Wage and price controls in the equilibrium sequential search model

In this paper, we study the effects of wage and price controls on employment, output, and welfare in a simplified version of the Bénabou (J. Econom. Theory 60 (1993) 140) equilibrium sequential search model with bilateral heterogeneity. We show that a price ceiling increases output but the change in welfare depends on three effects: the reduction in aggregate search costs, the increase in surplus due to increased output, and the transfer of production to the least efficient firm. The model is formally identical to a standard equilibrium search model of the labor market so analogous results hold for the minimum wage.     

R&D and Output in a Regulated Vertically Integrated Oligopoly

This paper examines input price regulation's effects on research and development (R&D) and output in a vertically integrated industry. A single integrated firm produces the crucial input and the output. The non-integrated rival does not produce the input but buys it from the integrated firm at a regulated price. Only the integrated firm engages in cost-reducing R&D. Results show that changes in input price have a negative effect on the integrated firm's output and R&D. The non-integrated firm's output response to changes in input price depends upon the slope of the demand curve. The welfare analysis examines the social desirability of such regulation.     

标准专利许可中可变价格的社会福利效应:基于产品差异化的视角

技术标准在产品生产过程中的使用越来越广泛,标准专利许可定价形式问题关系到技术标准所有者和产品生产者的收益,有待拓展研究。通过构建古诺竞争模型,从产品差异化角度对标准专利许可中可变价格形式的社会福利效应进行分析,得到的主要结论为:当产品市场达到均衡,且标准专利许可采用的价格形式是可变价格时,社会总福利随着产品差异化程度的提高而增加,随着差异化产品市场中标准专利使用者数量的增加而增加,随着可变价格中可变费用比率的提高而降低;均衡产量随着产品差异化程度的提高而增大,随着可变价格中可变费用比率的提高而降低;均衡价格与产品差异化程度呈现出倒“U”型关系,临界点为特定的市场规模;标准专利使用者的均衡利润随着产品差异化程度的提高而增大。由此可见,标准专利许可的可变费用比率下降有利于激励技术标准使用者生产更多的差异化产品,提升社会总福利。     

Imported inputs and privatization in downstream mixed oligopoly with foreign ownership

This paper examines welfare implications of privatization in a mixed oligopoly with vertically related markets, where an upstream foreign monopolist sells an essential input to public and private firms located downstream in the domestic country. The impact on domestic welfare of privatizing the downstream public firm is shown to contain three effects. The first is an output distortion effect, which negatively affects welfare since privatization decreases the production of final good for consumption. The second is an input price lowering effect resulting from a decrease in derived demand for the input. When the level of privatization increases, a decrease in final good production lowers input demand, causing input price to decline and domestic welfare to increase. The third is a rent‐leaking effect associated with foreign ownership in the downstream private firm. The rival domestic firm strategically increases its final good production, causing profits accrued to foreign investors to increase and domestic welfare to decline. Without foreign ownership in the downstream private firm, the optimal policy toward the public firm is complete privatization as the output distortion effect is dominated by the input price lowering effect. With foreign ownership, however, complete privatization can never be socially optimal due to the additional negative impact on domestic welfare of the rent‐leaking effect. We further discuss implications for domestic welfare under different privatization schemes (e.g., selling the privatization shares to the upstream foreign monopolist or to the rival domestic firm).     

The Inefficiency of Private Adaptation to Pollution in the Presence of Endogenous Market Structure

The paper considers an industry where production costs rise due to pollution, but where this effect can be partially off-set by investing in adaptation as a private good. The focus is not on external effects, but industries where economies of scale are introduced from adapting to pollution. The structure of the resulting oligopolistic market is endogenous, since the level of adaptation is chosen by the firms. The analysis of externalities usually disregards defensive or adaptation measures, with a few exceptions that point to considerable complications. The present debate on adaptation to climate change shows the importance of understanding defensive measures. I show that the market failure caused by economies of scale leads to production costs above the social optimum, i.e. to under-adapation. When pollution increases, adaptation only increases if demand is price inelastic. Otherwise, welfare loss from market failure decreases with pollution. The total welfare loss is only convex if demand is price inelastic and the influence of pollution on production costs is stronger than the influence of adaptation. Concave welfare loss has crucial implications for abatement policies.     

Asymmetries in price and quantity adjustments by the competitive firm

Focusing on the crucial role of inventory carry-overs in the production and sales decision, we describe the profit maximizing behavior of a dynamic competitive firm facing random prices. Each firm's behavior is incorporated into a stochastic equilibrium model of the competitive industry with uncertain demand. The industry model exhibits asymmetric cyclical fluctuations of the “Keynesian” sort: when demand is weak, output contracts while price holds at a fixed floor; when demand is strong, price increases as output is constrained by a ceiling. Even in a pure world of constant returns, without increasing costs, the inability to instantaneously coordinate production and sales along with the existence of inventories is sufficient to yield a “backward L” shaped supply curve for the short run.     

An Experimental Investigation of Hard and Soft Price Ceilings in Emissions Permit Markets

Tradable emissions permits have been implemented to control pollution levels in various markets and represent a major component of legislative efforts to control greenhouse gas emissions. Because permits are supplied for a fixed level of pollution, allowing the market for permits to determine the price, price control mechanisms may be needed to protect firms from price spikes caused by fluctuations in the demand for permits. We test permit markets in an experimental laboratory setting to determine the effectiveness of several price control mechanisms, with special attention on the soft price ceiling. We focus on a static setting similar to some of the earliest experimental work focused on price ceilings. Results indicate that both permit supply adjustments and price ceilings (hard ceilings) effectively limit elevated prices in this setting. By contrast, reserve auctions to implement soft ceilings do not consistently control prices, especially when a minimum reserve permit price is applied. Furthermore, the grandfathering of permits allows permit sellers to realize significant welfare gains at the expense of buyers under a soft ceiling policy. Our results thus highlight several advantages of hard ceilings for controlling short term price increases.     

An integrated tax-subsidy policy for carbon emission reduction

A carbon tax is often cited by economists as an effective instrument to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, but there is little political interest in the United States. In light of this political unpopularity, we develop and examine a net-revenue constrained carbon tax and subsidy program. The optimal revenue constrained tax and subsidy schedule based on our utility maximization model taxes energy sources with high emissions to energy price ratio, and subsidizes sources with low emissions to energy price ratios. This approach may be more palatable than a traditional carbon tax because it can change the relative price of low and high emissions energy sources while providing a mechanism to limit net tax increases and energy price increases. We find that a constrained tax/subsidy program provides welfare gains relative to a no-tax scenario. Welfare gains are estimated to be 1% and 36% of the welfare gains from a Pigouvian tax for the motor fuels industry and electric power industry, respectively. In contrast, subsidies for low-emitting energy sources funded from general tax funds rather than from high-emission energy tax revenues lead to welfare decreases substantially below our proposed tax/subsidy policy approach.     

Complementarity of willingness to pay and cost heterogeneity under vertical product differentiation: A welfare analysis

Due to the fact that a consumer’s willingness to pay differs between segments, many unregulated industries are price constrained, although the specific costs of market segments also differ. If the product quality is endogenously chosen, we find that third-degree price discrimination increases welfare if a sufficiently pronounced complementarity between the willingness to pay and variable cost heterogeneity is given. This is due to the fact that the monopolist’s incentive for employing a pronounced price dispersion strategy is directly influenced by the consumers’ willingness to pay for the quality of a product. With endogenous product quality, the paper shows that the standard welfare result of third-degree price discrimination compared to uniform monopoly pricing (e.g. that total welfare and consumer surplus both fall if total output does not rise) can be only reversed given the complementarity is sufficiently pronounced.     

The Loss from Trade under International Cournot Oligopoly with Cost Asymmetry

This paper examines the efficiency and welfare effects of intra‐industry trade in the presence of imperfect competition and heterogeneous technologies. We show that when a Southern country has a relatively less concentrated industry and faces low demand, the output of the Northern country may contract after initiating trade. Production inefficiencies can outweigh the gain effected by trade‐induced competition and lower price in trade, resulting in a net loss in the global welfare. In some circumstances, voluntary technology transfer, managed trade through VERs, or the introduction of a tariff can improve both trading partners' welfare.     

Exporting to bypass weak institutions

Institutions have been shown to be important for trade and growth. In particular, weak institutions may reduce the returns to product quality, harming domestic welfare and making it attractive to export to countries with strong institutions where quality is better rewarded. We model this alternative story as to why the “good apples are shipped out” and explore whether exporting ameliorates the problems created by weak institutions. We find that, instead, because home prices do not reflect the marginal value of quality, access to developed markets can be welfare reducing. Specifically, there are always export prices such that total welfare (and not just consumer welfare) is harmed by exporting. Furthermore, if the domestic price equilibrates to the export price, then the marginal unit exported reduces total welfare. Exporting can even reduce producer surplus, leading to a contraction of the export industry; although, welfare can decrease even if production of the exported good increases. Thus, our results reinforce the importance of strengthening institutions to help the development of economies.     

Heterogeneous beliefs, price dispersion, and welfare-improving price controls

Summary. We consider a search market model where agents have heterogeneous beliefs about the distribution of prices. A suggestive example shows that Jevon's Law of One Price and standard welfare results are not robust to small heterogeneous errors in beliefs. In particular we show that a price ceiling above marginal cost can reduce price dispersion and improve welfare (by lowering aggregate search costs) without decreasing quantity supplied. These results are broadly consistent with the empirical evidence. Received: July 27, 1999; revised version: May 24, 2000     

The Behaviour of Declining Industries

This paper examines how the prospect of imminent exit by a competitor in a declining industry affects the market behaviour of that industry prior to exit. We show that 'survivor' firms have an incentive to increase their holdings of inventories and to hold excess capacity before exit occurs. Preparation for the failure of a rival will also involve increasing output. This will push down the market price and may hasten the rival firm's demise. The welfare consequences of these actions are mixed but can be very different from the same actins in a growing or stable industry. In particular, holding excess capacity or increased inventories may be procompetitive.     

The Effects of Trade Liberalization in Textiles and Clothing on the Greek Market for Cotton Yarn: A Multi-Market Analysis

The Uruguay Round (1987–95) signaled the end of the Multifiber Agreement for textiles and clothing. The quota regime, in place since 1974, was decided, according to the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, to be gradually eliminated by the year 2005. As a result, prices of cotton-yarn in the world markets decreased, affecting producers in all cotton-yarn exporting countries, including Greece. At the same time, the labor cost in western industrialized countries remained high, or even increased, exerting further pressure on yarn producers. The present paper examines these changes for the cotton-yarn industry in Greece. We use a multi-market partial-equilibrium model which allows us to take into account simultaneous input and output price changes, relevant for the industry under study. Findings show that, after the implementation of the program for the gradual elimination of quotas, producers' welfare decreased whereas consumers noted substantial increases in welfare transfers.     

R&D活动、市场势力与社会福利效应*——基于中国企业的实证分析

R&D活动提高企业市场势力的途径是什么？R&D活动改善社会福利的途径与机制是否存在行业差异？本文利用2004-2007年中国工业企业的面板数据,在市场势力的度量模型--新产业组织生产法模型的基础上加入企业的R&D活动因素,直接测算我国工业企业的市场势力,并基于企业所在行业、企业所有制和企业行为特征的不同视角,考察R&D活动对企业市场势力的影响,以及降低成本和提高产品价格两条路径对不同行业的社会福利效应的影响。       

Third-Degree Price Discrimination in the Presence of Subsidies

Abstract. According to a classical result, a move from uniform pricing to third-degree price discrimination only improves welfare if total output increases. In this paper I show that the classical result fails in the presence of subsidies. This finding appears to be relevant for the pharmaceutical sector where a consumer pays a fraction of the actual drug price due to health insurance coverage.     

From ecological footprint to ecological rent: An economic indicator for resource constraints

This paper takes as a starting point a combination of an input-output model with a national Ecological Footprint account for Germany in the spirit of Wiedmann et al. [Wiedmann, T., Minx, J., Barrett, J., Wackernagel, M., 2006. Allocating ecological footprints to final consumption categories with input-output analysis. Ecological Economics. 56, 28-48]. Footprint as well as Biocapacity is dealt with at the industry level. Gross output of each industry and final demand for each industry can then be split up into a share that is reconcilable with Biocapacity and another share that corresponds to the ‘Ecological Deficit’. The Ecological Footprint concept is extended in this study by introducing the additional biocapacity necessary for sustaining the given level of economic activity. It is assumed that each industry had to rent the corresponding areas and to apply a given technology in order to make this additional land biophysically productive. That results in an additional technology for each industry leading to an increase in costs and prices. The new price level is directly linked to the share of output that corresponds to Biocapacity overshooting, which is defined by the ‘Ecological Deficit’. Economic indicators can be derived by measuring the income difference brought about by the price increase. This difference corresponds to a Ricardian rent which is due to resource constraints on output growth.     

Commodity tax structure under uncertainty in a perfectly competitive market

In a partial equilibrium setting without price uncertainty, the balanced-budget substitution of an ad valorem tax on output for a specific (unit) tax can enhance welfare in imperfectly competitive markets and is without impact in a competitive world. This paper demonstrates that a substitution of this kind can also increase expected output and welfare in a competitive market characterised by uncertainty about the commodity price, if firms can respond to the revelation of demand conditions by altering output.     

Optimal Pollution Abatement Under ‘Sustainable’ and Other Social Time Preferences

This paper analyses optimal pollution abatement expenditure and the pricing of pollution under alternative social time preferences, including ‘sustainable’ preferences, defined as those that are consistent with two axioms of sustainable development introduced by Chichilnisky (Land Econ 73:467–491, 1997). These axioms state essentially that neither the welfare of present nor future generations ought to be favoured over the other in determining the socially optimal path of economic development. The method is to calibrate a modified Ramsey model of optimal global growth and saving, where pollution is generated by the global output of goods and services. Pollution in turn reduces output. The simulation results illustrate how sensitive the optimal pollution price and abatement expenditure can be over time to assumptions about the social time preference rate. They also show that ‘sustainable’ preferences impose a lower burden on future generations in terms of the pollution price and abatement expenditure. Hence there is a case for governments to make explicit their value judgments about intergenerational welfare, in the context of their notion of sustainable development, when setting target pollution abatement levels and pollution prices over time.