Corporate tax avoidance and stock price crash risk: Firm-level analysis

Using a large sample of U.S. firms for the period 1995–2008, we provide strong and robust evidence that corporate tax avoidance is positively associated with firm-specific stock price crash risk. This finding is consistent with the following view: Tax avoidance facilitates managerial rent extraction and bad news hoarding activities for extended periods by providing tools, masks, and justifications for these opportunistic behaviors. The hoarding and accumulation of bad news for extended periods lead to stock price crashes when the accumulated hidden bad news crosses a tipping point, and thus comes out all at once. Moreover, we show that the positive relation between tax avoidance and crash risk is attenuated when firms have strong external monitoring mechanisms such as high institutional ownership, high analyst coverage, and greater takeover threat from corporate control markets.     

Internal liquidity risk,financial bullwhip effects,and corporate bond yield spreads: Supply chain perspectives

This study explores internal liquidity risk (ILR) and financial bullwhip effects on corporate bond yield spreads along supply chain counterparties by employing American market data from year 1997 to 2008. This study finds that the ILRs of suppliers and customers positively affect a firm’s bond yield spreads and the effects of customers’ ILRs are greater. This research also finds a financial bullwhip effect that the ILR effect becomes greater upwardly along the supply chain counterparties. The results are robust when controlling for well-known spread determinant variables.     

XBRL adoption and expected crash risk

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandated the adoption of eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) in 2009, with the aim of facilitating data exchange and reducing information processing costs. To shed light on the economic consequences of this important disclosure regulation, this study investigates whether and how XBRL mandate impacts investor expectations of future crash risk. Using the steepness of the option implied volatility smirk as a proxy for ex ante expectation of crash risk, we find that expected crash risk decreases after adoption of XBRL. Moreover, we document that the effect is more pronounced for firms with higher financial opacity, more volatile earnings, and greater analyst forecast dispersion. Further, our analysis generates evidence that the use of customized extension XBRL elements attenuates the effect of XBRL reporting on reducing expected crash risk. Our empirical results are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks. Overall, the findings indicate that XBRL reduces information processing costs and strengthens information transparency of capital markets, which in turn, reduces investor expectations of future crash risk.     

Portfolio greenness and the financial performance of REITs

This paper investigates the effects of the energy efficiency and sustainability of commercial properties on the operating and stock performance of a sample of US REITs, providing insight into the net benefits of green buildings. We match data on LEED- and Energy Star-certified buildings with detailed information on REIT portfolios and calculate the share of green properties for each REIT over the 2000–2011 period. We estimate a two-stage regression model and document that the greenness of REITs is positively related to three measures of operating performance – return on assets, return on equity and the ratio of funds from operations to total revenue. We also document that there is no significant relationship between the greenness of property portfolios and abnormal stock returns, suggesting that stock prices already reflect the higher cash flows deriving from investments in more efficient properties. However, REITs with a higher fraction of green properties display significantly lower market betas.     

Uncertainty avoidance,risk tolerance and corporate takeover decisions

In this paper, we examine the role of national culture in corporate takeover decisions, by arguing that managerial risk tolerance (a combination of risk aversion and risk perception), at the national level, is a cultural trait and affects the expected net synergies CEOs require. We propose a theoretical framework that links CEO risk tolerance to the expected net synergies. We empirically show that CEOs of firms located in countries with lower levels of risk tolerance, measured by Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) uncertainty avoidance score, require higher premiums on takeovers, and show that uncertainty avoidance plays a greater role in relatively large takeovers. Additional testing reveals that CEOs from high uncertainty avoiding nations engage less in cross-border/cross-industry takeovers, suggesting that uncertainty avoidance captures more the CEO’s risk perception than his/her risk aversion.     

CFOs versus CEOs: Equity incentives and crashes

Using a large sample of U.S. firms for the period 1993-2009, we provide evidence that the sensitivity of a chief financial officer's (CFO) option portfolio value to stock price is significantly and positively related to the firm's future stock price crash risk. In contrast, we find only weak evidence of the positive impact of chief executive officer option sensitivity on crash risk. Finally, we find that the link between CFO option sensitivity and crash risk is more pronounced for firms in non-competitive industries and those with a high level of financial leverage.     

Brand perception,cash flow stability,and financial policy

This paper demonstrates that intangible assets play an important role in financial policy. Using a proprietary database of consumer brand evaluation, I show that positive consumer attitude toward a firm's products alleviates financial frictions and provides additional net debt capacity, as measured by higher leverage and lower cash holdings. Brand perception affects financial policy through reducing overall firm riskiness, as strong consumer evaluations translate into lower future cash flow volatility as well as higher credit ratings for potentially volatile firms. The impact of brand is stronger among small firms, contradicting a number of reverse causality and omitted variables explanations.     

Information disclosure,CEO overconfidence,and share buyback completion rates

An open market share buyback is not a firm commitment, and there is limited evidence on whether firms repurchase the intended shares. Unlike US studies, we use data from unique UK regulatory and disclosure environment that allows to accurately measure the share buyback completion rates. We show that information disclosure and CEO overconfidence are significant determinants of the share buyback completion rate. In addition, we find that large and widely held firms that conduct subsequent buyback programs and have a past buyback completion reputation exhibit higher completion rates. Finally, we assess whether other CEO characteristics affect buyback completion rates and find that firms with senior CEOs who hold external directorships and have a longer tenure as CEO are more likely to complete the buyback programs. In sum, our results suggest there is a clear relationship between information disclosure, CEO overconfidence, and buyback completion rates.     

Financial markets,financial dependence,and the allocation of capital

We explore one specific channel through which finance promotes growth: the allocation of capital. Using international industrial data, we find that countries with developed financial markets invest more in growing industries, and pull out more funds of declining ones. Most interestingly, this pattern is more eminent for those industries more dependent on external financing. Various robustness checks show that the results are not driven by reverse causality, omitted variables, specific countries or industries.     

Bank loan loss accounting treatments,credit cycles and crash risk

Banks that follow conditional conservatism in their loan loss accounting treatments benefit from a reduction in crash risk. The key discretionary loan loss accounting channels are provisions and allowances. We show that conditional conservatism reduces crash risk of small banks during periods of credit contraction and boom. Interestingly, for large banks, crash risk is not reduced by more conservative accounting even for those with higher levels of opacity. Hence regulation prompting for more conservative bank loan loss accounting does not present a significant opportunity to limit systemic effects arising from abrupt price declines in the stocks of large banks.     

Market transparency,liquidity externalities,and institutional trading costs in corporate bonds

We develop a simple model of the effect of public transaction reporting on trade execution costs and test it using a sample of institutional trades in corporate bonds, before and after initiation of the TRACE reporting system. Trade execution costs fell approximately 50% for bonds eligible for TRACE transaction reporting, and 20% for bonds not eligible for TRACE reporting, suggesting the presence of a “liquidity externality.” The key results are robust to changes in variables, such as interest rate volatility and trading activity that might also affect execution costs. Market shares and the cost advantage to large dealers decreased post-TRACE. These results indicate that market design can have first-order effects, even for sophisticated institutional customers.     

Uninsurable risk and financial market puzzles

We compare the empirical performances of three risk-sharing arrangements involving idiosyncratic skill shocks: (a) where individuals are unable to directly insure their consumption against individual-specific shocks, (b) where agents strike long-term insurance contract with financial intermediaries involving a truth revelation constraint as in Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2009), (c) full risk sharing. Based on the widely accepted assumption of cross-sectional log-normality of individual consumption levels, we work out closed form expressions of the pricing kernels for (a) and (b). We put these three models to test four financial market anomalies, namely the equity premium, currency premium, risk-free rate, and consumption-real exchange rate puzzles simultaneously in an integrated framework. We find that the pricing kernel associated with (a) outperforms the other two models in terms of the produced estimates of the agent’s preference parameters and the model ability to predict the equity and currency premia, the risk-free rate, and the log growth in the exchange rate. However, the predictive ability is still far from satisfactory for all three models under scrutiny.     

Respondable risk and incentives for CEOs: The role of information-collection and decision-making

This paper examines the incentive provision when the agent can respond to risk by exerting effort to collect information about the underlying state and making corresponding decisions. Such effort is shown to be more valuable in a riskier environment and incentives can increase with “respondable” risk. The relation between incentives and risk is more positive when the agent's effort is more effective in collecting information or in acting upon it. Using data on chief executive officers (CEOs), I find that incentives for CEOs increase with industry-wide risk, a measure of respondable risk. The positive relation diminishes when the CEO is less able to collect information or is less effective in acting upon it.     

Employment risk,compensation incentives,and managerial risk taking: Evidence from the mutual fund industry

We examine the influence on managerial risk taking of incentives due to employment risk and due to compensation. Our empirical investigation of the risk taking behavior of mutual fund managers indicates that managerial risk taking crucially depends on the relative importance of these incentives. When employment risk is more important than compensation incentives, fund managers with a poor midyear performance tend to decrease risk relative to leading managers to prevent potential job loss. When employment risk is low, compensation incentives become more relevant and fund managers with a poor midyear performance increase risk to catch up with the midyear winners.     

Sell on the news: Differences of opinion,short-sales constraints,and returns around earnings announcements

Miller [1977. Risk, uncertainty, and divergence of opinion. Journal of Finance 32, 1151–1168] hypothesizes that prices of stocks subject to high differences of opinion and short-sales constraints are biased upward. We expect earnings announcements to reduce differences of opinion among investors, and consequently, these announcements should reduce overvaluation. Using five distinct proxies for differences of opinion, we find that high differences of opinion stocks earn significantly lower returns around earnings announcements than low differences of opinion stocks. In addition, the returns on high differences of opinion stocks are more negative within the subsample of stocks that are most difficult for investors to sell short. These results are robust when we control for the size effect and the market-to-book effect and when we examine alternative explanations such as financial leverage, earnings announcement premium, post-earnings announcement drift, return momentum, and potential biases in analysts’ forecasts. Also consistent with Miller's theory, we find that stocks subject to high differences of opinion and more binding short-sales constraints have a price run-up just prior to earnings announcements that is followed by an even larger decline after the announcements.     

Managers and efficiency in banking

This paper presents evidence on the impact of managers on cost efficiency in banking. Stochastic frontier analysis is applied to a unique Finnish data set. Manager age and education have strong yet complicated effects on efficiency. The impact of age on efficiency depends on education. A university degree is useful mainly in the largest banks of the sample. Educational background seems to be less important for young managers than for mature ones. Managing director changes are systematically followed by efficiency changes. Retirement typically causes an efficiency improvement whereas other manager changes can either improve or weaken efficiency. However, in many cases mature managers outperform their young colleagues.     

Sales order backlogs and momentum profits

Winner stocks have higher changes in sales order backlogs and a sales order backlog factor is significant in explaining various winner minus loser returns and often reduces the αs by big margins. We argue that this factor is a proxy for innovation in demand in the economy and it is likely to relate to expected growth risks and future business conditions.     

Omitted debt risk, financial distress and the cross-section of expected equity returns

The study of Ferguson and Shockley (2003) shows that, if the Merton (1974) model can reflect reality, the omission of debt claims from the market portfolio proxy may explain the poor pricing ability of the CAPM in empirical tests. We critically re-assess this argument by first reviewing existing, but also new avenues through which the Merton (1974) model can point to a systematic bias in market beta estimates. However, we also show that some avenues are diversifiable, and that they all rely on excessive economy-wide default risk to create a non-negligible bias. We then use the Merton (1974) model to proxy for the total debt portfolio, but find that its application in empirical tests cannot improve pricing performance. We conclude that there are (so far) no valid theoretical reasons to believe that omitted debt claims undermine CAPM tests.     

Implications of power: When the CEO can pressure the CFO to bias reports

Building on archival, anecdotal, and survey evidence on managers? roles in accounting manipulations, I develop an agency model to examine the effects of a CEO?s power to pressure a CFO to bias a performance measure, like earnings. This power has implications for incentive compensation, reporting quality, firm value, and information rents. Predictions from the model provide potential explanations for the differing results from recent empirical studies on the impact of regulatory interventions like SOX and the extent to which the CEO?s or CFO?s incentives significantly impact on earnings management. The model also identifies conditions under which either a powerful or a non-powerful CEO can extract rents, which can help explain mixed empirical results on the association between CEO power and “excessive” compensation.     

Information acquisition and financial contagion

This paper incorporates costly voluntary acquisition of information à la Nikitin and Smith (2007) [Nikitin, M., Smith, R.T., 2007. Information acquisition, coordination, and fundamentals in a financial crisis. Journal of Banking and Finance, in press, doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.04.031], in a framework similar to Allen and Gale (2000) [Allen, F., Gale, D., 2000. Financial contagion. Journal of Political Economy 108, 1–33], without relying on any unexpected shock to model contagion. In this framework, contagion and financial crises are the result of information gathering by depositors, weak fundamentals and an incomplete market structure of banks. It also shows how financial systems entering a recession can affect others with apparently stronger economic conditions (contagion). Finally, this is the first paper to investigate the effectiveness of the Contingent Credit Line procedures, introduced by the IMF at the end of the nineties, as a mechanism to prevent the propagation of crises.