in gaming (such as opportunistic earnings and disclosure management). These managerial behaviors result in an increase in the complexity of forecasting and hence, less accurate analysts’ forecasts. Analysts’ optimistic forecast bias may also increase as the level of stock options pay increases. Because forecast complexity increases with stock options pay, analysts, needing greater access to management’s information to produce accurate forecasts, have incentives to increase the optimistic bias in their forecasts. Alternatively, a higher level of stock options pay may lead to improved disclosure because it better aligns managers’ and shareholders’ interests. The improved disclosure, in turn, may result in more accurate and less biased analysts’ forecasts. Our empirical evidence indicates that analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy decreases and forecast optimism increases as the level of CEO stock options increases. This evidence suggests that the incentive alignment effects of stock options are more than offset by the investment, effort allocation and gaming incentives induced by stock options grants to CEOs.     

Determinants of analysts’ revenue forecast accuracy

This study investigates financial analysts’ revenue forecasts and identifies determinants of the forecasts’ accuracy. We find that revenue forecast accuracy is determined by forecast and analyst characteristics similar to those of earnings forecast accuracy—namely, forecast horizon, days elapsed since the last forecast, analysts’ forecasting experience, forecast frequency, forecast portfolio, reputation, earnings forecast issuance, forecast boldness, and analysts’ prior performance in forecasting revenues and earnings. We develop a model that predicts the usefulness of revenue forecasts. Thereby, our study helps to ex ante identify more accurate revenue forecasts. Furthermore, we find that analysts concern themselves with their revenue forecasting performance. Analysts with poor revenue forecasting performance are more likely to stop forecasting revenues than analysts with better performance. Their decision is reasonable because revenue forecast accuracy affects analysts’ career prospects in terms of being promoted or terminated. Our study helps investors and academic researchers to understand determinants of revenue forecasts. This understanding is also beneficial for evaluating earnings forecasts because revenue forecasts reveal whether changes in earnings forecasts are due to anticipated changes in revenues or expenses.     

Internal control material weakness, analysts’ accuracy and bias, and brokerage reputation

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of internal control material weaknesses (ICMW hereafter) on sell side analysts. We find that ICMW reporting firms have less accurate analyst forecasts relative to non-reporting firms when the reported ICMWs belong to the Pervasive type. ICMW reporting firms have more optimistically biased analyst forecasts compared than non-reporting firms. The optimistic bias exists only in the forecasts issued by the analysts affiliated with less-highly-reputable brokerage houses. The differences in accuracy and bias between ICMW and non-ICMW firms disappear when ICMW disclosing firms stop disclosing ICMWs. Collectively, our results suggest that the weaknesses in internal control increases forecasting errors and upward bias for financial analysts. However, a good brokerage reputation can curb the optimistic bias.     

Political patronage and analysts’ forecast precision

We test whether the channel by which the government plays the role of political patron to selected firms influences analysts’ forecast precision in Malaysia. Correcting for analysts’ self-selection bias, we find a negative relation between analysts’ forecast errors and the social dimension of political patronage, as proxied by government-controlled institutional ownership. The reverse is found for the economic dimension of political patronage, as proxied by the percentage shareholding of government-linked corporations. We find no evidence that the personal dimension of political patronage influences analysts’ forecast precision.     

Do sell-side analysts exhibit differential target price forecasting ability?

We examine the overall and individual analyst performance of 12-month-ahead target price forecasts over the 10 years from 2000 through 2009. Implied target price-based returns exceed actual returns by an average of 15 %, and absolute target price forecast errors average 45 %. At the end of the 12-month forecast horizon, only 38 % of target prices are met, but 64 % are met at some time during the forecast horizon. We find statistically significant but economically weak evidence of persistent differential abilities by sell-side analysts to forecast target prices. Target price announcement period return analyses indicate no differential market reactions to analysts’ target price revisions conditional on their recent target price forecast performance. This finding is consistent with the market understanding that analysts have, at best, limited abilities to persistently provide accurate target price forecasts.     

Does foreign investor demand for information affect forecast accuracy? Evidence from the Chinese stock markets

Prior international accounting studies have examined mainly the supply side of analyst research. Specific trading rights and financial reporting systems in China provide a unique opportunity to test both demand and supply factors of analyst information. For shares traded only by less-informed foreign investors, the increased information demand may create incentives for analysts to exert greater efforts than for shares traded by local investors. This study provides evidence that analyst effort (proxied by analyst coverage) and expertise (proxied by consensus cross-analyst forecast variability) affect forecast accuracy more significantly for shares traded by foreign investors than for shares traded by local investors. Additionally, I find that the relation between analyst characteristics and relative forecast accuracy is stronger for shares traded by the foreign investors. The findings are consistent with analysts responding to demands for information by less-informed investors.     

Do analysts affect bad news timeliness?

I investigate the effect of analysts on the speed with which bad news is reflected in earnings. Intuitively, the more analysts that cover a firm, the more costly it will be for the firm to keep bad news suppressed. Thus, analyst coverage should positively affect bad news timeliness (BNT) (but not necessarily the differential timeliness of bad news over good news, or conditional conservatism). Using brokerage house mergers as a natural experiment with a difference-in-differences design, I find that an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage decreases BNT; that is, analysts positively affect BNT. The decrease in BNT is robust to controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity, using a propensity score matched sample, persists for up to three years after the brokerage house merger, and is stronger for firms with relatively low analyst coverage before the merger. The result improves our understanding of how analysts affect a firm's information environment.     

Economic policy uncertainty and analysts’ forecast characteristics

We examine the influence of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on the characteristics of analysts’ earnings forecasts over a thirty-year period, spanning a wide variety of political and economic conditions. Motivated by both theory and empirical evidence that suggest a decline in the quality of the information environment for firms as EPU increases, we establish that analysts’ forecast errors increase with EPU, as does the degree of forecast dispersion. Increased error and dispersion persist after controlling for several competing sources of economy-wide uncertainty. Cross sectional analysis exploring heterogeneity in forecast quality across both analyst and firm characteristics establishes that forecast error and dispersion increase with EPU across a broad spectrum of firms and levels of analyst expertise. We control for analysts’ experience overall and the years spent covering a particular industry and firm. Five alternative methods for classifying firms as policy sensitive versus policy neutral provide consistent evidence that analyst forecast errors and dispersion increase with EPU, even for firms not deemed to be particularly sensitive to policy.     

The behavioral basis of sell-side analysts’ herding

Sell-side analysts move away from the prevailing consensus as their confidence increases. As their confidence falls, they herd toward the prevailing consensus. Confidence as well as the associated propensity to move away from the herd increase as firms become more difficult to analyze. This behavior is consistent with such analysts having lower meta-cognitive skills.     

Does Regulation Fair Disclosure affect analysts’ forecast performance? The case of restructuring firms

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate how the enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. FD) influences analysts?? forecast characteristics for restructuring firms. The Reg. FD requires all firms disseminate material information not only to some institutional investors and certain financial analysts, but to all market participants simultaneously. We expect that the regulatory effect of Reg. FD on financial analysts?? forecast performance would be pronounced because of uncertain earnings signals and information complexity produced by restructuring activities. Particularly, we examine how the enactment of Reg. FD affects the relationship between analysts?? earnings forecast attributes and the occurrence and magnitude of restructuring charges. Our general finding is that analysts?? forecast errors and forecast dispersion have declined in the post-FD period for restructuring firms. However, such an impact cannot be persistent with an increase in the relative magnitude of restructuring charges, the proxy for restructuring complexity. This study provides additional evidence that Reg. FD has limited private information, and attempts to provide all users with the same access to information within the context of firms reporting restructuring charges.     

Do investors affect financial analysts’ behavior? Evidence from short sellers

We examine how short sellers affect financial analysts’ forecast behavior using a natural experiment that relaxes short-sale constraints. We find that increased ease of short selling improves analyst earnings forecast quality by reducing forecast bias and increasing forecast accuracy. The improvements can be explained by both the disciplining pressure from short sellers and increased price efficiency from incorporating information in a timely manner. Although it is well documented that financial analysts can affect investors, our paper provides novel evidence on how sophisticated investors, short sellers, can affect analysts.     

Improvement in clinical trial disclosures and analysts’ forecast accuracy: evidence from the pharmaceutical industry

This paper examines whether financial analysts use the information contained in clinical trial disclosures to improve their forecast accuracy for pharmaceutical companies. Findings indicate that the improved clinical trial disclosures due to a quasi-regulation issued by the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) significantly reduce analysts’ long-term forecast error. In addition, a propensity-score matching analysis provides additional strong evidence that issuance of the 2005 ICMJE’s regulation is accompanied by an average 45 % decrease in long-term forecast error, and a more than 50 % decrease in long-term forecast dispersion. This study contributes to the accounting literature regarding nonfinancial disclosures by providing the first insights into financial analysts’ use of clinical trial disclosures in their forecasts of future earnings. In addition, because the major event examined in this study is a quasi-regulation issued by the ICMJE, we provide additional insights on the effectiveness of industry-initiated regulations (or quasi-regulations) on nonfinancial disclosure practice.     

Do product market threats affect analyst forecast precision?

We examine how product market threats influence the precision of analyst forecasts. Greater competitive threats may make forecasting more difficult by increasing the uncertainty regarding future cash flows and by influencing the quality of financial disclosure. Using a firm-specific measure of product market threats (i.e., fluidity), we find that analysts are more likely to be less precise forecasting earnings for highly fluid firms and that the lack of precision is not fully explained by performance volatility. Our findings further suggest that firms with fluid products have lower accruals quality and that they are more likely to withheld information regarding contract terms and sales from major customers. Cross-sectional analysis further suggests that the effect of fluidity on analyst forecasts is more pronounced when firms have flexibility in disclosure choices. Using significant changes in tariff rates as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that analyst forecast precision is significantly lower following tariff reductions.     

The effect of consistency in book-tax differences on analysts’ earnings forecasts: Evidence from forecast accuracy and informativeness

This study examines the relationship between the consistency of book-tax differences and the quality of analysts’ earnings forecasts. We find that the consistency of book-tax differences is associated with more accurate and informative forecasts. This suggests that the information embedded in the consistency of book-tax differences plays an important role in elevating the quality of analysts’ forecasts. Furthermore, the effect of consistency in book-tax differences on analyst forecast quality is greater for firms with noisier information environment. Finally, we find that the relation between consistency in book-tax differences and improvements in forecast accuracy and informativeness is stronger after the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure, which increased the role of public information in analysts’ forecasts.     

Do analysts’' forecast properties deter suboptimal labor investment decisions? Evidence from Regulation Fair Disclosure

We examine whether analysts' forecast properties deter inefficient labor investment decisions. Using accuracy and dispersion as analysts' forecast properties, we find that more accurate and less dispersed forecasts are associated with less inefficient corporate labor investments. Utilizing Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) as an exogenous variation to analysts' forecast activities, we find a causal relationship between analysts' forecast properties and labor investment inefficiency. We also find that more accurate and less dispersed forecasts decrease labor cost stickiness. Our results are consistent with the view that analysts' forecast properties enhance the information environment, which, in turn, improves corporate labor investment decisions.     

The effects of analysts’ tax expense forecast accuracy on corporate tax avoidance: An international analysis

A spotlight has recently been cast on the role of analysts as monitors of corporate tax planning, but investigations beyond the US are rare. After extension to the international setting, I investigate whether the strength of investor protection impacts the relationship between analysts’ tax expense forecast accuracy and tax avoidance. Using a sample from 24 countries, I find that firms with high analysts’ tax expense forecast accuracy engage in lower levels of tax avoidance than firms with low forecast accuracy; this relationship is greater for firms in countries with weaker investor protection. These findings suggest that the extent of country-level investor protection substitutes for firm-level governance in constraining managerial incentives for tax avoidance.     

Factors associated with price reactions and analysts’ forecast revisions around SEC filings

We investigate the extent to which rapid accessibility of financial reports filed electronically through the Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR system has affected the ability of investors and security analysts to use accounting data in pricing decisions and forecasting. Consistent with prior research, we find evidence confirming that stock price reactions to SEC filings are significant in the EDGAR period but not the pre-EDGAR period. We also find significant revisions in analysts’ one-quarter-ahead earnings forecasts around SEC filings dates in both the pre-EDGAR and EDGAR periods. The price and forecast revision evidence indicates that financial analysts have used SEC filings all along. However, it is the advent of EDGAR that has allowed individual investors to also use 10-K and 10-Q filings. Cross-sectional analyses indicate that in the EDGAR period, trading volume around the preceding earnings announcements may influence individual investors to react to SEC filings. In contrast, variables such as the earnings surprise and the level of total accruals attract the attention of financial analysts. Interestingly, analysts appear to have been less likely in the pre-EDGAR period to bear the cost of searching out each SEC filing to identify those with large total accruals, which are known only after examining the SEC filing itself.     

Does short selling reduce analysts’ optimism bias in earnings forecasts?

We examine the relationship between short selling and analyst optimism bias of earnings forecasts of stocks in China. We propose two possible hypotheses: short selling enhances analysts’ information set to lower optimism bias and analysts drum up optimistic earnings forecasts to counter short selling. Our results suggest that short selling and earnings optimism bias are negatively correlated. The findings are robust to a two-stage least square method, a difference in-differences fixed effect model, an alternative measure of optimism bias, incorporated different time windows to calculate short selling, considered bull and bear market conditions, accounting for media coverage, and using abnormal short selling. By leveraging rich data, we conduct additional analyses using stocks with different forecasting horizons and earnings forecasts that were made after the accounting year but prior to the earnings announcement to further support expanding the information set argument. Lastly, we document that short selling information improves the accuracy of earnings forecasts.     

Can sell-side analysts’ experience,expertise and qualifications help mitigate the adverse effects of accounting reporting complexity?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We examine the relation between accounting reporting complexity and analysts’ performance and whether analysts’ qualifications,...