关税与经济增长模型在中国的实证分析

关税政策旨在通过关税的调节来调整进出口的数量和种类,进而影响国家经济增长和人民生活水平。改革开放以来,我国关税税率持续下调,加入世界贸易组织后关税水平进一步下降。国外学者对关税调整如何影响经济增长有很多研究。本文运用DREXE大学Constantious Syropoulos教授的基本观点,结合我国实际数据,构建回归模型,验证了关税对长期经济增长的影响机制,并对关税政策制定提出了一定的政策建议。     

新形势下中国关税水平和关税结构的合理性探讨

本文从中国已是全球贸易大国这一事实出发,通过关税调整国际经验的总结,对中国关税水平的合理性作出一个准确判断。同时,结合后多哈回合这一国际背景和新一轮改革开放的国内形势,认为维持当前关税水平已不符合中国发展的实际需要,需要进行自主的关税减让。此外,通过对中国HS10位码中的工业品税目进行逐项分析,发现当前中国关税结构不尽合理,仍然需要进一步优化。结合上述分析结论,对中国关税水平和关税结构的未来调整,给出方向性的建议。     

中国工业贸易有效保护水平与结构——基于2006年关税数据的实证分析

本文在对关税有效保护率进行理论分析的基础上,对我国36个工业贸易部门2006年的关税有效保护水平和结构进行了实证分析。实证结果表明,我国工业部门的关税有效保护率呈现出了从上游产品到下游产品逐渐升高的阶梯型分布,总体结构比较合理,但是与比较优势的动态变化和产业结构调整的方向还存在不相适应的地方。本文就此提出了进一步优化我国关税有效保护结构的政策建议。     

国际贸易中出口关税政策调整的效应分析——以俄罗斯提高原木出口关税为例

贸易大国出口关税政策的调整具有福利效应、收入效应和需求弹性效应。本文以俄罗斯原木出口关税政策调整为例,利用经济学理论分析了国际贸易中的准垄断效应和需求弯曲效应,拓展了对国际贸易中效应问题的认识。     

中国关税政策调整及其对经济发展的影响

我国最近进口关税税率的调整,目的在于解决名义关税水平高而实际关税水平低的矛盾;解决地区间、企业间不平等竞争的矛盾,以及解决进口体制与关贸总协定要求之间的矛盾。本文通过分析我国进口税收调整的主要特点后,认为调整关税有利于我国民族工业、对外贸易的发展,并有可能增加财政收入,也使消费者受益。     

从千年回合关税减让谈判看我国关税政策的调整

世贸组织新一轮多边贸易谈判将于2000年1月开始。本文重点介绍和分析新一轮关税减让谈判的主要内容,发达国家和发展中国家将采取的立场,我国现行关税制度存在的问题及如何对现行关税政策进行调整。     

外贸企业税负轻减与否

关税调整分行业 刚刚实施了进出口关税及税则调整,但业界基本无波无浪,毕竟每年1月1日起调整实施新的进出口关税及税则,已经成为近十几年来我国关税政策的“惯例”。而且,关税调整本在情理之中,是我国外贸进出口形势与环境变化需要,也是我国政府在逐步兑现加入WTO时的关税减让承诺。     

关联产业关税税率结构的设计

中国将按照双边市场准入谈判的承诺,逐步调整关税率,到2006年中国的关税平均水平将降到9%左右。在关税平均水平一定的条件下,关税税率结构的不同,带来对本国民族产业的有效保护程度的不同。本文从分析关税税率结构研究的现状出发,提出以产业结构调整的要求为依据来确定各产业合理的关税有效保护率,以实现平均关税税率最低为目标来构建从上游产品到下游产品名义关税税率逐步提高的梯形关税结构,并且给出了具体的设计方法。     

中美贸易摩擦背景下中国制造业调整成本分析——基于贸易增加值的测算

本文构建了基于贸易增加值的调整成本指数Sv,以此测算中美贸易中中国制造业的调整成本,分析了美国对华加征关税对中国相关产业的影响。结果表明:在中美贸易中,中国制造业普遍面临着扩张性的调整成本,且存在着较大的产业间差异;美国对华加征关税商品主要分布在中国处于扩张性调整成本的产业,加征关税将给这些产业带来较大的调整压力。本文的政策建议一是将贸易保护引致的调整成本作为中美贸易谈判的重要参考,对中国制造业的进一步开放和保护做出合理取舍;二是建立调整成本风险预警机制,规避贸易保护的不利影响。     

恢复关贸总协定地位对我国外贸的影响及对策

我国恢复关贸总协定地位,对我国对外经贸事业将产生深远的影响,作者在本文提出了5项抉择与对策:有效运用灵活关税制或差别关税保护民族工业;尽快实现关税保护向非关税措施保护的转变;加快人民币汇率到位;积极争取关贸总协定缔约各方为我国产品开放市场;大力培养与关贸总协定相关的人才。     

Differentiated products and evasion of import tariffs

An emerging literature has demonstrated some unique characteristics of trade in differentiated products. This paper contributes to the literature by postulating that differentiated products may be subject to greater tariff evasion due to the difficulties associated with assessing their quality and price. Using product-level data on trade between Germany and 10 Eastern European countries during 1992-2003, we find empirical support for this hypothesis. We show that the trade gap, defined as the discrepancy between the value of exports reported by Germany and the value of imports from Germany reported by the importing country, is positively related to the level of tariff in 8 out of 10 countries. Further, we show that the responsiveness of the trade gap to the tariff level is greater for differentiated products than for homogeneous goods. A one-percentage-point increase in the tariff rate is associated with a 0.4% increase in the trade gap in the case of homogeneous products and a 1.7% increase in the case of differentiated products. Finally, the data indicate that tariff evasion takes place through misrepresentation of the import prices rather than underreporting of quantities or product misclassification.     

Differentiated products and evasion of import tariffs

An emerging literature has demonstrated some unique characteristics of trade in differentiated products. This paper contributes to the literature by postulating that differentiated products may be subject to greater tariff evasion due to the difficulties associated with assessing their quality and price. Using product-level data on trade between Germany and 10 Eastern European countries during 1992–2003, we find empirical support for this hypothesis. We show that the trade gap, defined as the discrepancy between the value of exports reported by Germany and the value of imports from Germany reported by the importing country, is positively related to the level of tariff in 8 out of 10 countries. Further, we show that the responsiveness of the trade gap to the tariff level is greater for differentiated products than for homogeneous goods. A one-percentage-point increase in the tariff rate is associated with a 0.4% increase in the trade gap in the case of homogeneous products and a 1.7% increase in the case of differentiated products. Finally, the data indicate that tariff evasion takes place through misrepresentation of the import prices rather than underreporting of quantities or product misclassification.     

Trade Creation and Diversion Effects of Regional Trade Agreements: A Product‐level Analysis

This paper examines the impacts of regional trade agreements (RTAs) on trade flows at product level, with a particular focus on trade creation and diversion. Based on estimation of the gravity equation, dealing with the zero trade flows and endogeneity bias problems, we analyse the impacts of various types of RTAs involving 67 countries for 20 products during the 1980–2006 period. We find that RTAs among developing countries tend to cause trade diversion compared with RTAs among developed countries. Taking the higher external tariff rates of developing countries compared with developed countries into consideration, our results suggest trade diversion is likely to be caused by remaining high tariffs on imports from non‐members. In addition, we find the trade creation effect for many products in the cases of Customs Unions and plurilateral RTAs. These results imply that trade creation would be caused by various factors besides the reduction in tariff rates. Based on these results, we draw a policy implication that external tariff rate reduction is an important factor in avoiding trade diversion in the formation of RTAs, in particular for RTAs among developing countries, while a large number of members and the common external tariff appear to be important for generating the trade creation effect.     

The effects of cross-regional free trade agreements under a vertical industry structure

This paper examines the effects of a cross-regional free trade agreement (FTA) on tariffs, welfare, and the incentives for multilateral free trade in a three-country model with a vertical industry structure. We show that the FTA induces member countries to reduce their tariffs on nonmember countries. On the other hand, a nonmember country lowers its tariff on final-good imports, but raises its tariff on intermediate-good imports. Also, the FTA makes member and nonmember countries better off. After the FTA is enacted, member and nonmember countries have an incentive to support multilateral free trade, so an FTA acts as a building block for multilateral trade liberalization.     

Optimum tariffs and retaliation: How country numbers matter

This paper identifies a new terms-of-trade externality that is exercised through tariff setting. A North-South model of international trade is introduced in which the number of countries in each region can be varied. As the number of countries in one region is increased, each government there competes more aggressively with the others in its region, by lowering its tariff, to attract imports from the other region. In doing so, all countries in a region exert a negative terms-of-trade externality on each other, collectively undermining their own terms of trade and welfare. This externality can increase efficiency if the numbers of countries in both regions are increased simultaneously.     

Non‐Tariff Measures,Specific Trade Concerns and Tariff Reduction

This paper studies the determinants of the recent proliferation of Specific Trade Concerns raised at the WTO on non‐tariff trade measures (NTMs), with a focus on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBTs). Even though NTMs are imposed de jure to protect consumers from unhealthy products, they increase trade costs de facto. So, when tariff protection lowers, NTMs become effective barriers to trade and the exporting countries can complain at the dedicated committee at the WTO (STCs). Therefore, we study whether STCs are raised by exporting countries as a consequence of tariff reductions in importing countries, that is when non‐tariff measures become barriers to trade. Using a recent database on STCs over the period 1996–2010, we find empirical evidence that SPS and TBT concerns are raised by exporting country as a consequence of importer's tariff cut.     

Preference Erosion,Government Revenues and Non‐tariff Trade Barriers

Developing countries benefiting from developed country unilateral trade preferences fear that Doha Round tariff cuts will erode the value of those preferences. That these programmes confer significant benefits, however, is not clear. Studies indicate that the impact of preference erosion would be minimal for most developing countries. But for a small subset of middle‐income and least‐developed countries, concern may be warranted. WTO members, should address affected countries’ concerns, perhaps by tailoring WTO tariff negotiations to lessen adjustment pressures and providing development assistance. Developing countries also are anxious that lower tariffs will reduce government revenues. Dependence on tariff revenue is diminishing and trade liberalisation need not result in lower total tax revenues or even lower customs revenues. Much depends on a country's current tariff and trade regime, its tax structure and its overall economic structure. At some point, a country does need to broaden its tax base and look to other revenue sources to offset declining tariff revenues. Tax reform, therefore, complements trade reform. A third area of developing country concern is non‐tariff barriers (NTBs), which may limit market access even after tariffs are reduced. Despite prior WTO work in this area, NTBs remain a thorny issue for all WTO members.     

The biggest losers (and winners) from US trade liberalization

Many development experts worry that continuing reductions of tariff levels in high-income countries will limit trade flows from developing countries that benefit from preferential trade programs because of ‘preference erosion.’ Using a panel of US import data between the years of 1997 and 2005, I find that reductions in preference margins will significantly diminish imports of some products, particularly from lower-middle and low income countries; for example, a 1% reduction in the US tariff on a product that is currently imported duty-free from developing countries will decrease imports of that product from lower-middle income countries by an average of 2.6%. However, many products produced by developing countries fail to qualify for preferential tariffs, thus a gradual reduction in all US tariff rates is expected to have only a modest impact on trade flows from developing countries.     

Trade Liberalisation and Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence for Developing Countries

The last five decades have witnessed a profound evolution of economic policy in developing countries, particularly in the case of trade strategies. Both internal, as well as external, factors have prompted the need for more outward‐oriented (or liberalised) trade policy regimes. The creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995 have been important driving forces for free trade. Since then, the major quantitative barriers to trade, i.e. tariffs and non‐tariff barriers (quotas, licences and technical specifications, among other restrictions), have substantially been reduced or dismantled. Also, the progress towards more liberalised trade regimes, mainly in developing countries, has been manifested in the trade and development literature. Major studies suggest that the performance of more outward‐oriented economies is superior to that of those countries pursuing more inward‐looking trade practices (Greenaway and Nam, 1988; Dollar, 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1995; and Rodríguez and Rodrik, 2000). Recent developments in the international trade literature focus on the potential dynamic effects of trade liberalisation, i.e. simplification of tariff structures and elimination of non‐tariff barriers, in reducing the incentives to rent seeking and in accelerating the flow of technical knowledge from the world market. Moreover, there have been important advances regarding the study of trade liberalisation and its impact on exports, imports and the balance of payments, largely neglected in the literature, often driven by supply‐side considerations.     

Foreign direct investment and customs union: Incentives for multilateral tariff cooperation over free trade

The present article examines the implications of a customs union (CU) on the pattern of tariffs, welfare and the prospects for free trade when the non-member firm has an incentive to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI). First, I show that upon the formation of a bilateral CU, the non-member firm has greater incentives to engage in FDI. However, when FDI becomes a feasible entry option for the non- member firm under a CU, member countries have incentives to strategically induce export over FDI by lowering their joint external tariff. When fixed set-up cost of FDI is sufficiently low, this tariff falls below Kemp–Wan tariff and CU leads to a Pareto improvement relative to no agreement. Moreover, using an infinite repetition of the one-shot tariff game under a CU, I show that the presence of FDI incentive of the non-member firm makes the member countries more willing to cooperate multilaterally over free trade while the opposite is true for the non-member country. Finally, I find that, unless fixed cost of having an additional plant is sufficiently low, multilateral cooperation over free trade is easier to sustain when FDI incentive is present.