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1.
Consumers learn quality of many durable products through word-of-mouth information while firms launch new and improved products
frequently in these markets. This paper examines firm incentives to invest in R&D to compete for patents in makets where consumers
rely on word-of-mouth information and have expectations about the new products before launch. When its loss due to a possible
entry is above a threshold, an incumbent has more incentives than a potential entrant to invest in R&D for patents. Moreover,
if the current product is more profitable, its true quality is above consumer priors and the quality of the new product is
below a threshold, it is optimal for the incumbent to launch the new product after a time lag. The later the optimal time
of launch, the greater is the incumbent’s potential loss if entry occurs and greater its incentives is to invest in R&D versus
that of the entrants. While potential entrants are generally thought to have more incentives to invest in a drastic innovation
which results in a race to launch the new products, we show that the more drastic the innovation, the later the optimal time
of launch and greater are the incumbent’s incentives to invest in R&D when the value added of the new product can be conveyed
to all the consumers. Only when consumers are uncertain about the value added of the new product, the incumbent’s incentives
are lower. We also demonstrate that by promoting consumer expectations about the new product before launch, an incumbent has
more time to launch and higher probability of dominating its market. 相似文献
2.
Cátia Felisberto 《Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade》2012,12(1):21-46
A static model is developed to analyse the incumbent’s innovation strategy under monopoly and duopoly. A number of potential
objectives for the incumbent are modelled here, including the maximization of revenue, profit, and welfare (which are common
among the network industries). Its marginal cost depends upon investment in new technologies and processes. The incumbent
chooses its price and its level of investment in innovation. The incumbent’s elasticity of demand under both market structures
and the incumbent’s market share under duopoly determine which market structure creates more incentives to innovate. For certain
values of these variables, duopoly provides more incentives to innovate than monopoly. As expected, the incentives to innovate
increase when the incumbent places greater weight on social welfare. 相似文献
3.
Many transnational corporations and international organizations have embraced corporate social responsibility (CSR) to address
criticisms of working and environmental conditions at subcontractors’ factories. While CSR ‹codes of conduct’ are easy to
draft, supplier compliance has been elusive. Even third-party monitoring has proven an incomplete solution. This article proposes
that an alteration in the supply chain’s governance, from an arms-length market model to a collaborative partnership, often
will be necessary to effectuate CSR. The market model forces contractors to focus on price and delivery as they compete for
the lead firm’s business, rendering CSR observance secondary, at best. A collaborative partnership where the lead firm gives
select suppliers secure product orders and other benefits removes disincentives and adds incentives for CSR compliance. In
time, the suppliers’ CSR habit should shift their business philosophy toward pursuing CSR as an end in itself, regardless
of buyer incentives and monitoring. This article examines these hypotheses in the context of the athletic footwear sector
with Nike, Inc. and its suppliers as the specific case study. The data collected and conclusions reached offer strategies
for advancing CSR beyond the superficial and often ineffectual ‹code of conduct’ stage. 相似文献
4.
This paper characterizes the differences in incentives to respond adversely to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 CRA91 across firm
size. I then empirically test the firm responses and compare them to the incentives. I find that responses across firm size
match the incentive differences. Thus firms appear to be rational as well as fully informed. The most pronounced adverse response
comes from large firms. Firms with more than 100 employees reversed a trend of increasing employment at a rate of 0.28 weeks
worked per year prior to CRA91 to a trend of decreasing employment at a rate of −0.21 weeks per year. Since this group employs
63.7 of the workforce, this has a profound impact on opportunities for protected groups. 相似文献
5.
Betty Yung 《Journal of Business Ethics》2009,87(1):45-57
The common discourse on intellectual property rights rests mainly on utilitarian ground, with implications on the question
of justice as well as moral significance. It runs like this: Intellectual property rights are to reward the originators for
his/her intellectual labour mainly in monetary terms, thereby providing incentives for originators to engage in future innovative
labouring. Without such incentives, few, if not none, will engage in creative activities and the whole human community will,
thereby, suffer because of reduced inventions. However, such utilitarian argument on piracy as de-motivation may not be necessarily
justified. In fact, intellectual property arrangement is one among different institutions concerning how the society may handle
new ideas and creative works. In reality, private ownership over one’s intellectual product is merely a modern western concept
that is being ‹advertised’ as being normative, which, by itself, is highly debatable. Alarming still, such normative argument
assumes both justness and moral dimensions. This article will analyse whether such argument is philosophically sound. 相似文献
6.
The burden of past restructuring of the external debt of developing countries has been distributed asymmetrically among creditors
owing to the lack of incentives for voluntary debt reduction. “New creditors” have been deterred from lending voluntarily
because their claims would inevitably be added to a mountain of bad debt. Therefore new ways of reducing debt and debt servicing
must be found. Our authors suggest a process of concerted debt reduction designed to ensure that all the creditor banks involved
play an equal part. 相似文献
7.
The major normative recommendations in the literature on food risk communication can be summarized in the form of seven practical
principles for such communication: (1) Be honest and open. (2) Disclose incentives and conflicts of interest. (3) Take all
available relevant knowledge into consideration. (4) When possible, quantify risks. (5) Describe and explain uncertainties.
(6) Take all the public’s concerns into account. (7) Take the rights of individuals and groups seriously. We show that each
of these proposed principles can be justified both in terms of more fundamental ethical principles and instrumentally in terms
of the communicating agent’s self-interest. The mechanisms of this concordance of justifications are discussed. It is argued
that the concordance is specific for areas such as food risks in which agents such as companies and public authorities are
highly dependent on the public’s trust and confidence. The implications of these findings both for moral philosophy and for
practical food risk communication are discussed. 相似文献
8.
In this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives in Quebec, using manufacturing firm data from 1997 to 2003
originating from R&D surveys, annual surveys of manufactures and administrative data. The estimated price elasticity of R&D
is –0.10 in the short run and –0.14 in the long run, with slightly higher elasticities for small firms than for large firms.
We show that there is a deadweight loss associated with level-based R&D tax incentives that is particularly acute for large
firms. For small firms it is not sizeable enough to suppress the R&D additionality, at least not for quite a number of years
after the initial tax change. Incremental R&D tax credits do not suffer from this deadweight loss and are from that perspective
preferable to level-based tax incentives.
相似文献
Pierre MohnenEmail: |
9.
Public services worldwide have been subject to externally imposed reforms utilizing tools such as financial incentives and
performance targets. The adverse impact of such reforms on a public service ethos has been claimed, but rarely demonstrated.
Individuals within organizations work beyond their formal contracts of employment, described as Organizational Citizenship
Behavior (OCB), to further organizational interests. Given New Public Management reform and the subsequent contextual changes
in the way in which public sector organizations are managed and funded, the present study theorizes that OCB directed towards
the organization may be ‘crowded-out’. This article tests the relationships between public service ethos and OCB and it presents
empirical evidence from a study in England (n = 433) of the ability of each dimension of this ethos to predict OCB. 相似文献
10.
《Journal of Business Venturing》1987,2(1):41-51
This article reports the results of a questionnaire survey addressed to CEOs of Fortune 500 companies concerning incentive practices for venture managers. Data was also collected for venture performance history in these companies.Highlights of the results are:Most companies are not providing different incentives for venture managers than for other managers.Companies that do and companies that do not provide special incentives seem to agree on the types of incentives which would promote improved venture performance, which include milestone bonuses, equity, and/or options in the new venture, variable bonuses based on venture ROI.The primary obstacle to installing such incentives is reported by firms without special incentives in place to be concern about internal equity.Firms with special incentives already in place have less concern with this problem. A moderate problem to such firms is difficulty in defining venture objectives.There is no evidence, from this study, that special incentives for venture managers affected the outcome in venture performance, when such performance was measured by the percentage of “successes” and “failures.” About 50% success rate was reported by each group.The article deals with these questions:Are performance incentives essential?Certainly not, from the data in this sample, but this was a “head count” of successes and failures—a study of overall economic performance might yield a different result. One expensive failure can wipe out the gains from many small successes.Are the incentives reported effective?Obviously not enough to show a difference between those who use them and those who don't. Analysis of the incentive elements used and the earnings limits imposed suggest that the special incentives are not particularly special, nor very much of an incentive. Further, the most common incentive reported, based on venture ROI, fails to consider the time period usually required to achieve a positive ROI, and the many changes of management which occur during that period.What criteria should be used for designing an incentive program for venture managers?Recognition of the probability of management change, incentives which promote early identification of need for change of direction or to abort, focus on event completion milestones rather than the calendar, the relationship of reward potential to risk potential including job security and actual financial risk by the venture manager, achievability, and simplicity are factors to be considered.What kind of financial incentives might be included in incentive design?Depending on the life cycle stage of the venture, fixed and variable bonuses, options for equity or shadow equity in the venture itself, actual equity in the new venture, and to a lesser extent, salary increases and equity or equity options in the parent are suggested. How can the obstacles to installation of performance incentives for venture managers be reduced?To reduce perception of internal inequity, relating potential risk to potential reward and extending performance incentives to other managers is suggested. The problem of defining venture objectives as an obstacle is instantly solved as an incentive issue by making ownership possibility a reality for venture management, especially with financial investment required by venture management. 相似文献
11.
In this paper, we first establish the core, fundamental concepts of Williamson’s TCE, examining the different governance structures
or the institutional alternatives that TCE theory proposes. We go on to describe some critical considerations and theoretical
proposals that correspond fundamentally to Williamson’s heuristic model, the integration of incentives in organizational forms,
idiosyncratic demand, and how the concept of transaction is conceived in general. 相似文献
12.
This paper investigates the effects of equity incentives on firm performance in Chinese listed firms. We address the sample
selection problem by employing the propensity score matching methodology. Results show that, (1) On the whole, performance
is positively related to equity incentives even after controlling for sample selection bias; (2) The final control rights
have an important impact on the effects of equity incentives. The execution of equity incentives in privately owned firms
can significantly decrease the agency costs between shareholders and managers, but such effects cannot be observed in state-owned
firms; (3) Effects of equity incentives depend on the incentive type, that is, comparing to stock-based incentives, option-based
incentives can reduce the agency costs significantly, thus are more effective; (4) Ownership structure also has important
impacts on the effects of equity incentives. The agency costs decrease in firms with more decentralized ownership after introducing
equity incentive, while in concentrated firms the effect is negligible. 相似文献
13.
This paper uses an analytical model to examine when it makes sense to provide incentives to innovators to adopt a new product.
The model allows for separate segments of innovators and imitators, each of which follows a Bass-type diffusion process. Interestingly
“seeding” the market is optimal for a limited range of situations and these do not appear to include those where there is
a downturn in sales (chasm) as sales move from the first to the second segment. 相似文献
14.
American businesses and corporate executives are faced with a serious problem the loss of public confidence. Public criticism,
increased government controls, and growing expectations for improved financial performance and accountability have accompanied
this decline in trust. Traditional approaches to corporate governance, typified by agency theory and stakeholder theory, have
been expensive to direct and have focused on short-term profits and organizational systems that fail to achieve desired results.
We explain why the organizational governance theories are fundamentally, inadequate to build trust. We advance a conceptual
framework based on stewardship theory characterized by “covenantal relationships” and argue that design of governance mechanisms
using a covenantal approach is more effective in building trust in organizations. A covenantal relationship is a specialized
form of a relational contract between an employee and his or her organization. We argue that regardless of incentives and
control mechanisms carefully designed through contractual mechanisms, in the absence of covenantal relationships it is extremely
difficult to build trust within organizations. We propose that organizations are more likely to build trust – both at the
organizational level and at the interpersonal level – when they create reinforcing and integrated systems that honor implied
duties of “covenantal relationships.” 相似文献
15.
Karl Aiginger 《Intereconomics》2009,44(5):309-316
The financial crisis has affected the real economy in stages yet nevertheless at an unexpected rate and with all regions being
affected simultaneously. It advanced almost independently of the regions’ exposure to the actual initial causes, among them
the subprime crisis, innovative financial products, dubious microeconomic incentives, inefficient regulation and macroeconomic
imbalances. The following analysis asks how national economic structures can be made more resilient to a shock (be it a financial
crisis or another turbulence) and how economic policy can act in order to stabilise the economy before and after such a shock. 相似文献
16.
全球中小企业税收优惠制度改革及借鉴 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
20世纪70年代开始,主要发达国家都对中小企业税收优惠制度进行了重大改革:从全面优惠到有选择的重点优惠;在坚持税收法定原则的基础上,灵活务实;引入税式支出,对税收优惠进行绩效考评;非常注重政策的配套与协调等。中国在中小企业税收优惠制度方面存在法定性不足、受惠主体过窄、力度小、优惠方式单一、导向性不明显、配套协调不够、缺少科学合理的评价等问题。因此,中国应借鉴全球中小企业税收优惠制度改革的经验,有针对性地进行改革。 相似文献
17.
This paper analyzes the incentives of duopolists to invest in advanced care technology under liability law. We establish that investment incentives under strict liability are in line with the taxonomy of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), whereas the investment incentives under negligence most likely are not. Indeed, investment incentives under negligence are dependent on the timing of the policy maker’s regulations, whether or not due care is firm specific, and whether or not precautionary measures are durable. 相似文献
18.
This study examines how the structure of distribution channels may influence firms’ quality and price strategies and how they
may in turn affect consumer welfare. It treats product quality as a decision variable so that the degree of product substitution
becomes endogenous rather than exogenous as in previous studies. We find that, with vertically differentiated firms, the changes
in channel structure have asymmetric effects depending on whether they occur in the high-quality channel or in the low-quality
channel. The product quality of the high-quality channel decreases when it decentralizes unilaterally. However, product quality
of the low-quality channel would increase when it decentralizes. The high-quality manufacturer and its channel suffer more
from decentralization in comparison with their low-quality counterparts, and the low-quality manufacturer actually receives
greater profits when both channels are decentralized. An important driver behind these asymmetries is the interaction between
firms’ pricing incentives in integrated versus decentralized channels and what consumer segments they serve. Our analysis
indicates that decentralization may reduce consumer welfare, but decentralization in the high-quality channel hurts consumers
more than that in the low-quality channel. Therefore in a competitive environment where firms make both quality and price
decisions, channel integration would have significant welfare enhancement effects through the elimination of double marginalization,
especially if it happens in the high-quality channel. Moreover, we demonstrate that once quality is endogenized, integration
is the only equilibrium of channel structure choices. This suggests that the private incentives of firms may actually benefit
consumers but do not have to be in line with the general preference of industry regulation for decentralization. 相似文献
19.
In many professional and services industries, firms try to scale up their operations by reproducing practices in new locations
through franchising arrangements, especially business format franchising. The classic but still prevailing explanations for
franchising related phenomena, especially the initiative of franchising, the propensity to franchise, and the franchise performance,
are mostly based on two orders of reasons (or a combination of them): franchising is either explained as a means to deal with
resource scarcity or (and) as a mechanism for franchisor and franchisee to align incentives between themselves. However, empirical
studies have shown limited support for both such claims, especially in face of the so called plural form, where proprietary
and franchised units of the same franchisor co-exist. It may also be argued that the traditional literature on franchising
has assumed a high level of homogeneity within and between franchising “networks,” possibly due to the perception that they
tend to be “dominated” by a high level of standardization and replication of practices, both operative and relational. However,
learning processes in such “networks” have recently been brought in as an attempt to capture other mechanisms that may underlie
their operation and sustainability. This article seeks to explore a third perspective to look at franchising “networks,” by
drawing from the literatures on capabilities and industrial networks. Seen from this perspective, business format franchising
may involve more than the mere replication or exploitation of a recipe, especially if we take into consideration the partly
idiosyncratic nature of both the relationships between actors and their capabilities and intentions. Within this perspective,
variety preservation, and not only uniformity, may be recognized by participants as relevant for the performance of the franchise
chain. In other words, variety may reflect the need for the refinement of the “package” throughout time, in more than one
ways, together with the gradual development of the network and the learning experiences that take place in that context. 相似文献
20.
Lonnie Golden 《Journal of Business Ethics》2009,84(Z2):217-227
What are some of the key historical trends in hours of work per worker in US? What economic, social-psychological, organizational
and institutional forces determine the length of individuals’ working hours? How much of the trend toward longer working hours
among so many workers may be attributable to workers’ preferences, workplace incentives or employers’ constraints? When can
work become overwork or workaholism – an unforced addiction to incessant work activity which risk harm to workers, families
or even economies? The first part of this article traces the history of the length of working hours and its recent polarization.
The second part develops a multi-disciplinary model to identify motivations behind working longer hours. Individuals' desired
work hours will stem from the weighted contribution of five sources: (1) current real wage rates; (2) forward-looking, wage
trajectories; (3) relative status associated with hours of labor; (4) intrinsic rewards, process benefits or amenities acquired
through work; (5) hours demanded by the employer and other structural constraints, to which workers may adapt. Employers and
their established conditions of work have influenced the course of long run trends labor supply and in work time structures.
The final section suggests policies that might address the persistence of long hours. 相似文献