互联网金融利率定价能否准确反映违约风险？——基于P2P网络借贷的实证检验北大核心

本文以P2P网络借贷平台——“人人贷”的历史数据为研究样本,从风险补偿的视角,研究互联网金融利率定价能否有效覆盖违约风险。研究结果表明:P2P产品的借款利率整体上低估了借款人的违约风险;投资者对借款订单信息、借款人个人信息以及信用评估信息存在不同的风险敏感性,对借款期限、借款金额、借款人的信用等级以及婚姻状况的风险敏感性较高,而对借款人的工作所属行业、工作时间、年龄、学历信息的风险敏感性较低;在不同的P2P细分市场中,由于投资者的风险敏感性有所不同,其对借款人所要求的风险溢价也有所差异,进而产生了部分细分市场中违约风险被低估或者高估的现象。上述研究结论表明,国内互联网金融的利率定价机制并不能够准确反映借款人的违约风险。为此,要反思国内互联网金融的定价和风险控制机制,从风险控制制度建设着手,推动互联网金融健康、有序发展。要完善互联网金融行业的信息披露制度,夯实利率定价准确反映风险的基础;要推动互联网金融平台优化对借款人的信用评估机制,引导投资者对信用评估信息给予关注和重视;要加强投资者风险教育,引导投资者对互联网金融产品的违约风险及其他风险进行有效识别和定价。     

P2P网络借贷平台的利率定价合理吗?——基于“人人贷”的经验证据北大核心CSSCI

本文基于"人人贷"平台的历史数据,研究P2P网络借贷平台的利率定价,结果表明:仅有12.18%的贷款项目利率定价基本合理;高信用等级贷款项目利率大多被高估,低信用等级贷款项目利率大多被低估;利率被低估的借款人所属行业大多为低端服务业及其它聘用人员流动性较强的服务行业,利率被高估的借款人所属行业则大多属于农业、制造业等劳动密集型产业,而其他行业理论利率与真实利率差异不大。     

P2P网络借贷的羊群行为及其信息驱动

我国互联网金融投资者面临的骗局和连锁风险,是否是互联网金融羊群行为的必然结果呢?如何建构互联网金融的监管制度,才能在不影响互联网金融融资效率前提下降低互联网金融的风险呢?在改进的MNL模型基础上,通过研究我国P2P网络借贷羊群行为的性质及其背后的信息驱动,回答上述问题。研究结果显示,我国P2P网络借贷市场上存在着理性的羊群行为;其背后的信息驱动因素依次为平台信息、项目信息和借款人信息。因此,我国网络借贷市场不会由于投资者羊群行为引发市场风险,互联网金融监管机制的重点在于,强化投资者保护、完善和统一P2P网络借贷平台的信用评估和披露制度。     

借款人声誉与风险识别——来自P2P网络借贷的证据

P2P网络借贷和传统借贷都存在着信息不对称,借款人声誉作为一种信号缓解了信息不对称程度,提升了借贷效率。本文以借款人过往逾期次数与成功借款次数作为声誉变量,实证研究了借款人声誉对违约风险的识别效应,同时发现随着借款人还款能力的增加,这种风险识别效应也在增强,因此投资人和P2P平台可借助分析借款人声誉指标做出合理的投资和监控决策,降低P2P网络借贷风险,使得P2P网络借贷成为传统借贷的有力补充。     

基于P2P个人借贷平台的信用风险识别

P2P网络借贷信用风险对投资人的放贷决策有明显的干扰作用,能否有效识别来自借款人的信用风险,成为P2P网络借贷平台未来发展的关键.本文以P2P网络借贷平台拍拍贷2016年2月和3月发布的借款标的数据为样本,运用Probit模型,对P2P网络借贷的信用风险进行识别.研究结果表明:投资者能够识别来自借款人的信用风险.信用等级越高,风险越低,利率越高,风险越低;男性的信用风险要高于女性,而借款人是否婚配对于识别其信用风险有很大帮助;手机认证和户口认证在识别信用风险方面有同样的功效,央行征信认证报告有助于降低风险.     

我国P2P网络借贷信用风险下投资者利益保护研究——基于人人贷的数据分析

作为一种新兴的借贷模式,P2P网络借贷兼具互联网思维和普惠金融理念,自传入我国至今已成长为一股不可小觑的金融力量。而在P2P网络借贷中存在的借款人信用风险,严重危害了投资人的利益。国内P2P网络借贷平台为缓解此现象也进行了借款人信息披露机制,但通过对"人人贷"的实证研究发现,其标的信息中的大部分信息并不足以为投资者提供有效的风险判断。     

P2P借款人的定价偏差与被动违约风险——基于“人人贷”数据的分析

本文主要通过行为资产定价理论和"人人贷"2014—2018年的数据,研究网络借贷(P2P)借款人定价偏差的影响因素及其与被动违约风险之间的关系。定价偏差是将P2P借贷利率分解为效率部分和无效率部分,并通过成本随机前沿模型得到。结果表明:借款人定价存在显著偏差且在不同群体间有所差异;借款人的粉饰行为未能起到减小定价偏差的作用,甚至会起到反效果;当借款人的声誉成本高于还款成本时,此时的违约主要表现为被动违约;即使借款人主观还款意愿强烈,但定价偏差越大,借款人剩余收入就越吃紧,还款过程中逾期次数和欠债比例增加的可能性就越大,进而引发被动违约风险。     

我国P2P网络借贷发展现状及其监管思考

P2P网络借贷,是指帮助投资者与借款人实现直接借贷行为的中介服务行业。发展P2P网络借贷对缓解我国小微企业及个人融资难问题具有非常重要的意义。自2007年“拍拍贷”网贷平台成立以来,我国网络借贷平台数量日益增长,对小额贷款领域贡献明显,但同时由于监管的缺位,一些P2P网络借贷平台不规范操作引发的风险给整个行业发展带来一定的隐患。通过对我国现阶段P2P网贷平台运行模式、发展规模等现状进行梳理总结,发现网贷平台发展良莠不齐,存在借款利率过高和监管不力等问题,为此提出了加快制定相应规章制度、加强监管、完善平台信息公布和加强平台内外部合作等规范P2P网络借贷的政策建议。     

社交朋友网络资本与P2P网贷行为选择研究

本文研究P2P网贷市场中社交朋友网络资本对借贷结果和违约风险的影响,并利用拍拍贷平台数据进行实证分析。结果表明,借款人在网贷市场中的社交朋友网络资本的质量越高,其借款成功的可能性越大、支付的利率越低且违约的可能性越低。因此,投资人可以根据借款人社交朋友网络资本的质量来判断其信用水平;网贷平台可以通过鼓励用户之间建立高质量的社会网络来缓解市场中的信用信息不对称,从而提高交易效率、降低信用违约风险。     

“P2P+保险”模式对借贷双方行为的影响——基于演化博弈论的分析

随着P2P网贷行业"去担保化"政策的出台,平台自主担保、第三方担保等模式逐渐退出该行业,保险成为P2P平台化解市场风险的管理手段之一。本文基于演化博弈理论构建了信用信息共享机制以及保险参与机制下P2P借贷双方两大群体之间博弈的复制动态模型,分析不同条件下的演化稳定状态,即保险的介入是否有效约束借款人违约行为,以及能否促进投资者投资积极性。研究表明,借款利率以及信用信息共享水平直接影响借贷双方策略选择,借款人缴纳保费的政策可有效约束借款人违约行为,保险公司风险分担比例越大越能有效激励投资者投资积极性,在满足一定参数条件下,借贷双方博弈演化稳定于(放贷,守约),从而为监管部门引入保险机制提供一定理论依据。     

Seeing is important: the usefulness of video information in P2P

P2P lending is an important research subject of rising internet finance research. This paper uses unique data from Renrendai, a leading platform in China, to test the influence of video information on P2P lending behavior. Results suggest that, first, the lower the borrower's credit rating is, the more likely they are to provide video information. Second, compared to the video‐information‐absent borrowers, the otherwise borrowers can get easier access to a loan and offer a lower interest rate. These results indicate that compared to text messages, video information can increase the borrower's creditworthiness and reduce the transaction risk. Thereupon seeing is important in online P2P lending. Third, when the borrower's credit rating is lower, the video effect is significant. The study makes sense in terms of the enrichment of P2P lending literature and the enlightenment on decision‐making of both lenders and borrowers.     

Debt maturity dispersion and the cost of bank loans

This paper examines the relation between corporate debt maturity dispersion and the pricing and terms of bank loans. Analyzing a sample of U.S. bank loans from 2002 to 2016, we find that firms with a dispersed debt maturity structure pay a lower interest rate. The rate-reduction effect is significant only for firms without a credit rating. For these firms, spreading debt maturity dates also results in lower commitment fees, fewer covenant restrictions, and less collateral in their loan contracts. The impact of debt maturity dispersion on the pricing and structure of bank loans is stronger when borrowers have higher rollover risk or when the need for monitoring is greater. Our results suggest that dispersion in debt maturity structure mitigates the agency problem associated with shareholder–creditor conflicts by reducing rollover risk and alleviating the need for monitoring, which results in borrowers receiving more favorable terms in loan contracts.     

我国P2P网络借贷信用风险影响因素研究——基于排序选择模型的实证分析

P2P(peer-to-peer)网络借贷是一种借助网络平台,由个人与个人间互为借贷双方的小额借贷交易。它作为互联网与民间借贷相结合的新兴金融模式,具有较高的信用风险。采用排序选择模型,基于 ex-celVBA 数据挖掘技术截取多个 P2P 网站数据,对平台信用风险的影响因素进行实证分析,结果表明：个人特征、信用变量、历史表现、借款信息分别对网络借贷信用风险存在正向影响,由此发现网站提供的信息对投资者避免信用风险没有起到实质作用。     

论加强P2P网络借贷平台的监管

P2P网络借贷,即在网上实现借贷,借入者和借出者均可利用这个网络平台实现借贷的在线交易,一切认证、记账、清算和交割等流程均通过网络完成,满足了人们对资本便利快捷的需求.本文阐述了P2P网络借贷的基本概念、发展情况和积极意义,分析了其业务流程可能引发的风险,认为应将网络借贷纳入监管体系,制定监管原则、模式、内容以及安全与技术指标,引导其健康发展.     

Rating manipulation and creditworthiness for platform economy: Evidence from peer-to-peer lending

Credit rating provides essential information on a project's credit risk to both lenders and borrowers. On exploring over five million lending listings from a leading peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platform, a mismatch phenomenon was observed between credit rating and default probability of P2P listings across different credit rating groups, despite controlling for common credit-related characteristics. Further looking into the misevaluation of credit risk, it was found that this phenomenon was more pronounced when an unexpected intervention was likely to be applied in rating projects, such as listings with high credit ratings, large loan amounts, and less personal information. The study results question the credibility of related research that uses internal credit ratings, because this variable is likely to be manipulated by the platform.     

The mechanism of credit risk contagion among internet P2P lending platforms based on a SEIR model with time-lag

The credit risk contagion of Internet peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms is an important part of Internet financial risk management and supervision. This study analyzes the contagion path of credit risk in Internet P2P lending. Based on complex network theory and the theory of infectious disease dynamics, the characteristics of Internet P2P lending development are combined to construct a SEIR model of credit risk transmission among Internet P2P lending platforms with time lag, and the robustness of the model is analyzed and proven. The influence of platform correlations, the susceptible immune rate, the platform elimination rate, contagion latency, the saturation coefficient, and the susceptibility input rate on credit risk contagion behavior among Internet P2P lending platforms is analyzed, using the equilibrium point and threshold value. The impact of each variable is analyzed by simulation. Corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are proposed to prevent and control credit risk contagion among these platforms.     

Bank Loans, Bonds, and Information Monopolies across the Business Cycle

Theory suggests that banks' private information about borrowers lets them hold up borrowers for higher interest rates. Since hold-up power increases with borrower risk, banks with exploitable information should be able to raise their rates in recessions by more than is justified by borrower risk alone. We test this hypothesis by comparing the pricing of loans for bank-dependent borrowers with the pricing of loans for borrowers with access to public debt markets, controlling for risk factors. Loan spreads rise in recessions, but firms with public debt market access pay lower spreads and their spreads rise significantly less in recessions.     

P2P平台的信息不对称问题国外研究综述

信息不对称问题是困扰P2P平台发展的主要问题之一。论文重点梳理了国外学者P2P平台的信息不对称问题的研究以及由信息不对称问题引发的风险,之后针对P2P平台信息不对称问题,论文重点梳理了国外学者针对该问题的解决方案———“集体信贷”模式。最后,论文提出缓解P2P平台解决信息不对称问题的政策建议。     

“草根”金融P2P信贷模式探究

P2P信贷即网络信贷,具有小额、无担保、快捷、网络化的特点,又被称作"草根"金融模式。P2P信贷模式在全球范围内发展迅猛,迸发出强劲的生命力,近几年我国也相继诞生了上千家P2P信贷平台。通过对P2P信贷模式的运营模式、自身优点和存在的风险进行研究分析,进而提出解决P2P信贷风险的建议。