非完全竞争市场假设在CGE模型中的引入及应用

通过对部门生产函数及相关参数、系数的改造,将非完全竞争市场条件引入CGE模型,并模拟在完全竞争与不完全竞争两个不同市场结构下国际油价上升对我国经济的影响.结果表明,当油品市场设定为不完全竞争时,面对国际油价上升的冲击,GDP下降的程度大于完全竞争的情况.因此随着油品市场逐渐开放,油品市场的产出增加,可以增强我国石油产业和总体经济应对国际油价上升冲击的能力,应继续推动我国石油产业市场自由化的进程.     

Price Competition Between Teams

This study uses an experimental approach to examine whether markets are sensitive to the internal incentive structure of the competitors. Toward this goal, we modeled the competitors in a price competition duopoly game as three-player teams. Each player simultaneously declares a bid (price) and the team whose total bid was lower won the competition and was paid accordingly. The losing team was paid nothing, and in case of a tie, each team was paid half its price. This duopoly game was studied under two conditions; a cooperative treatment in which the team's profit was divided equally amongst its members and a non-cooperative one in which each individual member was paid her own bid. Whereas the Nash equilibrium is for each player in either treatment to demand the minimal price possible, we predicted that convergence to the competitive price would be much faster in the cooperative treatment than in the non-cooperative one. The experimental results firmly confirmed this prediction.     

贸易开放、不完全竞争与成本加成——基于中国制造业数据的实证分析

文章利用中国制造行业的面板数据,分析贸易开放对我国国内行业成本加成的影响。回归结果表明,市场竞争与国际贸易是影响我国制造行业成本加成的重要因素。进口贸易在高竞争性行业对成本加成具有正向的促进效应,而在低竞争性行业具有相反的效应;出口贸易对国内行业的成本加成具有显著的正向促进效应。     

河北省建立农村社会保障制度成本效益分析

在现代化进程中，农村社会保障始终处于整个社会保障体系的边缘，农民长期游离于社会保障网络之外。改革的实践和理论都未能突破城市和农村两个独立的圈子，这造成了农村社会保障制度建设严重滞后的状况。建立农村社会保障制度必然要付出巨大的成本，包括推行成本和社会保障费用支出成本。但建立农村社会保障制度带来的社会效益也是非常明显，是难以用数据来衡量的。     

Stackelberg竞争条件下的最佳福利关税与最大收入关税

文章考察Stackelberg竞争条件下的最佳福利关税与最大收入关税。分析表明,最佳福利关税与最大收入关税的相对大小主要取决于产品之间的相互关系和国内外企业的成本差异。当产品是互补品时,最佳福利关税总是小于最大收入关税;当产品是替代品时,最佳福利关税与最大收入关税的关系,既取决于产品间的替代程度又取决于国内外企业间的成本差异。产品的替代程度较弱时,最大收入关税总是大于最佳福利关税;产品的替代程度较强时,若国内外厂商间的成本差异越小,则最佳福利关税越有可能超过最大收入关税。     

Pigouvian Taxes Under Imperfect Competition If Consumption Depends on Emissions

The paper considers environmental regulation of a consumption good and an externality which influence demand and costs in a nonseparable way. Under monopoly two instruments are always required for first-best. The Pigouvian tax is more complicated than anticipated.     

价格竞争还是质量竞争--中国出口产品竞争力的实证研究

中国出口产品普遍被认为“价廉质次”,然而这并不能充分解释中国出口贸易长期增长的实质。对中国2001年加入WTO以来出口产品竞争力的实证研究表明：一方面,中国出口产品的相对单位价格呈现持续下降的趋势,这说明低价竞争是中国出口产品的一个主要特征;另一方面,中国出口产品质量在逐年上升,其中高技术出口产品的质量竞争力较为明显,这说明中国出口产品并未陷入低质量产品的陷阱。在新时期进一步深化对外贸易转型中,把握中国出口产品竞争力特征对我国对外贸易政策制定有重要意义。     

Labour Hoarding, Price Rigidity and the Theory of Imperfect Competition under Uncertain Demand

It is shown that a monopolistic firm under uncertainty may be inclined to keep some of its output unsold when demand is low. This gives rise to changes in conventional results. Under uncertainty, a risk-neutral monopolistic firm produces more than in a deterministic environment and it refuses to sell its total output when demand is low, because the marginal revenue could become negative or lower than the cost of selling the product. Moreover, in this framework, prices are shown to be more rigid downwards than upwards. The model also provides a new explanation for labour hoarding.
JEL classification : D 24; D 42     

Strategic Choice of the Price Structure and Entry Deterrence Under Price Cap Regulation

This paper shows that a price‐capped firm under the threat of entry in some of the markets it serves can strategically manipulate its price structure to deter entry. In doing so, the regulated firm uses the price cap constraint as a commitment device to an aggressive pricing behaviour in case of entry. A (dynamic) price cap generally entails that the prices allowed today are a function of the previous‐period prices and that the tighter is the constraint on each price, the larger is the quantity sold of this good in the previous period. Hence, the regulated firm may strategically choose its price structure before entry to place a tighter regulatory control on the prices set in the (potentially) competitive markets and to make it optimal to charge in these markets – in case of entry – prices so low that entry is unprofitable.     

土地政策调整对经济发展和社会福利的影响

构建了一个土地对社会福利影响的分析模型,并用天津市的数据进行检验。研究结果表明：（1）政府对于土地供应量的控制减少了均衡资本量;（2）严格的土地政策会使单位资本产生的福利量减少;（3）土地政策的适时调整能使经济发展沿着社会福利最大化的路径发展。因此,土地政策的制定应该以社会需求为导向,并通过适时调整以实现社会福利最大化。     

资本主义、社会民主主义和福利国家

在资本主义市场经济发展的进程中，产生了福利国家。工业主义理论家从工业化的视角把福利国家的发展看作是工业化发展的水平的结果；社会民主主义者把福利国家看作是实现社会主义经济发展的必要步骤，并借助干凯恩斯主义的福利国家来推行其福利国家的发展战略；一些从资本主义发展的角度认识福利国家原因的理论家，则把福利国家的出现看作是资本主义市场经济发展的产物，并分析了福利国家中的阶级利益的对立。     

转移成本、价格歧视和非对称寡头竞争

通过在Hotelling空间差异模型的基础上结合转移成本构建非对称企业竞争博弈模型.主要研究在非对称情况下,两企业在一致定价与价格歧视下竞争的均衡结果.还对两种不同定价体制下的均衡结果进行了比较,分析价格歧视是否强化竞争.研究发现价格歧视对竞争的效应是不确定的,很大程度受到两企业不对称程度的影响.     

Price,Programming and Potential Competition in US Cable Television Markets

Potential competition in the US cable television industry is empirically examined for 385 markets. Predicted entry probabilities are included in a supply-demand model to permit empirical investigation of the effect of potential competition on incumbent cable operators price and channel programming decisions. Estimation results show incumbents offer more channels to consumers in markets facing greater potential competition from broadband service provider (BSP) wireline overbuilders and/or incumbent local exchange carriers. In particular, when the probability of entry rises to about 42 the average cable system provides six more channels, and price per channel declines from US$ 0.77 to US$ 0.66.JEL Classification: L8, L9, L11We thank Ben Compaine, Shane Greenstein, Anne Hoag, Donald Waldman, Bradley Wimmer, the editor of this journal, an anonymous referee, and participants at the 30th Research Conference on Communication, Information and Internet Policy (TPRC 2002), September 28–30, 2002, Hilton Hotel, Alexandria, Virginia, for comments. Armando Galarraga and Nana Puangpathumanond provided research assistance, and Jane Frenette and Jonathan Levy provided excellent help with FCC cable entry and competition data. The usual disclaimer applies.     

我国航空运输服务业的市场结构及价格竞争策略分析

我国航空运输服务业从宏观上分析具有寡头垄断的市场结构特点,从航线运营的角度分析却具有垄断竞争的特点,因此我国航空运输服务市场还处在重要的发展变革阶段。在我国空运市场特定的经济环境下,旅客的购买决策受到多种因素的影响,航空公司的价格竞争主要表现为不同价格的子舱位数量的决策,并且具有复杂的价格体系。在同一航线上经营的不同企业一方面要针对价格需求弹性大和时间需求弹性大的旅客采取强硬的价格竞争策略;另一方面也要注重差异化价格竞争策略, 避免恶性竞争的发生。     

The Complete Welfare Effects of Cost Reductions in a Cournot Oligopoly

This paper provides the smallest upper bound or the critical level for a Cournot firm's market share below which its cost reduction reduces welfare. It shows that a firm's cost reduction increases social welfare with nonlinear demand and nonlinear costs if and only if its market share is above the critical level, which is equal to a weighted sum of the other firms' market shares. The paper also reports similar results for technological spill-overs within any given set of firms.     

收入分布、破坏性创新与社会福利

通过构建破坏性创新企业与在位企业进行市场竞争的双寡头博弈模型,分析在具有不同收入分布特征市场中破坏性创新企业的市场绩效及社会福利。研究发现,在收入差距较大的市场中,破坏性创新企业获得更大的市场份额和利润,社会福利相对较小;相反,在收入水平较高且分布趋向同质的市场中,在位企业获得更大的市场份额和利润,并且,破坏性创新厂商的利润随着收入水平的提高而降低。同时,随着收入水平的提高,两企业的产品质量不断提高,但质量差距不断扩大,社会总福利也随之增加。最后,进一步阐释了破坏性创新更多地发生于贫富差距较大的新兴市场的微观机制,为企业根据不同市场的收入分布特征选择竞争战略提供理论依据,为相关国家基于收入分布特点制定限制或支持破坏性创新创业政策提供理论参考。     

企业出口贸易低价竞争的现实根源及影响

本文讨论了我国出口企业低价竞争的现实根源,分析了低价竞争给我国经济和社会所造成的影响,提出了相应的对策。     

转移成本、价格歧视与银行竞争——基于霍特林模型的实证分析

在银行业竞争中,转移成本能够锁定消费者,使银行能够对锁定的消费者定一个较高的价格,但是,转移成本也使银行对没有被锁定的消费者的竞争更加激烈。研究发现,转移成本的存在增加了银行的利润,并且转移成本越高,银行从信贷中获得的利润越高。但是,当存在存款市场和贷款市场竞争时,由于价格歧视的存在,银行的利润随着转移成本的增加而降低,转移成本没有给银行带来优势。     

解析中国农产品价格的非对称性与刚性——基于空间竞争模型和菜单成本理论的微观阐释

2007年以来,我国农产品价格经历了多轮大幅度的上涨和回落,而在此过程中,农产品零售价格却形成了有别于批发价格的独立走势,表现出显著的非对称性和刚性特征,影响了政府价格调控政策的实施效果。本文拟通过创造性地引入空间竞争模型和菜单成本理论,合理解释这一中观和宏观价格现象的微观基础和深层原因,为政府当前的价格调控和未来的价格管理体制改革开拓新的政策视角。     

论采购联盟集体谈判力的价格、销量与福利效应

文章以中国的制造业外包服务,即出口加工贸易活动为基础,发展了一个有关本国企业的中间品策略性采购联盟与外国垄断性供给者进行集体谈判的非合作性广义Coumot-Nash谈判模型,探讨是否应该建立中间品策略性采购联盟,以及如何运用其集体谈判力实现行业降低成本、保障供给等问题.文章证明本国与外国之间的中间品与最终产品贸易的互补性既增加了建立采购联盟进行集体谈判的迫切性,也复杂化了集体谈判力的价格、销量与福利效应:这些效应既依存于本国策略性采购联盟的偏好这种主观因素,也取决于最终产品需求由线的弹性与曲率、外国企业的技术以及生产专业化程度等客观因素,其中,采购联盟的偏好因素具有重要的影响.