MANAGING THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS: THE FUTURE OF THE BAKER PLAN

The Baker Plan, announced in October 1985, represents a new approach by the U.S. administration to managing the international debt crisis. This paper assesses the present administration's new approach, first by examining whether it addresses the factors that led to the failure of past administrations' policies, and then by evaluating the Baker Plan with reference to the obstacles that hinder a lasting resolution of the debt crisis.     

NEW ESTIMATES OF THE U.S. ECONOMY'S POTENTIAL GROWTH RATE

Using an Okun's law framework, the analysis here estimates potential growth for the 1990s as measured by both fixed- and chain-weighted GDP. It then decomposes estimated potential growth rates into labor productivity growth (LPG) and labor input growth (LIG) using a regression analysis to separate secular from cyclical changes. It compares estimates of potential output and trend productivity growth for the 1990s with estimates from earlier periods. Results indicate that eliminating the substitution bias associated with fixed-weight measures of real GDP raises estimated potential GDP growth in the 1980s but lowers it in the 1990s. A slowdown in labor force growth, with little or no change in long-term productivity growth, largely accounts for the implied slowdown in potential growth.     

A BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ANALYSIS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN DEBT CRISIS

In this paper we offer a definition of a country "debt crisis" based upon the amount of new borrowing relative to the cost of servicing past debt. Policy implications for both debtor countries and their creditors are examined. An empirical application is made to Latin American countries, 1978–82. The causes of the debt problems created during this period are investigated with respect to the extent they were the result of rising interest rates vis à vis increased borrowing.     

THE FARM DEBT CRISIS: TEMPORARY OR CHRONIC?

This paper's objective is to analyze the etiology of the crisis confronting the farm sector and its creditors. It draws on data for the period 1950 to 1984 to argue that: (1) rising productivity of farm assets led to large increases in asset values during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s; (2) rising asset values significantly altered the incentive structure of agriculture; and (3) the resulting capital-gains based agriculture of the postwar period motivated farmers to alter their capital structure in ways that made the current financial debacle inevitable once the income growth from assets tapered. From this basis, the paper concludes that farmers' borrowing behavior was substantially more responsible for the existing crisis than often-cited adversities in the markets for agricultural commodities. Accordingly, a farm incomes policy cannot remedy the situation, and the current consolidation in agricultural debt—though painful—represents an unavoidable adjustment for American agriculture.     

东南亚区域发展与金融危机

本文从东南亚国家的发展角度探讨了其金融危机的必然性。认为始于 １９９７ 年的东南亚金融风暴并不是简单的金融信用危机,而是其经济发展模式的必然结果。经济发展过于依赖“外贸”和“外资”,为其经济发展的不稳定和爆发金融危机隐患之一;投资结构不合理,导致经济结构发展失衡,产业结构未能适时升级和转换,为其经济发展不稳定和日后爆发金融危机隐患之二;世界范围内区域经济一体化的冲击,动摇了东南亚国家经济基础,是其爆发金融危机的原因之三。     

THE BANKING SYSTEM CRISIS IN LATIN AMERICA

A major "bootstraps" challenge lies ahead for Latin America: finding enough savings capacity at home to finance needed increases in investment during the 1990s. The banking system throughout the region cannot carry out its role in this process, however, due to a ruinous process of internal debt accumulation and corporate bankruptcy—the domestic analog of the external debt crisis of the 1980s.
This paper briefly reviews recent financial liberalization experiences in Latin America. It identifies three factors as contributing to the undermining of the banking system and the failure of liberalization in the region: (i) foreign exchange risks that the banking system has assumed, (ii) unsound lending and borrowing practices, and (Hi) inadequate regulatory and supervisory frameworks. A case study of Chile illustrates the dynamics of frustrated reform and privatization in the financial markets.
The paper concludes that Latin America has no real choice but to pursue liberalization and to rely more on the private sector in the financial markets. The path to deeper financial markets is extremely complex, however, and Latin America must continue seeking the proper balance between state sector supervision and intervention and an increased role for the private sector. An agenda for research points to some thorny issues awaiting empirical investigation.     

RISK TAKING BY THRIFT INSTITUTIONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

The discussion surrounding the recent reregulation of the thrift industry suggests that (i) thrifts engaging in "risky" activities are more likely to become insolvent and that (ii) thrifts already near insolvency are likely to take on more risks resulting in increased loss. This paper considers the relationship between insolvency and risk taking in a simultaneous framework and uses 1978–1983 data for Illinois thrifts to investigate the relationship. The paper explores the likelihood that risk taking by thrifts increases as the probability of insolvency increases, that risk taking increases as the probability of failure (i.e., closure by the regulator) increases, and that the probability of insolvency increases as risk taking increases. Preliminary empirical results suggest that an increase in the probability of insolvency increases risk taking and that an increase in risk taking increases the likelihood of insolvency. This latter result is (statistically) significant only when one measures risk by an index of diversification. If sustained in more extensive testing, this result implies that regulatory restrictions on asset diversification are counterproductive.     

金融危机背景下发展湖南文化产业的对策探讨

金融危机的到来,给发展中的湖南文化产业提出了严峻的挑战.但中外产业实践都证明,挑战同时蕴藏着难得的发展机遇.湖南的文化企业应抓住机遇,实施诸如完善运行机制、创新商业模式、广泛运用高新技术、努力打造自有品牌等切实有效的应对措施,在危机中求得发展.湖南省各级政府都应认真履行职责,积极支持湖南文化产业的发展.     

IGNORING ECONOMICS IN DEALING WITH THE SAVINGS AND LOAN AND COMMERCIAL BANKING CRISIS

This paper describes how the government has largely ignored economics in its recent attempts to deal with the deterioration of federally insured depository institutions. The most recent example was the Financial Institutions Recovery, Reform, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989. Well documented and widely distributed studies have pointed out the decline of commercial banks. However, the FIRREA completely ignored commercial banks. The paper discusses the pervasive regulatory laxity and forbearance that existed toward banks during the 1980s despite the consequences of similar regulatory behavior toward savings and loans. The paper also shows how the FIRREA's major provisions regarding savings and loans ignore economic analyses. The paper discusses the implications of economic analysis for more appropriate government responses to the continuing deterioration of depositories.