Analysts’ estimates of the cost of equity capital

We explore a large sample of analysts' estimates of the cost of equity capital (CoE) to evaluate their usefulness as expected return proxies (ERP). We find that the CoE estimates are significantly related to a firm's beta, size, book-to-market ratio, leverage, and idiosyncratic volatility but not other risk proxies. Even after controlling for the popular return predictors, the CoE estimates incrementally predict future stock returns. This predictive ability is better explained as the CoE estimates containing ERP information rather than reflecting stock mispricing. When evaluated against traditional ERPs, including the implied costs of capital, the CoE estimates are found to be the least noisy. Finally, we document CoE responses around earnings announcements, demonstrating their usefulness to study discount-rate reactions of market participants. We conclude that analysts' CoE estimates are meaningful ERPs that can be fruitfully employed in a variety of asset pricing contexts.     

Analysts’ forecast revisions and firms’ research and development expenses

This study examines whether reported values for firms’ research and development (R&D) affect analysts’ annual earnings forecast revisions following quarterly earnings announcements. Because R&D introduces uncertainty into earnings forecasts, analysts may benefit from additional information searches in an effort to increase forecast accuracy. Also, accounting standards mandate an immediate expensing of R&D, in essence projecting a zero value for the R&D. To the extent that R&D will produce future payoffs, the expense treatment reduces the informativeness of reported earnings for forecasting future earnings. Thus, the marginal benefit of analysts’ efforts to produce more information may increase with the magnitude of the R&D component of earnings announcements and trigger additional forecast revisions. Alternatively, if the cost of information searches exceeds the benefit, analysts’ forecast revisions may decrease. Our results show a positive relation between R&D expenses and analysts’ forecast revision activity. We also find a positive and significant association between the level of R&D expenses and the magnitude of analysts’ forecast revisions following quarterly announcements. These results point to a greater amount of analyst scrutiny when reported earnings are accompanied by high levels of R&D expenses.

The impact of SEC investigations and accounting and auditing enforcement releases on firms’ cost of equity capital

I study the impact of an SEC investigation (as captured by accounting and auditing enforcement releases) on a firm’s cost of equity capital. AAERs are often used in accounting literature as a proxy for fraudulent financial reporting. Fraudulent financial reporting should lead to an increase in cost of equity capital as a firm’s future cash flows become less certain. Overall, this study provides evidence of changes in cost of equity capital for firms targeted by an SEC AAER on the date the investigation is first made public.     

Investors’ perception of CEO overconfidence: evidence from the cost of equity capital

Prior literature documents that CEO overconfidence plays an important role in corporate financial reporting and accounting decisions. However, an unexplored issue is how investors perceive the risks associated with CEO overconfidence. This study examines the effect of CEO overconfidence on the cost of equity capital. We find that the association between CEO overconfidence and the cost of equity is nonlinear: a moderate level of CEO overconfidence results in the lowest cost of equity capital after controlling for other known determinants of the cost of equity. We also find an inverted nonlinear relation between CEO overconfidence and equity issuance, which corroborates our main conclusion of the nonlinear effect of CEO overconfidence on the cost of equity. Our results are robust to alternative overconfidence measures, cost of equity measures, and change analysis.     

Analysts’ earnings forecasts: coexistence and dynamics of overconfidence and strategic incentives

This paper formulates a two-stage model to capture the decision process of financial analysts when issuing earnings forecasts. Our model extends the model of Chen and Jiang [(2005). Analysts’ weighting of private and public information. Review of Financial Studies, 19 (1), 319–355], by allowing for a distortion of forecasts independent of whether an analyst has private information. Using quarterly earnings forecasts, we provide empirical evidence on the coexistence of overconfidence and strategic incentives. Financial analysts overweight their private information and at the same time strategically inflate their forecast.     

The impact of accruals and lines of business on analysts’ earnings forecast superiority

In this paper, we examine the linkage between analyst advantage (AA) (compared to the seasonal random walk model) in the prediction of quarterly earnings-per-share (EPS) and a broad set of economic determinants. Specifically, we employ a pooled cross-sectional time-series regression model where AA is linked to a set of firm-specific economic determinants that have been employed in extant work (e.g., Brown et al. in J Account Res 22:49?C67, 1987; Kross et al. in Account Rev 65:461?C476, 1990). We refine this set of independent variables by including a new variable (RATIODEV) based upon Sloan (Account Rev 71(3):289?C315, 1996) who documents that differential levels of accruals impact future earnings performance. This variable is particularly salient in explaining AA since analysts may be in a position to identify the permanent component of accruals via fundamental financial analysis. Additionally, we refine the measurement of lines of business??consistent with the reporting requirements of SFAS No. 131 relative to extant work that operationalized proxies for this variable based upon SFAS No. 14. Parameters for these aforementioned variables are significantly positively related to AA, consistent with theory.     

Discussion of “Using earnings forecasts to simultaneously estimate firm-specific cost of equity and long-term growth”

Accounting-based valuation models allow us to develop rigorous estimates of either value or the expected rate of return on equity capital (i.e., ERR) without making steady-state forecasts that rely on ad hoc assumptions about dividend policy. Hence, these models have great potential. Their ultimate usefulness, however, depends on the extent to which users of them make assumptions about future residual income that are consistent with the underlying accounting. Nekrasov and Ogneva contribute by developing a methodology that allows us to integrate information about accounting attributes such as conservatism into our estimates of the growth rate in residual income. Hence, their methodology can be used to improve our understanding of the role that conservatism plays in determining growth. This, in turn, improves our ability to estimate key parameters such as value and the expected rate of return on equity capital.     

Does information risk affect the implied cost of equity capital? An analysis of PIN and adjusted PIN

Using a unique dataset of Korean listed companies for which trade initiators are correctly identifiable, we estimate bias-free PIN (probability of informed trading) that is no longer subject to the trade misspecification problem and test whether it is related to expected returns. Unlike prior studies, we find that bias-free AdjPIN, the adjusted PIN purged of a liquidity component, is positively related to implied cost of equity. Our findings suggest that the errors in PIN variables hamper a proper identification of PIN pricing in prior studies.     

The impact of CSR performance and CSR disclosure readability on investors’ earnings estimates

We investigate how the valence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance and the readability of CSR disclosure impact investors’ earnings estimates. Ninety-seven part-time MBA students participate in an experiment, in which we manipulate the valence of CSR performance (positive versus neutral) and the readability of CSR reports (high versus low), while holding financial information constant. Our findings reveal that investors make more positive earnings estimates when CSR performance is positive. The readability level of CSR reports also influences investors’ decision-making process. Moreover, by using an eye-tracking device, we are able to observe investors’ different reading behaviours upon the different levels of readability.     

Duration of equity overvaluation and managers’ choice to use aggressive underlying earnings disclosure and accrual-based earnings management: Australian evidence

This paper examines whether equity overvaluation duration influences managers’ choice of different earnings management mechanisms and how corporate governance and the Australian Securities and Investment Commission’s underlying earnings disclosure guidelines influence managers’ choices. The study samples Australian Securities Exchange 200 firms from 2009 to 2016. Findings show that on average, firms more likely engage in accrual-based earnings management in the early overvaluation stage. In later stages, firms more likely disclose underlying earnings aggressively to sustain overvaluation. Additionally, firms with a high proportion of independent directors on the board prefer to disclose underlying earnings aggressively to sustain the equity overvaluation; firms with a low proportion of independent directors prefer both accrual-based earnings management and aggressive underlying earnings disclosure to sustain the overvaluation. Moreover, firms that conform to the Commission’s underlying earnings disclosure guidelines use neither accrual-based earnings management nor aggressive underlying earnings disclosure to sustain overvaluation, but non-conforming firms use both mechanisms.     

Accounting flexibility and managers’ forecast behavior prior to seasoned equity offerings

This study examines the effect of accounting flexibility on managers’ forecasting behavior prior to seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Although SEO firms have a strong incentive to convey optimistic information to boost the pre-SEO stock price, they also face enhanced litigation risk arising from SEO-related regulations. Thus, I hypothesize that managers will release positive news through their forecasts (relative to the prevailing analyst consensus) prior to an SEO only if they have the accounting flexibility to manage subsequent reported earnings to meet or exceed their forecasts. I find that managers with greater accounting flexibility are more likely to issue a forecast prior to the SEO and that their forecasts are more likely to convey positive news and are more specific. Furthermore, I find no effect of accounting flexibility for non-SEO control firms or for non-SEO periods. My results suggest that when managers experience a tension between the incentive for voluntary disclosure and high litigation risk, accounting flexibility is an important factor that determines their forecasting behavior.     

Does international experience of managers bring financing benefits? Evidence from the cost of equity capital

Using a sample of Chinese firms, this study examines whether and how managers’ overseas experience affects a firm’s cost of equity capital. We document a negative association between managers’ overseas experience and the cost of equity capital. Mechanism analyses indicate that companies with returnee managers have better information quality and lower systematic risk; more institutional investors, media reports, and analysts following; and higher stock liquidity, all of which lead to a lower cost of equity capital. Further analyses show that chief executive officers (CEOs) with foreign experience have a more significant impact on the cost of capital than non-CEO managers with foreign experience and that managers’ overseas work experience has a more significant impact on the cost of capital than their overseas education. We also find that the impact of managers’ overseas experience is more pronounced when that experience is gained in common law countries compared to code law countries but weaker for state-owned enterprises and firms that are cross-listed or have foreign institutional investors. Overall, the results suggest that managers’ knowledge, skills, and ethical values imprinted from overseas experience, plus eyeball effects from media and analyst attention, can reduce the cost of equity capital.     

The impact of multi-dimensional corporate transparency on us firms’ credit ratings and cost of capital

This study examines corporate transparency in the US market for a sample of 319 S&P 500 firms. We examine whether a number of disparate measures of corporate transparency used by other researchers are distinct, cohere as measures of a single factor of corporate transparency, or capture multiple different dimensions. Next, we begin to examine the impact of corporate transparency, conceived in the broadest sense, and not limited to financial reporting, on US firms. We develop a model of corporate transparency based on a broad definition and framework proposed by Bushman, Piotrowski and Smith, which we extend in several ways, and then study the effect of corporate transparency on cost of debt, credit rating, and cost of equity. First, we find that corporate transparency is neither a unitary concept nor merely an ambiguous term for multiple distinct concepts: factor analysis of ten corporate transparency variables identifies four independent underlying dimensions: public disclosure information, intermediary information, earnings quality information and insider information. Second, we find that corporate transparency has significant power to explain cross-sectional variation in credit rating and cost of capital. More specifically, (i) credit rating, cost of debt, and beta are significantly associated with disclosure information transparency; (ii) credit rating, cost of equity, and beta are significantly associated with intermediary information transparency; and (iii) cost of equity and beta are significantly associated with insider information transparency. Our findings offer a more comprehensive evaluation of corporate transparency than prior studies, and we demonstrate direct economic implications for both US firms and markets.     

Analysts’ sale and distribution of non fundamental information

We examine an analyst’s sale and distribution of information related to short-term price movements but unrelated to underlying firm value. By selling non fundamental information, the analyst increases competition on the signal, but prices become more sensitive to net order flow, creating an offsetting increase in the non fundamental signal’s value. More precise non fundamental information is more widely distributed. In the limit, a perfect non fundamental signal will be publicly disclosed for an arbitrarily small fee, and the analyst earns profits as if he possessed fundamental information. Consistent with empirical findings, analysts’ recommendations can be profitable, even when widely distributed or seemingly inconsistent with detailed forecasts. Analysis based on non fundamental information does not contribute to greater price efficiency but reduces liquidity costs. In a multi-period setting, traders with non fundamental information do not front-run, preferring to transact only in the period in which uninformed demand is executed.     

What's your real cost of capital?

In valuing any investment project or corporate acquisition, executives must decide what discount rate to use in their estimates of future cash flows. The traditional approach is to apply the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), which has remained fundamentally unchanged for 40 years. But the formula--in particular, its beta element--has long been a source of frustration. In fact, corporate executives and investment bankers routinely fudge their CAPM estimates, say the authors, because experience and intuition tell them the model produces inappropriate discount rates. CAPM has three main problems: First, beta is a measure of both a stock's correlation and its volatility; second, beta is based on historical data; and third, CAPM rates don't take into account the term of the investment. These factors together result in discount rates that defy common sense. As an alternative to CAPM and its beta element, the authors developed a forward-looking approach to calculating a company's cost of capital, the market-derived capital pricing model (MCPM). It does not incorporate any measure of historical stock-to-market correlation, relying instead on estimates of future volatility derived from the options market. This is helpful since investor expectations from the options market are built into a company's current stock price. Using GE as an example, the authors give step-by-step instructions for how to calculate discount rates with MCPM. They also offer evidence from a range of industries to show that MCPM's discount rates are more realistic--especially from the corporate investor's perspective--than are CAPM's.     

The association between quarter length,forecast errors,and firms’ voluntary disclosures

Approximately 60 percent of adjacent fiscal quarters contain a different number of calendar days. In preliminary analyses, we find the change in quarter length is significantly associated with the changes in sales and earnings and that analysts condition on the prior quarter's results when making their forecasts. These results indicate that it is important for analysts to adjust for changes in quarter length when making forecasts. However, we find the quarterly change in days is positively associated with analysts’ sales and earnings forecasts errors, where forecast error equals the actual earnings minus the forecasted earnings. These results indicate that analysts systematically underestimate (overestimate) performance when quarter length increases (decreases). We find evidence indicating investors make similar errors as returns around earnings announcements are positively associated with the change in quarter length, but only when changes in firm performance is more sensitive to changes in quarter length. Corroborating these findings, managers are more (less) likely to discuss quarter length during conference calls when quarter length decreases (increases). These results are consistent with managers’ strategic disclosure incentives. In summary, our evidence suggests analysts and investors fail to fully take account of the quasi-mechanical effect that quarter length has on firm performance and managers strategically alter their voluntary disclosures to take advantage of these failures.     

The effect of consistency in book-tax differences on analysts’ earnings forecasts: Evidence from forecast accuracy and informativeness

This study examines the relationship between the consistency of book-tax differences and the quality of analysts’ earnings forecasts. We find that the consistency of book-tax differences is associated with more accurate and informative forecasts. This suggests that the information embedded in the consistency of book-tax differences plays an important role in elevating the quality of analysts’ forecasts. Furthermore, the effect of consistency in book-tax differences on analyst forecast quality is greater for firms with noisier information environment. Finally, we find that the relation between consistency in book-tax differences and improvements in forecast accuracy and informativeness is stronger after the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure, which increased the role of public information in analysts’ forecasts.     

Analysts’ annual earnings forecasts and changes to the I/B/E/S database

Review of Accounting Studies - I/B/E/S is a common source of analyst earnings forecast data, and the reliability of these data is important for practice and academic research. Examining a common...     

Do firms’ earnings management practices affect their equity liquidity?

This study investigates the relationship between earnings management and equity liquidity, positing that as incentives arise for the manipulation of firm performance through earnings management (due partly to conflicts of interest between firm insiders and outsiders), greater earnings management may signal higher adverse selection costs. If earnings manipulation reveals aggressive accounting practices, liquidity providers tend to widen bid-ask spreads to protect themselves. The empirical results indicate that companies with higher earnings management suffer lower equity liquidity.     

The effect of board‐manager agency conflicts on non‐profit organisations’ earnings and cost allocation manipulations

Taking into account agency problems between board and management within non‐profit organisations, for the first time a comprehensive formal model of earnings manipulations is developed. Both organisational earnings as well as disaggregated financial performance indicators are looked at, the last ones being affected by possible indirect cost allocation manipulations. The model takes into consideration the impact of disclosed earnings and performance indicators on externally raised funds, and assumes risk‐neutral managers. In the last section, it is generalised by introducing risk‐averse managers.

The conditions for optimal manipulation levels (from a managerial point of view) are derived. Depending on the (dis) utility parameters involved, different solutions emerge. As to the agency problems, it is shown that, at least for all interior solutions, a single mechanism is at work in all the situations analysed: more agency problems lead to more manipulations, both at the organisational level and the disaggregated level.