复杂制度网络的嵌入性关系与制度演化

从复杂性理论出发,认为制度是一种复杂网络系统,具有小世界和无标度特征,且网络正是制度产生的方式。分析了复杂制度网络系统的拓扑结构,阐述了该系统演化的嵌入性特点及其对制度演化的影响方式,并结合企业制度的演化进行了具体的分析。揭示了复杂制度网络系统存在的多重嵌入分形结构,为研究复杂制度系统及其演化提供了一种新的研究视角和方法。     

Procedural Rationality and Institutions: The Production of Norms by Means of Norms

This paper deals with a cognitivist approach to the problem of how social and economic institutions are formed. The economic framework I use is Simon's model of procedural rationality, integrating a cognitivist approach into a game structure. In game theory norms are seen as conventions, but not all institutions can be explained by game theory models. In cognition-based approaches, the creation and maintenance of institutions is the outcome of a search for satisficing norms. According to Simon and Newell (1972), agents faced with problems to solve visualise a problem as an area of potential situations to examine in order to establish analogical problem structures. In my approach, a norm can be defined within a system of norms that form in a historical-evolutionary dimension, suggesting a path in norm-forming processes.     

Norms as emergent properties of adaptive learning: The case of economic routines

Interaction among autonomous decision-makers is usually modelled in economics in game-theoretic terms or within the framework of General Equilibrium. Game-theoretic and General Equilibrium models deal almost exclusively with the existence of equilibria and do not analyse the processes which might lead to them. Even when existence proofs can be given, two questions are still open. The first concerns the possibility of multiple equilibria, which game theory has shown to be the case even in very simple models and which makes the outcome of interaction unpredictable. The second relates to the computability and complexity of the decision procedures which agents should adopt and questions the possibility of reaching an equilibrium by means of an algorithmically implementable strategy. Some theorems have recently proved that in many economically relevant problems equilibria are not computable. A different approach to the problem of strategic interaction is a “constructivist” one. Such a perspective, instead of being based upon an axiomatic view of human behaviour grounded on the principle of optimisation, focuses on algorithmically implementable “satisfycing” decision procedures. Once the axiomatic approach has been abandoned, decision procedures cannot be deduced from rationality assumptions, but must be the evolving outcome of a process of learning and adaptation to the particular environment in which the decision must be made. This paper considers one of the most recently proposed adaptive learning models: Genetic Programming and applies it to one the mostly studied and still controversial economic interaction environment, that of oligopolistic markets. Genetic Programming evolves decision procedures, represented by elements in the space of functions, balancing the exploitation of knowledge previously obtained with the search of more productive procedures. The results obtained are consistent with the evidence from the observation of the behaviour of real economic agents.     

Export variety and the economic performance of countries

We explore the relationship between export variety and economic development, using data on OECD countries between 1964 and 2003. We show that structural change in the world economy has a particular arrow of time leading to a growing variety of exports. Distinguishing between related variety (within sectors) and unrelated variety (variety between sectors), we also show that related variety stimulates growth instantaneously, while unrelated variety only promotes growth with a considerable time lag. This finding is in line with the evolutionary notions that economic development and international trade patterns are path dependent.

利润最大化原则与经济可持续发展——一个经济学悖论

利润最大化原则与经济可持续发展目标是相背离的，主要表现在以下四个方面：第一，利润最大化原则导致弱成本约束，成本约束服从并服务于利润最大化目标，其有身只具有工具价值。第二、利润最大化原则引致四种类型的经济扩张，即规模经济扩张、范围经济扩张、地域经济扩张以及经济帝国主义。第三，利润最大化原则纵容个体非理性，致使整个社会普遍漠视或回避社会整体理性的缺失，第四，利润最大化原则侵蚀全球整体主义价值观，妨碍人类在处理与应对全球危机时进行真诚的合作。     

Narrativity and identity in the representation of the economic agent

We critically survey explicit discussions of the narrativity of economic agents by economists. Narrativity broadly refers to the way humans construct and use stories, notably to define their personal identity. We borrow from debates outside of economics to provide the critical dimension of our survey. Most contributions on the narrativity of economic agents do not discuss one another. To establish communication, we suggest a structure of oppositions that characterize these contributions taken as a whole. These oppositions are notably characterized by three tensions: in terms of methodological attitudes (‘scientism’ vs. ‘humanism’), of underlying theories of personal identity postulating the existence of a unique sense of self or not (‘diachronicity’ vs. ‘episodicity’) and of the normative implications of narrativity (‘welfare-increasing’ vs. ‘welfare-decreasing’). The main goal is to clarify the structure of opposite positions within a more or less explicit debate about the identity of individuals in economics.     

The auctioneerless economics of Axel Leijonhufvud: the 'dark forces of time and ignorance' and the coordination of economic activity

Leijonhufvud focuses his analysis on the coordination of economicactivities. In a world tossed and torn by ever new episodesof instability, macroeconomic theory must finally admit andproperly analyse the limits of collective and individual rationality.Starting from the system's coordination, Leijonhufvud underlinesthe crucial role of information, learning and institutions.Coming to individual choice, he unremittingly rejects unboundedrationality. Methodologically, however, his use of general equilibriumas a benchmark seems to have conditioned his analysis. In bringingto light the ‘dark forces of time and ignorance’,Leijonhufvud himself seems to have fallen under the influenceof the siren represented by general equilibrium theory.     

Puzzles in the economic institutions of capitalism: production coordination, contracting and work organisation in the Irish linen trade, 1750-1850

Pre-Famine Ireland is a byword for market failure and path dependence.Production of flax yarn and linen cloth was highly regulatedand coordinated by the market rather than by firms. Contemporarypolitical economists suggested that these institutional featuresprovided evidence of organisational inefficiency. The historicalevidence suggests that they were a rational response to transactionand production costs. The Irish case provides a test of thehypotheses that firms emerge to reduce the cost of market transactions.It suggests that institutions other than the firm can modifytransaction costs, coordination of production can affect bothtransaction and production costs, and that agents choose betweenmarket and firm coordination given technology and factor prices.Finally, centralisation of production was driven by technology.     

The governance structures of Japanese credit associations and their objective functions

Although Japanese credit associations are non-profit cooperative financial institutions, they assume the same financial functions as regional banks that are stock companies and they could compete with each other in a regional market. On the other hand, the governance structures of credit associations tend to exhibit weaker discipline than those of regional banks, and, for this reason, the financial performances of credit associations and regional banks might differ. In this article, we empirically investigated whether the objective functions of credit associations are different from those of regional banks considering their different governance structures. As a result, although significant differences of profitability of these two types of institutions were not detected, it was demonstrated that credit associations can capture a greater share of deposits than regional banks and the former are more conservative in risk taking than the latter. From these, there is a possibility that Japanese credit associations have different objective functions from regional banks.     

Study of the relationship between average prices of residential properties and selected economic factors in the years 2000-2002 in Szczecin

The article presents the development unemployment and interest rates against the average of important economic variables such as GDP dynamics, transaction prices in one of the local property markets in Poland in the years 2000-2002. The strength, direction and time delay of the relationships between these variables and transaction prices have been considered during the only period of decline in property prices in the years 2000-2002. The specified relationships have been described using linear regression equations.