Predatory lending and the subprime crisis

We measure the effect of a 2006 antipredatory pilot program in Chicago on mortgage default rates to test whether predatory lending was a key element in fueling the subprime crisis. Under the program, risky borrowers or risky mortgage contracts or both triggered review sessions by housing counselors who shared their findings with the state regulator. The pilot program cut market activity in half, largely through the exit of lenders specializing in risky loans and through a decline in the share of subprime borrowers. Our results suggest that predatory lending practices contributed to high mortgage default rates among subprime borrowers, raising them by about a third.     

Bank size, lending technologies, and small business finance

Under the current paradigm in small business lending research, large banks tend to specialize in lending to relatively large, informationally transparent firms using “hard” information, while small banks have advantages in lending to smaller, less transparent firms using “soft” information. We go beyond this paradigm to analyze the comparative advantages of large and small banks in specific lending technologies. Our analysis begins with the identification of fixed-asset lending technologies used to make small business loans. Our results suggest that large banks do not have equal advantages in all of these hard lending technologies and these advantages are not all increasing monotonically in firm size, contrary to the predictions of the current paradigm. We also analyze lines of credit without fixed-asset collateral to focus on relationship lending. We confirm that small banks have a comparative advantage in relationship lending, but this appears to be strongest for lending to the largest firms.     

Does market size structure affect competition? The case of small business lending

Market size structure refers to the distribution of shares of different size classes of local market participants, where the sizes are inclusive of assets both within and outside the local market. We apply this new measure of market structure in two empirical analyses of the US banking industry to address concerns regarding the effects of the consolidation in banking. Our quantity analysis of the likelihood that small businesses borrow from large versus small banks and our small business loan price analysis that includes market size structure as well as conventional measures yield very different findings from most of the literature on bank size and small business lending. Our results do not suggest a significant net advantage or disadvantage for large banks in small business lending overall, or in lending to informationally opaque small businesses in particular. We argue that the prior research that excluded market size structure may be misleading and offer some likely explanations of why our results differ.     

Does the Basle Capital Accord reduce bank fragility? An assessment of the value-at-risk approach

We examine the economic implications arising from a bank using a VaR-constrained mean-variance model for the selection of its trading portfolio as a consequence of the Basle Capital Accord. Surprisingly, we show that when a VaR constraint is imposed, it is plausible that certain banks will end up selecting ‘riskier’ portfolios than they would have chosen in the absence of the constraint. Accordingly, regulators such as the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision should be aware that allowing a bank to use VaR to determine its minimum regulatory capital may increase its fragility. Alternatives to VaR-based bank capital regulation that mitigate or even preclude its perverse implications are presented.     

Foreign bank entry,credit allocation and lending rates in emerging markets: Empirical evidence from Poland

Earlier studies have documented that foreign banks charge lower lending rates and interest spreads than domestic banks. We hypothesize that this may stem from the superior efficiency of foreign entrants that they decide to pass onto borrowers (“performance hypothesis”), but could also reflect a different loan allocation with respect to borrower transparency, loan maturity and currency (“portfolio composition hypothesis”). We are able to differentiate between the above hypotheses thanks to a novel dataset containing detailed bank-specific information for the Polish banking industry. Our findings demonstrate that banks differ significantly in terms of portfolio composition and we attest to the “portfolio composition hypothesis” by showing that, having controlled for portfolio composition, there are no differences in lending rates between banks.     

Recovery rates of commercial lending: Empirical evidence for German companies

There are very few studies concerning the recovery rate of bank loans. Prediction models of recovery rates are increasing in importance because of the Basel II-framework, the impact on credit risk management, and the calculation of loan rates. In this study, we focus the analyses on the distribution of recovery rates and the impact of the quota of collateral, the creditworthiness of the borrower, the size of the company and the intensity of the client relationship on the recovery rate. All our hypotheses can be confirmed. A higher quota of collateral leads to a higher recovery rate, whereas the risk premium of the borrower and the size of the company is negatively related to the recovery rate. Borrowers with an intense client relationship with the bank exhibit a higher recovery rate.     

Assessing financial contagion in the interbank market: Maximum entropy versus observed interbank lending patterns

Interbank markets allow banks to cope with specific liquidity shocks. At the same time, they may represent a channel for contagion as a bank default may spread to other banks through interbank linkages. This paper analyses how contagion propagates within the Italian interbank market using a unique data set including actual bilateral exposures. Based on the availability of information on actual bilateral exposures for all Italian banks, the results obtained by assuming the maximum entropy are compared with those reflecting the observed structure of interbank claims. The comparison indicates that, under certain circumstances, depending on the structure of the interbank linkages, the recovery rates of interbank exposures and banks’ capitalisation, the maximum entropy approach overrates the scope for contagion.     

Media ownership,concentration and corruption in bank lending

Building on the pioneering study by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2006), this study examines the effects of media ownership and concentration on corruption in bank lending using a unique World Bank data set covering more than 5,000 firms across 59 countries. We find strong evidence that state ownership of media is associated with higher levels of bank corruption. We also find that media concentration increases corruption both directly and indirectly through its interaction with media state ownership. In addition, we find that media state ownership and media concentration both accentuate the positive link between official supervisory power and lending corruption and attenuate the negative link between the regulations that empower private monitoring and corruption in lending. Media state ownership or media concentration also accentuates the positive link between banking concentration and corruption in lending. Furthermore, the links between media structure and corruption are more pronounced when the borrowing firm is privately owned.     

Subprime mortgage design

This paper offers evidence on the design of subprime mortgages as bridge-financing products. We show that the viability of subprime mortgages was uniquely predicated on the appreciation of house prices over short horizons. High rates of early prepayments on subprime mortgages suggest the use of prepayments as an exit option. This paper argues that high early defaults on post-2004 originations can be explained when one considers high early prepayment rates for pre-2004 originations.     

The effect of banking regulation on cross-border lending

Banking regulations often differ between countries: Some regulators require banks to document their evaluation of firms’ creditworthiness, which determines the banks’ choice of lending technology. In a theoretical model, we study how differences in regulation influence competition between domestic and foreign banks and analyze the effect of regulatory harmonization on cross-border lending. We predict that lending rates are lower and access to credit is easier for firms in a border region if the national regulations differ. Using unique bank- and firm-level data from Germany, we show that firms in a border region have better access to credit if regulation differs.     

Bankruptcies of small firms and lending relationship

This paper empirically investigates the role played by relatively small banks in the Japanese local credit market. We test the hypothesis that small banks enhance the recovery rate from the financial distress and reduce the bankruptcy ratio of small firms. Empirical evidence suggests that small banks specialize more in relationship loans to small firms. However, this expertise is limited to the loans to unincorporated firms or those with a very small number of employees.     

Bank incentives and suboptimal lending decisions: Evidence from the valuation effect of bank loan announcements in Japan

Using a sample of bank loan announcements in Japan, we examine whether or not banks have incentives to engage in suboptimal lending that results in wealth transfer from the banks to the borrowing firms. We find that abnormal returns for borrowing firms are significantly positive, but those for lending banks are sometimes significantly negative. Furthermore, the announcement returns for borrowing firms are negatively related to those for lending banks, especially when poorly performing firms borrow from financially healthy (low-risk) banks. Our results suggest that the positive valuation effect of bank loan announcements for borrowing firms is mainly due to a wealth transfer from lending banks.     

Market discipline and too-big-to-fail in the CDS market: Does banks' size reduce market discipline?

This paper examines market discipline in the credit default swap (CDS) market and the potential distortion of CDS spreads which arises when a bank is thought to be too-big-to-fail. Overall, we find evidence for market discipline in the CDS market. However, CDS prices are distorted by a size effect when a bank is considered to be too-big-to-fail. A 1 percentage point increase in size reduces the CDS spread of a bank by about 2 basis points. We further find that some banks have already reached a size that makes them too-big-to-be-rescued. While the price distortion for these banks decreases, the existence of banks that are considered to be too-big-to-rescue raises important new issues for banking supervisors.     

The CARD Act and Young Borrowers: The Effects and the Affected

We study a new law that restricts credit to individuals under age 21. We first use a difference‐in‐difference approach to estimate the effect of the law on credit card availability. Following the passage of the law, individuals under age 21 are 8 percentage points (15%) less likely to have a credit card, have fewer cards, and, conditional on having a card at all, are 35% more likely to have a cosigned card. We then use data from before the passage of the law to identify the characteristics of those individuals most likely to be affected by the Act.     

The light and dark side of TARP

This paper empirically investigates the impact of the first announcement of TARP, the announcement of revised TARP, respective capital infusions under TARP–CPP and capital repayments on changes in shareholder value and the risk exposure of supported US banks. Our analysis reveals a light and a dark side of TARP. While announcements as well as capital repayments may provoke positive wealth effects and a decrease in bank risk, equity capital injections to banks are observed to be a severe impediment to restore market confidence and financial stability. Furthermore, while TARP announcements and capital injections may increase systemic risk, no significant effect on systemic risk is found for capital repayments.     

Determinants of Bank-Market Structure: Efficiency and Political Economy Variables

This paper analyzes how bank efficiency and political economy variables influence bank-market structure in 69 countries. Results for more than 2,500 banks over the 1996–2002 period indicate that the ability of the efficiency-structure hypothesis to explain bank-market structure varies across countries, depending on national political economy variables. Increased market monitoring and a better-quality contracting environment amplify the positive influence of bank efficiency on market share and market concentration. Stricter bank entry requirements and more generous deposit insurance schemes, however, mitigate the influence of bank efficiency on market share and market concentration.     

Industrial Loan Companies: Where Banking and Commerce Meet

Should commercial firms be prohibited from owning banking institutions? Should the United States remain the only G20 country opposed to the “mixing of banking and commerce”? These questions have assumed new urgency as the Dodd Frank Act of July 2010 imposed a moratorium on the commercial ownership of industrial loan companies (ILCs), which was the last remaining entry point for commercial firms into banking. This paper specifically examines the role of ILCs in America's financial system from its beginnings in 1910 to the present. Special attention is paid to the performance of commercially owned ILCs prior to, during and after the most recent financial crisis. The examination is based upon both survey data and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) data, which represents a database of the ILC industry that is the most comprehensive one available to date. The paper also reviews the laws and regulations regarding the mixing of banking and commerce, and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of allowing commercial ownership of banks.     

When more is less: Using multiple constraints to reduce tail risk

Financial institutions suffered large trading losses during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis. These losses cast doubt on the effectiveness of regulations and risk management systems based on a single Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraint. While some researchers have recommended using Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) to control tail risk, VaR remains popular among practitioners and regulators. Accordingly, our paper examines the effectiveness of multiple VaR constraints in controlling CVaR. Under certain conditions, we theoretically show that they are more effective than a single VaR constraint. Furthermore, we numerically find that the maximum CVaR permitted by the constraints is notably smaller than with a single constraint. These results suggest that regulations and risk management systems based on multiple VaR constraints are more effective in reducing tail risk than those based on a single VaR constraint.     

Switching costs and relationship profits in bank lending

This paper studies how the cost of switching banks affects the profits available from relationship based lending when the relationship produces inside information. Lower switching cost compounds the adverse selection problem, discouraging outsider banks to depress loan rates. The adverse selection effect eases off along with higher switching cost, leading to more aggressive bidding and thereby reduction in insider profits. Above a certain threshold, however, the adverse selection effect vanishes completely and the insider profits turn increasing in the switching cost. The model predicts that the availability of relationship credit is non-monotonously related to the magnitude of the switching cost.     

Systematic mistakes in the mortgage market and lack of financial sophistication

Institutions often offer a menu of contracts to consumers in an attempt to create a separating equilibrium that reveals borrower types and provides better pricing. We test the effectiveness of a specific set of contracts in the mortgage market: mortgage points. Points allow borrowers to exchange an upfront amount for a decrease in the mortgage rate. We document that, on average, points takers lose about $700. Also, points takers are less financially savvy (less educated, older), and they make mistakes on other dimensions (e.g., inefficiently refinancing their mortgages). Overall, our results show that borrowers overestimate how long they will stay with the mortgage.