Allies or commitment devices? A model of appointments to the Federal Reserve

We present a model of executive‐legislative bargaining over appointments to independent central banks in the face of an uncertain economy with strategic economic actors. The model highlights the contrast between two idealized views of Federal Reserve appointments. In one view, politicians prefer to appoint conservatively biased central bankers to overcome credible commitment problems that arise in monetary policy. In the other, politicians prefer to appoint allies, and appointments are well described by the spatial model used to describe appointments to other agencies. Both ideals are limiting cases of our model, which depend on the level of economic uncertainty. When economic uncertainty is extremely low, politicians prefer very conservative appointments. When economic uncertainty increases, politicians’ prefer central bank appointees closer to their own ideal points. In the typical case, the results are somewhere in between: equilibrium appointments move in the direction of politician's preferences but with a moderate conservative bias.     

An Empirical Analysis of the Political Economy of Tariffs

We seek to analyze the determinants of senatorial response to "generic" trade bills that seek to impose restrictions on the lowering of tariffs. The analysis is based on the response of senators to the trade expansion acts of 1962 and 1974. In the recent past these have been the only bills that are "generic" in nature since they are not targeted at any particular industry. Within the same framework we also examine the issue of "legislator shirking", a term used to imply the response of senators based on pure personal ideology rather than the interests of the constituents. Regression results show the growing influence of state specific factors and the diminishing role of party and personal ideology on senatorial response. Interestingly, we find that despite the similar generic nature of the two bills examined, the influence of personal ideology on the response of senators varies across the two bills examined.     

Comparing Presidents, Senators, and Justices: Interinstitutional Preference Estimation

A major challenge in testing spatial, interinstitutional modelsis placing different sets of actors on a common preference scale.We address this challenge by presenting a random effects, panelprobit method which we use to estimate the ideal points of presidents,senators, and Supreme Court justices on one scale. These estimatesare comparable across time and institutions. We contrast ourmethod with previously used methods and show that our methodincreases the ability to study interactions among differentinstitutions.     

学者型CEO更加自律吗?——学术经历对高管在职消费的影响

本文选取2010—2016年中国沪深A股上市公司样本,实证检验CEO学术经历对高管在职消费行为的影响。研究发现,学术经历有助于CEO强化道德自觉、增强道德自律,形成内在的自我约束与监督机制,进而抑制了其所在企业的高管在职消费活动。当CEO拥有高层次学术经历或来自内部晋升时,CEO学术经历对高管在职消费的抑制效应更为显著。该结论在采用双重差分模型、Heckman两阶段模型控制潜在的内生性问题及其他稳健性检验之后仍然成立。进一步研究表明,在自由现金流较多、董事会规模较大或独立性较低、外部审计监督较弱以及产品市场竞争程度较低等公司内外部治理环境较差的情景下,学者型CEO的自律品质所能发挥的治理作用更大,对高管在职消费的抑制效应也更为明显。此外,在党的十八大之后,随着“八项规定”等多项高压反腐政策的出台,政策效应在国有企业高管在职消费的治理中发挥着主导性作用,CEO学术经历对国有企业高管在职消费的抑制效应有所下降。本文为高管学术经历的治理效应假说提供了证据支持,对于上市公司规范和治理高管在职消费行为、选聘合适的高管人才具有重要的借鉴意义。     

Local television,citizen knowledge and U.S. senators' roll-call voting

I study the effect of access to local television on citizens' political knowledge. I do so by utilizing the mismatch between U.S. television markets and state borders, causing some citizens to receive local television which primarily covers neighboring state politics. I find that access to relevant local television causes citizens to be more informed about their senators' roll-call votes, and more likely to hold opinions about these senators. I also find that citizens with access to relevant local television are more likely to assess their senators based on how well the senators' roll-call votes align with the citizens' policy preferences. These results suggest that passively acquired information through television can help individuals evaluate their elected representatives.     

An empirical analysis of the U.S. Senate vote on NAFTA and GATT

This paper examines the determinants of the voting behavior of the U.S. Senate on the North American Free Trade Agreement and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Public choice theory suggests that the voting behavior of senators is influenced by constituent interests, special interest politics, and their ideology. This paper uses probit analysis to test the significance of the above factors. The results indicate that constituent economic interests and special interest money were significant determinants of the Senate voting on the North American Free Trade Agreement but not on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.     

The presidential power of unilateral action

In this article we highlight a formal basis for presidentialpower that has gone largely unappreciated to this point, buthas become so pivotal to presidential leadership and so centralto an understanding of presidential power that it virtuallydefines what is distinctively modern about the modern presidency.This is the president's formal capacity to act unilaterallyand thus to make law on his own. Our central purpose is to setout a theory of this aspect of presidential power. We arguethat the president's powers of unilateral action are a forcein American politics precisely because they are not specifiedin the Constitution. They derive their strength and resiliencefrom the ambiguity of the contract. We also argue that presidentshave incentives to push this ambiguity relentlessly to expandtheir own powers - and that, for reasons rooted in the natureof their institutions, neither Congress nor the courts are likelyto stop them. We are currently in the midst of a research projectto collect comprehensive data for testing this theory - dataon what presidents have done, as well as on how Congress andthe courts have responded. Here we provide a brief history ofunilateral action, with special attention to the themes of ourtheoretical argument. We also make use of some early data toemerge from our project. For now it appears that the theoryis well supported by the available evidence. This is a workin progress, however, and more is clearly needed before definitiveconclusions can be justified.     

Whose opinion counts? Implementation by sortition

Sortition is the process of selecting decision makers or senators by a lottery. We introduce sortition in implementation theory by augmenting a mechanism with a kleroterion or lottery machine p that selects the senators. An outcome is implemented after consulting only the opinions of the senators. We call the corresponding notion of implementation as “p-implementation”, and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for p-implementation. Our main result is that in “economic” environments, every Nash implementable social choice rule (SCR) is also p-implementable if p selects every quartet of players with positive probability and always selects at least three senators. We apply this result to two kleroteria: “oligarchic democracy” and “random sampling”. In economic environments, every Nash implementable SCR can be implemented by oligarchic democracy of three oligarchs. In economic environments, every Nash implementable SCR can be implemented by randomly selecting four senators.     

The president and asymmetric use of information

While presidents try to allocate resources to their interests in budgeting process, they have limited power to influence because the government budget is approved by the legislative body. This study investigates whether presidents asymmetrically use information on the efficiency of programs to allocate more resources to their interests. Specifically, I focus on leftover funds in the government reporting. Growing leftover funds indicate inefficiency of the programs as they are the results of lack of demand or operational problems in implementation. Using data from the Korean government, I find that the change of leftover funds of programs and the following year’s budget has a negative relation only when the change of leftover funds is negative, which suggests that the efficiency of the program improves. This phenomenon becomes more salient when the programs are related to the president’s political interests. This suggests that presidents allocate resources to the programs of their interests by asymmetrically using the information on efficiency. This study contributes to the extant literature by identifying one of the presidents’ tools to affect the budgeting process.     

Delegation and the regulation of U.S. financial markets

We analyze the institutional determinants of U.S. financial market regulation with a general model of the policy-making process in which legislators delegate authority to regulate financial risk at both the firm and systemic levels. The model explains changes in U.S. financial regulation leading up to the financial crisis. We test the predictions of the general model with a novel, comprehensive data set of financial regulatory laws enacted specifically between 1950 and 2009. The theoretical and empirical analysis finds that economic and political factors impact Congress’ decision to delegate regulatory authority to executive agencies, which in turn impacts the stringency of financial market regulation, and our estimation results indicate that political factors may have been stronger and resulted in inefficiencies.     

Politicians, deficits, and monetary policy in the U.S. revisited

This paper reconsiders the evidence regarding the existence of executive and congressional influences on monetary policy in the U.S. Results regarding the source of the federal deficit (cyclical or structural) provide evidence that structural deficits occurring under Democratic presidential administrations have a significant impact on money growth rates, but those occurring under their Republican counterparts may not. Although the evidence regarding cyclical deficits is statistically weaker, their more limited influence on monetary growth rates appears to be similar regardless of whether they occur under Democratic or Republican presidents. This contrasts with previous research which suggests that cyclical deficits influence monetary growth rates under Democratic administrations while structural deficits generated a similar monetary response regardless of which party held the presidency.     

IS THERE A “CULTURE OF SPENDING” IN CONGRESS?

This study empirically tests the "Culture of Spending" hypothesis (Payne, 199la). According to this hypothesis, the longer congressmen stay in office, the more likely they are to support federal spending. Spending behavior in this study is measured by the National Taxpayers Union (NTU) Congressional Spending Score. Samples are drawn from annual spending scores for all U.S. representatives and senators who served in office between 1975 and 1993. This study finds no statistical support for the hypothesis that congressmen have an increasing propensity to support federal spending the longer they stay in office. Furthermore, we are able to explain why other studies obtain results different from ours.     

Who's talking about the future?: An analysis of the U.S. Presidents

What are people actually saying when they are talking and writing about the future? The paper rests on two premises; that the future is essentially a construct of human thought, and that one method of knowing the future is to carefully examine the language used when “the future” is being talked about. The 13 inaugural addresses of the U.S. presidents since 1933 are systematically examined for evidences of their author's future orientation. The paper provides both factual data about the future consciousness of our presidents over the past 50 years, and also demonstrates the use of linguistic analysis for forecasting the future.     

高层次人才政策的演进历程及其中国特色

改革开放以来我国高层次人才政策的演进和创新可分为4个阶段,即拨乱反正和摸索期、体系初建和发展期、战略转型和完善期、自主创新和成熟期。通过分析,剖析了我国高层次人才政策具有的鲜明特色,即以科学发展观为指导思想、以党管人才为根本原则、以人才强国为国家战略、“一体两翼”式的决策思维、“多重肯定”式的激励模式、“党政并存”式的组织机构和“指导、协作与分工”式的实践机制。     

科学技术进步地方性立法比较研究

随着《中华人民共和国科学技术进步法》在2007年的修订,拥有地方立法权的各级人民代表大会纷纷制订与之相适应的地方性法规。比较研究了新近颁布的多个地方科技进步条例,分析其在章节结构、条款上存在的差异,从而归纳出制订此类法规应注意的问题。     

RESTORATION-BASED COMPENSATION MEASURES IN NATURAL RESOURCE LIABILITY STATUTES

In the past two decades, the U.S. Congress has passed several major environmental statutes that designate natural resource management agencies as trustees of the resources on behalf of the public and that allow the trustees to recover damages for injuries to public resources from releases of hazardous substances and discharges of oil.
The standard measure of damages in the various statutes is the cost of restoring the resources to baseline conditions ("primary restoration") plus the interim loss in alue from the time of the incident until full recovery from the injuries. However, trustees are allowed to spend their damage recoveries only on enhancing or creating ("restoring, rehabilitating, replacing or acquiring the equivalent of") natural resources. The statutory restriction on the use of the recoveries has motivated the development of an alternative measure of damages for interim losses—the cost of "compensatory restoration" actions providing in-kind compensation—which the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) incorporated in its 1996 regulations implementing the natural resource liability provisions of the Oil Pollution Act (OPA).
This analysis first identifies the statutory measure of damages and the traditional framing of damages for interim losses (monetary compensation). It then defines an alternative utility-theoretic measure of resource compensation and identifies alter-native methods of implementation.     

The influence of money and the rate of interest on the rate of inflation in a financially repressed economy: the case of Turkey

In this paper we discuss a recent paper by Stephen E. Haynes in which he relates electoral cycles in political support to electoral cycles in economic variables. Haynes finds that the cycle in support for Republican presidents is explained by the cycle in economic variables, whereas the cycle in support for Democratic presidents is not. In our opinion this shortcoming is due to his specification of the popularity function. Haynes estimates a popularity function which incorporates the notion that voters reward the incumbent for favourable outcomes (score hypothesis). Our popularity function combines the score hypothesis and the notion that voters cast their ballots for the party that best fits the current economic situation (issue hypothesis). We show that the electoral cycle in popularity of both Republican and Democratic presidents is explained very well by the cycle in economic variables.     

RESTORING PREDICTABILITY TO MERGER GUIDELINE ANALYSIS

Two recent developments reduce predictability and accountability in merger analysis. First, the 1984 Merger Guidelines adopt a multifactor method of analysis that focuses upon market structure, other market factors, financial trends, and efficiencies. Little guidance is given concerning the relative importance of these factors or how they will be measured and balanced. Second, current enforcement agencies appear to take a “regulatory” approach to merger enforcement. They issue “no-action” decisions in 90–95 percent of the mergers reviewed and reach “fix-it-first” consent settlements before complaints are filed in most remaining cases. These developments provide mixed blessings. Enforcement agencies gain flexibility and discretion. However, the business community suffers a reduction in predictability in merger analysis, which makes planning more difficult. Congress loses ability to carry out its oversight responsibilities, and the public's understanding of the government's policies is impaired. Systematic, regular reports of information used by the government analyzing significant “second-request” mergers should replace the present system of providing either no information or, at best, only selected information through ad hoc press releases and official speeches. Reporting on these transactions would not be burdensome, because their number is relatively small and the information already has been produced by the investigating enforcement agency. This information could easily be incorporated into the annual Hart-Scott-Rodino Act reports. For each of these mergers, the information reported should include the government's views concerning the relevant market and the degree of concentration in that market. It also should specify the type and magnitude of other market factors, efficiencies, and/or defenses that might have played a role in reaching a decision not to prosecute the merger or a fix-it-first settlement. This information could be provided without infringing on confidentiality.     

Legislative Organization Under Separate Powers

Existing theories of legislative organization attribute thestrong committee system in the U.S. Congress to members' distributive,informational, or partisan needs. But legislators elsewhereshare these same motivations, yet not all have chosen to organizethemselves in a similar fashion. Therefore the strong committeesystem must derive to some extent from the larger constitutionalcontext, including plurality winner elections, bicameralism,and our focus, the system of separate powers. In particularwe argue that committees established in part to oversee executiveagencies will have preferences biased against those of the executive.Thus committees serve as contrary outliers, acting as a counterweightto executive branch policy making. We find support for thisprediction with data drawn from all standing committees fromthe 80th to 102nd Congresses. We also find that each of theseemingly incompatible theories of legislative organizationpredicts well patterns of committee composition in differentissue areas.     

PROPERTY RIGHTS, REGULATORY TAKING, AND COMPENSATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

The 104th Congress considered several proposals requiring compensation for regulatory actions that diminish property values. Aimed primarily at weakening environmental protection, the bills focus on property rights independent of the public benefits from regulation. By significantly broadening the constitutional standard for compensation, the bills generate a government liability well in excess of compliance costs and thus discourage regulatory agencies from carrying out their mandates. The bills would increase transactions costs and undermine the efficient provision of environmental quality, public safety, and other public goods.