Nonnegotiable shares, controlling shareholders, and dividend payments in China

China has some unique institutional features. For example, the shares of listed firms are segmented into negotiable and nonnegotiable ones. The controlling shareholders, usually connected to the government, hold nonnegotiable shares. We examine how these institutional features affected cash dividend payments in China during the period 1994-2006. We find that dividend payments are positively associated with the proportion of nonnegotiable shares in a firm and the proportion of nonnegotiable shares held by the controlling shareholder; moreover, the 2001 China Securities Regulatory Commission stipulation requiring cash dividend payments does not benefit negotiable shareholders. However, we also find that dividend payments are downside flexible, and controlling shareholders cannot force firms to pay or to pay more dividends when firms' earnings decline significantly. The conventional factors, especially profitability or the capability to pay, still play an important role in determining the dividend policy. The propensity to pay and the payout ratio in China are not high compared to those of other countries.     

Inside shareholders’ effective tax rates and dividends

Using information collected from the Swedish tax authorities, we calculate insiders’ actual effective tax rates on dividends. With this unique dataset, we find a significant negative cross-sectional relationship between insiders’ effective tax rates and dividend payout. This result is consistent with a tax-induced clientele effect for dividends. We also look at the impact of large block trades on dividends. We find that when insiders with zero effective taxes sell blocks, subsequent dividend payments are significantly more likely to decrease. This provides evidence that large shareholders are adjusting dividends for their individual tax situations.     

Crossing takeover premiums and mix of payment: An empirical test of contractual setting in M&A transactions

The analyses of the tender offer premiums and of the means of payment should not be performed separately. In the empirical literature, these two variables are often considered independently, although they may have an endogenous relationship in a contractual setting. Using a sample of European M&As over the 2000–2010 decade, we show that these two variables are jointly set in a contractual empirical approach. The relationship between the percentage of cash and the offer premium is positive: higher premiums yield payments with more cash.     

Stock repurchases: How firms choose between a self tender offer and an open-market program

In practice, open-market stock repurchase programs outnumber self tender offers by approximately 10–1. This evidence is puzzling given that tender offers are more efficient in disbursing free cash and in signaling undervaluation – the two main motivations suggested in the literature for repurchasing shares. We provide a theoretical model to explore this puzzle. In the model, tender offers disburse free cash quickly but induce information asymmetry and hence require a price premium. Open-market programs disburse free cash slowly, and hence do not require a price premium, but because they are slow, result in partial free cash waste. The model predicts that the likelihood that a tender offer will be chosen over an open-market program increases with the agency costs of free cash and decreases with uncertainty (risk), information asymmetry, ownership concentration, and liquidity. These predictions are generally consistent with the empirical evidence.     

Dividend payout determinants for Australian Multinational and Domestic Corporations

I investigate the determinants of dividend payments for Australian Multinational Corporations (MCs) and Domestic Corporations (DCs). Six measures of dividend payout ratios are investigated, and five international factors are employed in addition to traditional factors. I find: MCs pay significantly less regular cash, special cash, total dividends and net dividends relative to DCs; the degree of foreign involvement is important in determining special cash and net dividend payments; MCs are more active than DCs in dividend increasing activities; and MCs are significantly less likely to be a dividend payer relative to DCs due to tax disadvantages coupled with unfavourable foreign risk exposures.     

THE DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION CONVEYED BY SHARE REPURCHASE TENDER OFFERS AND DIVIDEND INCREASES

We identify the difference in the private information conveyed by the announcements of a share repurchase tender offer and of a regular dividend increase. We find that, after controlling for timing, industry, size of cash distribution, and other firm-specific characteristics, a share repurchase tender offer causes a much larger stock price response than a regular dividend increase. The results suggest that the two cash distribution mechanisms convey differential information. Further examination of the differential information indicates that (1) the upward revision in financial analysts' earnings forecasts following a share repurchase is, on average, greater than that following a regular dividend increase, and (2) a repurchase announcement is followed by a permanent decline in the firms' systematic risk while a dividend-increase announcement is not.     

Stakeholder conflicts and dividend policy

This paper compares the dividend policy of owner-controlled firms with that of firms where the owners are a minority relative to non-owner employees, customers, and community citizens. We find that regardless of whether owners or non-owners control the firm, the strong stakeholder uses the dividend payout decision to mitigate rather than to intensify the conflict of interest with the weak stakeholder. Hence, the higher the potential agency cost as reflected in the firm’s stakeholder structure, the more the actual agency cost is reduced by the strong stakeholder’s dividend payout decision. These findings are consistent with a dividend policy in which opportunistic power abuse in stakeholder conflicts is discouraged by costly consequences for the abuser at a later stage. Indirect evidence supports this interpretation.     

Dividend Policies and Price-Volume Reactions to Cash Dividends on the Stock Market: Evidence from the Istanbul Stock Exchange

This study examines the effects of cash dividend payments on stock returns and trading volumes in the stock market. It also investigates whether there is any difference in the investment behavior of investors with respect to the dividend pay out ratio and size in the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE)from 1995 to 2003. Prices start to rise a few sessions before cash dividend payments, and on the ex-dividend day, they fall less than do dividend payments, finally decreasing in the sessions following the payment. Trading volume shows a considerable upward shift before the payment date and, interestingly, is stable after Thus, cash dividends influence prices and trading volumes in different ways before, at, and after payment, providing some profitable active trading strategy opportunities around the ex-dividend day. The findings support price-volume reaction discussions on the divident payment date and the significant effect of cash dividends on the stock market.     

Cash holdings in private firms

Evidence from a wide sample of Italian private firms shows that cash holdings are significantly related with smaller size, higher risk and lower effective tax rates, therefore supporting predictions from the trade-off model. More cash is also held by firms with longer cash conversion cycles and lower financing deficits, as predicted by the financing hierarchy theory. Reported evidence also shows that dividend payments are associated with more cash holdings, and both bank debt and net working capital represent good cash-substitutes. When controlling for macroeconomic and industry factors, some variables lose their significance, but the general findings are confirmed. Finally, cash-rich companies are found to be more profitable, to pay more dividends and to invest more in a medium-term future horizon.     

Valuing and pricing IPOs

This paper investigates how underwriters set the IPO firm’s fair value, an ex-ante estimate of the market value, using a unique dataset of 228 reports from French underwriters. These reports are issued before the IPO shares start trading on the stock market and detail how underwriters determined fair value. We document that underwriters often employ multiples valuation, dividend discount models and discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis to determine fair value but that all of these valuation methods suffer from a positive bias with respect to equilibrium market value. We also analyze how this fair value estimate is subsequently used as a basis for IPO pricing. We report that underwriters deliberately discount the fair value estimate when setting the preliminary offer price. Part of the intentional price discount can be recovered by higher price updates. We find that, controlling for other factors such as investor demand, part of underpricing stems from this intentional price discount.     

Shareholder Preferences and Dividend Policy

This paper develops a theory of choice among alternative procedures for distributing cash from corporations to shareholders. Despite the preferential tax treatment of capital gains for individual investors, it is shown that a majority of a firm's shareholders may support a dividend payment for small distributions. For larger distributions an open market stock repurchase is likely to be preferred by a majority of shareholders, and for the largest distributions tender offer repurchases dominate.     

Dividend Payouts and Corporate Governance Quality: An Empirical Investigation

Motivated by agency theory, we investigate how a firm's overall quality of corporate governance affects its dividend policy. Using a large sample of firms with governance data from The Institutional Shareholder Services, we find that firms with stronger governance exhibit a higher propensity to pay dividends, and, similarly, dividend payers tend to pay larger dividends. The results are consistent with the notion that shareholders of firms with better governance quality are able to force managers to disgorge more cash through dividends, thereby reducing what is left for expropriation by opportunistic managers. We employ the two‐stage least squares approach to cope with possible endogeneity and still obtain consistent results. Our results are important as they show that corporate governance quality does have a palpable impact on critical corporate decisions such as dividend policy.     

Institutional ownership,volatility and dividends

We find that the sign of the correlation between institutional ownership and volatility depends on the firm’s dividend policy: institutional ownership is negatively (positively) related to volatility among non-dividend (dividend) paying stocks. The empirical results are consistent with an interaction between institutional preference for low volatility and the tendency of higher levels of institutional ownership to increase volatility through their trading behavior. This result is robust to many control variables and possible endogeneity concerns. Supporting our conjecture that institutions herd on dividend signals we find that the correlation between turnover and institutional ownership is higher for dividend paying stocks, and that the positive correlation between turnover and institutional ownership is higher on dividend declaration days. Finally, we also find that the level of institutional ownership drops following an increase in volatility for both dividend payers and non-payers, and that volatility rises following increased institutional ownership for dividend paying stocks.     

Hedging index exchange traded funds

This paper presents an empirical comparison of the out of sample hedging performance from naïve and minimum variance hedge ratios for the four largest US index exchange traded funds (ETFs). Efficient hedging is important to offset long and short positions on market maker’s accounts, particularly imbalances in net creation or redemption demands around the time of dividend payments. Our evaluation of out of sample hedging performance includes aversion to negative skewness and excess kurtosis. The results should be of interest to hedge funds employing tax arbitrage or leveraged long–short equity strategies as well as to ETF market makers.     

Asymmetric stock market volatility and the cyclical behavior of expected returns

Recent explanations of aggregate stock market fluctuations suggest that countercyclical stock market volatility is consistent with rational asset evaluations. In this paper, I develop a framework to study the causes of countercyclical stock market volatility. I find that countercyclical risk premia do not imply countercyclical return volatility. Instead, countercyclical stock volatility occurs if risk premia increase more in bad times than they decrease in good times, thereby inducing price–dividend ratios to fluctuate more in bad times than in good. The business cycle asymmetry in the investors’ attitude toward discounting future cash flows plays a novel and critical role in many rational explanations of asset price fluctuations.     

Earned/contributed capital, dividend policy, and disclosure quality: An international study

We examine the agency cost version of the lifecycle theory of dividends by taking advantage of cross-country variations in disclosure environments. The outcome hypothesis posits that transparent disclosure environments lead to higher dividend payouts because shareholders can more accurately measure (and therefore demand) excess cash flows. In contrast, the substitute hypothesis argues that opaque disclosure environments lead to higher payouts because managers have stronger incentives to establish their reputation for fair treatment. Our empirical results confirm both hypotheses and contribute to the literature in two primary ways. First, we confirm that the lifecycle theory of dividends explains dividend payout patterns around the world. Second, and more important, we show that the firm’s disclosure environment plays a significant role in dividend payouts through its effect on agency costs; that is, we confirm an agency cost-inclusive lifecycle theory of dividends.     

A test of risk arbitrage profitability

We explore the performance of risk arbitrage involving three types of merger offers: cash tender, stock swap, and collar offers for the period between 1990 and 2000. Our result reveals that risk arbitrage for a successful stock offer generates higher returns than a successful cash offer. This finding implies that the profitability of risk arbitrage depends on the level of asymmetric information associated with the payment method. We also find that the beta of typical risk arbitrage positions/portfolios is heavily influenced by the payment method and market conditions.     

Do option markets substitute for stock markets? Evidence from trading on anticipated tender offer announcements

Using a sample of cash tender offers occurring between 1993 and 2002, we find evidence that the options market has become the preferred venue for traders attempting to profit on anticipated announcements. Options offer advantages relative to stocks. Traders gain leverage by trading in options and multiple options contracts on an individual stock. The results of our study indicate that a substitution effect does exist. Abnormal volume in the option market replaces abnormal volume in the stock market prior to cash tender offer announcements, and this abnormal option volume precedes abnormal stock volume for targets with or without traded options.     

The Effect of Managerial Ownership on the Short- and Long-run Response to Cash Distributions

We examine both the short‐run and long‐run responses to the following corporate cash flow transactions: dividend increases and decreases, dividend initiations, and tender offer repurchases. Our focus is the short‐run and long‐run effects of managerial ownership. We hypothesize that ownership plays an important role in explaining the announcement effects for these events, owing to signaling effects and the reduction of agency problems. Our short‐run results accord well with the earlier work on announcement effects for these events and show that firms with high insider ownership exhibit higher excess returns. Our long‐term results indicate a drift over a three‐year period following the announcement, with the excess returns for the high insider‐ownership group becoming more pronounced.     

R&D sensitivity to asset sale proceeds: New evidence on financing constraints and intangible investment

We examine the intersection between corporate divestitures of tangible assets and investment in intangible capital (R&D) to provide new tests for the impact financing constraints have on real activity. A positive R&D sensitivity to asset sale proceeds indicates binding financing constraints since cash inflows from tangible asset sales are negatively correlated with productivity shocks and not otherwise connected to intangible investment via non-financial channels. Using a variety of estimation approaches, we document a strong, positive link between cash inflows from fixed asset sales and corporate R&D investment, but only among firms most likely facing binding financing constraints. These results offer robust evidence that financing frictions impact the increasingly important yet understudied intangible corporate investments that drive innovative activity, and they highlight a previously unexplored but potentially valuable use of proceeds from fixed asset divestitures.