Routines, genes and program-based behavior

It is argued that the ‘routines as genes’ and the ‘routines as skills’ analogies are misleading in several respects. Neither genes, nor skills, nor routines program behavior, if this is taken to involve, first, that they do so in a way that excludes conscious, deliberate choice and, second, that they determine behavior. On a proper understanding of ‘gene’, ‘skill’ and ‘routine’, conscious, deliberate choice is not ruled out when genes, skills or routines are operating. Once we shift from analogy to ontology, genes and skills appear as basic constituents of routines. Routines cannot exist unless specific genes and skills are in place in the individuals involved in the operation of the routines. Both genes and skills can be said to act unconsciously as ‘If ..., then ...’ programs. Even complete knowledge of genes and skills of the individuals involved would fall far short of predicting individual and firm behavior, however. What would still be missing, it is argued, is knowledge about organization, the specific ways in which genes, skills and individuals are connected with one another, and knowledge of context-dependence, what environmental stimuli activate specific chains of genes, skills and individuals.

A simple note on herd behaviour

In his ‘Simple model of herd behaviour’, (Banerjee A (1992) A simple model of herd behaviour. Q J Econ CVII:797–817) shows that—in a sequential game—if the first two players have chosen the same action, player 3 and all subsequent players will ignore his/her own information and start a herd, an irreversible one. In this paper, we analyse the role played by the tie-breaking assumptions in reaching the equilibrium. We show that: players’ strategies are parameter dependent—an incorrect herd may be reversed; a correct herd is irreversible.

The evolution of IT innovations in Swedish organizations: a Darwinian critique of ‘Lamarckian’ institutional economics

Fundamental correspondence and analogies between the evolution of technological and biological innovations call for an ‘innovation Darwinian’, ‘universal Darwinian’ or ‘memetic’ approach to understanding technology innovation. Neo-institutional, in fact pseudo-Lamarckian evolutionary economic theory, represented by North, Nelson and Winter, Freeman and others, is criticized. Pseudo-Lamarckian (“by volition”) evolution is explained and analyzed on Darwinian grounds (as intentional and artificial selection), as is Schumpeter’s definitions of creative and imitative innovation. Data from a web survey among Swedish public and private organizations in 1999 are studied. Data show that Darwinian co-evolutionary interaction between producers and users or clients provide essential conditions and stronger influence on creative IT innovations than both ‘Lamarckian’ strategies and competition.

How useful is generalized Darwinism as a framework to study competition and industrial evolution?

The role of Darwinist concepts in evolutionary economics has long been a contentious issue. The controversy has recently been rekindled by the proposal of a “Universal” or “generalized” Darwinism, which holds that the ontology of all evolutionary systems accords to the Darwinist scheme of variation, selection and inheritance. This paper focuses on the application of the generalized Darwinist framework to the analysis of markets and industries. It argues that selection and inheritance concepts narrowly construed after the biological example are of limited usefulness. As an alternative to the ‘top–down’ approach of Universal Darwinism, the development of ‘bottom–up’ theories is advocated.

Trade liberalization,intra-industry trade and the environment: competition mode and the order of firms’ moves

This paper explores the implications of trade liberalization by extending the intra-industry trade framework à la Fung and Maechler (J Int Trade Econ Dev 16(1):53–69, 2007) to the case of sequential move and taking the mode of firms’ competition into consideration as well. It is shown that the existing results obtained for the case of simultaneous price competition are robust in quantity competition and sequential move cases. Moreover, it studies the likelihood that the environmental effects of trade liberalization occur.

Methodological Procedure for Estimating Brazilian Quarterly GDP Series

This paper presents a methodology for estimating the Brazilian GDP quarterly series in the period between 1960–1996. Firstly, an Engle–Granger’s static equation is estimated using GDP yearly data and GDP-related variables. The estimated coefficients from this regression are then used to obtain a first estimation of the quarterly GDP, with unavoidable measurement errors. The subsequent step is entirely based on benchmarking models estimated within a state space framework and consists in improving the preliminary GDP estimation in order to both eliminate as much as possible the measurement error and that the sum of the quarterly values matches the annual GDP.

Transaction tax and stock market behavior: evidence from an emerging market

This study examines the impact of a stamp tax rate increase on market behavior, using data from two stock exchanges in China. We find that when the tax rate increases from 0.3 to 0.5% (which implies that the transaction cost increases by about 1/3) trading volume decreases by 1/3. This implies an elasticity of turnover with respect to a stamp tax of −50% and an elasticity of turnover with respect to transaction cost of −100%. The markets’ volatility significantly increases after the increase in the tax rate. Furthermore, the change in the volatility structure indicates that the markets become less efficient in the sense that shocks are less quickly assimilated in the markets.

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The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayek’s legacy

This paper is organized as follows: first, we show that the reference to the notion of group selection is coherent with the other parts of Hayek’s thought. Second, we develop the idea that recent works in terms of the emergence and evolution of social norms corroborate in part Hayek’s theses in this domain. Finally, we put to the fore some drawbacks in Hayek’s approach and propose means to solve them.

Quantifying corruption by a human capital earnings equation

This paper uses a human capital earnings equation to quantify administrative corruption in the public sector. Regression analyses are conducted based on information from surveys administered to public officials in Albania. After accounting for officials’ characteristics, e.g., schooling, experience, gender, type of agency, and public and private sectors’ features, we deduce that the administrative corruption was on average 2.6× the officials’ current salary in Albania, which is equivalent to 16.7% of the country’s GDP.

Buchanan on monetary constitutions

Buchanan’s reflections on monetary issues have been mostly neglected, despite their great interest both per se and for a deeper understanding of his general constitutional endeavour. We will thus propose a comprehensive assessment of Buchanan’s writings on this topic, focusing in particular on the different political models that have been developed to argue in favour of constitutional constraints on the governmental power to create money and on the implications that one can draw from our author’s monetary papers for the structure and the objectives of his constitutional discourse more generally.

Imperfect competition and the modelling of expectations in macroeconomics

We show that when a model of the macroeconomy is based on imperfect, rather than perfect, competition, this may increase the problem of how to model agents’ expectations. We provide a simple example using an overlapping-generations economy with the potential for unemployment. Under certain assumptions about how consumers migrate between locations between the first and second periods of their lives, this extra issue regarding expectations arises. Imperfect competition may increase agents’ forecasting difficulties because they have to forecast not only future equilibrium prices, but also future out-of-equilibrium prices, and by definition the latter are never actually observed.

Kids Cause Specialization: Evidence for Becker’s Household Division of Labor Hypothesis

We examine the division of labor within households and marital matching patterns in the USA using both the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). We use Becker’s theory of marriage markets by estimating household production functions and using the estimates to test for positive or negative assortive matching. We also construct match matrices, which are used to judge how well our model fits Becker’s theory. We find positive assortative matching on all traits in young marriages and couples without children, and negative assortment along some traits in marriages with children. This suggests that children induce specialization whereas couples without children exploit household public goods.

Choosing one’s own informal institutions: on Hayek’s critique of Keynes’s immoralism

In the main, Hayek favored rules that apply equally to all and located such rules in tradition, beyond conscious construction. This led Hayek to attack Keynes’s immoralism, i.e., the position that one should be free to choose how to lead one’s life irrespective of the informal institutions in place. However, it is argued here that immoralism may be compatible with Hayek’s enterprise since Hayek misinterpreted Keynes, who did not advocate the dissolving of all informal rules for everybody. By avoiding this misinterpretation, immoralism can be seen as institutional experimentation at the margin, which Hayek himself favored.

A note on parental and child risk valuation

The paper develops a model that allows the estimation of parent’s valuation of own and child health, in an endogenous risk framework, where parents can employ multiple activities to protect themselves and their children from a health risk. These risk-reducing activities may differ in their effectiveness and their intensity of use. We suggest how to estimate the parent’s ex ante marginal willingness-to-pay for a reduction in the ambient level of health risk, unencumbered by expected utility terms.

On the evolutionary edge of migration as an assortative mating device

In a haystack-type representation of a heterogeneous population that is evolving according to a payoff structure of a prisoner’s dilemma game, migration is modeled as a process of ‘swapping’ individuals between heterogeneous groups of constant size after a random allocation fills the haystacks, but prior to mating. Migration is characterized by two parameters: an exogenous participation-in-migration cost (of search, coordination, movement, and arrangement-making) which measures the migration effort, and an exogenous technology—of coordinating and facilitating movement between populated haystacks and the colonization of currently unpopulated haystacks—which measures the migration intensity. Starting from an initially heterogeneous population that consists of both cooperators and defectors, a scenario is postulated under which ‘programmed’ migration can act as a mechanism that brings about a long-run survival of cooperation.

Rawls’ Paradox

Rawls’ theory of justice is paradoxical, for it requires a society to aim directly to maximize the basic goods received by the least advantaged even if directly aiming is self-defeating. Rawls’ reasons for rejecting capitalist systems commit him to holding that a society must not merely maximize the goods received by the least advantaged, but must do so via specific institutions. By Rawls’ own premises, in the long run directly aiming to satisfy the difference principle is contrary to the interests of the poor, though it is meant to aid them.

Extending the Learning-By-Exporting Hypothesis: Introducing a Credit Constraint

This paper develops a theoretical framework which can be used to examine policy implications from the learning-by-exporting hypothesis. This work builds on previous theoretical literature by introducing a credit constraint. When credit is available, the analysis suggests that supporting a learning sector via an export subsidy is not necessarily advised to improve social welfare. The learning sector’s goods may be over-produced (relative to another non-tradable sector goods) when consumers can borrow freely for their consumption. If the learning sector’s goods are over-produced, social welfare will be improved via a tax on production.

Vertical Innovation and Catching-Up: Implications of EU Integration for CEECs-5

We analyze the role of vertical innovation in trade patterns for developing economies trading with technologically advanced countries. A model is presented where the international diffusion of knowledge, promoted by economic integration, is the source of a technological catching up and leads to a convergence in the quality of traded goods, with a positive effect on exports. We then turn our attention on the evolution of trade between the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs-5) and their European Union partner countries, assessing whether economic integration has increase the quality of the goods produced. For the period 1995–2005, we find evidence of the increasing role of intra-industry trade and vertical differentiation and a process of specialization in higher quality products, especially in the medium- and high-skill sectors.

Distribution-free estimation with interval-censored contingent valuation data: troubles with Turnbull?

Contingent valuation (CV) surveys frequently employ elicitation procedures that return interval-censored data on respondents’ willingness to pay (WTP). Almost without exception, CV practitioners have applied Turnbull’s self-consistent algorithm to such data in order to obtain nonparametric maximum likelihood (NPML) estimates of the WTP distribution. This paper documents two failings of Turnbull’s algorithm; (1) that it may not converge to NPML estimates and (2) that it may be very slow to converge. With regards to (1) we propose starting and stopping criteria for the algorithm that guarantee convergence to the NPML estimates. With regards to (2) we present a variety of alternative estimators and demonstrate, through Monte Carlo simulations, their performance advantages over Turnbull’s algorithm.

Mises’ democracy–dictatorship equivalence theorem: A critique

Ludwig von Mises argues that public opinion, not the form of government, is the ultimate determinant of policy. The implication is that, holding public opinion constant, democracies and dictatorships will have the same policies—a result I call Mises’ Democracy–Dictatorship Equivalence Theorem. According to Mises, dictators have to comply with public opinion or else they will be overthrown. I argue that he seriously overestimates the power of revolution to discipline dictators. Mises was perceptive to note that, in practice, “dictatorially imposed” policies are often democratically sustainable, but he neglected several mechanisms—all more plausible than the threat of revolution—capable of explaining this fact.