政治联系与审计师选择

政治联系是中国资本市场民营上市公司普遍的重要特征之一,对审计师选择产生着重要的影响。本文依据民营上市公司2004至2007年高管的政治联系数据,实证研究了政治联系、政府官员类政治联系、代表委员类政治联系等不同的政治联系类型对审计师选择的影响。本文的实证研究结果表明:具有政治联系、政府官员类政治联系的民营上市公司倾向于选择非十大会计师事务所进行审计。     

政治联系对中国上市公司的R&D投资具有“挤出”效应吗?

本文揭示了政治联系这一非正式的制度安排对中国上市公司R&D投资行为的影响。手工搜集了2004-2009年R&D与关键高管政治联系的经验数据,本文实证研究了政治联系是否对R&D具有"挤出"效应。结果表明,政治联系的公司投资于R&D的概率显著更小、R&D投资强度显著更低,即政治联系对R&D投资具有显著的挤出效应。进一步研究发现,相对于非国有上市公司与非高科技企业,政治联系对国有上市公司与高科技上市公司的R&D投资产生了显著的挤出效应。     

政治关联与会计信息质量——基于我国民营上市公司的实证研究

采用2007~2011年持续经营的民营上市公司为样本,对不同政治关联方式与会计信息质量的关系进行实证研究,结果表明,不同政治关联方式对会计信息质量的影响程度不一致:政府官员类政治关联的负影响最大,代表委员类则是正相关关系,其他背景类则影响不大;在后金融危机时代,政治关联对会计信息质量的这种负面影响更为显著。     

政治关联、融资渠道与民营企业非效率投资研究

从自由现金流和银行贷款两方面考量2007~2010年沪深A股民营上市企业政治关联对企业非效率投资的影响。结果表明,存在政治关联民营企业容易利用自由现金流和银行长期贷款进行过度投资;存在地方政治关联的民营企业,其自由现金流的过度投资更严重,中央政治关联企业则存在更多利用长期贷款进行过度投资的行为。同时,投资不足的民营企业政治关联降低了企业投资对于自由现金流和银行短期贷款的依赖;中央政治关联的民营企业投资对于银行长期贷款的敏感度更高,地方政治关联企业未发现类似的显著影响。     

政治关系、制度环境与股票价格的信息含量——来自我国民营上市公司股价同步性的经验证据

以2004～2007年间所有的民营A股上市公司为样本,本文对政治关系与股票价格的信息含量(以公司的股价同步性衡量)之间的关系进行了实证检验。检验结果发现,与没有政治关系的公司相比,有政治关系的公司的股票价格同步性显著较高。并且,政治关系与股票价格同步性之间的正相关关系只在市场化程度较低、政府干预较多以及法制水平较差的地区存在。进一步区分政治关系的类型发现,代表委员类政治关系显著提高了公司的股价同步性,而政府官员类政治关系对股价同步性的影响则不显著。     

Rent-seeking incentives, corporate political connections, and the control structure of private firms: Chinese evidence

We examine how the rent-seeking incentives of local government motivate private firms¹ listed in China to establish political connections, and whether such connections lead to more concentrated corporate control structures. Our results show that such firms are more likely to establish political connections in regions in which the local economy is less market-oriented or in which the government has more discretion in allocating economic resources. This is consistent with the notion that the presence of incentives for government officials to engage in rent seeking motivates private firms to look for alternative safeguards through political connections. We also find that the controlling owners of politically connected firms tend to concentrate their shareholdings and dominate the board of directors by occupying the position of either chairman or CEO, which supports the conjecture that a concentrated control structure facilitates rent seeking through political connections and allows the controlling owner to retain all of the benefits arising from connections with politicians.     

Relationship-based debt financing of Chinese private sector firms: The role of social connections to banks versus political connections

We study whether a firm's social connections to banks can augment its political connections to help it obtain loans. In China, Regulation No. 18 (announced in 2013) prohibits all high-level government officials from being independent directors of firms. As a result, many firms lost their political connections. We find that after firms lose their politically connected independent directors, firms having no social connections to banks experience, on average, a 12% decrease in the bank loan ratio relative to the median ratio; but those whose board chairs or CEOs are socially connected to local bank branch heads experience a 22% increase in the loan ratio relative to the median. However, this positive effect is short lived and thus not a new equilibrium. Overall, our findings support the hypothesis that a firm's social connections to banks can augment its political connections to help it get bank financing.     

Corporate cash holdings and political connections

We examine the relation between corporate liquidity and political connections measured via lobbying expenditures. This is an interesting question as many of the motives for holding cash should be diminished by political connections. Results indicate a significant and inverse relation between cash levels and lobby expenses and that the marginal value of cash decreases with lobbying. Taken together, these findings suggest firms react optimally to the reduced benefits of cash linked to political connections and that the market recognizes the weakened benefits of cash. Overall, our research shows another way political connections can shape corporate policy.     

The effect of social connections on capital structure in supplier-customer relationships

Suppliers socially connected to major customers with relation-specific investments have higher leverage ratios compared to unconnected suppliers. The presence of connections partially reduces supplier underleverage observed in supplier-customer relationships with relation-specific investments. Consistent with the role of connections in bonding trading parties' commitment, connections to major customers help to increase customer purchases, and supplier leverage increases are primarily observed in firms with high intensity of customer purchases. Additionally, connected suppliers are associated with higher leverage primarily when information asymmetry between parties is high. Overall, connections help strengthening implicit contracts through establishing trust between trading parties.     

The decreasing value of non‐SOEs’ political connections during China’s anti‐corruption campaign: evidence and mechanism

In this paper, we find that China’s anti‐corruption campaign since 2012 significantly reduces the value of political connections for non‐state‐owned enterprises (non‐SOEs). We provide evidence showing that the decline of the value of political connections for non‐SOEs is attributed mainly to the decreasing return from political connections, instead of increasing political risk. We further find that the decreasing return of the politically connected firms is driven mainly by the disappearance of the ‘resource effect’ of political connection in facilitating access to bank credit and government subsidies, but not due to the increasing cost of maintaining political connections.     

The power of Connections: Evidence from financial companies

The role of political connections has been highlighted as an important influence on firm behaviour and value. We argue that political connections are just part of a wider pool of connections such as those with regulatory bodies and government officials. Using a quasi-experiment, we provide empirical evidence that broader directors' connections reduce company risk. More specifically, we find a negative and significant relationship between directors with both government and regulatory bodies' connections and company risk. Interestingly, we find that connected female directors are less risk-averse compared with their male counterparts. Our results also reveal that connected directors, though offered generous compensation packages, do not necessarily generate higher stock abnormal performance. Therefore, shareholders of financial companies should consider the trade-off between the incremental costs and benefits of appointing connected directors. The paper provides helpful insights for regulators and wider stakeholder groups.     

Divisional Managers and Internal Capital Markets

Using hand‐collected data on divisional managers at S&P 500 firms, we study their role in internal capital budgeting. Divisional managers with social connections to the CEO receive more capital. Connections to the CEO outweigh measures of managers' formal influence, such as seniority and board membership, and affect both managerial appointments and capital allocations. The effect of connections on investment efficiency depends on the tradeoff between agency and information asymmetry. Under weak governance, connections reduce investment efficiency and firm value via favoritism. Under high information asymmetry, connections increase investment efficiency and firm value via information transfer.     

Political connections,auditor choice and corporate accounting transparency: evidence from private sector firms in China

This article investigates the way in which political connections impact auditor choice. Using a political connection index constructed based on the bureaucratic ranks of executive managers and board members in Chinese private sector firms, we find that for firms with weak political connections, the likelihood of hiring high‐quality auditors increases with the degree of political connectedness, while it decreases with political connectedness for firms with strong political connections. This inverse U‐shaped relationship is particularly pronounced for firms with ownership structures that intensify agency problems. Finally, we find that political connections and accounting transparency also have an inverse U‐shaped relationship.     

政治联系、审计师选择的“地缘”偏好与审计意见——基于国有上市公司的经验证据

政治联系是中国资本市场上市公司的普遍现象,对审计行为产生着重要的影响。本文手工搜集了国有上市公司2004—2008年关键高管的政治联系数据,实证研究了政治联系对审计师选择的地缘偏好和审计意见的影响。研究结果表明:政治联系的国有上市公司显著地倾向于选择本地小所、具有地缘偏好性,且该结论主要适用于地方国有上市公司。对于既定的盈余质量,政治联系的国有上市公司获得非标审计意见的概率显著地更低。     

Board connections and crisis performance: Family,state, and political networks

We introduce a novel concept of network interactions in which board connections provide access to external spheres of political influence, state ownership, and family control. We posit this form of indirect access via board association enables connected firms to benefit from information privy to external networks while avoiding their resource-based costs of membership. Board network data are assembled for 1290 East Asian firms and linked to hand-collected data on political connections and corporate ownership around the 2008–09 crisis. Companies with board connections to state-owned firms and family business groups had greater crisis-period accounting performance and stock returns. In countries with weak institutional development, board connections to politically connected firms were also beneficial.     

Political Connection,Ownership, and Post-Crisis Industrial Upgrading Investment: Evidence from China

This article investigates the effect of political connections, along with government ownership and family control, on the intensity of investment in industrial upgrading, including the intensity of R&D, facility upgrading, and marketing, in the context of post-crisis recovery through industrial upgrading in emerging economies. Based on empirical evidence in China, the article finds that political connections of top executives are positively associated with investment in upgrading. The effects of political connections on the intensity of investment in R&D and marketing are negatively moderated by both government ownership and family control, whereas the relationship between political connections and the intensity of investment in facilities upgrading is positively moderated by government ownership and negatively moderated by family control.     

How are political connections valued in China? Evidence from market reaction to CEO succession

Using a sample of listed Chinese firms between 2000 and 2010, the paper analyzes the stock market reaction to CEO succession. We document significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns when CEO succession is accompanied with increased political connections. We also show that the market reaction to political connections is significantly stronger for external successors and for poorly performing firms, while it is significantly weaker for firms in high-tech industries and firms located in more developed regions. Finally we find that political connections are valued significantly less in state owned enterprises than in privately controlled firms. Our findings suggest that Chinese investors do value political connections, and such valuation is conditioned by successor origin, prior firm performance, industry, region, and ownership structure.     

Spillover of stock price crash risk: Do environmental,social and governance (ESG) matter?

This study measures the static and dynamic crash risk connections across ESG networks from 2015 to 2020, using the generalized vector autoregressive framework. In particular, it highlights the mixed results of the crash risk connections across ESG three pillars and the different spillover performance when firms with different ownership structures and qualification of margin-trading and short-selling. Our results reveal that stocks with higher ESG ratings display more negative net spillover effects, which is consistent with the ideas that stock groups with good ESG performance experience lower crash risk, and thus transmitting smaller crash risk to other ESG levels. Among the three ESG pillars, good social performance (S) significantly lowers the total crash risk connections. In contrast, firms with well environment performance (E) do not transmit lower crash risk. Moreover, SOEs and firms with qualification of margin-trading and short-selling have lower total crash risk connections among ESG ratings. Using propensity score matching to match companies with high ESG and low ESG quarterly, we find the results are still robust. When dividing the sample according to the outbreak of COVID-19, we find the crash risk connections across ESG networks are stronger during crisis.     

Political relationships,global financing,and corporate transparency: Evidence from Indonesia

This study examines the role of political connections in firms’ financing strategies and their long-run performance. We view political connections as an example for domestic arrangements which can reduce the benefits of global financing. Using data from Indonesia, we find that firms with strong political connections are less likely to have publicly traded foreign securities. As a result, estimates of the performance consequences of foreign financing are severely biased if value-creating domestic arrangements such as political relationships are ignored. Connections not only alter firms’ financing strategies, they also influence long-run performance. Tracking returns across several regimes, we show that firms have difficulty re-establishing connections with a new government when their patron falls from power, leading closely connected firms to underperform under the new regime and subsequently to increase their foreign financing.     

Connected lending and concentrated control

Banks’ controlling owners may exploit business relationships with other firms so as to tangibly or intangibly benefit themselves. This paper uses data from more than 2600 firms across 25 countries to study whether the control rights of the banks’ controlling owners are associated with whether firms need special connections with banks in order to obtain loans. I find that the control rights of the controlling owners increase the need for special connections. I also find that supervisory power raises the need for special connections and intensifies the adverse effect induced by concentrated control. No evidence is found that shareholder rights protection reduces the need for special connections, nor that bank officials become less corrupted as the control rights of the controlling owners increase. The results thus indicate that an increase in the control rights of the banks’ controlling owners only reduces the integrity of bank lending.