Dynamic capital structure and the contingent capital option

The financial crisis has emphasized the difficulties for financial companies to raise funds through conventional liabilities. In this environment, hybrid securities are becoming popular. In this paper we study the optimal capital structure of a company issuing a particular type of hybrid security: perpetual contingent capital, i.e., debt that converts into equity under some conditions. A two-period model with endogenous bankruptcy for a company with equity, straight debt and contingent capital is analyzed. We investigate the instrument under different conversion rules: automatic or optimally chosen by equity holders. We show that contingent capital reduces the coupon of straight debt and expected bankruptcy costs but can require a high spread. A trigger imposed by the regulatory authority in terms of par value of debt may induce a little use of contingent capital with an increase of bankruptcy costs.     

Asset financing with credit risk

This paper develops a model for the unified valuation of all forms of real asset financing, such as bank loans, leases, securitization vehicles, and credit guarantees, secured by assets that generate a stochastic service flow to the operator, or a rental stream to the lessor, and depreciate over a finite economic life to their scrap value. Examples include mobile equipment, such as aircraft, railroad equipment, ships, trucks and trailers, as well as energy generation assets, heavy factory equipment and construction equipment. In the event of obligor default, after a repossession delay and incurring costs of repossession, maintenance, re-marketing and re-deployment, the lender repossesses the asset and sells it on the secondary market and is, thus, subject to the risk of decline in the market value of the asset. The model we develop in this paper treats all forms of asset financing in a unified fashion as contingent claims on the collateral asset and the credit of the borrower. As an application, we estimate the collateral asset model on historical secondary market data for aircraft values and calibrate the financing model to the Enhanced Equipment Trust Certificates (EETCs) issued in 2007 by Continental Airlines and secured by a fleet of new aircraft. We then apply the calibrated model to value private market financing, including bank loans, leases, and credit guarantees, consistently with the capital market financing, and assess the impact of repossession delays on credit spreads. This analysis leads to a policy insight suggesting that bankruptcy laws limiting asset repossession delays lead to lower costs of asset financing.     

Capital Structure Deviation and Speed of Adjustment

As a firm deviates from its target leverage from above (below), the bankruptcy costs (foregone tax savings) rise at an increasing rate while the tax savings (reduced bankruptcy costs) rise at a decreasing rate, generating a stronger incentive for rebalancing capital structure. This phenomenon renders the speed of adjustment (SOA) an increasing function of the deviation. Employing a bootstrapping‐based estimation strategy that averts well‐known estimation biases, we find U.S. firms exhibit a positive SOA sensitivity to leverage deviation. Also, the SOA sensitivity is greater for overlevered than underlevered firms.     

An expectations-driven interpretation of the “Great Recession”

The boom-years preceding the “great recession” were a time of rapid innovation in the financial industry. We explore the idea that both the boom and eventual bust emerged from overoptimistic expectations of efficiency-gains in the financial sector. We treat the bankruptcy costs facing intermediaries in a costly state verification problem as a stochastic process, and model the boom-bust in terms of an unfulfilled news-shock where the expected fall in costs are eventually not realized. In response to a change in expectations only, the model generates a boom-bust cycle in aggregate activity, asset prices and leverage, and a countercyclical credit spread.     

Limited liability and bank safety net procedures ∗

A model is presented of bank behaviour which identifies the factors determining a bank's optimal capital/asset ratio, its optimal liquidity ratio, the expected value of non-performing loans and the probability of bank failure. We propose that this last variable can act as an index of bank credit-worthiness. The main factors determining this index are (i) the risk associated with bank asset returns, (ii) the variability of bank deposits, (iii) the costs associated with bank failure and (iv) the implicit or explicit government subsidy involved in depositor protection schemes. The principal general conclusion of the paper is that regulations governing capital requirements, liquidity requirements and depositor protection should be (a) risk related and (b) integrated. Depositor protection can be improved through relatively high capital requirements. However, the optimal strategy is for all bank safety net procedures and incentive mechanisms to be related to the riskiness of individual bank portfolios.     

Financing and takeovers

This paper analyzes the interaction between financial leverage and takeover activity. We develop a dynamic model of takeovers in which the financing strategies of bidding firms and the timing and terms of takeovers are jointly determined. In the paper, capital structure plays the role of a commitment device, and determines the outcome of the acquisition contest. We demonstrate that there exists an asymmetric equilibrium in financing policies with endogenous leverage, bankruptcy, and takeover terms, in which the bidder with the lowest leverage wins the takeover contest. Based on the resulting equilibrium, the model generates a number of new predictions. In particular, the model predicts that the leverage of the winning bidder is below the industry average and that acquirers should lever up after the takeover consummation. The model also relates the dispersion in leverage ratios to various industry characteristics, such as cash flow volatility or bankruptcy costs.     

Comparing the performance of market-based and accounting-based bankruptcy prediction models

Recently developed corporate bankruptcy prediction models adopt a contingent claims valuation approach. However, despite their theoretical appeal, tests of their performance compared with traditional simple accounting-ratio-based approaches are limited in the literature. We find the two approaches capture different aspects of bankruptcy risk, and while there is little difference in their predictive ability in the UK, the z-score approach leads to significantly greater bank profitability in conditions of differential decision error costs and competitive pricing regime.     

Deposit guarantee evaluation and incentives analysis in a mutual guarantee system

This paper analyzes how the deposit guarantee value affects the risk incentives in a mutual guarantee system. We liken the guarantee’s value to that of a European-style contingent claims portfolio. The main feature emerging from our model is that a mutual guarantee system would give banks an adverse incentive to increase riskiness. To mitigate this incentive, we introduce a regulatory provision modelled using a path-dependent contingent claim. By comparing the mutual guarantee system with a non-mutual one, we show that the former is less expensive, but implies higher adverse incentives for the banks, especially for undercapitalized institutions.     

U.S. consumer bankruptcy choice: The importance of general equilibrium effects

We study the implications of U.S. personal bankruptcy rules for resource allocation and welfare. Our analysis shows that general equilibrium considerations along with bankruptcy chapter choice and production matter crucially for the effects of policy reform. Contrary to previous work, we find that completely eliminating bankruptcy provisions causes significant declines in output and welfare by reducing capital formation and labor input. Furthermore, subjecting Chapter 7 filers to means testing, as suggested by recent legislative proposals, would not improve upon current bankruptcy provisions and, at best, leave aggregate filings, output, and welfare unchanged. However, we do find that an alternative tightening of Chapter 7, in the form of lower asset exemptions, can increase economic efficiency.     

A MULTIPERIOD MEAN-VARIANCE MODEL OF OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE

The continuing interest in the capital structure issue among financial researchers is evidenced by the stream of capital structure models that have appeared in the literature. Much of this research has used a risk-neutral and/or a single-period framework. In this paper, we develop a capital structure model for multiperiod firms and allow for the firm's cash flows to grow over time, for the firm to issue new debt, and for two types of bankruptcy costs to occur. The types of bankruptcy costs that occur are determined by the firm's uncertain operating cash flows and negotiations between the firm and creditors. Risk is priced via the Sharpe-Lintner capital asset pricing model. Multiperiod risk-priced models, we argue, realistically represent actual firms and are thus an important step toward the development of more testable and usable models of capital structure. We execute a demonstration example in which the value of the levered firm achieves a maximum and discuss the steps the firm would take to maximize shareholder wealth within this example. The example illustrates that the value of the firm passes through an interior optimum as the promised debt payment is increased. A simulation of the effect of changes in firm-specific parameters shows that the model exhibits expected and appealing relationships between these parameters and the value of the levered firm.     

Can Managerial Discretion Explain Observed Leverage Ratios?

This article analyzes the impact of managerial discretion andcorporate control mechanisms on leverage and firm value withina contingent claims model where the manager derives perquisitesfrom investment. Optimal capital structure reflects both thetax advantage of debt less bankruptcy costs and the agency costsof managerial discretion. Actual capital structure reflectsthe trade-off made by the manager between his empire-buildingdesires and the need to ensure sufficient efficiency to preventcontrol challenges. The model shows that manager-shareholderconflicts can explain the low debt levels observed in practice.It also examines the impact of these conflicts on the cross-sectionalvariation in capital structures.     

Debt and managerial rents in a real-options model of the firm

We present a theory of capital investment and debt and equity financing in a real-options model of a public corporation. The theory assumes that managers maximize the present value of their future compensation (managerial rents), subject to constraints imposed by outside shareholders’ property rights to the firm's assets. Absent bankruptcy costs, managers follow an optimal debt policy that generates efficient investment and disinvestment. We show how bankruptcy costs can distort both investment and disinvestment. We also show how managers’ personal wealth constraints can lead to delayed investment and increased reliance on debt financing. Changes in cash flow can cause changes in investment by tightening or loosening the wealth constraints. Firms with weaker investor protection adopt higher debt levels.     

Asymmetric stock market volatility and the cyclical behavior of expected returns

Recent explanations of aggregate stock market fluctuations suggest that countercyclical stock market volatility is consistent with rational asset evaluations. In this paper, I develop a framework to study the causes of countercyclical stock market volatility. I find that countercyclical risk premia do not imply countercyclical return volatility. Instead, countercyclical stock volatility occurs if risk premia increase more in bad times than they decrease in good times, thereby inducing price–dividend ratios to fluctuate more in bad times than in good. The business cycle asymmetry in the investors’ attitude toward discounting future cash flows plays a novel and critical role in many rational explanations of asset price fluctuations.     

Corporate Debt Value,Bond Covenants,and Optimal Capital Structure

This article examines corporate debt values and capital structure in a unified analytical framework. It derives closed-form results for the value of long-term risky debt and yield spreads, and for optimal capital structure, when firm asset value follows a diffusion process with constant volatility. Debt values and optimal leverage are explicitly linked to firm risk, taxes, bankruptcy costs, risk-free interest rates, payout rates, and bond covenants. The results elucidate the different behavior of junk bonds versus investment-grade bonds, and aspects of asset substitution, debt repurchase, and debt renegotiation.     

Personal bankruptcy costs: Their relevance and some estimates

The paper argues that there is a need for the formal treatment of personal bankruptcy costs in the finance literature. The need arises out of the relevance of such costs to both corporate and personal financing decisions. We show that (a) personal bankruptcy costs (like personal taxes) are relevant to the corporate capital structure problem and that (b) differential bankruptcy costs across corporations and individuals can result in a clientele model of individual investment-borrowing decision which could lead to institutional arrangements designed to minimize combined bankruptcy costs. Further, we develop a theory of personal bankruptcy and a set of testable hypothesis with regard to their costs. Some preliminary estimates of personal bankruptcy costs are reported which suggest that they are higher than corporate bankruptcy costs. There is also some evidence of economics of scale in personal bankruptcy costs.     

Bank capital buffer and portfolio risk: The influence of business cycle and revenue diversification

The relationship between macroeconomic developments and bank capital buffer and portfolio risk adjustments is relevant to assess the efficacy of newly created countercyclical buffer requirements. Using the U.S. bank holding company data over the period 1992:Q1–2011:Q3, we find a negative relationship between the business cycle and capital buffer. Our results offer some support for the Basel III agreements that countercyclical capital buffer in the banking sector is necessary to help the performance of the real economy during recessions. We find a robust evidence of inverse relationship between business cycle and bank default risk. Our analysis provides evidence of diversification benefits. The probability of insolvency risk decreases for diversified banks and banks with high revenue diversity achieve capital savings.     

Inventory investment and the cost of capital

We examine the relation between inventory investment and the cost of capital in the time series and the cross section. We find consistent evidence that risk premiums, rather than real interest rates, are strongly negatively related to future inventory growth at the aggregate, industry, and firm levels. The effect is stronger for firms in industries that produce durables rather than nondurables, exhibit greater cyclicality in sales, require longer lead times, and are subject to more technological innovation. We then construct a production-based asset pricing model with two types of capital, fixed capital and inventories, to explain these empirical findings. Convex adjustment costs and a countercyclical price of risk lead to negative time series and cross-sectional relations between expected returns and inventory growth.     

Risk,uncertainty, and asset prices

We identify the relative importance of changes in the conditional variance of fundamentals (which we call “uncertainty”) and changes in risk aversion in the determination of the term structure, equity prices, and risk premiums. Theoretically, we introduce persistent time-varying uncertainty about the fundamentals in an external habit model. The model matches the dynamics of dividend and consumption growth, including their volatility dynamics and many salient asset market phenomena. While the variation in price–dividend ratios and the equity risk premium is primarily driven by risk aversion, uncertainty plays a large role in the term structure and is the driver of countercyclical volatility of asset returns.     

Measuring the Agency Cost of Debt

We adapt a contingent claims model of the firm to reflect the incentive effects of the capital structure and thereby to measure the agency costs of debt. An underlying model of the firm and the stochastic features of its product market are analyzed and an optimal operating policy is chosen. We identify the change in operating policy created by leverage and value this change. The model determines the value of the firm and its associated liabilities incorporating the agency consequences of debt.     

Capital reallocation and liquidity

This paper shows that the amount of capital reallocation between firms is procyclical. In contrast, the benefits to capital reallocation appear countercyclical. We measure the amount of reallocation using data on flows of capital across firms and the benefits to capital reallocation using several measures of the cross-sectional dispersion of the productivity of capital. We then study a calibrated model economy where capital reallocation is costly and impute the cost of reallocation. We find that the cost of reallocation needs to be substantially countercyclical to be consistent with the observed joint cyclical properties of reallocation and productivity dispersion.