Abnormal Returns from Takeover Prediction Modelling: Challenges and Suggested Investment Strategies

While takeover targets earn significant abnormal returns, studies tend to find no abnormal returns from investing in predicted takeover targets. In this study, we show that the difficulty of correctly identifying targets ex ante does not fully explain the below‐expected returns to target portfolios. Target prediction models’ inability to optimally time impending takeovers, by taking account of pre‐bid target underperformance and the anticipation of potential targets by other market participants, diminishes but does not eliminate the potential profitability of investing in predicted targets. Importantly, we find that target portfolios are predisposed to underperform, as targets and distressed firms share common firm characteristics, resulting in the misclassification of a disproportionately high number of distressed firms as potential targets. We show that this problem can be mitigated, and significant risk‐adjusted returns can be earned, by screening firms in target portfolios for size, leverage and liquidity.     

External monitoring and returns to hedge fund activist campaigns

Firms targeted by hedge fund activists experience significantly higher returns when there are fewer external monitors in place at the target firm. Using analyst coverage and institutional ownership as measures of external monitoring presence, we find that low‐monitored activist targets experience abnormal returns 17.52% above that of high‐monitored targets in the 2‐year period following the initial campaign start date. The significant effect of external monitoring remains after controlling for target firm and activist characteristics. We also document improved operating performance and an increased monitoring presence at low‐monitored target firms across the same 2‐year period, consistent with the observed market performance.     

The Performance of the European Market for Corporate Control: Evidence from the Fifth Takeover Wave

This paper presents an in‐depth analysis of the performance of large, medium‐sized, and small corporate takeovers involving Continental European and UK firms during the fifth takeover wave. We find that takeovers are expected to create takeover synergies as their announcements trigger statistically significant abnormal returns of 9.13% for the target and of 0.53% for bidding firms. The characteristics of the target and bidding firms and of the bid itself are able to explain a significant part of these returns: (i) deal hostility increases the target's but decreases bidder's returns; (ii) the private status of the target is associated with higher bidder's returns; and (iii) an equity payment leads to a decrease in both bidder's and target's returns. The takeover wealth effect is however not limited to the bid announcement day but is also visible prior and subsequent to the bid. The analysis of pre‐announcement returns reveals that hostile takeovers are largely anticipated and associated with a significant increase in the bidder's and target's share prices. Bidders that accumulate a toehold stake in the target experience higher post‐announcement returns. A comparison of the UK and Continental European M&A markets reveals that: (i) the takeover returns of UK targets substantially exceed those of Continental European firms. (ii) The presence of a large shareholder in the bidding firm has a significantly positive effect on takeover returns in the UK and a negative one in Continental Europe. (iii) Weak investor protection and low disclosure in Continental Europe allow bidding firms to adopt takeover strategies enabling them to act opportunistically towards the target's incumbent shareholders.     

The role of derivatives in hedge fund activism

Using a hand-collected sample of hedge fund activist engagements from 1994 to 2014, this study analysed the role of derivatives in the hedge fund activism. Evidence shows abnormal returns of targets of hedge fund activists who did not use derivatives exceeded the abnormal returns of targets of hedge fund activists who employed derivatives around the activist engagement disclosure period. We also find that idiosyncratic volatility of the targets of hedge fund activists who did not use derivatives was more reduced than that of the targets of hedge fund activists who used derivatives. Finally, the probability of takeovers increases for hedge fund activists who did not use derivatives.     

INDUSTRY PROSPECTS AND ACQUIRER RETURNS IN DIVERSIFYING TAKEOVERS

We use a sample of 816 diversifying takeovers from 1978 to 2003 to examine whether takeover announcements release negative information about the future prospects of the acquirer's main industry. We find that rivals that are most similar to the acquirer (homogeneous rivals) experience significant negative cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around takeover announcements. Takeovers that result in negative wealth effects to acquirers are associated with negative abnormal revisions in analysts' forecasts of homogeneous rivals' earnings per share. We also find a decline in the posttakeover operating performance of rival firms. The decline is especially pronounced for homogeneous rivals and for takeovers with negative wealth effects to acquirers. Our findings imply that CAR-based estimates of acquirer wealth gains from takeovers that do not account for industrywide information releases are significantly biased downward.     

Corporate life cycle and M&A activity

We investigate the impact of corporate life cycle on takeover activity from the perspective of acquiring firms. Using the earned/contributed capital mix as the proxy for firm life cycle, we find a highly significant and positive relation between firm life cycle and the likelihood of becoming a bidder. This finding is, however, driven by the mature rather than the old acquirers in the sample. Further we find that, whilst firm life cycle has a positive effect on the probability that a deal will be negotiated, it is negatively related to tender offers. In addition, the likelihood of making both cash and mixed deals are positively related to the corporate life cycle. Finally, we find that life cycle has a negative impact on the abnormal returns generated on the announcement of a deal although it is unable to distinguish between the returns received by firms at different stages in their life cycle.     

Board classification and managerial entrenchment: Evidence from the market for corporate control

This paper considers the relation between board classification, takeover activity, and transaction outcomes for a panel of firms between 1990 and 2002. Target board classification does not change the likelihood that a firm, once targeted, is ultimately acquired. Moreover, shareholders of targets with a classified board realize bid returns that are equivalent to those of targets with a single class of directors, but receive a higher proportion of total bid surplus. Board classification does reduce the likelihood of receiving a takeover bid, however, the economic effect of bid deterrence on the value of the firm is quite small. Overall, the evidence is inconsistent with the conventional wisdom that board classification is an anti-takeover device that facilitates managerial entrenchment.     

Failed takeovers, methods of payment, and bidder returns

This study documents bidding-firm stock returns upon the announcement of takeover terminations. On average, bidding firms that offer common stock experience a positive abnormal return, and firms that offer cash experience a negative abnormal return. The positive performance is primarily driven by bidders initiating the takeover termination. Commonstock-financed bidders earn a return not significantly different from that earned by cashfinanced bidders when terminations are initiated by the target firm. The results are consistent with the asymmetric information hypothesis, that the decision not to issue common stock conveys favorable information to the market. In addition, bidder returns at takeover termination are positively related to the amount of undistributed cash flow, supporting the free cash flow hypothesis.     

Abnormal returns and asymmetric information surrounding strategic and financial acquisitions

Using takeover bids from the United States, we investigate the importance of information asymmetry in self-selection when evaluating the abnormal returns of financial versus strategic takeover targets during a period of possible informed trade. Sample selection bias due to differences in financial versus strategic takeover bid information environments is controlled for using Heckman's model. Results show that takeover announcements are not randomised, indicative of timed announcements, and further that private equity firms exhibit lower price impact post-announcement. We conclude that the long-term financial motive of private equity takeovers, coupled with higher private information pre-announcement, leads to lower abnormal returns post-announcement.     

Shell games: On the value of shell companies

A reverse merger allows a private company to assume the current reporting status of another company that is public. This can be done quickly, without fundraising, road show, underwriter, substantial ownership dilution, or great expense. Private firms that go public via reverse merger are often motivated by the need to quickly secure financing through privately placed stock (PIPEs) and the desire to make acquisitions using stock as payment. In each of the last eight years reverse mergers have outnumbered traditional IPOs as a mechanism for going public, and reporting shell companies are providing fuel for much of this growth. We study 585 trading shell companies over the period 2006-2008. The purpose of most of these shell firms is to find a suitor for a reverse merger agreement. These companies have no systematic risk, operations, or assets, and their share price tends to decline over time. Yet, these firms have investors. When a takeover agreement is consummated, shell company three-month abnormal returns are 48.1%. We argue that this exceptional return is compensation to investors for shell stock illiquidity and the uncertainty of finding a reverse merger suitor. We show that shell company returns are much greater at the consummation of a merger than those of a similar entity that in dollar terms is more popular among investors — Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs).     

Limited attention,share repurchases,and takeover risk

We hypothesize that announcing open market share repurchases (OMRs) to counter negative valuation shocks reveals repurchasing firms’ lost growth opportunities or underperforming assets to potential bidders, making them more likely to become takeover targets. This also leads their investors to face higher takeover risk, a systematic risk associated with economic fundamentals that drive takeover waves, as proposed by Cremers et al. (2009). Indeed, we find that repurchasing firms tend to face higher takeover probability in the first few years following their OMR announcements, and that the increase in takeover risk can largely explain their post-announcement long-run abnormal returns documented in the literature. The increase in takeover risk is larger for smaller firms, firms with poorer pre-announcement stock performance, and those attracting more attention of market participants. Our results suggest that OMRs, which are used by many firms to counter undervaluation, could make the firms more sensitive to takeover waves and raise their cost of equity capital.     

Do private equity consortiums facilitate collusion in takeover bidding?

We address whether the joint bidding by private equity consortiums facilitates collusion in the takeover market. We employ a sample of 870 takeovers of publicly traded targets in the 2003 to 2007 period, the time period which is the focus of investigation by the Justice Department and the source of cases for class action lawsuits. A unique aspect of our analysis is that we determine the identification of private equity bidders from actual merger documents rather than rely on sources such as Securities Data Corp and that we analyze both prominent private equity bidders as well as smaller private equity firms. Our analysis finds competitive reasons for consortium formation based on scale, risk and bidder expertise. We also find that both single private equity bidders and private equity consortiums are associated with significantly greater levels of takeover competition than other types of bidders. While we find some evidence that target abnormal returns are lower in private equity consortium deals for narrow windows around the initial takeover-related announcement date, we find that these results do not hold for longer event windows that better account for the differences in the takeover process across types of bidders. Analysis that controls for the endogenous selection of consortium formation also fails to find any negative effect of consortiums on either takeover competition or target returns. We also do not find any negative effects of consortiums formed by prominent private equity firms. We interpret the evidence to be inconsistent with a collusive explanation for consortium formation in the 2003 to 2007 period and to be consistent with competitive reasons for consortium formation.     

Cash holdings and the bargaining power of R&D-intensive targets

Prior literature suggests that R&D-intensive firms hold large amounts of cash due to financing constraints. This paper examines whether such firms could also use cash holdings as a strategic bargaining tool in M&A transactions. Using a large sample of takeover bids announced between 1980 and 2012, we demonstrate that cash holdings positively impact R&D-intensive targets’ takeover premiums and announcement-period abnormal returns. These effects disappear in non-R&D-intensive firms. Controlling for various endogeneity and financing concerns, we also find that R&D-intensive firms build up cash holdings in anticipation of becoming a takeover target. Further analysis indicates that in R&D-intensive firms, such cash holdings are valued highly by the market. Taken together, our findings shed new light on the strategic bargaining role of corporate cash holdings in the outcomes of acquisitions targeting R&D-intensive firms.     

Industry structure and horizontal takeovers: Analysis of wealth effects on rivals,suppliers, and corporate customers

We examine the wealth effects of horizontal takeovers on rivals of the merging firms, and on firms in the takeover industry's supplier and customer industries. Inconsistent with the collusion and buyer power motives, we find significant positive abnormal returns to rivals, suppliers, and corporate customers for the subsample of takeovers with positive combined wealth effect to target and bidder shareholders. Overall, our findings suggest that the average takeover in our sample is driven by efficiency considerations. However, we find evidence suggesting that horizontal takeovers increase the buyer power of the merging firms if suppliers are concentrated.     

The Evolving Shareholder Activist Landscape (How Companies Can Prepare for It)

Shareholder activists remain an important force in the boardroom. More than 60 activist campaigns were initiated against S&P 1500 companies in 2016. And although activist hedge funds have under‐performed the broad market since 2013, activists’ assets under management are still nearly double their level of four years ago, and announcements of their campaigns continue to be met with increases in the target companies’ stock prices. At the same time, shareholder activism continues to evolve in constructive ways. Most important is the growing support of mainstream investors, as reflected in the increased backing of activist proposals by traditional institutional asset managers and the falling number of openly confrontational campaigns. Activists have also had continued success in gaining board representation, particularly at the largest target companies. And more board seats are being gained by activists in early settlements, which have also been associated with higher stock returns than those campaigns that resulted in later settlements or ended in a proxy contest. During the period 2006–2016, over 40% of activist campaigns made public demands for specific strategic actions, such as selling assets, spinning off divisions, or seeking buyers for the companies. And activist investors have been remarkably effective in accomplishing such changes in that those activist targets urged to seek buyers were four times more likely to be acquired than the average company. At the same time, a growing number of campaigns have focused on operating efficiency, capital allocation, business strategy, and other changes that often require longterm engagement. Perhaps because of their longer‐term focus, such campaigns have also more been likely to result in board seats for the activists. The authors' findings contain a number of messages for corporate managements and boards: listen to your shareholders, and assess your strengths and vulnerabilities through an activist's eyes; build an effective board; articulate your strategy clearly; consider the possibility of activist intervention when planning M&A transactions; and engage early when approached by an activist.     

Do Capital Structure Adjustments by Takeover Targets Influence Acquisition Gains?

We link debt issuances by target companies around takeover announcements to enhanced target bargaining power in negotiations with bidders over merger synergy gains in completed takeovers. Announcements of debt issuances by targets—especially new bank loans—are associated with more positive target equity returns relative to those made by nontargets, particularly for debt issuances immediately surrounding the takeover announcement. At least some of these gains to targets come at the expense of bidder shareholders, as bidder equity abnormal returns at target debt issuance are negative. We further show that targets issuing debt are primarily those with relatively low acquisition abnormal returns, consistent with initially poor target bargaining power. Subsequent debt issuances by targets increase the likelihood of positive adjustments to acquisition premiums offered by acquirers.     

The 2008 short sale ban: Liquidity, dispersion of opinion, and the cross-section of returns of US financial stocks

This study examines the cross-sectional impact of the 2008 short sale ban on the returns of US financial stocks. Motivated by the large cross-sectional variation in the extent to which banned stocks suffer an illiquidity shock, we hypothesize that stocks with larger liquidity declines are associated with poorer contemporaneous stock returns. The evidence supports this hypothesis and suggests that this effect is stronger for more liquid stocks, as predicted by Amihud and Mendelson (1986). Moreover, consistent with Miller’s (1977) model, we report a valuation reversal whereby stocks with higher abnormal returns at the onset of the ban have lower abnormal returns at its removal. Our findings are robust when we control for firms most affected by TARP, include non-banned matched firms, and compare banned firms’ stock returns with their bond returns. From a policy standpoint, the ban reduced valuations, ceteris paribus, of the stocks that were hardest hit by illiquidity.     

The earnout structure matters: Takeover premia and acquirer gains in earnout financed M&As

In this article, based on both parametric and non-parametric methods, we provide a robust solution to the long-standing issue on how earnouts in corporate takeovers are structured and how their structure influences the takeover premia and the abnormal returns earned by acquirers. First, we quantify the effect of the terms of earnout contract (relative size and length) on the takeover premia. Second, we demonstrate how adverse selection considerations lead the merging firms to set the initial payment in an earnout financed deal at a level that is lower than, or equal to, the full deal payment in a comparable non-earnout financed deal. Lastly, we show that while acquirers in non-earnout financed deals experience negative abnormal returns from an increase in the takeover premia, this effect is neutralised in earnout financed deals.     

The Gains from Takeover Deregulation: Evidence from the End of Interstate Banking Restrictions

This paper uses interstate banking deregulation to explore the benefits of takeover deregulation and how these benefits are distributed across different firms. We find large and significant abnormal returns around the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 which imply it created $85 billion of value in the banking industry. Consistent with an active market for corporate control allowing beneficial consolidation and providing needed discipline, there is a strong negative relationship between banks' abnormal returns and their prior performance. Consistent with managerial entrenchment limiting takeover discipline, banks with higher insider ownership, lower outside block ownership, and/or less independent boards have lower abnormal returns.     

Firm characteristics and long-run stock returns after corporate events

The well-documented abnormal long-run buy-and-hold returns to firms issuing equity in initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings, firms bidding in mergers, and firms initiating dividends can be attributed to imperfect control-firm matching. In addition to firm size and market-to-book ratio, event firms on average differ from control firms in terms of idiosyncratic volatility, liquidity, return momentum, and capital investment, each of which also explains returns. We propose a simple regression-based approach to control for differences in firm characteristics across event and control firms, and we show that long-run abnormal returns do not differ significantly from zero for event firms in the 1980 to 2005 period. The returns to event firms are, therefore, consistent with patterns known to exist for the broad stock market and do not require event-specific explanations.