Long-term factorization in Heath–Jarrow–Morton models

The long-term factorization decomposes the stochastic discount factor (SDF) into discounting at the rate of return on the long bond and a martingale that defines a long-term forward measure. We establish sufficient conditions for existence of the long-term factorization in HJM models. A condition on the forward rate volatility ensures existence of the long bond volatility. This yields existence of the long bond and convergence of \(T\)-forward measures to the long forward measure. It contrasts with the familiar risk-neutral factorization that decomposes the SDF into discounting at the short rate and a martingale defining the risk-neutral measure.     

Accounting information,disclosure, and expected utility: Do investors really abhor uncertainty?

Investors are said to “abhor uncertainty,” but if there were no uncertainty they could earn only the risk‐free rate. A fundamental result in the analytical accounting literature shows that investors buying into a CARA‐normal CAPM market pay lower asset prices, gain higher ex‐ante expected returns, and obtain higher expected utility, when the market payoff has higher variance. New investors obtain similar “welfare” gains from risk under a log/power utility CAPM. These results do not imply that investors “abhor information.” To realize investors' ex‐ante expectations, the subjective probability distributions representing market expectations must be accurate. Greater payoff risk can add to investors' expected utility, but higher ex‐post(realized) utility comes from better information and more accurate ex‐ante expectations. An important implication for accounting is that greater disclosure can have the simultaneous effects of (i) exposing more fully or perceptibly firms' payoff uncertainty, thereby increasing new investors' expected utility, and (ii) improving market estimates of firms' payoff parameters (means, variances, covariances), thereby giving investors a better chance of realizing their expectations. Paradoxically, better information can be valuable to new investors by exposing more fully and more accurately the risk in firms' business operations and results–new investors maximizing expected utility want both more risk and better information.     

Feedback Effects and Asset Prices

Feedback effects from asset prices to firm cash flows have been empirically documented. This finding raises a question for asset pricing: How are asset prices determined if price affects fundamental value, which in turn affects price? In this environment, by buying assets that others are buying, investors ensure high future cash flows for the firm and subsequent high returns for themselves. Hence, investors have an incentive to coordinate, which may generate self‐fulfilling beliefs and multiple equilibria. Using insights from global games, we pin down investors' beliefs, analyze equilibrium prices, and show that strong feedback leads to higher excess volatility.     

Heterogeneous Beliefs and Learning about the Expected Return in a Market for a Short-Lived Asset

This paper examines the properties of asset prices in an economy in which the true expected return on an asset is unknown and investors have heterogeneous assessments of the expected return. The principal innovation of the analysis is that the formation and evolution of investors' beliefs are modeled in a Bayesian framework. Among other things, this allows one to operationalize the notion of investor confidence. The dispersion of beliefs is, in contrast to the findings of many existing studies, not vacuous for asset prices and, in fact, can have virtually any qualitative effect on asset prices depending on the parameterization. The model has implications for the volatility of asset prices and shows that learning can give rise to some unconventional relationships, such as an inverse relationship between asset prices and risk.     

How Do Investors' Expectations Drive Asset Prices?

Based on an extension of the process of investors' expectations to stochastic volatility we derive asset price processes in a general continuous time pricing kernel framework. Our analysis suggests that stochastic volatility of asset price processes results from the fact that investors do not know the risk of an asset and therefore the volatility of the process of their expectations is stochastic, too. Furthermore, our model is consistent with empirical studies reporting negative correlation between asset prices and their volatility as well as significant variations in the Sharpe ratio.     

Exchange Rates and the Conversion of Currency‐Specific Risk Premia

How do the risk factors that drive asset prices influence exchange rates? Are the parameters of asset price processes relevant for specifying exchange rate processes? Most international asset pricing models focus on the analysis of asset returns given exchange rate processes. Little work has been done on the analysis of exchange rates dependent on asset returns. This paper uses an international stochastic discount factor (SDF) framework to analyse the interplay between asset prices and exchange rates. So far, this approach has only been implemented in international term structure models. We find that exchange rates serve to convert currency‐specific discount factors and currency‐specific prices of risk – a result linked to the international arbitrage pricing theory (IAPT). Our empirical investigation of exchange rates and stock markets of four countries presents evidence for the conversion of currency‐specific risk premia by exchange rates.     

The Binomial Model and Risk Neutrality: Some Important Details

This paper reexamines the relationship between investors' preferences and the binomial option pricing model of Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (CRR). It is shown that the independence of the binomial option pricing model from investors' preferences is a result of a special choice of binomial parameters made by CRR. For a more general choice of binomial parameters, risk neutrality cannot be obtained in discrete time. This analysis reveals the essential difference between the “risk neutral” valuation approach of Cox and Ross and the equivalent martingale approach of Harrison and Kreps in a discrete time framework.     

Short sale restrictions,differences of opinion,and single-country,closed-end fund discount

The purpose of this paper is to study the closed-end fund discount in Miller's (1977) framework. Miller's theory states that in the simultaneous presence of (1) short sale restrictions and (2) dispersion of investors' opinions, securities become overvalued. We show that discounts of single-country, closed-end funds are related to Miller's two conditions. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that neither dispersion of investor opinion nor short sale restrictions alone are positively related to the discount. However, when both conditions exist simultaneously, fund discounts increase.     

Subjective evaluation of delayed risky outcomes for buying and selling positions: the behavioral approach

This paper analyzes time discounting as a function of risk, using reservation prices. Based on experimental data, we compare bidder reservation prices for riskless assets with those for risky assets. The experiments rely on a second price auction with real monetary incentives and real delay in payoffs. We estimate the pure time discount rate for different maturities, considering riskless assets (bonds) and risky assets (delayed lotteries). An innovation in the experimental design allows disentangling pure time from pure risk discounting effects. If subjects bid for assets, we find implied discount rates for risky assets to be uniformly lower than those for riskless assets, across all maturities (the risk moderation effect). However, there is no risk moderation effect if subjects quote ask prices. We argue that delaying a payoff has a stronger effect on the price of bonds than on the price of risky assets since, in the case of bonds, the investor moves from a position of certainty to a position of risk, or uncertainty. Our findings on the risk moderation effect may be used to explain the attractiveness of compensation contracts with options, as commonly used in the financial industry.     

IPO Pricing in “Hot” Market Conditions: Who Leaves Money on the Table?

This paper explores the impact of investor sentiment on IPO pricing. Using a model in which the aftermarket price of IPO shares depends on the information about the intrinsic value of the company and investor sentiment, I show that IPOs can be overpriced and still exhibit positive initial return. A sample of recent French offerings with a fraction of the shares reserved for individual investors supports the predictions of the model. Individual investors' demand is positively related to market conditions. Moreover, large individual investors' demand leads to high IPO prices, large initial returns, and poor long‐run performance.     

Martingalized historical approach for option pricing

In a discrete time option pricing framework, we compare the empirical performance of two pricing methodologies, namely the affine stochastic discount factor (SDF) and the empirical martingale correction methodologies. Using a CAC 40 options dataset, the differences are found to be small: the higher order moment correction involved in the SDF approach may not be that essential to reduce option pricing errors. This paper puts into evidence the fact that an appropriate modelling under the historical measure associated with an adequate correction (that we call here a “martingale correction”) permits to provide option prices which are close to market ones.     

All Guts,No Glory: Trading and Diversification among Online Investors

I explore cross‐sectional portfolio performance in a sample containing 324,736 transactions conducted by 16,831 Swedish investors at an Internet discount brokerage firm during the period May 1999 to March 2002. On average, investors hold undiversified portfolios, show a strong preference for risk, and trade aggressively. I measure performance using a panel data model, and explain the cross‐sectional variation using investors' turnover, portfolio size and degree of diversification. I find that turnover is harmful to performance due to fees, and is therefore more predominant among investors with small portfolios. I argue that the degree of diversification is a proxy for investor skill, and it has a separate and distinct positive effect on performance. Investors underperform the market by about 8.5% per year on average, of which half can be attributed to trading costs.     

Estimating Risk‐Adjusted Costs of Financial Distress

The search for the optimal, or value‐maximizing, capital structure involves weighing the expected benefits of higher leverage against the expected “costs of financial distress.” These costs include not only the direct costs of reorganization, but less quantifiable effects of financial trouble such as damage to the firm's reputation, the loss of key employees and customers, and the loss of value from forgone investment opportunities. This article proposes a new method for valuing expected financial distress costs. While researchers have provided estimates of the costs associated with financial distress when it takes place, whether or when these costs will be incurred is, of course, unknown at the time the financing decision. As a result, the “correct” discount rate for valuing expected distress costs is difficult to derive. Instead of adjusting the discount rate to reflect historical default rate probabilities, the authors' method uses “risk‐neutral” probabilities of encountering distress that allow for discounting at the risk‐free rate. The risk‐neutral probabilities of default are derived by incorporating the systematic risk premia implicit in corporate bond yield spreads. This method results in a significant increase in estimates of financial distress costs. In a simple example presented by the authors, distress costs estimated at about 1.6% of firm value using the conventional method turn out to run about 5% after adjusting for the increased systematic risk associated with financial distress.     

完全市场中的资产定价——有限离散时间情形

研究完全市场中有限离散时间情形下的资产定价问题。首先,给出了无风险收益的概念,借助无风险收益定义了一种风险中性概率。基于这个概率,得到了资产的价格等于随机现金流与随机贴现因子乘积的期望,而且资产的价格还等于资产支付关于q的期望对无风险收益的贴现值。其次,借助无风险概率考虑了资产在多期情形下的资产定价,得出了相应的股票期权公式,尤其作为推论给出了欧式看涨期权的定价公式,并对资产价格过程的鞅性作了讨论。     

From Implicit to Explicit: The Impact of Disclosure Requirements on Hidden Transaction Costs

This paper provides evidence that disclosing corporate bond investors' transaction costs (markups) affects the size of the markups. Until recently, markups were embedded in the reported transaction price and not explicitly disclosed. Without explicit disclosure, investors can estimate their markups using executed transaction prices. However, estimating markups imposes information processing costs on investors, potentially creating information asymmetry between unsophisticated investors and bond‐market professionals. We explore changes in markups after bond‐market professionals were required to explicitly disclose the markup on certain retail trade confirmations. We find that markups decline for trades that are subject to the disclosure requirement relative to those that are not. The findings are pronounced when constraints on investors' information processing capacity limit their ability to be informed about their markups without explicit disclosure.     

Corporate fraud and investment distortions in efficient capital markets

Inefficient investment allocation induced by corporate fraud, where informed insiders strategically manipulate outside investors' beliefs, has been endemic historically and has recently attracted much attention. We reconcile corporate fraud and investment distortions with efficient capital markets, building on shareholder‐manager agency conflicts and investment renegotiation in active takeover markets. Because investments that are ex post inefficient are not renegotiation proof, the optimal renegotiation‐proof contract induces overstatements by managers, accompanied by overinvestment in low return states and underinvestment in high return states by rational investors. Our framework also helps explain why easy access to external capital appears to facilitate corporate fraud.     

FOREIGN INVESTOR PARTICIPATION IN PRIVATIZATIONS: DOES THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT MATTER?

We examine the determinants of foreign investors' participation in the privatization process of developing countries. First, we estimate the probability that foreign investors target privatized firms in a given country. We show that a favorable legal environment where investor protection is higher enhances foreign investors' participation. Foreigners also prefer large, strategic firms from high‐growth economies and socially stable countries with low political risk. Second, we restrict our analysis to privatized firms that foreign investors actually choose and show that the stakes foreigners hold are larger if the firms are privatized by private sales as opposed to public offerings.     

Heterogeneous Beliefs, Speculation, and the Equity Premium

Agents with heterogeneous beliefs about fundamental growth do not share risks perfectly but instead speculate with each other on the relative accuracy of their models' predictions. They face the risk that market prices move more in line with the trading models of competing agents than with their own. Less risk‐averse agents speculate more aggressively and demand higher risk premiums. My calibrated model generates countercyclical consumption volatility, earnings forecast dispersion, and cross‐sectional consumption dispersion. With a risk aversion coefficient less than one, agents' speculation causes half the observed equity premium and lowers the riskless rate by about 1%.     

The Traditional Hedging Model Revisited with a Nonobservable Convenience Yield

This article examines the hedging of constrained commodity positions with futures contracts. We extend the study of Adler and Detemple (1988a, 1988b) to include a partial information framework where the convenience yield is not observable. As a consequence, futures prices depend on investor's beliefs regarding the value of the convenience yield, and every component of the hedge is impacted by these beliefs. We achieve a decomposition of the demand that clarifies the impact on the optimal hedge of the beliefs, the spot price and the risk‐free rate as well as the hedging horizon.     

Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation

We present a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in a position to manipulate short‐term stock prices and the manipulation propensity is uncertain. We analyze the tradeoffs involved in conditioning pay on long‐ versus short‐term performance and show how manipulation, and investors' uncertainty about it, affects the equilibrium pay contract and the informativeness of prices. Firm and manager characteristics determine the optimal compensation scheme: the strength of incentives, the pay horizon, and the use of options. We consider how corporate governance and disclosure regulations can help create an environment that enables better contracting.