How legal and institutional environments shape the private debt renegotiation process?

I investigate how legal and institutional conditions around loan origination influence a private debt renegotiation process. Using a large sample of 15,000 loans on the European credit market, I apply a sequential logit model to consider the renegotiation likelihood, the conditional probability of multiple renegotiation rounds or multiple amended terms, and the renegotiation outcomes conditional on specific loan amendments. I find that legal systems with stronger protection of creditors control rights have a positive influence on renegotiation likelihood and favorable outcomes on amendments to amount or maturity. Stronger legal protection reduces renegotiation likelihood when creditors face potential strategic default by shareholders. The legal and institutional environment has a significant effect on how the initial design of the financial contract impacts the renegotiation process.     

Investment and liquidation in renegotiation-proof contracts with moral hazard

In a long-term contract with moral hazard, the liquidation of the firm can arise as the outcome of the optimal contract. However, if the future production capability or market opportunities remain unchanged, liquidation may not be free from renegotiation. Will the firm ever be liquidated if we allow for renegotiation? This paper shows that the firm can still be liquidated even though liquidation is not free from renegotiation in the long-term contract. In addition to liquidation, the renegotiation-proof contract generates important features of the investment behavior and dynamics of firms observed in the data.     

Credit default swap spreads and variance risk premia

We find that the firm-level variance risk premium has a prominent explanatory power for credit spreads in the presence of market- and firm-level control variables established in the existing literature. Such predictability complements that of the leading state variable—the leverage ratio—and strengthens significantly with a lower firm credit rating, longer credit contract maturity, and model-free implied variance. We provide further evidence that (1) the variance risk premium has a cleaner systematic component than implied variance or expected variance, (2) the cross-section of firms’ variance risk premia capture systematic variance risk in a stronger way than firms’ equity returns in capturing market return risk, and (3) a structural model with stochastic volatility can reproduce the predictability pattern of variance risk premia for credit spreads.     

Hedging emerging market bonds and the rise of the credit default swap

On October 5, 2001, when credit spreads were widening, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange CME de-listed the full menu of emerging market Brady bond futures contracts. This is intriguing because at a time when interest in hedging and speculating in emerging market sovereign credit risk should be at its peak, the CME de-listed precisely the sort of contract designed to hedge and speculate in sovereign credit risk. This paper finds statistical evidence suggesting that the developing over the counter CDS contract acted as a substitute product for the Brady bond futures contract thereby undermining the Brady bond futures contract and contributing to its demise.     

Foreign currency borrowing by small firms in emerging markets: When domestic banks intermediate dollars

This paper investigates what induces small firms in an emerging market economy to borrow dollar credit from domestic banks. Our data are from a unique survey of firms in Lebanon. The findings complement studies of large firms with foreign currency loans from foreign lenders. Exporters, naturally hedged against currency risk, are more likely to incur dollar debt. Firms also partly hedge themselves by passing currency risk to customers and suppliers. Less opaque firms with easily verifiable collateral and higher net worth are more likely to access dollar credit. Firms reliant on formal financing (banks and supplier credit) are more likely to contract dollar debt than firms reliant on informal financing (family, friends and moneylenders). Bank relationships, however, do not increase the dollar debt likelihood. And finally, profitable firms are less likely to have dollar debt. Information frictions and limited collateral, therefore, constrain dollar credit even when it is intermediated domestically.     

Customer concentration and loan contract terms

We study pricing and non-pricing features of loan contracts to gauge how the credit market evaluates a firm’s customer-base profile and supply-chain relations. Higher customer concentration increases interest rate spreads and the number of restrictive covenants featured in newly initiated as well as renegotiated bank loans. Customer concentration also abbreviates the maturity of those loans as well as the relationship between firms and their banks. These effects are intensified by customers’ financial distress, the level of relationship-specific investments, and the use of trade credit in customer–supplier relations. Our evidence shows that a deeper exposure to a small set of large customers bears negative consequences for a firm’s relations with its creditors, revealing limits to integration along the supply chain.     

The determinants of multiple bank loan renegotiations in Europe

This article provides empirical evidence on the determinants of multiple bank loan renegotiations in Europe over the last decade. It finds that renegotiations differ from those in the US in terms of frequency, amended terms, and first occurrence. Multiple renegotiations concern very large loans, which are funded by large pools of lenders with fewer lead banks. Borrower transparency and amendment characteristics halt the number of renegotiation rounds, while the credit crisis of 2008 has had the opposite effect. Financial development, banking structure, and creditor rights also influence the renegotiation process. Overall, the renegotiation process adapts to informational frictions in the borrower–lender relationship.     

The effects of bank relationships on firm private debt restructuring: Evidence from an emerging market

Our paper seeks to examine the direct benefit of bank relationships for a distressed borrower by assessing its influence on the success of firm private debt restructuring. We find that a distressed firm with a stronger bank relationship has a greater probability to successfully restructure its debt through private renegotiation. Accordingly, an analysis of credit rating recovery provides complementary evidence on the factors of successful debt restructuring. A duration analysis of the length of time needed for a debt restructuring to be completed is fully consistent with our documented results. We conclude that in a bank dominated financial system like Taiwan's where firms are heavily bank-dependent, the bank-firm relationship is of crucial importance to the success of financially distressed firms in private debt restructuring.     

Renegotiation and the impossibility of optimal investment

In a model with asymmetric information and external equity financingit is impossible to achieve socially optimal investment becauseof renegotiation possibilities. The contractual solution suggestedby Dybvig and Zender (1991) is not dynamically consistent -the manager's contract would be renegotiated, resulting in inefficientinvestment. Moreover, no other compensation contract that wouldinduce the manager to invest efficiently survives renegotiation.Contracts that pay the manager based on the stock price, whileproducing suboptimal investment as in Myers and Majluf (1984),are robust to renegotiation.     

Sovereign debt and the London Club: A precommitment device for limiting punishment for default

In this paper, we examine the role that institutions may play in enabling banks to write contracts whereby sovereign debt is not forgiven ex post. Our model provides a rationale for the emergence of a centralized forum for debt renegotiation, such as the London Club, as well as for bank syndicates. These bank syndicates arise as part of a pre-commitment device rather than for risk sharing purposes. We propose a debt contract under which only involuntary default is forgiven ex post. Our main findings are that under this contract, debt forgiveness after voluntary (strategic) default is avoided. When voluntary default occurs, access to the credit market is denied only for a limited number of periods, rather than forever. In contrast to a voluntary default, involuntary default is forgiven immediately.     

Uncertainty and debt covenants

I examine the use of financial covenants when contracting for debt under uncertainty. Uncertainty, in the context of this study, is a lack of information about future economic events and their consequences for the borrower’s creditworthiness. I examine the implications of ex ante uncertainty that is resolved by information received following loan initiation but prior to maturity. I argue that financial covenants, by transferring control rights ex post, provide a trigger for creditor-initiated renegotiation when the borrower is revealed to be of low credit quality. Using a large sample of private loans, I predict and find that financial covenant intensity is associated with greater uncertainty. I also revisit the agency-based explanation for covenant use and find that this uncertainty explanation is robust to various controls for agency conflicts.     

Liquidity and Credit Risk

We develop a structural bond valuation model to simultaneously capture liquidity and credit risk. Our model implies that renegotiation in financial distress is influenced by the illiquidity of the market for distressed debt. As default becomes more likely, the components of bond yield spreads attributable to illiquidity increase. When we consider finite maturity debt, we find decreasing and convex term structures of liquidity spreads. Using bond price data spanning 15 years, we find evidence of a positive correlation between the illiquidity and default components of yield spreads as well as support for downward‐sloping term structures of liquidity spreads.     

How and why do small firms manage interest rate risk?

Although small firms are particularly sensitive to interest rates and other shocks, empirical work on corporate risk management has focused instead on large public companies. This paper studies fixed-rate and adjustable-rate loans to see how small firms manage their exposure to interest rate risk. Credit-constrained firms are found to match significantly more often with fixed-rate loans, consistent with prior research that shows the supply of credit shrinks during periods of rising interest rates. Banks originate a higher share of adjustable-rate loans than other lenders, ameliorating maturity mismatch and exposure to the lending channel of monetary policy. Time-series patterns in the fixed-rate share are consistent with recent evidence on debt market timing.     

Liquidity risk and maturity management over the credit cycle

We show that firm demand-side factors are strong drivers of procyclical refinancing behavior over the credit cycle using novel data from the Shared National Credit program. Firms are more likely to refinance early when credit conditions are good to keep the effective maturity of their loans long and hedge against having to refinance in tight credit conditions. High credit quality firms are better able to hedge, making their refinancing propensity more sensitive to credit cycles than less creditworthy firms. There is a strong relationship between refinancing a loan, and subsequent growth in capital expenditure, especially when a loan is refinanced early.     

企业发债和贷款期限的差异化:基于增量法的实证研究

已有文献主要从资产负债表法来实证研究企业负债期限结构的影响因素,本文以我国企业在1998～2008年企业发行的各类债券和银行贷款为研究对象,运用增量法从企业财务特征和债务契约属性等方面对企业增量债务期限的影响因素进行实证研究,采用了GMM计量方法,并通过对比分析筛选出了影响企业发债和贷款期限差异化的关键因素。研究表明:企业规模越大,利润率越高,具备担保,信用评级和授信比率越高,其债务期限越长。企业若选择发债,债务期限会延长,而选择银行贷款则企业债务期限会缩短。     

The Bankruptcy Decision and Debt Contract Renegotiations

We consider the bankruptcy law and workout practices in theUnited States and model bankruptcy as a strategic decision.We analyze a firm's choice between liquidation under Chapter7, renegotiation of the debt contract in a workout, and reorganizationunder Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code. Our premise is thata financially distressed firm chooses its action in order tominimize the loss in value caused by the well-known over- andunder-investment problems. We show that the firm initiates aworkout when it faces under-investment, and commences Chapter11 when it faces over-investment. Some of the results are: (i)in default, total firm value and equity value increase uponthe announcement of a workout and decrease upon the announcementof Chapter 11; (ii) firms with shorter maturity of debt aremore likely to reorganize in a workout; (iii) among the firmsthat renegotiate their debt contract, the proportion of firmsentering Chapter 11 is higher for firms in mature industriesthan for firms in growth industries.     

Resaleable debt and systemic risk

Many debt claims, such as bonds, are resaleable; others, such as repos, are not. There was a fivefold increase in repo borrowing before the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Why? Did banks’ dependence on non-resaleable debt precipitate the crisis? In this paper, we develop a model of bank lending with credit frictions. The key feature of the model is that debt claims are heterogenous in their resaleability. We find that decreasing credit market frictions leads to an increase in borrowing via non-resaleable debt. Such borrowing has a dark side: It causes credit chains to form, because, if a bank makes a loan via non-resaleable debt and needs liquidity, it cannot sell the loan but must borrow via a new contract. These credit chains are a source of systemic risk, as one bank’s default harms not only its creditors but also its creditors’ creditors. Overall, our model suggests that reducing credit market frictions may have an adverse effect on the financial system and even lead to the failures of financial institutions.     

The real effects of credit default swaps

We examine the effect of introducing credit default swaps (CDSs) on firm value. Our model allows for dynamic investment and financing, and bondholders can trade in the CDS market. The model incorporates both negative and positive effects of CDSs. CDS markets lead to more liquidations, but they also reduce the probability of costly debt renegotiation and reduce costly equity financing. After calibrating the model, we find that firm value increases by 2.9% on average with the introduction of a CDS market. Firms also invest more and increase leverage. The effect on firm value is strongest for small, financially constrained, and low productivity firms.     

Winners and losers in tolled motorway renegotiations: an empirical evaluation of the Spanish pioneers

This paper evaluates the welfare impact of a tolled motorway contract renegotiation in Spain. The results show that, after renegotiation, both taxpayers and the private concessionaire were better off. However, road users lost out. An agreement leaving road users unaffected, while securing gains for taxpayers and the concessionaire, would have been possible by negotiating a larger reduction in tolls linked to the extension of the contract duration.     

Does futures exhibit maturity effect? New evidence from an extensive set of US and foreign futures contracts

In a seminal article, Samuelson (1965) [Samuelson, P. A. (1965), “Proof that properly anticipated prices fluctuate randomly,” Industrial Management Review 6, 41-49.] proposes the maturity effect that the volatility of futures prices should increase as futures contract approaches maturity. This study provides new evidence on the maturity effect by examining a more extensive set of futures contracts than previous studies and analyzing each contract separately. Using 6805 futures contracts drawn from 61 commodities, including some data from non-US markets, we find that the maturity effect is absent in the majority of contracts. In addition, the maturity effect tends to be stronger in agricultural and energy commodities than in financial futures. We also examine the hypothesis in Bessembinder et al. (1996) [Bessembinder, H., J. F. Coughenour, P. J. Seguin, & M. M. Smoller (1996), “Is there a term structure of futures volatilities? Reevaluating the Samuelson hypothesis,” Journal of Derivatives 4, 45-58.], which states that negative covariance between the spot price and net carry cost causes the maturity effect in futures. Our results provide very weak evidence in favor of this hypothesis.