共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 296 毫秒
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Helmuth Cremer André Grimaud Jean-Pierre Florens Sarah Marcy Bernard Roy Joëlle Toledano 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2001,19(2):107-121
This paper presents a model of entry and imperfect competition, which is inspired by the product differentiation literature and incorporates facts pertaining to the postal sector. There are two operators: incumbent and potential entrant. The entrant offers only one of the products (commercial mail) with a specific technology and delivers only to part of the addressees (located in low cost areas). Its degree of coverage is viewed as a quality attribute; it affects demand and hence market share. The incumbent faces a USO while the entrant is an unregulated profit maximizing firm. To illustrate the potential applications of our approach, we provide some numerical simulations of entry scenarios. 相似文献
3.
Iñaki Aguirre 《Spanish Economic Review》1999,1(3):283-299
This paper analyzes how the pricing policy of an incumbent may signal information not only on the demand level but also on
the demand composition. A signalling game with two periods and two players (an established firm and a potential entrant) is
considered. The potential entrant has incomplete information on market demand. There exist many sequential equilibria in which
the uniform price policy acts as an entry deterrence device by hiding actual market profitability. We can interpret the uniform
pricing policy as a rejection of the use of superior information on market demand composition in order to reduce the entrant's
expected profits. 相似文献
4.
Liping Zhang 《Frontiers of Economics in China》2012,7(2):246
This paper studies price-matching guarantees in a market where entrant does not have perfect information about incumbent’s cost. The low-cost incumbent can adopt price-matching guarantees as a signal to distinguish itself from the high-cost type and thus effectively deter entry. On the other hand, the high-cost incumbent can successfully fool the potential entrant under certain conditions. Compared with the equilibriums in situations where the option of offering a price guarantee is not available, the use of this instrument either makes it easier for the low-cost incumbent to signal its cost, or expands the range of parameters over which the high-cost incumbent is able to deter entry successfully. 相似文献
5.
We analyze the effect of industrial espionage on entry deterrence. We consider a monopoly incumbent who may expand capacity to deter entry, and a potential entrant who owns an Intelligence System. The Intelligence System (IS) generates a noisy signal based on the incumbentʼs actions. The potential entrant uses this signal to decide whether or not to enter the market. The incumbent may signal-jam to manipulate the likelihood of the noisy signals and hence affect the entrantʼs decisions. If the precision of the IS is commonly known, the incumbent benefits from his rivalʼs espionage. Actually, he benefits more the higher is the precision of the IS while the spying entrant is worse off with an IS of relatively high quality. When the IS quality is private information of the entrant, the incumbent is better off with an IS of high expected precision while the entrant benefits from one of high quality. In this case espionage makes the market more competitive. 相似文献
6.
Yutian Chen 《Journal of Economics》2011,102(2):137-156
By sourcing key intermediate goods to a potential entrant, an incumbent firm can credibly and observably commit to an intense
post-entry competition, thereby deterring the entry. At the same time, a collusive effect exists, whereby the entrant’s loss
from staying out of the final-good market is compensated through their sourcing transaction. We find that entry-deterring
sourcing in general has ambiguous effect on social welfare. However, there exist scenarios where it enhances not only social
welfare, but also consumers’ surplus. 相似文献
7.
Jean Gabszewicz 《Economics of Innovation and New Technology》2013,22(4):323-343
This paper explores (i) the incentives for an incumbent firm to acquire an entrant willing to sell a product innovation rather than openly competing with this entrant, and (ii) in case of acquisition, the incentives to sell simultaneously both the existing products and the new one rather than specializing on a single variant. We prove that, in some circumstances, an incumbent firm can find it profitable to make an acquisition proposal to the entrant. Nevertheless, in this acquisition scenario, a product proliferation strategy is never observed at equilibrium. Furthermore, while being available for sale, sometimes the innovation simply remains unexploited. 相似文献
8.
We investigate tax/subsidy competition for foreign direct investments (FDI) between countries of different size when a domestic firm is the incumbent in the largest market and we study how the nature (public or private) of the incumbent firm affects policy competition. We show that, differently from the case of a private firm, the country hosting the incumbent always benefits from FDI if the domestic firm is a public welfare‐maximizing firm. We also show that the public firm acts as a disciplinary device for the foreign multinational that will always choose the efficient welfare‐maximizing location. An efficiency‐enhancing role of policy competition may then arise only when the domestic incumbent is a private firm, whereas tax competition is always wasteful in the presence of a public firm. 相似文献
9.
ANGELA S. BERGANTINO ETIENNE BILLETTE DE VILLEMEUR ANNALISA VINELLA 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2011,13(2):255-287
We provide theoretical foundations for quality‐adjusted price‐cap regulation in industries where a regulated incumbent and an unregulated entrant offer vertically differentiated products competing in price and quality. We show that, whether or not the incumbent anticipates the reaction of the entrant, the optimal weights in the cap depend upon the market served by the entrant, despite the latter not being directly concerned by regulation. We further show that the cap is robust to small errors in the weights. Our findings point to the conclusion that, in partially regulated industries, regulators should use information about the whole sectors rather than on the sole regulated incumbents. 相似文献
10.
We analyze history-based price discrimination in an asymmetric industry, where an incumbent, protected by switching costs, faces an entrant who does not have access to information about consumers’ purchase histories. We demonstrate that consumer surplus is higher with uniform pricing than with history-based price discrimination. We find that the entry decision is invariant to whether the incumbent implements history-based pricing or uniform pricing. This implies that the potential abuse of market dominance imposed by history-based price discrimination is exploitation, not exclusion. Finally, we establish that the profit gain to the incumbent from history-based pricing exceeds the associated loss to consumers. 相似文献
11.
António Brandão Joana Pinho Joana Resende Paula Sarmento Isabel Soares 《Portuguese Economic Journal》2016,15(2):99-127
In this paper, we develop a theoretical model that enriches the literature on the pros and cons of ownership unbundling vis-à-vis lighter unbundling frameworks in the natural gas markets. For each regulatory framework, we compute equilibrium outcomes when an incumbent firm and a new entrant compete à la Cournot in the final gas market. We find that the entrant’s contracting conditions in the upstream market and the transmission tariff are key determinants of the market structure in the downstream gas market (both with ownership and with legal unbundling). We also study how the regulator must optimally set transmission tariffs in each of the two unbundling regimes. We conclude that welfare maximizing tariffs often require free access to the transmission network (in both regulatoy regimes). However, when the regulator aims at promoting the break-even of the regulated transmission system operator, the first-best tariff is unfeasible in both regimes. Hence, we study a more realistic set-up, in which the regulator’s action is constrained by the break-even of the regulated firm (the transmission system operator). In this set-up, we find that, for a given transmission tariff, final prices in the downstream market are always higher with ownership unbundling than with legal unbundling. 相似文献
12.
Summary. Models of spatial competition are typically static, and exhibit multiple free-entry equilibria. Incumbent firms can earn
rents in equilibrium because any potential entrant expects a significantly lower market share (since it must fit into a niche
between incumbent firms) along with fiercer price competition. Previous research has usually concentrated on the zero-profit
equilibrium, at which there is normally excessive entry, and so an entry tax would improve the allocation of resources. At
the other extreme, the equilibrium with the greatest rent per firm normally entails insufficient entry, so an entry subsidy
should be prescribed. A model of sequential firm entry (with an exogenous order of moves) resolves the multiplicity problem
but raises a new difficulty: firms that enter earlier can expect higher spatial rents, and so firms prefer to be earlier in
the entry order. This tension disappears when firms can compete for entry positions. We therefore suppose that firms can commit
capital early to the market in order to lay claim to a particular location. This temporal competition dissipates spatial rents
in equilibrium and justifies the sequential move structure. However, the policy implications are quite different once time
is introduced. An atemporal analysis of the sequential entry process would prescribe an entry subsidy, but once proper account
is taken of the entry dynamics, a tax may be preferable.
Received: April 26, 1999; revised version: September 22, 1999 相似文献
13.
In this paper we study an entrant’s incentives to build a network infrastructure, when there is an initial phase of service-based competition where it leases access to the incumbent’s infrastructure. We build a model in which the phase of service-based competition allows the entrant to step into the market by progressively acquiring market experience. We show that the acquisition of experience in the phase of service-based competition delays the entrant’s investment when the prospects for infrastructure investment are good, and accelerates investment otherwise. We also show that when the acquisition of experience depends on the entrant’s current customer base and facility-based entry is a long-term possibility, setting a low access price can accelerate the entrant’s investment. 相似文献
14.
Pricing Access to a Monopoly Input 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
David S. Sibley Michael J. Doane Michael A. Williams & Shu-Yi Tsai 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2004,6(4):541-555
What price should downstream entrants pay a vertically integrated incumbent monopoly for use of its assets? Courts, legislators, and regulators have at times mandated that incumbent monopolies lease assets required for the production of a retail service to entrants in efforts to increase the competitiveness of retail markets. This paper compares two rules for pricing such monopoly inputs: marginal cost pricing (MCP) and generalized efficient component pricing rule (GECPR). The GECPR is not a fixed price, but is a rule that determines the input price to be paid by the entrant from the entrant's retail price. Comparing the retail market equilibrium under MCP and GECPR, the GECPR leads to lower equilibrium retail prices. If the incumbent is less efficient than the entrant, the GECPR also leads to lower production costs than does the MCP rule. If the incumbent is more efficient than the entrant, however, conditions may exist in which MCP leads to lower production costs than does the GECPR. The analysis is carried out assuming either Bertrand competition, quantity competition, or monopolistic competition between the incumbent and entrant in the downstream market. 相似文献
15.
Kenneth S. Corts 《The Canadian journal of economics》2018,51(2):510-527
I revisit a simple model of entry‐deterring tying—example 1 from Whinston's (1990) seminal paper—but allow the potential entrant to have either a cost advantage or a willingness‐to‐pay (WTP) advantage relative to the incumbent. I show that, compared to the usual case in which the potential entrant is cost‐advantaged, tying is less effective against an entrant with a WTP advantage because an entrant with a large WTP advantage may be able to induce the buyer to buy both the tied bundle and the entrant's product. I also show that tying but failing to deter entry can be less costly when facing an entrant with a WTP advantage than when facing an entrant with a cost advantage. For a firm facing uncertainty about, for example, the entrant's entry costs, this makes tying a more attractive entry deterrence strategy against a WTP‐advantaged entrant. These results shed light on the important policy question of which markets are most likely to be susceptible to entry‐deterring tying. 相似文献
16.
《Research in Economics》2014,68(3):239-247
Significant amount of vertical technology transfer occurs between developed and developing-country firms, and many trading companies from developing countries create competition in the developed countries, yet the literature on intellectual property rights did not pay considerable attention to these aspects. In a Cournot oligopoly with vertical technology transfer, we show that patent protection in the developing country raises developed-country welfare if the following three conditions hold together: (i) patent protection in the developing country deters entry in the final goods market, (ii) the marginal cost difference between the incumbent and the entrant final goods sellers is sufficiently small, and (iii) the marginal cost difference between the incumbent and the entrant developing-country producers is sufficiently high. We also show that patent protection in the developing country always creates higher developing-country welfare if no developing-country firm enters the final goods market. We also discuss the implications of Bertrand competition on our results. 相似文献
17.
Tariff Policy and the Foreign Entry Decision in the Presence of a Cost-Based Informational Asymmetry
The paper demonstrates that the standard prediction on the relation between tariff rates and the mode of foreign entry—exports or direct investment—may not hold in the presence of incomplete information. A foreign firm lacks full information on the cost structure of an informed incumbent firm located in the domestic (potential) host country. Within a two‐period model, the local incumbent may behave in a manner which keeps the potential foreign entrant uninformed of its cost structure. In such a pooling equilibrium, the uninformed foreign firm either refrains from entering altogether or serves the host country via exports at tariff rates which would, otherwise under complete information, induce entry via direct investment. When entry mode is altered, other standard full‐information effects of trade policy may also no longer hold. 相似文献
18.
Strategic R&D policy under vertically differentiated oligopoly 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Jee-Hyeong Park 《The Canadian journal of economics》2001,34(4):967-987
In this paper strategic R&D policy is analysed, where a high-tech firm and a low-tech firm compete in a third country with vertically differentiated ( high-quality and low-quality ) products. If the product market is under price competition, the high-tech (low-tech) firm's government has an incentive to tax (subsidize) its domestic firm's product R&D activities. If the product market is under quantity competition, the results are opposite: an R&D subsidy (tax) incentive for the high-tech (low-tech) firm's government; and the high-tech firm's government always gains in the R&D policy game, in contrast to the standard prisoner's dilemma result of the R&D policy literature. JEL Classification: F13 相似文献
19.
国际多市场寡头条件下的贸易政策和产业政策 总被引:2,自引:1,他引:2
国际多市场寡头是Bulow( 1 985)提出的多市场寡头概念在国际贸易领域的自然延伸。在本文中 ,市场之间联系的纽带是本国企业具有规模收益递减的生产技术。本文的主要结论是 ,第一 ,如果本国企业与外国企业在外国市场进行价格竞争 ,那么 ,最优干预组合包括国内生产补贴与出口税 ,它们对本国福利的作用是一致的。第二 ,如果本国企业与外国企业在外国市场进行数量竞争 ,那么 ,最优干预政策组合包括国内生产补贴与出口补贴 ,它们作用于本国福利的方向是不一致的 ,这时 ,本国政府用国内生产补贴执行反托拉斯职能 ,用出口补贴执行利润转移职能。第三 ,作为模型的一个应用 ,本文论证了出口退税政策会加剧国内市场的扭曲 ;而且它不一定能够提高本国福利。 相似文献
20.
Gbor Virg 《Games and Economic Behavior》2009,67(1):315-330
In a dynamic contest the current incumbent competes against a randomly assigned entrant in a private value all pay auction each period. We focus on equilibria where the beliefs about the incumbent's type and the employed strategies are stationary. We show that inefficient types survive, even if the entrants arrive very frequently, because the entrant plays more aggressively than the incumbent, allowing a low type entrant to win against a high type incumbent. In an example we show that if the incumbent is challenged more often, then the equilibrium type of the incumbent is higher on average. When the value of the prize is the same for all players (the case studied in the public choice literature), the equilibrium rent of the bidders is fully dissipated as the incumbent is challenged infinitely often. The technical contribution lies in showing the existence of stationary equilibrium in an incomplete information game. 相似文献