Indexed versus nominal government debt under inflation and price-level targeting

This paper presents a DSGE model in which long run inflation risk matters for social welfare. Optimal indexation of long-term government debt is studied under two monetary policy regimes: inflation targeting (IT) and price-level targeting (PT). Under IT, full indexation is optimal because long run inflation risk is substantial due to base-level drift, making indexed bonds a better store of value than nominal bonds. Under PT, where long run inflation risk is largely eliminated, optimal indexation is substantially lower because nominal bonds become a relatively better store of value. These results are robust to the PT target horizon, imperfect credibility of PT and model calibration, but the assumption that indexation is lagged is crucial. A key finding from a policy perspective is that indexation has implications for welfare comparisons of IT and PT.     

Weak Identification of Forward‐looking Models in Monetary Economics*

Recently, single‐equation estimation by the generalized method of moments (GMM) has become popular in the monetary economics literature, for estimating forward‐looking models with rational expectations. We discuss a method for analysing the empirical identification of such models that exploits their dynamic structure and the assumption of rational expectations. This allows us to judge the reliability of the resulting GMM estimation and inference and reveals the potential sources of weak identification. With reference to the New Keynesian Phillips curve of Galí and Gertler [Journal of Monetary Economics (1999) Vol. 44, 195] and the forward‐looking Taylor rules of Clarida, Galí and Gertler [Quarterly Journal of Economics (2000) Vol. 115, 147], we demonstrate that the usual ‘weak instruments’ problem can arise naturally, when the predictable variation in inflation is small relative to unpredictable future shocks (news). Hence, we conclude that those models are less reliably estimated over periods when inflation has been under effective policy control.     

PRICE-LEVEL TARGETING AND STABILISATION POLICY: A SURVEY

Abstract.  This paper surveys recent articles on the costs and benefits of price-level targeting, focusing its use as a tool for stabilisation policy. It discusses how price-level targeting can affect the short-run trade-off between output and inflation variability by influencing inflation expectations. It reviews how assigning an explicit price-level target to a central bank that is unable to commit to its future policies can improve economic performance. It surveys other potential benefits and costs. Among the costs, it underlines the importance of perfectly rational expectations for the optimality of price-level targeting, and an exacerbation of the time inconsistency problem.     

Testing Steady‐State Restrictions of Linear Rational Expectations Models when Data are Highly Persistent*

Steady‐state restrictions are commonly imposed on highly persistent variables to achieve stationarity prior to confronting rational expectations models with data. However, the resulting steady‐state deviations are often surprisingly persistent indicating that some aspects of the underlying theory may be empirically problematic. This paper discusses how to formulate steady‐state restrictions in rational expectations models with latent forcing variables and test their validity using cointegration techniques. The approach is illustrated by testing steady‐state restrictions for alternative specifications of the New Keynesian model and shown to be able to discriminate between different assumptions on the sources of the permanent shocks.     

Transmission lags and optimal monetary policy

The credibility problems of monetary policy are enlarged by transmission lags whenever the welfare criterion consists of arguments with differing transmission lags. If, as usually argued, prices react to monetary policy with a longer lag than output, the discretionary bias is substantially increased under a consumer welfare maximizing policy criterion (flexible inflation targeting) in the prototype New Keynesian model. Money growth targeting can significantly reduce the discretionary bias, but is not robust to other specifications of welfare with higher valuation of output stability.     

Experimental evidence on inflation expectation formation

Using laboratory experiments within a New Keynesian sticky price framework, we study the process of inflation expectation formation. We focus on adaptive learning and rational expectations contrary to the previous literature that mostly studied simple heuristics. Using a test for rational expectations that allows heterogeneity of expectations we find that we cannot reject rationality for about 40% of subjects. More than 20% of subjects are also best described by adaptive learning models, where they behave like econometricians and update their model estimates every period. However, rather than using a single forecasting model, switching between models describes their behavior better. Switching is more likely to occur when experimental economy is in a recession.     

Simulation‐based tests of forward‐looking models under VAR learning dynamics

In this paper we propose a simulation‐based technique to investigate the finite sample performance of likelihood ratio (LR) tests for the nonlinear restrictions that arise when a class of forward‐looking (FL) models typically used in monetary policy analysis is evaluated with vector autoregressive (VAR) models. We consider ‘one‐shot’ tests to evaluate the FL model under the rational expectations hypothesis and sequences of tests obtained under the adaptive learning hypothesis. The analysis is based on a comparison between the unrestricted and restricted VAR likelihoods, and the p‐values associated with the LR test statistics are computed by Monte Carlo simulation. We also address the case where the variables of the FL model can be approximated as non‐stationary cointegrated processes. Application to the ‘hybrid’ New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) in the euro area shows that (i) the forward‐looking component of inflation dynamics is much larger than the backward‐looking component and (ii) the sequence of restrictions implied by the cointegrated NKPC under learning dynamics is not rejected over the monitoring period 1984–2005. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

From inflation to exchange rate targeting: Estimating the stabilization effects for a small open economy

This paper attempts to estimate possible losses in macroeconomic stabilization due to a move from inflation to exchange rate targeting on the example of the Czech Republic. The authors use an estimated New Keynesian policy model, typical inflation and exchange rate targeting rules, and representative central bank loss functions to carry out these estimations. The authors find that for the Czech Republic, moving from the historically applied inflation targeting to optimized exchange rate targeting should not involve any significant losses in macroeconomic stabilization. However, the Czech National Bank could improve its stabilization outcomes while remaining an inflation targeter. This requires the Czech National Bank to respond more strongly to increasing expected future inflation and to be less concerned about an opening output gap when adjusting its policy rate. Moving then from such optimized inflation targeting to optimized exchange rate targeting can result in significant losses in economic stabilization in the magnitude of 0.4–2% points of GDP growth.     

Constructing Multi‐Country Rational Expectations Models

This article considers some of the technical issues involved in using the global vector autoregression (GVAR) approach to construct a multi‐country rational expectations (RE) model and illustrates them with a new Keynesian model for 33 countries estimated with quarterly data over the period 1980–2011. The issues considered are: the measurement of steady states; the determination of exchange rates and the specification of the short‐run country‐specific models; the identification and estimation of the model subject to the theoretical constraints required for a determinate rational expectations solution; the solution of a large RE model; the structure and estimation of the covariance matrix and the simulation of shocks. The model used as an illustration shows that global demand and supply shocks are the most important drivers of output, inflation and interest rates in the long run. By contrast, monetary or exchange rate shocks have only a short‐run impact in the evolution of the world economy. The article also shows the importance of international connections, directly as well as indirectly through spillover effects. Overall, ignoring global inter‐connections as country‐specific models do, could give rise to misleading conclusions.     

Binary choice under social interactions: an empirical study with and without subjective data on expectations

This paper examines two methods of modeling binary choice with social interactions: models assuming homogeneous rational expectations and models using subjective data on expectations. Exploiting a unique survey conducted during the 1996 US presidential election that was designed to study voting behavior under social context, we find that in various model specifications using subjective expectations consistently improves models' goodness‐of‐fit; and that subjective expectations are not rational as formulated by Brock and Durlauf. Specifically, members' characteristics are individually important in forming expectations. We also include correlated effect in the rational expectation model. This extension provides a remedy to the selection issues that often arise in social interaction models. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Monetary policy and learning from the central bank's forecast

We examine the expectational stability (E-stability) of rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in a standard New Keynesian model in which private agents refer to the central bank's forecast in the process of adaptive learning. To satisfy the E-stability condition in this environment, the central bank must respond more strongly to the expected inflation rate than the extent to which the Taylor principle suggests. However, the central bank's strong reaction to the expected inflation rate raises the possibility of indeterminacy of the REE. In considering these problems, a robust policy requires responding to the current inflation rate to a certain degree.     

Monetary Policy Indeterminacy and Identification Failures in the U.S.: Results from A Robust Test

We propose a novel identification‐robust test for the null hypothesis that an estimated New Keynesian model has a reduced form consistent with the unique stable solution against the alternative of sunspot‐driven multiple equilibria. Our strategy is designed to handle identification failures as well as the misspecification of the relevant propagation mechanisms. We invert a likelihood ratio test for the cross‐equation restrictions (CER) that the New Keynesian system places on its reduced‐form solution under determinacy. If the CER are not rejected, sunspot‐driven expectations can be ruled out from the model equilibrium and we accept the structural model. Otherwise, we move to a second‐step and invert an Anderson and Rubin‐type test for the orthogonality restrictions (OR) implied by the system of structural Euler equations. The hypothesis of indeterminacy and the structural model are accepted if the OR are not rejected. We investigate the finite‐sample performance of the suggested identification‐robust two‐step testing strategy by some Monte Carlo experiments and then apply it to a New Keynesian AD/AS model estimated with actual US data. In spite of some evidence of weak identification as for the ‘Great Moderation’ period, our results offer formal support to the hypothesis of a switch from indeterminacy to a scenario consistent with uniqueness occurring in the late 1970s. Our identification‐robust full‐information confidence set for the structural parameters computed on the ‘Great Moderation’ regime turns out to be more precise than the intervals previously reported in the literature through ‘limited‐information’ methods. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Taylor principle fights back,Part II

The existing literature holds that the Taylor principle often leads to indeterminacy in New Keynesian models that allow for capital accumulation and limited asset market participation. This conclusion is special, however, to the case of continuous full employment. When the assumption of perfect wage flexibility is relaxed very slightly so that the labor market clears quickly but not instantaneously, determinacy is the norm. The threat of indeterminacy is limited to a tiny, irrelevant corner of the parameter space where the elasticity of labor supply is unusually high and real wage adjustment is unbelievably fast. Everywhere else, the Taylor principle guarantees a unique rational expectations equilibrium. The dramatic difference in results reflects the sensitivity of the monetary transmission mechanism to the speed of adjustment in the labor market.     

NOMINAL AND REAL WAGE RIGIDITIES IN NEW KEYNESIAN MODELS: A CRITICAL SURVEY

Abstract The labour market is receiving increasing attention in the New Keynesian literature. In this paper, I critically survey this literature in order to highlight the role played by wage rigidities in the explanation of fluctuations caused by technology shocks. To this aim, I present a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with sticky prices, nominal wage rigidities and hiring costs. The comparison between this model and that of Blanchard and Gali highlights the non‐trivial differences which exist in the way nominal wage and real wage rigidities drive the economy's dynamics. My conclusion is that models incorporating nominal wage rigidities and some degree of price stickiness provide a better account of macroeconomic dynamics than models with real wage rigidities.     

Dangers of commitment under rational expectations

Within a New Keynesian framework, interest rate rules that respond to public expectations lead to determinate and expectationally stable solutions for any level of commitment, as shown by Waters (Macroecon Dyn 13(4):421–449, 2009). That paper also demonstrates gains to commitment, under least square learning, though over-commitment can lead to some very poor outcomes for some parameter values. This paper shows an identical outcome under rational expectations. The optimal level of commitment is unchanged if there are observation errors in the policymaker’s knowledge of public expectations, which is not the case under learning. However, if there is sufficient policymaker uncertainty about the parameter values, partial commitment is best.     

Monetary policy,financial uncertainty,and secular stagnation

A monetary policy framework describing how to cope with a financial crisis might alleviate a recession; however, it might also result in subsequent secular stagnation. Based on an empirical New Keynesian model with financial uncertainty, this study investigates how monetary policy can avoid sluggish economic recovery in response to financial shocks. The results show that a protracted sluggish response of an output gap to a financial shock is triggered by inflation targeting, without considering interest rate variations. In such a policy, the uncertainty causes additional sluggish behavior after a sharp reduction in the output gap. In contrast, in a speed limit policy, the output gap recovers rapidly, regardless of the central bank’s approach to interest rate variations, and the uncertainty mitigates reductions in the output gap. Finally, the results are robust under several alternative settings.     

Asset price targeting in an open economy with cognitive limitations: The best for macroeconomic and financial stability?

The choices of policy targets and the formation of agent expectations have been critical issues addressed by monetary policy management since the financial crisis of 2008. This paper evaluates macroeconomic stability in a new Keynesian open economy in which agents experience both cognitive limitations and asset market volatility. The (im)perfect credibility of various monetary policies (e.g., a Taylor-type rule with- or without asset price targeting, strict domestic inflation targeting, strict CPI inflation targeting, and exchange rate peg) may lead agents to react according to their expectation rules, and thus create various degrees of booms and busts in output and inflation. Simulations confirm that a Taylor-type CPI inflation targeting including an asset price target is the best choice. In contrast, the business cycles induced by Keynesian “animal spirits” are enhanced by strict inflation targeting. Furthermore, a credible exchange rate pegging system with an international reserve pooling arrangement can improve social welfare and stability in an open economy, even though its absolute value of the loss function is slightly lower than a Taylor-type CPI inflation targeting including an asset price target.     

Pooling forecasts in linear rational expectations models

Estimating linear rational expectations models in a limited-information setting requires replacing the expectations of future, endogenous variables either with instrumented, actual values or with forecast survey data. Applying the method of Gottfries and Persson [Empirical examinations of the information sets of economic agents. Quarterly Journal of Economics 103, 251–259], I show how to augment these methods with actual, future values of the endogenous variables to improve statistical efficiency. The method is illustrated with an application to the US hybrid new Keynesian Phillips curve, where traditional, lagged instruments and the median forecast from the Survey of Professional Forecasters both appear to miss significant information used by price-setters, so that forecast pooling with actual values improves the statistical fit to inflation.     

Liquidity traps and expectation dynamics: Fiscal stimulus or fiscal austerity?

We examine global dynamics under infinite-horizon learning in New Keynesian models where the interest-rate rule is subject to the zero lower bound. The intended steady state is locally but not globally stable. Unstable deflationary paths emerge after large pessimistic shocks to expectations. For large expectation shocks that push interest rates to the zero bound, a temporary fiscal stimulus, or in some cases a policy of fiscal austerity, will insulate the economy from deflation traps if the policy is appropriately tailored in magnitude and duration. A fiscal stimulus “switching rule,” which automatically kicks in without discretionary fine-tuning, can be equally effective.