Access to information and international portfolio allocation

We examine whether foreign equity holdings of portfolio investors depend on the level of information accessibility between the investors’ home and host countries. Using a comprehensive data set, alternative measures of information accessibility and robust analytical techniques, we show that differences in access to cross-country information significantly influence investors’ portfolio allocation decisions. Furthermore, the results suggest that for a given level of access to information, investors prefer to invest more in countries with a higher quality of legal/macro-institutions. Finally, the findings also confirm that the implications of information accessibility are more pronounced when markets are turbulent.     

Information immobility,industry concentration,and institutional investors’ performance

This paper examines foreign institutional investors’ portfolio allocation and performance in US securities. We test how information immobility, proxied by information barriers between the investors’ home markets and the US, influences portfolio strategies. Consistent with theoretical predictions, foreign institutional investors’ total investment in the US is negatively related to information immobility. Similarly, information immobility is a significant driver of portfolio under-diversification across industries. Industry concentration has declined over time, consistent with declining search costs. Industry-concentrated portfolios outperform more diversified portfolios for both foreign and US institutional investors. Concentration especially helps institutional investors with the easiest access to information.     

Investors’ distraction and strategic repricing decisions

In this paper I analyze investors’ reactions to changes in the expense ratios of equity mutual funds. I show that investment flows’ response to fees cannot be fully explained by looking at investors’ performance sensitivity. While performance sensitivity monotonically increases with past performance, price sensitivity does not: investors who buy top past performers seem to be “distracted” by the fund’s previous return and pay relatively little attention to the expense ratios. Moreover price sensitivity increases with fund visibility while performance sensitivity decreases, and while looking at data from 1986 to 2006 no discernible trend can be observed in the average performance sensitivity, price sensitivity strongly increases due to the dramatic increase in the availability of mutual funds’ information for retail investors. Finally I show that investment companies strategically time their repricing decisions in order to exploit time variations in price and performance sensitivities, and that fund governance quality affects the degree to which investment companies engage in this opportunistic behavior.     

Reprint of Investors’ distraction and strategic repricing decisions

In this paper I analyze investors’ reactions to changes in the expense ratios of equity mutual funds. I show that investment flows’ response to fees cannot be fully explained by looking at investors’ performance sensitivity. While performance sensitivity monotonically increases with past performance, price sensitivity does not: investors who buy top past performers seem to be “distracted” by the fund’s previous return and pay relatively little attention to the expense ratios. Moreover price sensitivity increases with fund visibility while performance sensitivity decreases, and while looking at data from 1986 to 2006 no discernible trend can be observed in the average performance sensitivity, price sensitivity strongly increases due to the dramatic increase in the availability of mutual funds’ information for retail investors. Finally I show that investment companies strategically time their repricing decisions in order to exploit time variations in price and performance sensitivities, and that fund governance quality affects the degree to which investment companies engage in this opportunistic behavior.     

Equity home bias and corporate disclosure

I show that more comprehensive corporate disclosure reduces investors’ uncertainty about domestic companies’ payoffs at no cost, thereby decreasing investors’ equity home bias toward a country. Since investors should base their investment decisions on valid and easily interpretable company information only, more comprehensive disclosure will reduce the home bias only if domestic securities law is sufficiently stratified and domestic companies use international accounting standards. Using panel data for 38 countries from 2003 to 2008 I find that more comprehensive disclosure reduces investors’ home bias, though significantly only for countries that sufficiently enforce their securities law and implement international accounting standards.     

The value of excess cash and corporate governance: Evidence from US cross-listings

We examine whether and how a US cross-listing mitigates the risk that insiders will turn their firm’s cash holdings into private benefits. We find strong evidence that the value investors attach to excess cash reserves is substantially larger for foreign firms listed on US exchanges and over-the-counter than for their domestic peers. Further, we show that this excess-cash premium stems not only from the strength of US legal rules and disclosure requirements, but also from the greater informal monitoring pressure that accompanies a US listing. Overall, because investors’ valuation of excess cash mirrors how they expect the cash to be used, our analysis shows that a US listing constrains insiders’ inefficient allocation of corporate cash reserves significantly.     

Foreign versus local investors: Who knows more? Who makes more?

This paper examines the nature of information asymmetry between foreign and local investors on the Helsinki stock exchange (HEX) for the period 1999–2004. We take into account the differences in informational characteristics by partitioning stocks into single-listed, cross-listed and internationally well-known stock categories, after which we compare foreign and local investors’ performance and trading advantages. Local investors have trading advantages in the short term in all stock categories. However, such local advantages diminish for Nokia, the only internationally well-known stock on HEX.     

IPO auctions and private information

IPO auctions, which provide an impartial way of determining IPO pricing and share allocations, offer a natural setting for examining whether institutional investors possess private information, and for measuring how valuable their information is. Analyzing detailed bidding data from Taiwan’s discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions, we find that, relative to retail investors, institutional investors tend to bid higher in auctions when IPO shares are more valuable, and that underpricing is larger in auctions with relatively higher institutional bids. These results imply that institutional investors are better informed about IPO value, and that they obtain higher information rents when they bid higher relative to retail investors. We estimate the value of institutional investors’ private information to be worth about 8.68% of return, which is the extra rate of return they command on their informational advantages over retail investors.     

Is local bias a cross-border phenomenon? Evidence from individual investors’ international asset allocation

Extant literature consistently documents that investors tilt their domestic equity portfolios towards regionally close stocks (local bias). We hypothesize that individual investors’ local bias is not limited to the domestic sphere but instead also determines their international investment decisions. Our results confirm the presence of a cross-border local bias. Specifically, we show (i) that the stockholdings of individual investors living within regional proximity to a foreign country display a significantly lower foreign investment bias towards investment opportunities in that country and (ii) that this drop in foreign investment bias levels is disproportionately driven by investments in regionally close neighbor-country companies. The impact of cross-border local bias on investors’ bilateral foreign equity investments is economically significant and holds even after controlling for previously identified explanations of international asset allocation.     

Institutional trading, information production, and the choice between spin-offs, carve-outs, and tracking stock issues

We analyze a firm's choice between spin-offs, equity carve-outs, and tracking stock issues and the role of institutional investors in corporate restructuring. We model a firm with two divisions. Insiders have private information about firm value and face an equity market with retail and institutional investors. We show that restructuring increases information production by institutional investors (relative to that about the consolidated firm): the highest increase in information production arises from spin-offs, the next highest from carve-outs, and the lowest from tracking stock issues. Insiders with the most favorable private information implement spin-offs; those with less favorable private information implement carve-outs; those with even less favorable private information implement tracking stock issues; and those with unfavorable private information remain consolidated. We explain the positive announcement effect and increase in analyst coverage associated with all three forms of restructuring. Our model also generates a number of novel testable predictions for firms' choice between spin-offs, carve-outs, and tracking stock issues, and for institutional trading around these three forms of restructuring.     

Intraday volume and volatility relations with and without public news

This paper reexamines the dynamic relation between intraday trading volume and return volatility of large and small NYSE stocks in two partitioned samples, with and without identifiable public news. We argue that the sequential information arrival hypothesis (SIAH) can be tested only in periods containing public news. After partitioning the sample into periods with and without public news, we find bi-directional Granger-causality between volume and volatility in the presence of public information as hypothesized by the SIAH. Our analysis further suggests that return volatility is higher in the periods with public news, while trading volume is significantly higher in the no-news period; perhaps owing to the importance of private information for trading stocks. Using the sample without public news, we find evidence that volume Granger-causes volatility without feedback. These results are broadly consistent with behavioral models like the overconfidence and biased self-attribution model of [Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D., Subrahmanyam, A., 1998. Investor psychology and security market under- and over-reactions. Journal of Finance 53, 1839–1885]. It appears that overconfident investors overrate the precision of their private news signals and therefore trade too aggressively in the absence of public news; when public news arrives, investors’ biased self-attribution triggers excessive return volatility.     

Regulatory harmonization and the development of private equity markets

This paper introduces a new dataset from 100 Dutch institutional investors’ domestic and international asset private equity allocations. The data indicate that the perceived comparative dearth of regulations of private equity funds impedes institutional investor participation in private equity funds, particularly in relation to the lack of transparency. The data further indicate that the perceived importance of regulatory harmonization of institutional investors has increased Dutch institutional investor allocations to domestic and international private equity funds. The Financieel Toetsingskader (regulation of portfolio management standards such as matching of assets and liabilities) has had the most pronounced and robust effect, followed by Basel II (regulation of risk management and disclosure standards) and the International Financial Reporting Standards (regulation of reporting standards and transparency).     

The role of institutional investors in seasoned equity offerings

Do institutional investors possess private information about seasoned equity offerings (SEOs)? If so, do they use this private information to trade in a direction opposite to this information (a manipulative trading role) or in the same direction (an information production role)? We use a large sample of transaction-level institutional trading data to distinguish between these two roles of institutional investors. We explicitly identify institutional SEO allocations for the first time in the literature. We analyze the consequences of the private information possessed by institutional investors for SEO share allocation, institutional trading before and after the SEO and realized trading profitability, and the SEO discount. We find that institutions are able to identify and obtain more allocations in SEOs with better long-run stock returns, they trade in the same direction as their private information, and their post-SEO trading significantly outperforms a naive buy-and-hold trading strategy. Further, more pre-offer institutional net buying and larger institutional SEO allocations are associated with a smaller SEO discount. Overall, our results are consistent with institutions possessing private information about SEOs and with an information production instead of a manipulative trading role for institutional investors in SEOs.     

Information,sophistication, and foreign versus domestic investors’ performance

Using an intraday transaction dataset with trader identity, we study foreign and domestic investors’ trading activities and investment performance ahead of open-ending events of Taiwanese closed-end funds. Simply buying the funds at a discount and holding until open-ending generates large abnormal returns. All information required to execute this strategy is made public, so the events set up natural experiments to examine how investors trade, holding constant access to information. Foreign investors are net buyers ahead of the open-endings, more than doubling their positions and earning large abnormal returns. Domestic investors are net sellers while the discounts are still large, and forego large abnormal returns. The results suggest that investor sophistication in interpreting the same information is potentially an important determinant of investment performance differences across foreign and domestic investors.     

Geographic earnings disclosure and trading volume

Beginning with Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131 (SFAS 131), Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information, most US multinational firms no longer disclose geographic earnings in their annual reports. Given the recent growth in foreign operations of US firms and the varying operating environments around the world, information (or lack thereof) related to geographical performance can affect investors’ information set. Using empirical tests that closely follow the [Kim, O., Verrecchia, R., 1997. Pre-announcement and event-period private information. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24, 395–419] model, we find results consistent with their predictions. Specifically, using a sample of firms with substantial foreign operations, we find evidence of a decrease in event period private information following adoption of SFAS 131 for firms that no longer disclose geographic earnings. These results suggest that decreased public information (i.e., non-disclosure of geographic earnings) reduces the ability of investors to utilize or generate private information in conjunction with the public announcement of quarterly earnings, which dampens trading. We also find evidence of a decrease in pre-announcement private information following adoption of SFAS 131. This is consistent with an overall improvement in public disclosures that has the effect of reducing differences in the precision of private information across investors in the period prior to the earnings announcement. However, such an effect is observed for both firms which no longer disclose geographic earnings and for firms that continue to disclose geographic earnings.     

Transparency in IPO mechanism: Retail investors’ participation,IPO pricing and returns

Using data from the transparent Indian IPO setting, the paper examines retail investors’ participation, their influence on IPO pricing and the returns they make on IPO investment. The transparency in the mechanism, which allows investors to observe prior investors’ participation, leads to demand which is concentrated at either one or two points of the offer price range. Analysis of investors’ demand during the offer period shows that the participation of retail investors is significantly influenced by the participation of institutional investors. We examine IPO pricing and find that favourable demand by retail investors is positively associated with a high IPO price even after controlling for demand by institutional investors. Further, we find that due to aggressive bidding by overconfident investors, retail investors are, on average, unlikely to make positive allocation weighted initial returns even in a setting where they do not have to compete with institutional investors. Retail investors, however, can earn significant positive allocation weighted initial returns if they limit their participation in IPOs with above average institutional investors’ demand.     

Earnings management,market discounts and the performance of private equity placements

Private equity placement data allow us to determine whether sophisticated investors can uncover the true value of firms. This can be done by defining sophisticated investors as those who meet the stringent participation requirements of the private equity market. Our results show private equity issuing firms overstate their earnings in the quarter preceding private equity placement announcements and that sophisticated investors do not ask for a fair discount when purchasing the shares of the private issuing firms. We also find evidence showing that the reversal of the effects of pre-issue earnings management is a significant determinant of the long-term performance of private issues. Results further show that post-issue stock performance and operating performance of firms using “aggressive” earnings management significantly underperform those using more “conservative” earnings management.     

Institutional investment horizon and investment–cash flow sensitivity

This paper examines the relevance of institutional investors’ investment horizon, as reflected in the response of firm investment to internal cash flows. We argue that institutional investors with longer investment horizons have greater incentives and efficiencies to engage in effective monitoring. This improved monitoring mitigates asymmetric information and agency problems, and in turn reduces the wedge between the costs of internal and external funds. As a result, the sensitivity of firms’ investment outlays to internal cash flows decreases in the presence of institutional investors with long-term investment horizons. Using a sample of 8402 US firms over the period 1981–2008, we provide empirical evidence consistent with these arguments.     

Competition and cooperation among exchanges: A theory of cross-listing and endogenous listing standards

We analyze firms’ choice of exchange to list equity and exchanges’ choice of listing standards when insiders have private information about firm value, but outsiders can produce (noisy) information at a cost. Exchanges are populated by two kinds of investors, whose numbers vary across exchanges: sophisticated (low information production cost) investors and ordinary (high–cost) investors. While firms are short-lived, exchanges are long-lived, value-maximizing agents whose listing and disclosure standards evolve over time. The listing standards chosen by exchanges affect their “reputation,” since outsiders can partially infer the rigor of these standards from the post-listing performance of firms. We show that, while exchanges use their listing standards as a tool in competing for listings with other exchanges, this will not necessarily lead to a “race to the bottom” in listing standards. Further, a merger between two exchanges may result in a higher listing standard for the combined exchange relative to that of either of the merging exchanges. We develop several other implications for firms’ listing choices and resulting valuation effects, the impact of competition and co-operation among exchanges on listing standards, and the optimal regulation of exchanges.     

Marketwide Private Information in Stocks: Forecasting Currency Returns

We present a model of equity trading with informed and uninformed investors where informed investors trade on firm‐specific and marketwide private information. The model is used to identify the component of order flow due to marketwide private information. Estimated trades driven by marketwide private information display little or no correlation with the first principal component in order flow. Indeed, we find that co‐movement in order flow captures variation mostly in liquidity trades. Marketwide private information obtained from equity market data forecasts industry stock returns, and also currency returns.