Tournament incentives, firm risk, and corporate policies

This paper tests the proposition that higher tournament incentives will result in greater risk-taking by senior managers in order to increase their chance of promotion to the rank of CEO. Measuring tournament incentives as the pay gap between the CEO and the next layer of senior managers, we find a significantly positive relation between firm risk and tournament incentives. Further, we find that greater tournament incentives lead to higher R&D intensity, firm focus, and leverage, but lower capital expenditures intensity. Our results support the hypothesis that option-like features of intra-organizational CEO promotion tournaments provide incentives to senior executives to increase firm risk by following riskier policies. Finally, the compensation levels and structures of executives of financial institutions have received a great deal of scrutiny after the financial crisis. In a separate examination of financial firms, we again find a significantly positive relation between firm risk and tournament incentives.     

Good for managers,bad for society? Causal evidence on the association between risk-taking incentives and corporate social responsibility

Using FAS 123R as an exogenous shock to stock options, I provide evidence that equity-based risk-taking incentives discourage corporate social responsibility (CSR). This finding suggests that compensation incentives can motivate managers not to pursue CSR strategies because CSR reduces firms’ risk and provides insurance-like benefits. Firms with a greater demand for CSR's risk reduction are more sensitive to changes in risk-taking incentives. I triangulate my results by confirming that CSR weaknesses are positively related to subsequent stock return volatility. Overall, using a robust empirical design, I find that risk-taking incentives are a determinant of firms’ CSR.     

Managerial incentives,options, and cost-structure choices

This study explores the relationship between changes in managerial risk-taking incentives and adjustments of firms’ cost structures, particularly the operating leverage (fixed-to-variable cost ratio). We find managers reduce operating leverage by substituting fixed costs with variable costs, mainly in the selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) and research and development (R&D) cost components, in response to reductions in option-based compensation following the issuance of FAS 123R. Managers facing a decrease in risk-taking incentives adjust operating leverage downward because high operating leverage intensifies the downside potential of earnings. Overall, we present compelling evidence that managers adjust the cost structure of their firms in response to a reduction in risk-taking incentives.     

The differential effects of classified boards on firm value

Classified boards actually benefit firms that have low monitoring costs and greater needs for advisory services. Previous literature has emphasized the entrenchment effect of classified boards. However, we find that this adverse impact of classified boards can be offset or even superseded by the potential benefits of board classification for firms who hope to benefit from the advisory services of their independent directors. We show that firms with greater advising needs appoint more outside directors with diverse attributes and expertise, qualifications that enhance the ability to provide useful advice to managers. Furthermore, in such firms, board classification is associated with higher performance sensitivity of forced CEO turnover and better acquisition performance. Conversely, in firms with high monitoring costs, board classification hurts managerial equity-based incentives and risk-taking incentives. These findings suggest how and through which channels classified boards engender the differential effects on firm value.     

CEO risk-taking incentives and socially irresponsible activities

This study examines the relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives, measured by the sensitivity of CEO wealth held in options to a change in stock return volatility or Vega, and socially irresponsible activities using a large sample of U.S. firms during the period 1992–2012. Our results for the period before the 2007 financial crisis suggest that CEO risk-taking incentives are positively related to socially irresponsible activities. In addition, we find that a firm's socially responsible actions may act as a moderator, strengthening the aforementioned relationship. The results after the 2007 financial crisis show no evidence of a significant relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives and socially irresponsible activities. This could be due to the increased scrutiny regarding compensation packages and the increased role of reputational issues in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Our results suggest that risk-taking incentives embedded in the CEO compensation scheme have implications for corporate policies toward socially irresponsible activities.     

Corporate cash holdings and CEO compensation incentives

We examine the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation incentives on corporate cash holdings and the value of cash to better understand how compensation incentives designed to enhance the alignment of manager and shareholder interests could influence stockholder-bondholder conflicts. We find a positive relation between CEO risk-taking (vega) incentives and cash holdings, and we find a negative relation between vega and the value of cash to shareholders. The negative effect of vega on the value of cash is robust after controlling for corporate governance, is stronger in firms with high leverage, is reversed for unlevered firms, and is not present in financially constrained firms. We also find that the likelihood of liquidity covenants in new bank loans is increasing in CEO vega incentives. Our evidence primarily supports the costly contracting hypothesis, which asserts that bondholders anticipate greater risk-taking in high vega firms and, therefore, require greater liquidity.     

Tournament incentives and firm credit risk: Evidence from credit default swap referenced firms

In this paper, we evaluate the impact of managerial tournament incentives on firm credit risk in credit default swap (CDS) referenced firms. We find that intra‐firm tournament incentives are negatively related to credit risk. Our results suggest that tournament incentives reduce credit risk by alleviating the potential for underinvestment when managers are concerned about exacting empty creditors. Further, we find that tournament incentives decrease credit risk when internal governance is strong or product market competition is intense. Taken together, our results suggest that creditors perceive senior manager tournament incentives (SMTI) as a critical determinant of a firm's credit risk, particularly in settings where managerial risk aversion is high.     

Analyst coverage,executive compensation and corporate risk-taking: Evidence from property–casualty insurance firms

Using an exogenous drop in analyst coverage introduced by broker closures and mergers, we test for the causal impact of analyst coverage on corporate risk-taking, in an opaque industry. We document an increase in risk using several book-based and market-based risk measures, including tail and default risk measures. Results are driven by firms with stronger managerial risk-taking compensation incentives. The increase in risk is stronger in more opaque firms, and firms with weaker policyholder monitoring. Firm risk increases through at least one risk-taking action, such as investing firm assets in higher-risk bonds. Our study highlights the importance of stock analysts in affecting corporate risk-taking, especially in the presence of stronger managerial, compensation risk-taking incentives.     

Own company stock in defined contribution pension plans: A takeover defense?

If managers induce employees to hold company stock in defined contribution pension plans as a form of takeover defense, then changes in state laws that enhance managerial protection should lead to a reduction in employer stock in 401(k) plans. Delaware's mid-1990s validation of the poison pill in conjunction with a staggered board was followed by a significant decline in employee ownership within defined contribution plans for firms incorporated in Delaware. Evidence using governance data suggests that this is due to responses of firms with staggered boards. Binary choice models confirm that employee ownership in defined contribution plans lowers takeover probabilities.     

Restricting CEO pay

We analyze several proposals to restrict CEO compensation and calibrate two models of executive compensation that describe how firms would react to different types of restrictions. We find that many restrictions would have unintended consequences. Restrictions on total realized (ex-post) payouts lead to higher average compensation, higher rewards for mediocre performance, lower risk-taking incentives, and the fact that some CEOs would be better off with a restriction than without it. Restrictions on total ex-ante pay lead to a reduction in the firm's demand for CEO talent and effort. Restrictions on particular pay components, and especially on cash payouts, can be easily circumvented. While restrictions on option pay lead to lower risk-taking incentives, restrictions on incentive pay (stock and options) result in higher risk-taking incentives.     

Credit Default Swaps and Managers’ Voluntary Disclosure

We investigate how the availability of traded credit default swaps (CDSs) affects the referenced firms’ voluntary disclosure choices. CDSs enable lenders to hedge their credit risk exposure, weakening their incentives to monitor borrowers. We predict that reduced lender monitoring in turn leads shareholders to intensify their monitoring and demand increased voluntary disclosure from managers. Consistent with this expectation, we find that managers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts and forecast more frequently when traded CDSs reference their firms. We further find a stronger impact of CDS availability on firm disclosure when (1) lenders have higher ability and propensity to hedge credit risk using CDSs, and (2) lender monitoring incentives and monitoring strength are weaker. Consistent with an increase in shareholder demand for public information disclosure induced by a reduction in lender monitoring, we find a stronger effect of CDSs on voluntary disclosure for firms with higher institutional ownership and stronger corporate governance. Overall, our findings suggest that firms with traded CDS contracts enhance their voluntary disclosure to offset the effect of reduced monitoring by CDS‐protected lenders.     

CEO risk incentives and firm performance following R&D increases

In this study we analyze how CEO risk incentives affect the efficiency of research and development (R&D) investments. We examine a sample of 843 cases in which firms increase their R&D investments by an economically significant amount over the period of 1995–2006. We find that firms with higher sensitivity of CEO compensation portfolio value to stock volatility (vega) are more likely to have large increases in R&D investments. More importantly, we find that high-vega firms experience lower abnormal stock returns and lower operating performance compared to their low-vega counterparts following the R&D increases. Our main results hold in a variety of robustness tests. The results are consistent with the conjecture that high-vega compensation portfolios may induce managers to overinvest in inefficient R&D projects and therefore hurt firm performance.     

CEO pay incentives and risk-taking: Evidence from bank acquisitions

We analyze how the structure of executive compensation affects the risk choices made by bank CEOs. For a sample of acquiring U.S. banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that CEOs with higher pay-risk sensitivity engage in risk-inducing mergers. Our findings are driven by two types of acquisitions: acquisitions completed during the last decade (after bank deregulation had expanded banks' risk-taking opportunities) and acquisitions completed by the largest banks in our sample (where shareholders benefit from ‘too big to fail’ support by regulators and gain most from shifting risk to other stakeholders). Our results control for CEO pay-performance sensitivity and offer evidence consistent with a causal link between financial stability and the risk-taking incentives embedded in the executive compensation contracts at banks.     

Motivating innovation in newly public firms

Prior research suggests that executive option grants that do not quickly vest provide managers with better incentives to pursue long-term, instead of short-term, objectives. Previous research also suggests that the pursuit of long-term objectives could be undermined by the risk of early termination. We conjecture that these arguments jointly suggest that managers are better motivated to pursue innovation when they are given more incentive compensation with longer vesting periods for unexercised options and yet some protection from disruptive takeover threats. Our evidence for a sample of newly public firms is consistent with more innovative firms jointly choosing such a combination.     

Shareholder governance, bondholder governance, and managerial risk-taking

We examine the relation between the overall corporate governance structure and managerial risk-taking behavior. We find that the overall governance structure has a significant impact on how managers make decisions on investment policy: strong bondholder governance motivates more low-risk investments such as capital expenditure and lower high-risk investments such as R&D expenditures, whereas weak shareholder governance (entrenched managers) leads to more R&D expenditures. Moreover, we find that the effects of governance on investment policy differ significantly between speculative and investment-grade firms. For speculative firms, strong bondholder or shareholder governance leads to more capital expenditures and low R&D investments. For investment-grade firms, strong bondholder or shareholder governance leads to low capital expenditures and an insignificant impact on R&D investments. Furthermore, financing and investment covenants exhibit strong binding power to deter risky investments. Finally, a more dependent (or a less independent) board is associated with low capital expenditures and high R&D investments.     

What determines corporate pension fund risk-taking strategy?

Corporate sponsors of defined benefit pension plans generally assume low investment risk when they have low funding ratios and high default risk, consistent with the risk management hypothesis. However, for financially distressed sponsors and sponsors that freeze, terminate, or convert defined benefit to defined contribution plans, the risk-shifting incentive (moral hazard) dominates. Pension fund risk-taking is also affected by labor unionization and sponsor incentives to maximize tax benefits, restore financial slack, and justify the accounting choices of pension assumptions. Sponsors shift toward an aggressive risk strategy when their pension plans emerge from underfunding, bankruptcy risk is reduced, or marginal tax rate decreases. Overall, we show that corporate sponsors adopt a dynamic risk-taking strategy in their pension fund investments.     

CEO risk-taking incentives and corporate social responsibility

We examine how firms adjust CEO risk-taking incentives in response to risk environments associated with their corporate social responsibility (CSR) standing. We find strong evidence that as a firm's CSR status improves (declines), increasing (decreasing) its risk-taking capacity, the firm responds by adjusting compensation contracts to increase (decrease) CEO risk-taking incentives (Vega). One channel of the adjustment is through stock option grants. Further analyses indicate that the positive CSR-Vega association is stronger in firms with better corporate governance and in industries where riskiness is more important. Our evidence indicates that firms are not passive in response to changes in CSR status and firm risk.     

Capital structure and executive compensation contract design: A theoretical and empirical analysis

Compensation contracts including incentive instruments not only provide executives with positive incentives to increase shareholder wealth, but also create a negative value-dilution effect for existing shareholders. This study investigates this dilemma by conducting a benefit-cost analysis under a proposed structural form valuation framework. Our design mechanism shows that, given their firms’ current capital structure, shareholders are always capable of designing an optimal compensation contract to maximize their wealth. Due to the different research issue and assumptions, unlike findings of most previous studies, our model proposes that in a firm with a higher leverage ratio shareholders should provide a contract with higher incentive intensity for managers, and this proposition is supported by the empirical analyses which examine the sample of S&P index firms over the period 1992-2006 after adopting an updated fixed effects model.     

Executive stock options,differential risk-taking incentives,and firm value

The sensitivity of stock options' payoff to return volatility, or vega, provides risk-averse CEOs with an incentive to increase their firms' risk more by increasing systematic rather than idiosyncratic risk. This effect manifests because any increase in the firm's systematic risk can be hedged by a CEO who can trade the market portfolio. Consistent with this prediction, we find that vega gives CEOs incentives to increase their firms' total risk by increasing systematic risk but not idiosyncratic risk. Collectively, our results suggest that stock options might not always encourage managers to pursue projects that are primarily characterized by idiosyncratic risk when projects with systematic risk are available as an alternative.     

Stock options and managerial incentives for risk taking: Evidence from FAS 123R

We provide new evidence on the relation between option-based compensation and risk-taking behavior by exploiting the change in the accounting treatment of stock options following the adoption of FAS 123R in 2005. The implementation of FAS 123R represents an exogenous change in the accounting benefits of stock options that has no effect on the economic costs and benefits of options for providing managerial incentives. Our results do not support the view that the convexity inherent in option-based compensation is used to reduce risk-related agency problems between managers and shareholders. We show that all firms dramatically reduce their usage of stock options (convexity) after the adoption of FAS 123R and that the decline in option use is strongly associated with a proxy for accounting costs. Little evidence exists that the decline in option usage following the accounting change results in less risky investment and financial policies.