Loss Recoveries,Realized Excess Returns,and Credit Rationing in the Commercial Mortgage Market

In this paper we exploit loan level data combining foreclosure histories with information about the revenues and expenses associated with the ongoing management and eventual sale of financially distressed loans to estimate the magnitude of realized excess returns on commercial mortgages. Our findings are striking. We find that average realized excess returns on commercial mortgages are the lowest at the best times á la Stiglitz and Weiss (Am. Econ. Rev., 71:393–409, 1981). We also find that excess realized returns on commercial mortgages are low when lenders are swamped with funds (which we measure by the volume of commercial mortgage commitments) and when promised spreads are low.      

Borrower Mobility, Adverse Selection, and Mortgage Points

This paper analyzes a simple mobility-based model of mortgage lending and uses the results to illuminate the issue of mortgage points. The model predicts the points/interest-rate trade-off observed in the market, and it also predicts that mobile borrowers choose low-points/high-rate contracts from the available menu, in conformance with conventional wisdom. These outcomes are shown to be a result of adverse selection, which arises because of the lender′s inability to distinguish the mobility characteristics of borrowers. Empirical evidence is also presented showing the presence of a points/interest-rate trade-off in the market. In addition, relying on a proxy variable, the results establish that borrowers choose contracts from this menu according to mobility. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21.     

逆向选择与信用配给:中小企业融资难根源分析

文章通过中美中小企业融资的渠道和结构对比,分析中国中小企业融资困难的原因,并进一步通过两个模型解释资金借贷市场上的逆向选择问题和银行被迫采用的信用配给制度.文章最后提出了解决中小企业融资困难的一些建议.     

Mortgage Refinancing,Adverse Selection,and FHA's Streamline Program

When interest rates decline, borrowers whose houses have appreciated significantly refinance out of FHA, while those whose houses have not do not. We provide evidence of the negative impact of regular (nonstreamline) refinancing in the mid-1980s on the average quality of FHA's surviving business. We demonstrate this adverse selection both informally and econometrically. We also argue that the sharp reduction in the cost of streamline refinancing (limited documentation, no required appraisal, and so on) in FHA's streamline refinance program in 1992 likely reduced the level of adverse selection in the FHA portfolio during the 1993 to 1994 refinancing boom, and we provide quantitative estimates of the resultant reduction in claim rates. While this reduction in cost almost certainly increased the financial viability of FHA during the middle 1990s, it may not in the long run.     

The Importance of Adverse Selection in the Credit Card Market: Evidence from Randomized Trials of Credit Card Solicitations

Analyzing unique data from multiple large‐scale randomized marketing trials of preapproved credit card solicitations by a large financial institution, we find that consumers responding to the lender's inferior solicitation offers have poorer credit quality attributes. This finding supports the argument that riskier type borrowers are liquidity or credit constrained and, thus, have higher reservation loan interest rates. We also find a more severe deterioration ex post in the credit quality of the booked accounts of inferior offer types relative to superior offers. After controlling for a cardholder's observable risk attributes, demographic characteristics, and adverse economic shocks, we find that cardholders who responded to the inferior credit card offers are significantly more likely to default ex post. Our results provide evidence on the importance of adverse selection effects in the credit card market.     

金融市场中信贷配给的形成与均衡问题研究

信息不对称引发了金融体系的两大基本问题,那就是金融市场中的逆向选择和道德风险问题.本文首先分析了金融市场中的信贷配给问题,接着对金融市场中信息不对称导致信贷配给形成问题进行了深入研究,并进一步讨论了信息不对称下信贷配给的均衡问题.本研究对于金融监管部门采取科学有效的金融监管决策,将具有非常重要的理论和现实意义.     

Credit Rationing and Financial Disorder

We develop a model of lender behavior in the presence of default risk and moral hazard that determines default premiums and identifies the conditions under which borrowers are rationed. A hypothesis regarding a cognitive bias in the formation of expectations provides a dynamic component to our analysis and allows us to explain how an economy becomes vulnerable to a financial crisis and why vulnerability may increase over time.     

银行治理、信贷配给与中小企业融资

中小企业贷款难问题是目前困扰这些企业迅速发展的重要因素,国内外对这一问题成因进行了诸多研究与分析.从我国银行治理结构特点的这一独特视角出发,结合信贷配给理论,对不同治理结构下银行信贷行为进行建模与比较分析发现,银行治理结构通过影响银行信贷选择行为,将会对信贷市场配给程度以及中小企业获得贷款的可能性产生重要影响.     

中国农村金融市场中非价格信贷配给的理论和实证分析

本文建立农村金融市场中非价格信贷配给的理论分析框架,基于特殊设计的直接诱导式询问方法,对农户面临的非价格信贷配给机制进行调查和识别,并实证分析影响非价格信贷配给机制的因素。研究发现,农村利率市场化改革以来,农村金融机构并没有将灵活的利率差异化管理作为弥补潜在贷款损失的手段。当前农村金融市场中多种类型的非价格信贷配给机制并存,农村金融机构的信贷合约特征和放贷行为偏好使得一部分农户被配给出信贷市场,一部分农户主动退出信贷市场。农村金融机构倾向于与农村地区少数生产规模较大、具有稳定收入和身份特征的农户建立稳定的、以重复放贷为基础的信贷供给机制,不具备这些特征的农户将面临配给,这与利率管制时期的放贷行为并无本质差异。未来须调整仅仅以增加农村金融供给解决融资难题的改革思路,深入到市场结构、信贷合约和产品创新以及包括公司治理、风险甄别和内部管理机制在内的农村金融机构治理机制等微观层面的改革。     

信贷配给理论发展、模型与实证研究

信贷配给理论是一个比较复杂的经济学理论,对于信贷配给至今还没有一个统一公认的定义,该理论不仅内容多、不系统,且理论模型多又较为分散,实证研究虽已处于起步阶段但度量仍较为困难。中国学者对此问题也进行了10多年的研究,研究基本分为两类:一类是零散介绍西方信贷配给理论研究情况,另一类是结合中国国情进行了相应的信贷配给问题的研究。为全面理解和把握好信贷配给理论,本文从信贷配给定义、信贷配给理论发展、信贷配给理论模型、信贷配给实证和中国信贷配给理论研究等多视角,对信贷配给理论与实证文献进行了一次比较全面、系统的梳理。     

Credit Scoring and Mortgage Securitization: Implications for Mortgage Rates and Credit Availability

This article develops a model of the interactions between borrowers, originators, and a securitizer in primary and secondary mortgage markets. In the secondary market, the securitizer adds liquidity and plays a strategic game with mortgage originators. The securitizer sets the price at which it will purchase mortgages and the credit-score standard that qualifies a mortgage for purchase. We investigate two potential links between securitization and mortgage rates. First, we analyze whether a portion of the liquidity premium gets passed on to borrowers in the form of a lower mortgage rate. Somewhat surprisingly, we find very plausible conditions under which securitization fails to lower the mortgage rate. Second, and consistent with recent empirical results, we derive an inverse correlation between the volume of securitization and mortgage rates. However, the causation is reversed from the standard rendering. In our model, a decline in the mortgage rate causes increased securitization rather than the other way around.     

信息不对称状况下的信贷配给

信息不完全普遍存在于商业信贷活动中,这使得信贷配给成为一个普遍的现象。本文借鉴了前人理论,通过建立不完全信息条件下的信贷配给模型,分析了信贷配给的形成机理。由此得到的启示是,缓解信贷配给问题关键在于营造一个理想的社会化信用环境,改善中小企业整体资信状况。     

Household Income, Termination Risk and Mortgage Pricing

The premium embedded in home mortgage loans to compensate investors for their exposure to prepayment risk is a significant component of the cost of home mortgage lending. Moreover, there is some reason to believe that prepayment risk may be lower for loans to lower-income housing borrowers, especially those that are first-time home owners. If so, investor recognition of this advantage should facilitate greater willingness to acquire portfolios of lower-income housing loans, and encourage more competitive pricing in this segment of the market. This study investigates the possibility of differential mortgage prepayment behavior between lower-income home owners and non-low income home owners. The investigation relies on samples of the American Housing Survey spanning ten years of experience from 1985 to 1995. We find no significant difference between the termination or refinancing behavior of non-low income and low-income households. This result is robust to a number of alternative specifications such as restricting the low-income test group to non-moving households and to first-time owners. The same conclusions are derived from both aggregate prepayment rates and from analysis of individual household prepayment behavior.     

农村信贷配给实证分析

信贷配给是制约我国农村信贷市场建设的重要因素,也阻碍了农村金融环境优化、影响了农村经济的良性发展。通过引入制度因子,量化信贷配给,构建了信贷配给宏观计量模型,对我国农村信贷配给状况进行实证检验,结果证明,利率和制度因子是造成我国农村信贷配给的两大因子。应合理调控利率、推进深化改革、加大三农扶持力度,实现农村经济社会的和谐发展。     

Alternative Solutions to Underinvestment, Under Equity and Credit Rationing

We compare alternative solutions to underinvestment (UI) problems in firms subject to limited access to equity markets, interest ceilings, and constraints on the volume of debt. Collaterals (assets or compensating balances) and credit insurance ('regular' or 'outcome' insurance whereby the premium is paid at the end of the insurance period) are compared on the basis to their costs and their effective use of financial sources. It is shown that when there is no moral hazard problem, credit insurance is the most effective instrument. Otherwise, 'outcome' insurance program is the most effective one.     

Transparency in the Mortgage Market

This paper studies the impact of transparency in the mortgage market on the underlying real estate market. We show that geographic transparency in the secondary mortgage market, which implies geographic risk based pricing in the primary market, can limit risk-sharing and make house prices more volatile. Ex ante, regions prefer opaque markets to enable insurance opportunities. We discuss the implications for risk based pricing and house price volatility more generally. In addition, we investigate the specific conditions under which competitive lenders would optimally choose to provide opaque lending, thus reducing volatility in the real estate market. We show that in general the opaque competitive equilibrium is not stable, and lenders have incentive to switch to transparent lending if one of the geographic regions has experienced a negative income shock. We propose market and regulatory mechanisms that make the opaque competitive equilibrium stable and insurance opportunities possible.     

Alternative Solutions to Underinvestment, Under Equity and Credit Rationing

We compare alternative solutions to underinvestment (UI) problems in firms subject to limited access to equity markets, interest ceilings, and constraints on the volume of debt. Collaterals (assets or compensating balances) and credit insurance ('regular' or 'outcome' insurance whereby the premium is paid at the end of the insurance period) are compared on the basis to their costs and their effective use of financial sources. It is shown that when there is no moral hazard problem, credit insurance is the most effective instrument. Otherwise, 'outcome' insurance program is the most effective one.     

中国健康险市场逆向选择和正向选择并存现象的研究

本文以中国的健康险市场为例,考察不对称信息的影响。通过考察投保人投保金额以及附加险选择和索赔情况的相关关系,论文发现事后出现索赔的投保人,事前往往会选择购买附加险,但是投保金额却相对较低。结合理论模型分析,论文认为投保人在财富、风险偏好等方面的异质性以及信息不对称的存在是导致市场同时出现逆向选择和正向选择的主要原因。     

商业银行实施信贷配给的金融机理研究

信息不对称引发了金融体系的两大基本问题,那就是金融市场中的逆向选择和道德风险问题。本文首先分析了金融市场中的信贷配给问题,接着对金融市场中信息不对称导致信贷配给形成问题进行了深入研究,并进一步讨论了信息不对称下信贷配给的均衡问题。