Short-selling and cost of equity: evidence from China

In this study, we take advantage of the gradual lifting of the short-selling ban in China and find that firms affected by the lifting of the ban experience a lower cost of equity. In addition, the affected firms also incur less earnings management, higher market liquidity and higher investment efficiency. Further evidence shows that firms’ cost of equity increases after their stocks are no longer eligible for short selling. Our inferences are robust to alternative measures of cost of equity, and to using a propensity score-matched sample. Our study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that short sellers play a monitoring role in the Chinese stock markets and sheds light on the benefits of short selling in emerging markets.     

The impact of naked short selling on the securities lending and equity market

This paper examines the impact of naked short selling on equity markets where it is restricted to securities on an approved list. Consistent with Miller's (1977) intuition, stocks with the highest dispersion of opinions and short sale constraints are the only stocks to exhibit significant and negative abnormal returns in the post-event period. We also find slightly higher stock return volatility and a small reduction in liquidity when naked short sales are allowed. Overall, it impairs market quality (liquidity and volatility), although there appears to be some improvement in price efficiency in stocks with high short sale constraints.     

Effect of the ban on short selling on market prices and volatility

We examine the effects of the short‐selling ban, imposed by Australian regulators in the wake of the global financial crisis, on the trading of financial stocks. Our findings argue against commonly stated reasons for imposing short‐sale bans. We find no evidence that short‐sale restrictions provide support for stock prices or that they reduce volatility. Moreover, stocks subject to the short‐selling ban suffered a severe degradation in market quality. Controlling for the adverse effects of the financial crisis on markets, we show that short‐selling restrictions increase intraday volatility, reduce trading activity and increase bid–ask spreads.     

Market liquidity in the financial crisis: The role of liquidity commonality and flight-to-quality

We examine the dynamics and the drivers of market liquidity during the financial crisis, using a unique volume-weighted spread measure. According to the literature we find that market liquidity is impaired when stock markets decline, implying a positive relation between market and liquidity risk. Moreover, this relationship is the stronger the deeper one digs into the order book. Even more interestingly, this paper sheds further light on so far puzzling features of market liquidity: liquidity commonality and flight-to-quality. We show that liquidity commonality varies over time, increases during market downturns, peaks at major crisis events and becomes weaker the deeper we look into the limit order book. Consistent with recent theoretical models that argue for a spiral effect between the financial sector’s funding liquidity and an asset’s market liquidity, we find that funding liquidity tightness induces an increase in liquidity commonality which then leads to market-wide liquidity dry-ups. Therefore our findings corroborate the view that market liquidity can be a driving force for financial contagion. Finally, we show that there is a positive relationship between credit risk and liquidity risk, i.e., there is a spread between liquidity costs of high and low credit quality stocks, and that in times of increased market uncertainty the impact of credit risk on liquidity risk intensifies. This corroborates the existence of a flight-to-quality or flight-to-liquidity phenomenon also on the stock markets.     

Money and liquidity in financial markets

We argue that there is a connection between the interbank market for liquidity and the broader financial markets, which has its basis in demand for liquidity by banks. Tightness in the market for liquidity leads banks to engage in what we term “liquidity pull-back,” which involves selling financial assets either by banks directly or by levered investors. Empirical tests on the stock market are supportive. Tighter interbank markets are associated with relatively more volume in more liquid stocks; selling pressure, especially in more liquid stocks; and transitory negative returns. We control for market-wide uncertainty and in the process also contribute to the literature on portfolio rebalancing. Our general point is that money matters in financial markets.     

Credit default swaps and the UK 2008–09 short sales ban

Most studies of the short sales ban of UK financial stocks from September 2008 to January 2009 fail to control for the UK’s worst ever banking crisis and the underlying increase in risk. This paper studies the ban’s impact on the 13 large financials with credit default swaps (CDS) and 20 smaller stocks without CDS. The results reveal that returns of banned stocks Granger cause CDS returns in the pre- and post-ban periods, but causality runs from CDS to stock returns during the ban period. Underlying risk proxied by the CDS probability of default increased during the ban and the immediate pre- and post-ban periods which highlights an endogeneity problem ignored in some studies. This increased risk provides a plausible rationale for why CDS and related equity bid-ask spreads - which increased during the ban period – failed to fall significantly in the post-ban period. Panel regression results indicate that probability of default was an important economic determinant of stock bid-ask spreads during the ban period. Finally, our results suggest that the ban offered direct price support for the smaller non-CDS stocks during the ban period and indirect support for CDS stocks from their pre-ban to their post-ban levels.     

Which financial stocks did short sellers target in the subprime crisis?

Tracing the SEC ban on the short selling of financial stocks in September 2008, this paper investigates whether such selling activity before the 2008 short ban reflected financial companies’ risk exposure in the subprime crisis. Evidence suggests that short sellers sold short stocks that had the greatest asset and insolvency risk exposures, and that the short selling of financial firms’ stocks was not significantly greater than that of non-financial firms after we match them on firm size and insolvency risk. When the short ban was in effect, the market quality of financial stocks without subprime assets exposure had deteriorated to a larger degree than that of financial companies with subprime assets exposure. The findings imply that such a regulation may mute the market disciplining effects of investors and may also be seen as a counterweight to any perceived macro or systemic risk reduction benefits resulting from such a ban.     

The 2011 European short sale ban: A cure or a curse?

This paper examines whether the 2011 European short sale ban on financial stocks proved to be successful or had a negative impact on financial markets. We explicitly take an options market perspective and focus on market participants’ changes in beliefs and expectations. During the ban, short positions in banned stocks decreased, whereas they increased for non-banned stocks. Our results indicate that the ban increased implied jump risk levels, thereby negatively impacting the banned financial stocks. However, we also observe that after the announcement of the ban, financial contagion risk actually dropped for banned stocks. Instead of a substitution effect between regular short selling and synthetic shorting through single stock puts, we observe a migration out of single stock puts into the EuroStoxx 50 index options market. We conclude that this type of migration diversified selling pressure initially concentrated in financial stocks across a larger share of the stock market, thereby reducing systemic risks and enhancing overall financial stability.     

The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 and Market Liquidity

Investors rely heavily on the trustworthiness and accuracy of corporate information to provide liquidity to the capital markets. We find that the rash of financial scandals caused a severe deterioration in market liquidity in the form of wider spreads, lower depths, and a higher adverse selection component of spreads vis‐à‐vis their benchmark levels. Regulatory responses including the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) had inconsequential short‐term liquidity effects but highly significant and positive long‐term liquidity effects. These liquidity improvements are positively associated with the improved quality of financial reports, several firm‐specific variables (e.g., size), and market factors (e.g., price, volatility, volume).     

A Comparison of the Efficacy of Liquidity,Momentum, Size and Book‐to‐Market Value Factors in Equity Pricing on a Heterogeneous Sample: Evidence from Asia

This paper compares the size and book‐to‐market value factors of Fama and French (1993) alongside Momentum of Jagadeesh and Titman ( 1993 ) with two Liu ( 2006 ) liquidity factors formed from 1 year rebalancing and 1 month rebalancing respectively. A heterogeneous and comprehensive sample of the top blue chip stocks of all national Asian equity markets with further differentiation undertaken between sub samples formed for Japan only and Asia excluding Japan for period January 2000 to August 2014. Our empirical results suggest that multifactor time invariant pricing models based on augmented capital asset pricing model (CAPM) framework are ineffective in explaining the cross section of stock returns in the presence of significant inter and intra‐market segmentation. However an alternative model specification based on a time varying parameter specification and using same sets of factors yields significant enhancements in explaining cross section of stock returns across universe. We find that momentum factor largely lacks significance while a time varying two factor model, based on CAPM plus liquidity factor, is optimal. The liquidity factor being that of Liu (2006) and annually rebalanced. Our findings are important for investment managers seeking appropriate factors and modelling techniques to hedge against risks as well as firm's financial managers seeking to reduce costs of equity capital.     

Sovereign CDS Spreads,Volatility, and Liquidity: Evidence from 2010 German Short Sale Ban

The paper examines global impact of 2010 German short sale ban on sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads, volatility, and liquidity across 54 countries. We find that CDS spreads continue rising after the ban in the debt crisis region, which suggests that the short selling ban is incapable of suppressing soaring borrowing costs in these countries. However, we find that the ban helps stabilize the CDS market by reducing CDS volatility. The reduction in CDS volatility is greater in the eurozone than that in the non‐eurozone. Furthermore, we find that the CDS market liquidity has been impaired during the ban for the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain) countries. In contrast, there are no dramatic changes in the market liquidity for non‐PIIGS eurozone and non‐eurozone samples. The findings suggest that the short sale ban is ineffective to reduce sovereign borrowing costs in the debt crisis region if the underlying economy has not been significantly improved.     

Convertible bond arbitrage,liquidity externalities,and stock prices

In the context of convertible bond issuance, we examine the impact of arbitrage activity on underlying equity markets. In particular, we use changes in equity short interest following convertible bond issuance to identify convertible bond arbitrage activity and analyze its impact on stock market liquidity and prices for the period 1993 to 2006. There is considerable evidence of arbitrage-induced short selling resulting from issuance. Moreover, we find strong evidence that this activity is systematically related to liquidity improvements in the stock. These results are robust to controlling for the potential endogeneity of arbitrage activity.     

Short‐Selling Bans Around the World: Evidence from the 2007–09 Crisis

Most regulators around the world reacted to the 2007–09 crisis by imposing bans on short selling. These were imposed and lifted at different dates in different countries, often targeted different sets of stocks, and featured varying degrees of stringency. We exploit this variation in short‐sales regimes to identify their effects on liquidity, price discovery, and stock prices. Using panel and matching techniques, we find that bans (i) were detrimental for liquidity, especially for stocks with small capitalization and no listed options; (ii) slowed price discovery, especially in bear markets, and (iii) failed to support prices, except possibly for U.S. financial stocks.     

Reprint of: Market liquidity in the financial crisis: The role of liquidity commonality and flight-to-quality

We examine the dynamics and the drivers of market liquidity during the financial crisis, using a unique volume-weighted spread measure. According to the literature we find that market liquidity is impaired when stock markets decline, implying a positive relation between market and liquidity risk. Moreover, this relationship is the stronger the deeper one digs into the order book. Even more interestingly, this paper sheds further light on so far puzzling features of market liquidity: liquidity commonality and flight-to-quality. We show that liquidity commonality varies over time, increases during market downturns, peaks at major crisis events and becomes weaker the deeper we look into the limit order book. Consistent with recent theoretical models that argue for a spiral effect between the financial sector’s funding liquidity and an asset’s market liquidity, we find that funding liquidity tightness induces an increase in liquidity commonality which then leads to market-wide liquidity dry-ups. Therefore our findings corroborate the view that market liquidity can be a driving force for financial contagion. Finally, we show that there is a positive relationship between credit risk and liquidity risk, i.e., there is a spread between liquidity costs of high and low credit quality stocks, and that in times of increased market uncertainty the impact of credit risk on liquidity risk intensifies. This corroborates the existence of a flight-to-quality or flight-to-liquidity phenomenon also on the stock markets.     

Limit Order Book and Commonality in Liquidity

We show that the liquidity provided by an individual stock's limit order book comoves significantly with the market aggregate limit order book liquidity. A closer look at the inside and outside liquidity provided by different parts of limit order book suggests that inside liquidity is mainly influenced by market volatility, while idiosyncratic volatility has a larger impact on outside liquidity. Hence, limit order book inside liquidity exhibits higher commonality than outside liquidity. We also show that the comovement between the stock‐level and market‐aggregate limit order book liquidity measures is related to the commonality in the overall stock market liquidity.     

The 2008 short sale ban: Liquidity, dispersion of opinion, and the cross-section of returns of US financial stocks

This study examines the cross-sectional impact of the 2008 short sale ban on the returns of US financial stocks. Motivated by the large cross-sectional variation in the extent to which banned stocks suffer an illiquidity shock, we hypothesize that stocks with larger liquidity declines are associated with poorer contemporaneous stock returns. The evidence supports this hypothesis and suggests that this effect is stronger for more liquid stocks, as predicted by Amihud and Mendelson (1986). Moreover, consistent with Miller’s (1977) model, we report a valuation reversal whereby stocks with higher abnormal returns at the onset of the ban have lower abnormal returns at its removal. Our findings are robust when we control for firms most affected by TARP, include non-banned matched firms, and compare banned firms’ stock returns with their bond returns. From a policy standpoint, the ban reduced valuations, ceteris paribus, of the stocks that were hardest hit by illiquidity.     

Decomposing liquidity along the limit order book

In this paper, we estimate the asymmetric information and order processing components of liquidity at extended depths along the limit order book. Using data from the INET ECN, we find that the asymmetric information component decreases as depth increases. Inactive stocks have more information asymmetry at the inside quotes, but it decreases more rapidly along the book than for active stocks. The order processing component of liquidity has fixed and variable constituents, consistent with a fixed cost per order as well as a variable portion based on the size of the order.     

Short-selling,margin-trading,and stock liquidity: Evidence from the Chinese stock markets

This paper examines the impacts of two forms of leveraged trading—margin trading and short selling—on the trading liquidity of individual stocks in China. We find that trading liquidity for relevant stocks generally improves after restrictions on leveraged trading are removed. However, margin trading and short selling have opposite impacts on liquidity. During ordinary periods, margin trading benefits liquidity, whereas short selling damages liquidity; however, during market downturns, their roles are reversed. We also provide evidence suggesting that short sellers are informed traders in China and that short selling reduces stock liquidity because of the increased risk of adverse selection faced by uninformed traders.     

The strategic specialist and imperfect competition in a limit order market

The empirical literature suggests that the limit order book contains information that might be used by the specialist to his own advantage. I develop a model where there is a strategic specialist who competes against a limit order book and has information about supply. The presence of a strategic specialist in an imperfectly competitive limit order book market induces non-monotonicity of market indicators with respect to the variance of liquidation value. Moreover, the existence of private information about supply significantly affects market performance as it induces, among other effects, lower market liquidity. Finally, this model suggests another link between Kyle’s (1985, 1989) [Kyle, A., 1985. Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica 53, 1315–1336, Kyle, A., 1989. Informed speculators with imperfect competition. Review of Economic Studies 56, 317–356] and Glosten and Milgrom’s (1985) [Glosten, L., Milgrom, P., 1985. Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed markets. Journal of Financial Economics 14, 71–100] models by allowing for strategic behaviour of the specialist.     

IQ,trading behavior,and performance

We analyze whether IQ influences trading behavior, performance, and transaction costs. The analysis combines equity return, trade, and limit order book data with two decades of scores from an intelligence (IQ) test administered to nearly every Finnish male of draft age. Controlling for a variety of factors, we find that high-IQ investors are less subject to the disposition effect, more aggressive about tax-loss trading, and more likely to supply liquidity when stocks experience a one-month high. High-IQ investors also exhibit superior market timing, stock-picking skill, and trade execution.