The Effects of Setting Deposit Insurance Premiums to Target Insurance Fund Reserves

A common feature of many insurance systems is that they are backed by an insurance fund and insurance premiums are adjusted to target this fund's reserves. This study analyzes the fund targeting policy of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). It examines the distortions to banks' cost of deposit financing that result from setting premiums in this manner. The study's framework is a multiperiod, multibank contingent claims model where the stochastic rates of return on individual banks' assets are assumed to be correlated and match the actual empirical distribution of a sample of U.S. banks. The model identifies factors that are likely to exacerbate distortions due to insurance mispricing. The relative merits of a targeting policy and a flat-rate insurance policy are discussed, and the real effects of insurance mispricing are estimated. A method for valuing a government subsidy under a reserve targeting policy is also presented.     

社会保险市场上的逆向选择与公共政策干预:国际研究动态述评

随着社会经济的进步与发展,提供社会保险日益成为现代政府的重要任务,而信息不对称带来的逆向选择这一市场失灵问题是政府提供社会保险的主要经济依据之一。由此,近年来国际学术界涌现出一大批关于社会保险市场上逆向选择与公共政策干预问题的研究文献,在将理论与数据相结合以分析公共政策的福利影响方面出现了很多研究进展。本文就尝试对这一领域的研究进行总结与分析,为国内学术研究的开展与公共经济政策的设计提供有益借鉴。     

Competitive Insurance Markets and Adverse Selection in the Lab

We provide an experimental analysis of competitive insurance markets with adverse selection. Our parameterised version of the lemons’ model of Akerlof in the insurance context predicts total crowding-out of low risks when insurers offer a single full insurance contract. The therapy proposed by Rothschild and Stiglitz consists of adding a partial insurance contract so as to obtain self-selection of risks. We test the theoretical predictions of these two models in two experiments. A clean test is obtained by matching the parameters of these experiments and by controlling for the risk neutrality of insurers and the common risk aversion of their clients by means of the binary lottery procedure. The results reveal a partial crowding-out of low risks in the first experiment. Crowding-out is not eliminated in the second experiment and it is not even significantly reduced. Finally, instead of the predicted separating equilibrium, we find pooling equilibria. The latter can be sustained because insureds who objectively differ in their risk level do not perceive themselves as being so much different.     

Bayesian Risk Management for Equity-Linked Insurance

This paper describes how to apply Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques to a regime switching model of the stock price process to generate a sample from the joint posterior distribution of the parameters of the model. The MCMC output can be used to generate a sample from the predictive distribution of losses from equity linked contracts, assuming first an actuarial approach to risk management and secondly a financial economics approach. The predictive distribution is used to show the effect of parameter uncertainty on risk management calculations. We also explore model uncertainty by assuming a GARCH model in place of the regime switching model. The results indicate that the financial economics approach to risk management is substantially more robust to parameter uncertainty and model uncertainty than the actuarial approach.     

An Insurance Market Simulation With Both Adverse and Advantageous Selection

The theory of adverse selection predicts that high‐risk individuals are more likely to buy insurance than low‐risk individuals if asymmetric information regarding individuals’ risk type is present in the market. The theory of advantageous selection predicts the opposite—a negative relationship between insurance coverage and risk type can be obtained when hidden knowledge in other dimensions (e.g., the degree of risk aversion) is present in addition to the risk type. Using the heterogeneity of insurance buyers in either risk type or risk aversion, we first introduce a classroom‐based insurance market simulation game to show that adverse selection and advantageous selection can coexist. We then explain the underlying concepts using two methods: a mathematical framework based on expected utility theory and an empirical framework based on the results of the game itself. The game is easy to implement, reinforces textbook concepts by providing students a hands‐on experience, and supplements current textbooks by bringing their content up to date with current research.     

Adverse Selection and Competing Deposit Insurance Systems in Pre-Depression Texas

In 1910, Texas instituted a unique deposit insurance program for its state chartered banks by providing a choice between two separate plans: the depositors guaranty fund, similar to insurance schemes in several other states, and the depositors bond security system, which required the procurement of a privately issued guarantee of indemnity. While, under most deposit insurance schemes, the incentive to monitor the financial condition of individual banks simply devolves from depositors to regulators, the bond security system established in Texas distinguished itself by attempting to reintroduce market discipline through the indemnity requirement. Using a probit model with heteroscedasticity, we find evidence that the choice of insurance coverage led to risk-sorting among the banks, with relatively conservative and financially secure institutions opting for the comparatively rigorous bond security system. In addition, the bank failure record indicates the risk differentials between banks in the two plans persisted over time and even possibly grew, suggesting the bond security system at least partially avoided the moral hazard incentives associated with the fixed-rate depositors guaranty plan. These findings support the general view that market discipline is effective in banking.     

The Consequences for a Monopolistic Insurance Firm of Evaluating Risk Better than Customers: The Adverse Selection Hypothesis Reversed

This article models a situation in which a monopolistic insurer evaluates risk better than its customers. The resulting equilibrium allocations are compared to the consequences of the standard adverse selection hypothesis. On the positive side, they exhibit the property that low-risk people are better covered than higher-risk people. On the normative side, the article shows that there are two reasons for avoiding excessive risk classification: one is the classical destruction of insurance possibilities, and the other comes from the distrustful atmosphere generated by new asymmetric information.     

Long-Term Care Insurance and Life Insurance Demand

This article investigates the interaction between life insurance and long-term care insurance markets on the demand side. In the model utility depends on both consumption and bequest, and utility from consumption is contingent on the state of health. While the demand for life insurance increases both with decreasing income and with a rising degree of altruism, the influences of these two parameters on the demand for long-term care insurance are ambiguous. If the utility shock arising from disability declines, both insurance demands will rise.     

中国健康险市场逆向选择和正向选择并存现象的研究

本文以中国的健康险市场为例,考察不对称信息的影响。通过考察投保人投保金额以及附加险选择和索赔情况的相关关系,论文发现事后出现索赔的投保人,事前往往会选择购买附加险,但是投保金额却相对较低。结合理论模型分析,论文认为投保人在财富、风险偏好等方面的异质性以及信息不对称的存在是导致市场同时出现逆向选择和正向选择的主要原因。     

关于构建我国药品不良反应保险救济机制问题的研究

2006年上海试点的“严重药品不良反应综合保险”初探市场,未能实现药企蜂拥而至的期望局面,而是十分落寂地收场。药品不良反应保险救济机制一直未能实现,已成为我国医药业一大难题。本文通过对药品不良反应定义的分析,探析了我国建立药品不良反应保险救济机制的可行性,再结合近期的“严重药品不良反应综合保险”的失败经验,提出了完善救济制度、累积相关数据、建立鉴定委员会、政府补贴并强制购买等相关的政策与建议。     

Background Risk and the Performance of Insurance Markets under Adverse Selection

Background risk can influence the performance of insurance markets that must deal with adverse selection when applicants are risk vulnerable, since they are more averse to bearing the insurable risk as a result of their exposures to background risk. We show that background risk always results in a lower deductible for the incentive constrained contract, and that a broader range of markets attains the stable sequential equilibrium cross-subsidized pair of separating contracts. We conclude that background risk always improves the performance of markets for coverage against (insurable) foreground risks that must deal with adverse selection. We also find, however, that these improvements are never sufficient to offset the cost to insureds of bearing the background risk.     

Cream Skimming: Innovations in Insurance Risk Classification and Adverse Selection

We demonstrate how innovations in insurance risk classification can lead to adverse selection, or cream skimming, against insurers that are slow to adopt such pricing innovations. Using a model in which insurers with insufficient pricing data cannot differentiate between low‐ and high‐risk policyholders and therefore charge both the same premium, we show how innovative insurers develop new risk classification data to identify overcharged low‐risk policyholders and attract them from rival insurers with reduced prices. Less innovative insurers thus insure a growing percentage of high‐risk customers, resulting in adverse selection attributable to their informational disadvantage. Next, we examine two cases in which “Big Data” innovations in risk classification led to concerns about cream skimming among U.S. auto insurers. First, we track the rapid adoption of credit‐based insurance scores as pricing variables in personal auto insurance markets. Second, we examine the growing popularity of usage‐based insurance programs like telematics, plans in which insurers use data on policyholders’ actual driving behavior to set prices that attract low‐risk customers. Issues associated with the execution of such pricing strategies are discussed. In both cases, we document how rival insurers quickly adopt successful innovations to reduce their exposure to adverse selection.     

逆向选择条件下带甄别期的最优保险设计

为了改善信息不对称对保险市场交易效率的影响,分投保人为两种及两种以上风险类型建立了带甄别期的保险契约模型,指出可以利用投保人在甄别期的风险发生情况来推断投保人的风险类型.带甄别期的保险契约是指:自保险合同生效之日起的一段时间内(甄别期),如果投保人发生风险,保险公司将给予一定的赔偿,甄别期过后,如果投保人再次发生风险,保险公司将不再给予任何赔偿;如果投保人在甄别期未发生风险,而在甄别期之后的剩余保险期发生风险,保险公司仍然给予与上述情况相同的赔偿.证明指出效用最优时带甄别期的保险契约不比R-S传统部分保险契约差,并给出了前者是后者严格帕累托改进的充分条件.此外,对于两种以上风险类型情形,证明了满足对次低风险投保人的激励相容约束是满足对其余高风险投保人激励相容约束的一个充分不必要条件,并给出了相应的充分条件,进一步指出该充分条件的集合恰是带甄别期的保险契约能够产生分离均衡的一个充分条件.最后,以一个算例说明确实存在效用最优时带甄别期的保险契约是R-S传统部分保险契约的严格帕累托改进情形.     

贷款保证保险:发展情况、现存问题及建议

发展贷款保证保险对于缓解小微企业融资难有着积极的意义。从20世纪80年代开始,国内贷款保证保险的试点工作就已陆续开展。然而,发展贷款保证保险面临法律法规不健全、信用风险较大、银保合作不顺畅等问题。为积极发展贷款保证保险,需要完善相关的法律法规,优化社会信用生态环境,理顺银保合作关系。     

Finding Pareto Optimal Insurance Contracts

This paper deals with on-line computation—or step-wise learning—of Pareto optimal insurance contracts. Our approach tolerates that the loss distribution might be unknown, intractable, or not well specified. Thus we accommodate fairly inexperienced parties. Losses are here simulated or observed, one at a time, and they cause iterated revisions of the premium. The mechanical and global nature of probability calculus thereby yields to more tentative, myopic procedures, possibly closer to how humans operate or reason in face of risk. Sequential revisions may also reduce the expense of insurers' time and money in seeking sufficient statistics. Emphasized below is the remarkable simplicity and stability of the resulting adaptive procedures. Special attention goes to catastrophic risks, and to subsidized or competitive insurance.     

新《保险法》中"保证保险"的风险及其防范

新《保险法》财产保险业务中新增加了保证保险,然而并没有对保证保险的定义、性质、适用范围及合同相关内容做明确规定。因此,正确认知保证保险与普通财产保险的区别,把握保证保险在我国实施过程中可能面临的各种风险具有积极意义。防范保证风险应从完善保证保险立法和监管制度、提高保险公司对保证保险的专业管理操作能力、创新相关产品、加强银保合作和信用环境建设等方面落实。     

强制责任保险与无过失保险可否兼容?——台湾的经验与大陆的教训

强制责任保险与无过失保险是机动车强制保险的两种模式,二者在保险原理、保障范围及运作机制等方面都有较大不同。与大多数强制责任保险立法不同,我国台湾地区《强制汽车责任保险法》在强制责任保险的框架内吸收了无过失保险的经验,规定了保险公司的无过失赔偿责任,并已被实践证明运行良好。然而,《道路交通安全法》第76条强制责任保险与无过失保险结合的规定却遭到了质疑。因此,有必要探讨强制责任保险与无过失保险的兼容性问题。     

中国军人保险发展现状、问题与对策

中国军人保险已初步形成了基本的制度框架,待遇水平逐步提高,管理不断加强,但也存在保险方式比较单一、保险范围较窄等问题。我国军人保险应借鉴国外经验,不断创新和完善,加快推进军人保险制度的调整改革。     

Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets Under Adverse Selection and Yaari's Dual Theory of Risk

Under Yaari's dual theory of risk, we determine the equilibrium separating contracts for high and low risks in a competitive insurance market, in which risks are defined only by their expected losses, that is, a high risk is a risk that has a greater expected loss than a low risk. Also, we determine the pooling equilibrium contract when insurers are assumed non-myopic. Expected utility theory generally predicts that optimal insurance indemnity payments are nonlinear functions of the underlying loss due to the nonlinearity of agents' utility functions. Under Yaari's dual theory, we show that under mild technical conditions the indemnity payment is a piecewise linear function of the loss, a common property of insurance coverages.