Price competition,free entry,and welfare in congested markets

In this paper we study the problem of price competition and free entry in congested markets. In particular, we consider a network with multiple origins and a common destination node, where each link is owned by a firm that sets prices in order to maximize profits, whereas users want to minimize the total cost they face, which is given by the congestion cost plus the prices set by firms. In this environment, we introduce the notion of Markovian Traffic Equilibrium to establish the existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy price equilibrium, without assuming that the demand functions are concave nor imposing particular functional forms for the latency functions. We derive explicit conditions to guarantee existence and uniqueness of equilibria. Given this existence and uniqueness result, we apply our framework to study entry decisions and welfare, and establish that in congested markets with free entry, the number of firms exceeds the social optimum.     

Cartel sustainability with vertical product differentiation: Price versus quantity competition

In the context of a vertically differentiated duopoly, we analyse the influence of the degree of differentiation on cartel sustainability, under both price and quantity competition. We find that, under both Bertrand and Cournot competition, the effect of vertical product differentiation on sustainability of the collusive equilibrium is unclear. It is shown that, given a degree of differentiation, price collusion is more sustainable than quantity collusion.     

Price competition in a differentiated products duopoly under network effects

We examine price competition under product-specific network effects, in a duopoly where the products are differentiated both horizontally and vertically. We emphasize the role of consumers’ expectations formation. When expectations are not influenced by prices, the market may be shared but shares must be equal unless product qualities differ or one firm, possibly even the low-quality one, may capture the entire market. When expectations are influenced by prices, which would be the case when there is commitment, competition becomes more intense and the high-quality firm tends to capture a larger market share. Under strong network effects there is a continuum of equilibria and the higher the prices, the smaller the difference between those prices can be. Requiring continuity of expectations, however, delivers a unique equilibrium where one firm captures the entire market.     

Measuring competition in microfinance markets: a new approach

This paper employs a relatively new method of competition measurement, the Boone indicator, for data on 521 microfinance institutions (MFIs) in ten vibrant microfinance markets: Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Indonesia, the Philippines, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Mexico and Peru. This approach is able to measure competition on a yearly basis in market segments without considering the entire market, as other well-known methods – for instance, the Panzar-Rosse model – require. Stochastic frontier (SF) models have been employed to estimate the translog cost function (TCF) and then marginal costs are computed. The potential endogeneity of performance and costs are overcome by utilising a two-step GMM estimator. Results show that competition levels vary from country to country, and over the period 2003–2010 India and Nicaragua had the most competitive microfinance loan markets. Competition among the microfinance institutions in Bangladesh and Bolivia declined significantly over time, which may be due to the partial reconstitution of market power by the giant MFIs in these countries. Competition in other countries remained mostly unchanged over the years, in line with the consolidation and revitalisation of respective microfinance markets.     

Partial privatization in mixed duopoly with price and quality competition

We analyze price and quality competition in a mixed duopoly in which a profit-maximizing private firm competes against a state-owned public firm. We first show that the welfare-maximizing public firm provides a lower quality product than the private firm when they are equally efficient. In order to maximize social welfare, government manipulates the objective of the public firm that is given by a convex combination of profits and social welfare. It is demonstrated that an optimal incentive of the public firm is welfare maximization under the absence of quality competition, but it is neither welfare maximization nor profit maximization under the presence of quality competition. The result supports a completely mixed objective between welfare and profit maximizations or partial privatization of the public firm.      

Geographic price dispersion in retail markets: Evidence from micro-data

Using an extensive micro-price data of 266 retail goods and services across US, EU and OECD cities between 1990 and 2005, we study characteristics of geographic dispersion of deviations from the Law of One Price. We find that the magnitude of price dispersion is a function of the characteristics of both the type of good and set of locations under examination. Higher share of non-traded inputs and lower tradability of goods are both found to contribute to geographic price dispersion, with the former typically dominating in explanatory power. The role of tradability of good in accounting for the price dispersion is more significant as we move beyond an economic geography, while non-traded input level matters relatively more if we move to the interior of this geography. Our evidence suggests that the models of real exchange rates should incorporate the classical distinction between traded inputs and local inputs as well as a role for relative markups and traditional trade costs.     

Price versus quantity in a mixed duopoly with foreign penetration

We characterize the endogenous competition structure (in prices or quantities) in a differentiated duopoly between a public firm that maximizes domestic welfare and a private firm that can be owned by domestic or foreign investors. The market for which they compete can be domestic or integrated: in the first case Bertrand competition emerges endogenously and in the second case Cournot competition can emerge if the fraction of domestic consumers in the integrated market is low enough. We also determine the optimal degree of foreign penetration showing the optimality of a partial foreign ownership. Finally, we extend the model to increasing marginal cost confirming the robustness of the results.     

Price equilibrium in address models of product differentiation: unit-elastic demand

Summary. I present a class of address models of product differentiation with unit-elastic individual demand and show the existence of Nash equilibrium in prices under assumptions on utility functions and the taste and income heterogeneity across consumers. This paper complements the work by Caplin and Nalebuff (1991, Econometrica), who analyze unit demand models of product differentiation. Received: December 28, 1998; revised version: September 5, 2001     

Crowding-out effect and sorting in competitive labour markets with motivated workers

This article makes a contribution to the economics literature by inducing proper self-selection into contracts based on workers’ motivation. The novelty of our results is that it points out the alternative potential role of the crowding-out effect to separate workers based on their motivation.     

Price competition and the Bertrand model: the paradox of the German mobile discount market

We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase.     

Market share dynamics in a duopoly model with word-of-mouth communication

We analyze dynamic price competition in a homogeneous goods duopoly, where consumers exchange information via word-of-mouth communication. A fraction of consumers, who do not learn any new information, remain locked-in at their previous supplier in each period. We analyze Markov perfect equilibria in which firms use mixed pricing strategies. Market share dynamics are driven by the endogenous price dispersion. Depending on the parameters, we obtain different ‘classes’ of dynamics. When firms are impatient, there is a tendency towards equal market shares. When firms are patient, there are extended intervals of market dominance, interrupted by sudden changes in the leadership position.     

Price transmission in the international skim milk powder markets

This article investigates the strength and the pattern of spatial price linkages in skimmed milk powder markets using monthly wholesale price data from three major producers and exporters (the U.S.A., the E.U., and Oceania) and the nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag model. The results suggest that prices in the three regions considered are linked with stable long-run relationships. The law of one price, however, does not hold. The dominant pattern of transmission in the long run is asymmetric involving positive price stocks to be transmitted with higher intensity compared to negative prices shocks; asymmetries in price transmission exist in the short run as well.     

Imperfect competition and the modelling of expectations in macroeconomics

We show that when a model of the macroeconomy is based on imperfect, rather than perfect, competition, this may increase the problem of how to model agents’ expectations. We provide a simple example using an overlapping-generations economy with the potential for unemployment. Under certain assumptions about how consumers migrate between locations between the first and second periods of their lives, this extra issue regarding expectations arises. Imperfect competition may increase agents’ forecasting difficulties because they have to forecast not only future equilibrium prices, but also future out-of-equilibrium prices, and by definition the latter are never actually observed.

Enhancing the teaching of introductory economics with a team-based,multi-section competition

The authors describe a unique approach to enhancing student learning at the introductory economics level that utilizes a multi-section, team-based competition. The competition is structured to supplement learning throughout the entire introductory course. Student teams are presented with current economic issues, trends, or events, and use economic tools and theories to comprehensively examine the topics. Students present their analyses in their own sections with one team from each section moving on to compete in an inter-section round. Students are judged on technicality, creativity, and applicability of economic concepts. The competition has the potential to advance students' creativity, collaboration, communication, and critical and analytical thinking skills, while enhancing their ability to apply foundational economic concepts to real-world settings.     

History-based price discrimination and entry in markets with switching costs: A welfare analysis

We analyze history-based price discrimination in an asymmetric industry, where an incumbent, protected by switching costs, faces an entrant who does not have access to information about consumers’ purchase histories. We demonstrate that consumer surplus is higher with uniform pricing than with history-based price discrimination. We find that the entry decision is invariant to whether the incumbent implements history-based pricing or uniform pricing. This implies that the potential abuse of market dominance imposed by history-based price discrimination is exploitation, not exclusion. Finally, we establish that the profit gain to the incumbent from history-based pricing exceeds the associated loss to consumers.     

Price clustering and natural resistance points in the Dutch stock market: A natural experiment

This paper focuses on the tendency of stock prices to cluster at round numbers (like 10, 20, 30, etc. and to a lesser extent 5, 15, 25, etc.) and the related effect of round number price barriers (prices pass round numbers less frequently than other numbers). Two competing hypotheses are tested, using data from the Dutch stock market of the period 1990–2001. After 1 January 1999 stock prices were listed in euros, while guilders were still the currency of daily life until 2002. The aspiration level hypothesis predicts that round number effects in guilders will only slowly disappear. The odd price hypothesis predicts an abrupt change in round number effects after 1 January 1999. Generally, the results are consistent with the odd price hypothesis.     

Managerial incentives and the decision to hire managers in markets with public and private firms

This paper considers the managerial incentive contract when public and private firms compete in the same market. Social welfare is enhanced when all firms hire managers, but for different reasons than when all firms are privately owned. Incentives to hire managers differ in private and public firms; in equilibrium, only private firms hire managers.     

中国房地产价格运行轨迹及驱动因素

以1999—2008年数据为样本,利用多因素回归分析方法,构建了中国商品房平均价格影响因素模型,研究结果认为城镇投资和贷款利率是影响商品房价格的主要因素。要实现房地产行业的平稳发展,必须转变投资拉动型经济增长模式,鼓励消费、拉动内需,提高消费对经济增长的贡献程度,从而达到降低城镇投资增长速度,抑制房地产价格过快增长的目的。     

Bank competition and the cost of debt: the role of state ownership and firm size

The argument on the puzzling relationship between bank competition and the cost of debt remains inconclusive as the effects of state ownership and firm size are intertwined. We find that bank competition is negatively associated with the cost of debt and observe that the negative effect of bank competition is stronger for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and weaker for large-sized enterprises. Our findings accord with the market power hypothesis. State ownership strengthens the negative impact of bank competition on the cost of debt, but firm size tends to weaken it. SOEs and large-sized enterprises are associated with a lower cost of debt compared to non-SOEs and small- and medium-sized enterprises, respectively.     

Tax harmonization and tax competition in the European Union: Lessons from Switzerland

This paper presents empirical evidence on individual income tax competition in Switzerland. Tax competition has some influence on the spread of people with high income over the cantons, and it is partly capitalised in dwelling rents. However, it neither leads to a collapse of public good supply nor makes redistribution by the fiscal authorities impossible. Thus, if tax competition works well in Switzerland there is no reason why it should have disastrous effects in a future European Union.