Does Branch Religiosity Influence Bank Risk‐Taking?

Using branch‐level data on public and private US banking institutions, we investigate the importance of branch religiosity in shaping bank risk‐taking behavior. Our results show robust evidence that branch religiosity is negatively related to bank risk‐taking. This effect persists after controlling for several bank‐level and county‐level variables that might correlate with religiosity. Moreover, this result is robust to controlling for headquarter religiosity, suggesting that the effect of branch religiosity is additive and not washed out by headquarter religiosity. Overall, our findings document that headquarter religiosity does not capture the full effect of religiosity on bank behavior, as claimed by previous research, but that the religiosity of the geographic area in which the bank operates significantly influences bank behavior.     

Bank Liquidity Creation and Risk‐Taking: Does Managerial Ability Matter?

This study investigates the impact of managerial ability on banks' liquidity creation and risk‐taking behavior. We find that higher ability managers create more liquidity and take more risk. During times of financial crisis, however, higher ability bank managers reduce liquidity creation as a way to de‐leverage their balance sheets. Our findings inform recent theoretical and empirical studies that investigate determinants of liquidity creation and risk by introducing managerial ability as a prominent antecedent of the banks' intermediation and risk‐transforming service. Moreover, this study has policy‐related implications, since managerial ability can be quantified as a key performance indicator for prudential supervision of banks and could help regulators to target intervention efforts more purposefully during times of crisis.     

How Do Quasi‐Random Option Grants Affect CEO Risk‐Taking?

We examine how an increase in stock option grants affects CEO risk‐taking. The overall net effect of option grants is theoretically ambiguous for risk‐averse CEOs. To overcome the endogeneity of option grants, we exploit institutional features of multiyear compensation plans, which generate two distinct types of variation in the timing of when large increases in new at‐the‐money options are granted. We find that, given average grant levels during our sample period, a 10% increase in new options granted leads to a 2.8% to 4.2% increase in equity volatility. This increase in risk is driven largely by increased leverage.     

Stock Return Predictability of Residual‐Income‐Based Valuation: Risk or Mispricing?

In an influential paper, Frankel and Lee (1998) conclude that the stock return predictability of the value‐to‐price ratio (V/P) results from market mispricing. This paper confirms whether the V/P reflects the rational risk premiums associated with the V/P factor or is better explained by market inefficiency. Following Daniel and Titman (1997), this paper examines whether the V/P characteristics or the V/P factor loadings predict stock returns. The findings show that the V/P loadings are positively associated with average returns even after controlling for the V/P characteristics in both time series and cross‐sectional tests. The overall results suggest that the mispricing explanation of the V/P effect is premature.     

Does Risk Sharing Motivate Interdealer Trading?

We use unique data from the London Stock Exchange to test whether interdealer trade facilitates inventory risk sharing among dealers. We develop a methodology that focuses on periods of extreme inventories—inventory cycles. We further distinguish between inventory cycles that are unanticipated and those that are anticipated because of worked orders. The pattern of interdealer trade during inventory cycles matches theoretical predictions for the direction of trade and the inventories of trade counterparts. We also show that London dealers receive higher trading revenues for taking larger positions.     

Does Inefficient Risk Sharing Increase Public Self-Protection?

This paper studies how the risk of having an unequal distribution of income across the population affects the investment in a public self-protection policy, such as financial regulation or climate change mitigation. Two economies are compared. In the first economy, there is perfect risk sharing, i.e., individuals can credibly commit on a set of transfers that will remove ex-post inequalities in consumption. In the second economy, no risk sharing takes place. By referring to the literature on background risks, I determine some conditions in terms of change in risk aversion and prudence, which guarantee an increase in self-protection under inefficient risk sharing. Generally speaking, if self-protection reduces the risk of inequality, the investment tends to rise when either the probability of a catastrophic event and/or the risk of inequality are sufficiently low. If self-protection increases the risk of inequality, the investment tends to rise when both the probabilities of aggregate loss and the increase in the risk of inequality are sufficiently small.     

High‐Water Marks: High Risk Appetites? Convex Compensation,Long Horizons,and Portfolio Choice

We study the portfolio choice of hedge fund managers who are compensated by high-water mark contracts. We find that even risk-neutral managers do not place unbounded weights on risky assets, despite option-like contracts. Instead, they place a constant fraction of funds in a mean-variance efficient portfolio and the rest in the riskless asset, acting as would constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) investors. This result is a direct consequence of the in(de)finite horizon of the contract. We show that the risk-seeking incentives of option-like contracts rely on combining finite horizons and convex compensation schemes rather than on convexity alone.     

Are Incentives the Bricks or the Building?

The efforts of economists to emphasize the importance of incentives as determinants of organizational performance, while successful to some degree, may have left the mistaken impression that "getting the incentives right" is the only task requiring the attention of senior executives when designing corporate organizations. The author identifies the incentive-intensive companies envisioned by economists as "mercenary organizations" (or MOs), or companies whose distinguishing feature is near-complete reliance on financial rewards and controls. Citing the difficulties of devising an effective incentive system that cannot be gamed (which he calls the organizational equivalent of "an anti-gravity machine"), the article questions whether such organizations are likely to yield superior performance.
As an alternative to paying more attention to incentive design, the author suggests devoting more corporate resources to seeking and attracting individuals with low "monitoring costs." After holding up examples of top executives who appear committed to that search, the author posits a "character-rich" organization (CRO) as an alternative to the MO of the economists.
Then, viewing all companies as occupying points on a continuum with the MO and CRO as its poles, the author argues that all companies combine elements of both kinds of organizations. And perhaps most important, the CEOs of many of the most successful large organizations, without minimizing the importance of incentives, pay even greater attention to the search for trustworthy individuals and the creation of a culture of teamwork and accountability.     

Over‐investment or risk mitigation? Corporate social responsibility in Asia‐Pacific,Europe, Japan,and the United States

We study the relationship of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the distribution of stock returns for an international sample. Firms with a high level of CSR generally exhibit superior stock price synchronicity in the markets of Europe, Japan, and the United States. In particular, we identify optimal levels of CSR to minimize idiosyncratic risk for each region. Moreover, CSR has a mitigating effect on crash risk in Europe and the United States. In contrast, firms from the Asia‐Pacific region display CSR over‐investment followed by a higher crash risk. This appears to be a consequence of globalization, which forces firms from Asia‐Pacific to overinvest in CSR to adapt western standards.     

What Drives Private Equity Returns?– Fund Inflows,Skilled GPs,and/or Risk?*

This paper analyzes the determinants of returns generated by mature European private equity funds. It starts from the presumption that this asset class is characterized by illiquidity, stickiness, and segmentation. Given this presumption, Gompers and Lerner (2000) have shown that venture deal valuations are driven by overall fund inflows into the industry that yield the putative ‘money chasing deals’ phenomenon. It is the aim of this paper to show that this phenomenon explains a significant part of the variation in private equity funds' returns. This is especially true for venture funds, as they are affected more by illiquidity and segmentation than buy‐out funds. In the context of a WLS‐regression approach the paper reports a highly significant impact of total fund inflows on fund returns. It can also be shown that private equity funds' returns are driven by GP's skills as well as stand‐alone investment risk. In a bootstrapping context we can show that most of these results are quite stable.     

Do Foreign Investors Encourage Value-Enhancing Corporate Risk Taking?

This paper examines whether foreign investors in Korea affect incentives for firms to take risks in corporate investment. The short-term focus of foreign investors encourages managers to engage in conservative investment behavior. On the other hand, foreign investors encourage managers to focus on long-term value rather than short-term returns as active participants in corporate governance. These competing views are examined by testing for the association between foreign ownership and variations in corporate cash flow, a proxy for the risk of chosen investments. Furthermore, we examine whether risk taking is positively associated with firm growth, which is a primary concern in debates regarding the myopic behaviors of foreign investors. The results show that firms with high foreign ownership are less likely to avoid risk taking—and that risk taking is, in turn, positively associated with firm growth, implying that foreign investors perform a monitoring function in encouraging value-enhancing risk taking.     

CoCo Bonds,Conversion Prices and Risk Shifting Incentives. How Does the Conversion Ratio Affect Management's Behaviour?

The aim of this paper is to analyze risk shifting incentives for managers and shareholders of the financial institution issuing a CoCo bond. We assess the role of the conversion price settlement in enhancing both shareholders’ and management's discipline. Three recent contingent reverse convertible deals are analyzed, with the intention of showing how shareholder conversion returns are linked to the conversion ratio. The findings demonstrate that, in the case of an ingoing or ongoing crisis, a poor settlement of the conversion ratio could exacerbate both debt overhang and risk shifting issues. This will end in discouraging bank management from issuing new equity and from investing in low risk assets. We argue that a contingent bond triggered on Basel III capital requirement ratios and having a significantly discounted conversion price reduces risk shifting incentives. Moreover, we illustrate how the unexpected wealth transfers between CoCo bondholders and shareholders tends to zero when the bond face value is higher than the current stock market price and there is a concentration of bond subscribers. Accordingly, regulators should consider and oversee not only the conversion trigger but also all the other features of a contingent capital security, especially the conversion ratio.     

Marking‐to‐Market: Panacea or Pandora's Box?

Financial institutions have been at the forefront of the debate on the controversial shift in international standards from historical cost accounting to mark‐to‐market accounting. We show that the trade‐offs at stake in this debate are far from one‐sided. While the historical cost regime leads to some inefficiencies, marking‐to‐market may lead to other types of inefficiencies by injecting artificial risk that degrades the information value of prices, and induces suboptimal real decisions. We construct a framework that can weigh the pros and cons. We find that the damage done by marking‐to‐market is greatest when claims are (1) long–lived, (2) illiquid, and (3) senior. These are precisely the attributes of the key balance sheet items of banks and insurance companies. Our results therefore shed light on why banks and insurance companies have been the most vocal opponents of the shift to marking‐to‐market.     

Taking stock or cashing in? Shareholder style preferences,premiums and the method of payment

We develop and test hypotheses on the impact of target shareholders' investment style preferences on the method of payment and premiums in acquisitions. Stock offers (unlike cash offers) allow target shareholders to defer capital gains taxes. This deferral value, however, depends on target shareholders' willingness to retain acquirer stock. The empirical findings support our hypotheses. Bid premiums in stock offers are negatively and jointly related to target shareholder tax liabilities and to variables proxying for target shareholder willingness to hold acquirer stock. Moreover, the difference between predicted cash and stock premiums due to these factors significantly explains the method of payment choice.     

Are Options on Index Futures Profitable for Risk‐Averse Investors? Empirical Evidence

American options on the S&P 500 index futures that violate the stochastic dominance bounds of Constantinides and Perrakis (2009) from 1983 to 2006 are identified as potentially profitable trades. Call bid prices more frequently violate their upper bound than put bid prices do, while violations of the lower bounds by ask prices are infrequent. In out‐of‐sample tests of stochastic dominance, the writing of options that violate the upper bound increases the expected utility of any risk‐averse investor holding the market and cash, net of transaction costs and bid‐ask spreads. The results are economically significant and robust.     

Can tail risk explain size,book‐to‐market,momentum, and idiosyncratic volatility anomalies?

We examine the impact of tail risk on the return dynamics of size, book‐to‐market ratio, momentum and idiosyncratic volatility sorted portfolios. Our time‐series analyses document significant portfolio return exposures to aggregate tail risk. In particular, portfolios that contain small, value, high idiosyncratic volatility and low momentum stocks exhibit negative and statistically significant tail risk betas. Our cross‐sectional analyses at the individual stock level suggest that tail risk helps in explaining the four pricing anomalies, particularly size and idiosyncratic volatility anomalies.     

Do Investment Banks Have Incentives to Help Clients Make Value‐Creating Acquisitions?

Many have long suspected that investment banks, when advising corporate clients on potential acquisitions, have strong incentives just to “get the deal done” with little if any motive for urging clients to walk away from “bad” deals. The incentive to complete deals comes from compensation arrangements in which the bulk of the bankers' fees depend upon completion of the deals. Several earlier studies have provided support for this suspicion by reporting findings that show banks' market shares of advisory services depending mainly on two variables—their previous market shares and their deal completion rate—with little if any connection to the value created (or destroyed) for their clients' shareholders. In their recently published study, the authors revisit that relationship and reach a number of different conclusions: (1) advisors in acquisitions that create more value for clients are more likely to be chosen for future deals; (2) the changes in bankers' advisory market shares are strongly related to the value created for prior clients; and (3) the changes in banks' market values are positively correlated with the value created for their acquirer clients. In sum, the findings suggest that banks have significant market‐related incentives to advise their clients to pursue value‐creating acquisitions and to avoid deals likely to reduce their market values.     

Capital Gains Taxes and Asset Prices: Capitalization or Lock‐in?

This paper demonstrates that the equilibrium impact of capital gains taxes reflects both the capitalization effect (i.e., capital gains taxes decrease demand) and the lock‐in effect (i.e., capital gains taxes decrease supply). Depending on time periods and stock characteristics, either effect may dominate. Using the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 as our event, we find evidence supporting a dominant capitalization effect in the week following news that sharply increased the probability of a reduction in the capital gains tax rate and a dominant lock‐in effect in the week after the rate reduction became effective.