The Kornai Effect and Soft Budget Constraints

The Kornai effect refers to situations where soft budget constraints lead to higher input demands. This paper studies the Kornai effect under different scenarios: nonrandom subsidy rate, random subsidy rate, and random and endogenous subsidy rate; and gives sufficient, sometimes necessary and sufficient, conditions for the Kornai effect to exist.     

预算约束与金融制度选择的新理论:文献述评

本文的考察发现,在预算约束与金融制度结构之间存在着十分紧密的逻辑联系,而且国内外不少文献已经围绕于此展开了广泛而深入的讨论。针对预算约束与金融制度选择的关系,现有文献的理论发现大致包括三个层面:第一,虽然缓解乃至消除软预算约束是任何一种金融体系共同面临的挑战,但软预算约束的消除并非一定有利于长期经济增长;第二,分权的或者集权的金融体制都具有"内生性",因此,至少在理论上无法对其进行孰优孰劣的直观评判,同时也无法在它们之间进行简单的复制和移植;第三,金融体系应对预算约束问题的能力要远弱于企业制度,因此,当一个国家面对预算约束问题时,应当首先着手改善微观经济基础的金融需求结构,而不是调整金融供给结构。     

Investment and the soft budget constraint in China

This paper examines the incentive effects of the soft budget constraint on the investment behavior of firms in general and on the investment-cash flow sensitivity in particular. To this end, we develop a simple model of moral hazard that takes the soft budget constraint into account. Within this moral hazard environment, we show that investment is positively related to the amount of internal funds. We further show that the presence of the soft budget constraint deteriorates the moral hazard problem, thereby making the investment level less sensitive to the amount of internal funds. This is the case irrespective of whether the soft budget constraint renders the firm more or less liquidity constrained. To test the model's empirical implications, we employ data of China's listed companies for the period from 1997 to 2003. We use the share of state ownership as a proxy for the severity of the soft budget constraint. We find strong evidence that firms with larger shares of state ownership exhibit lower investment-cash flow sensitivities than firms with smaller shares of state ownership.     

软预算约束制度成因研究的现状与逻辑

本文试图总结关于软预算约束制度成因的既有研究,并就研究逻辑、基本思想提出建设性批评意见.指出,这些研究在如何理解软预算约束,什么是制度成因,以及研究的方法论这三个问题上有着较大的分歧,今后的研究既要充分发展软预算约束概念,又要充分探讨制度作用的因果逻辑.在此基础上作者给出了一个全面研究软预算约束的综合性研究框架.     

预算软约束与资产价格理性泡沫

文章将预算软约束引入资产价格理性泡沫的分析之中,在给出一个预算软约束情形下资产均衡价格决定模型的基础上,得出了资产价格理性泡沫的表达式.模型分析表明,当存在预算软约束时风险资产的理性泡沫为正;同时,风险资产对应企业面临的预算软约束越大,该风险资产价格中的理性泡沫越大.     

A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint

Why do soft budget constraints exist and persist? In this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best explained by the political desirability of softness. We develop an infinite horizon political economy model where neither democratic nor autocratic politicians can commit to policies that are not ex post optimal. We show that because of the dynamic commitment problem inherent in the soft budget constraint, politicians can in essence commit to make transfers to entrepreneurs which otherwise they would not be able to do. This encourages such entrepreneurs to support them politically. Though the soft budget constraint may induce economic inefficiency, it may be politically rational because it influences the probability of political survival. In consequence, even when information is complete, politicians may fund bad projects which they anticipate they will have to bail out in the future. We show that, maybe somewhat surprisingly, dictators who are less likely to lose power, are more likely to use the soft budget constraint as a strategy to gain political support.     

企业、银行和政府三方还贷博弈研究

预算软约束已成为国有企业改革的阻碍因素,并影响经济转型期的政企、银企关系,而政府对于债务的软预算约束是企业信贷违约的原因之一,根据企业还贷过程中相关利益者的相互博弈,建立一个企业、银行、政府之间三方博弈模型来分析它们之间的行为及其目标差异对企业信贷违约的影响。模型分析表明：政府出于政治和经济利益的考虑,通过补贴银行和企业来实施对企业还贷的软预算约束,而银行在衡量了政府补贴和清算得失之后有可能对企业再贷款。解决预算软约束和企业信贷违约的关键在于＂政府、银行、企业＂之间的关系处理,企业完全按市场化运作,建立科学的法人治理结构,让政府从企业中逐步退出,硬化企业的预算约束环境,从而降低企业的信贷违约的概率。     

Government spending and revenues in Sweden 1722–2011: evidence from hidden cointegration

This study examines the long-run causal relationship between government revenues and spending of the Swedish economy over the period 1722–2011. The results based on hidden cointegration technique and a modified version of the Granger non-causality test, show that there exists a long-run and asymmetric relationship between government spending and government revenues. Our estimation results can be summarized into three main empirical findings. First, the government follows a hard budget constraint and soft budget constraint strategies in the case of negative and positive shocks, respectively. Second, negative shocks to the fiscal budget are removed fairly quickly compared to positive shocks. Third, bi-directional causality between revenues and expenditures offers support in favor of the fiscal synchronization hypothesis. The policy implication is that budget deficit’s reduction could be achieved through government spending cut, accompanied by contemporaneous tax controls.     

BAILOUTS IN FEDERATIONS: IS A HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINT ALWAYS BEST?*

This article analyses hard and soft budget constraints in a federation, where there is a moral hazard problem between the central and the regional governments. Regional governments can avoid a bailout from the center by exerting costly effort. In this setting, a hard budget constraint is not always optimal because it can provide excessive incentives for high effort, and thus discourage investment that is socially efficient. Thus, a hard budget constraint can imply the opposite kind of inefficiency that emerges under a soft budget constraint, where the common pool problem can give rise to inefficiently low effort and overinvestment.     

转轨经济、软预算约束与财政分权

我国正处在经济转轨时期,软预算约束问题仍然存在。财政分权能够通过增强制度约束来缓解动态过程中因事前事后承诺不一致而导致的软预算约束问题,同时,也可以通过促进地方上及地方间的竞争来在一定程度上缓解软预算约束问题。     

Economics of shortage and non-price control

The main ideas and concepts of Economics of Shortage (by János Kornai) and Non-Price Control (edited by János Kornai and Béla Martos) are summarized. Then the notion of a normal state, and the significance of quantity signals in economic control processes are discussed, along with Kornai's views about the role of prices in economic adjustment, and the nature of the budget constraints that agents face. Finally, the paper explores the relationship between Kornai's analysis and the various types of macroeconomic equilibrium recently discussed by Malinvaud.     

Fiscal imbalances and asymmetric adjustment under Labour and Conservative governments in the UK

This paper examines whether the political colour of an incumbent government affects the speed at which fiscal imbalances are corrected in the case of the UK. Using quarterly data, we examine whether Conservative or Labour governments are more prone to operate under a soft budget constraint and vis-à-vis i.e. to adhere to a hard budget strategy. The tests, using quarterly data, cover the period 1961–2011 and the results reported herein reveal differences in the speed at which fiscal imbalances are corrected by Labour and Conservative governments. The former are more inclined to operate under a soft budget constraint whereas the latter under a hard budget constraint.     

Do China's State-Owned Enterprises Maximize Profit?

China's state enterprise reform is often believed to have made profit the most important goal of SOEs. Nonetheless the poor performance of SOEs relative to other forms of enterprises remains puzzling. We offer an explanation based on the incentive aspect of the reform, which complements the theory based on a soft budget constraint. Under certainty, the incentives of enterprise managers to maximize their own compensation are consistent with profit maximization with or without a soft budget constraint. Under uncertainty, however, the managers' incentives generally deviate from expected profit maximization. This deviation is dampened by, but still exists even without a soft budget constraint.     

预算软约束视角下私营企业成长分析

随着社会市场经济体制的不断完善私营企业成长的环境在不断优化。但在快速发展的背后,私营企业面临着多种形式的预算软约束问题,虽在一定条件下有助于经济增长,但大多数对企业成长影响是负面的,并严重损害了社会经济效率。有必要采取各种市场与非市场措施对进行预算软约束硬化,同时要坚持适度原则,在特定条件下保证适度的预算软约束,以加快"十二五"时期私营企业的转型进程。     

Soft budget constraint theories: From centralization to the market

This paper surveys the theoretical literature on the effect of soft budget constraints on economies in transition from centralization to capitalism; it also reviews our understanding of soft budget constraints in general. It focuses on the conception of the soft budget constraint syndrome as a commitment problem. We show that the two features of soft budget constraints in centralized economies – ex post renegotiation of firms' financial plans and a close administrative relationship between firms and the centre – are intrinsically related. We examine a series of theories (based on the commitment-problem approach) that explain shortage, lack of innovation in centralized economies, devolution, and banking reform in transition economies. Moreover, we argue that soft budget constraints also have an influence on major issues in economics, such as the determination of the boundaries and capital structure of a firm. Finally, we show that soft budget constraints theory sheds light on financial crises and economic growth.     

国有企业预算约束硬化与财政分权

软预算约束导致国有企业低效率。在向市场经济转轨的过程中,国有企业软预算约束问题仍然存在。硬化国有企业预算约束是改革的一项重要内容。在要素自由流动的条件下,从中央向地方的财政分权引起地方政府之间的竞争;竞争提高了对亏损国有企业进行救助的机会成本,从而有助于硬化国有企业的预算约束。     

Aid and the Soft Budget Constraint

The author applies the theory of the soft budget constraint to explain some stylized facts regarding the outcomes and practice of international aid, including ineffectiveness, white elephants, and volatility. The soft budget constraint can also make aid counterproductive. Nonetheless, actual aid institutions may be constrained optimal responses to soft budgets and commonly suggested reforms such as improved donor coordination in aid, focus on fewer countries and projects, and less volatility of aid may lower the effectiveness of aid. The soft budget is also consistent with conservative project selection and the recent focus on "ownership."     

Investment decisions and the soft budget constraint

This paper investigates the investment behaviour of a large panel of Hungarian firms in the period 1989–99, in order to assess the impact of institutional and regulatory changes on the efficiency of credit allocation. We find that the role of financial factors for investment decisions has changed significantly after the introduction of major financial reforms, and that firms were affected differently depending on their ownership type. Reforms have hardened the budget constraint of private domestic firms, particularly small ones, and reduced informational problems for foreign‐owned firms. State‐owned firms remained subject to a soft budget constraint. In particular, small state firms became more sensitive to financial conditions, whereas large state firms were unaffected and kept operating under a soft budget constraint.     

A signaling approach to soft budgets

A new explanation for soft budget constraints is given. Projects of an agent are often the more profitable, the more confident the agent is in the principal's competence and/or supports. Principals can signal support and/or competence through a soft budget constraint.     

Patient selection in a mixed oligopoly market for health care: the role of the soft budget constraint

Competition in hospital care is often implemented through mixed markets where public and private hospitals compete for patients. The optimality of this market form has long been debated in the literature. In this paper, we investigate the role of soft budget constraint in affecting patient selection within a mixed market. Patient selection is the undesired effect of hospital competition when three conditions are met: asymmetry in hospitals’ objectives, presence of hospital’s private information and inability to enforce hard budget constraint. The paper shows that soft budget is a pre-condition for the existence of patient selection. Our paper adds an important dimension to the existing literature which considers asymmetry of information as the only cause for this market failure. The understanding of the mechanisms leading to patient selection makes it possible for the regulator to design measures to reduce such undesirable effect.