Sharing the Spoils: Taxing International Human Capital Flows

This paper argues that cross-border human capital flows from developing countries to developed countries over the next half-century will demand a new set of policy responses from developing countries. The paper examines the forces that are making immigration policies more skill-focused, the effect of both flows (emigration) and stocks (diasporas) on the source countries, and the range of taxation instruments available to source countries to manage the consequences of those flows. This paper emphasizes the example of India, a large source country for human capital flows, and the United States, an important destination for these human capital flows and an example of how a country can tax its citizens abroad. In combination, these examples point to the significant advantage to developing countries of potential tax schemes for managing the flows and stocks of citizens who reside abroad. Finally, this paper concludes with a research agenda for the many questions raised by the prospect of large flows of skilled workers and the policy alternatives, including tax instruments, available to source countries.     

Cross-country differences in the contribution of future migration to old-age financing

As life expectancy increases and fertility declines, population aging puts pressure on the financing of welfare states in Europe and other developed countries. Given that immigrant workers are younger than the domestic population, a continuous flow of immigrants reduces the old-age dependency ratio and improves financing. Existing general equilibrium estimates of the public finance contribution of migration, performed with different models, are not comparable across countries and sometimes differ even in sign. We use the same overlapping-generations model with a detailed representation of institutions and labor market activity to provide comparable estimates of the impact of immigration on public finance in four European countries. We find that future projected immigration flows are equivalent to 14.3 % points labor income taxes in Austria, 7.3 points in Germany, 6.2 points in the UK and 1.7 points in Poland in 2060. These differences are due to the projected volume of immigration and institutional setups, among other factors. For comparable volumes of immigration, future flows have largest impact in Germany and smallest in the UK.     

Mustn't Grumble: Immigration,Health and Health Service Use in the UK and Germany*

A rise in population caused by increased immigration is sometimes accompanied by concerns that the increase in population puts additional or differential pressure on welfare services, which might affect the net fiscal contribution of immigrants. The UK and Germany have experienced significant increases in immigration in recent years and this study uses longitudinal data from both countries to examine whether immigrants differ in their use of health services from native-born individuals on arrival and over time. While immigrants to Germany, but not the UK, are more likely to self-report poor health than the native-born population, the samples of immigrants use hospital and GP services at broadly the same rate as the native-born populations in both countries. Controls for observed and unobserved differences between immigrants and native-born sample populations make little difference to these broad findings.     

Immigration and local spending in social services: evidence from a massive immigration wave

The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between immigration and redistributive public spending by using the recent, massive arrival of immigrants in Spain. Specifically, we focus our analysis on the effect of 1998–2006 changes in local immigrant density on contemporaneous changes in municipal spending in social services. To address the potential endogenous location of immigrants, we adopt an instrumental variables approach that uses the distribution of rental housing in 1991 to predict the location of immigrant inflows. The results indicate that (per capita) social spending increased less in those municipalities that recorded the largest increases in immigrant density. We interpret our results as a reduction in natives’ demand for redistributive public spending.     

Measuring International Skilled Migration: A New Database Controlling for Age of Entry

Recent data on international migration of skilled workers defineskilled migrants by education level without distinguishing whetherthey acquired their education in the home or the host country.This article uses immigrants' age of entry as a proxy for wherethey acquired their education. Data on age of entry are availablefrom a subset of receiving countries that together represent77 percent of total skilled immigration to countries of theOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Usingthese data and a simple gravity model to estimate the age-of-entrystructure of the remaining 23 percent, alternative brain drainmeasures are proposed that exclude immigrants who arrived beforeages 12, 18, and 22.     

Remittances and the Brain Drain: Do More Skilled Migrants Remit More?

In most destination countries, immigration policies are tiltedmore and more in favor of skilled individuals. Whether thisshift hurts economic prospects in sending countries, as arguedby the traditional brain drain literature, is somewhat controversial.The most recent literature focuses on the link between skilledoutmigration and educational achievements in the home country.This article emphasizes a different channel. It considers theargument that skilled migrants raise economic welfare at homeby sending a relatively larger flow of remittances. While skilledmigrants typically earn more, and so might be expected to remitmore, they are also likely to spend more time abroad and toreunite with their close family in the host country. These secondtwo factors should be associated with a smaller propensity toremit. Thus, the sign of the impact of the brain drain on totalremittances is an empirical question. A simple model has beendeveloped showing that skilled migrants may indeed have a lowerpropensity to remit from a given flow of earnings. An empiricalequation of remittances is estimated as a measure of the braindrain in developing countries using the Docquier and Marfouk (2004)data set. Evidence is found that the brain drain is associatedwith a smaller propensity to remit.     

Immigration and equity home bias

Why do investors hold such large positions in domestic equity when there are gains to be made from international diversification? This equity home bias puzzle has received considerable attention in the literature, with asymmetric information on domestic and foreign assets (whether by individual choice or by market imperfection) emerging as the most plausible explanation. What happens when we consider a subset of investors whose information sets are closer to investors in foreign countries? I assess the relationship between immigration and equity home bias and find that inward migration is positively correlated with increased foreign equity positions and reduced home bias. Looking across income groups, outward migration reduces home bias for relatively rich countries, but may actually increase home bias when migration occurs to or from a developing country. These results suggest that immigration generates a positive externality of increased information flows for developed countries, but not for developing nations. The effects of immigration on investment are strongest within the Euro-Zone, suggesting that this positive externality of immigration is largest when barriers to portfolio diversification (such as currency risk) are lowest.     

Taxation, Migration, and Pollution

This paper analyzes optimal fiscal, environmental and immigration policy for a single jurisdiction. In the presence of immigration quotas, taxes on the output of externality-producing industries should be higher than indicated by the standard rule for Pigovian corrective taxation. Immigration quotas are not optimal if fiscal instruments can be used to control immigration, and relaxation of immigration quotas generally increases domestic welfare. If optimal taxes are imposed on immigrants, no immigration quota should be imposed, and a version of the traditional Pigovian rule characterizes optimal taxation of domestic externalities. If production in the immigrants' country of origin causes trans-boundary spillovers, domestic welfare can be improved by lighter taxation of immigrants or by further relaxation of immigration quotas. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Domestic and foreign country bias in international equity portfolios

Distinguishing two components of the preference for geographical proximity – the domestic country bias assessing investors’ holdings within the domestic market, and the foreign country bias assessing investors’ bilateral holdings within a particular host, I document a number of stylized facts related to international equity portfolios. First, investors in emerging countries hold systematically larger shares in their local markets compared to investors in developed countries. Second, while investors generally allocate trivial shares to most of the available destinations and completely disregard the remaining ones, I report several positive country bias ratios suggesting that the source country's investors overweigh the destination market. Third, the portfolio equity held in only a small number of destination markets generates much of countries’ existing foreign assets. I refer to this observation as the geographical shrinkage suggesting that the domestic bias coexists with an equally imperfect diversification of investors’ foreign asset holdings.     

Temporary immigration visas

This paper deals with recent proposals concerning temporary immigration visas as a means to combat the problem of illegal immigration. We set up a simple two-period model of international migration between a poor South and a rich North with temporary visas issued for one period. Because of capital market imperfections, immigrants from the South face additional capital costs when financing the visa fee. In this model, we find that temporary visas can improve welfare in the North if capital costs of the immigrants are sufficiently low. For high capital costs, however, a welfare reduction cannot be ruled out. We extend the model to the case of heterogeneous immigrants and asymmetric information. In this setting, we show that the government in the North may have an incentive to issue temporary visas for those with low capital costs and to tolerate illegal immigration of the others.     

MIGRATION into the WELFARE STATE: tax and migration competition

Despite big gains from easing restrictions on international labor mobility, liberalizing migration flows is not pursued unilaterally or negotiated among countries in a way that international trade negotiations are pursued. Among several key explanations is the fiscal burden imposed by immigration on native-born. The paper focuses on a central tension faced by policy makers in countries that receive migrants from lower wage countries. Such countries are typically high productivity and capital rich, and the resulting high wages attract both skilled and unskilled migrants. A generous welfare state may attract low-skill migration deter skilled migration, since it is likely to be accompanied by higher redistributive taxes. Assuming that a group of host countries faces an upward supply of immigrants, the analysis demonstrates that tax competition does not indeed lead to a race to the bottom; competition may lead to higher taxes than coordination. There exists a fiscal externality (fiscal leakage) that causes tax rates (on both labor and capital), and the volume of migration (of both skill types), to be higher in the competitive regime than in the coordinated regime.     

On the Political Economy of Low Skilled Immigration and the Welfare State

This paper inquires into the collective decision making on both unemployment insurance and immigration. It is shown that low skill immigration typically increases the contribution rate to the unemployment insurance system. This can translate into higher benefits, the increase of the economy-wide unemployment rate nonwithstanding. The host country allows for immigration only if high skilled natives are sufficiently powerful. Furthermore, political rights of immigrants are restricted to a minimum.     

The ageing of Europe: Demographic scenarios of Europe's futures

This paper explores the demographic futures of Europe by presenting two scenarios. The ‘silver century’ scenario is based on the continuation of current demographic trends and policies. In this scenario, Europe's population will continue to age and immigration will be limited. As a result younger people will increasingly tend to concentrate in urban areas while the retirees, who are able, will settle in suburban and rural spaces. In the ‘open borders’ scenario, the EU and most of the member states will introduce an open and actively promoted immigration policy. Most immigrants will concentrate in large metropolitan areas. At the same time there will also be some countries and regions with very limited immigration from abroad. At the local scale immigration will contribute to social and spatial segregation. Hence, without the regulation or at least management of types and destinations of immigration, demographic imbalances will not be addressed at the regional level. Furthermore while the freedom of movement may have some macro-economic benefits and address population imbalances in some (mainly metropolitan) areas, pre-existent trends undermining both socio-economic cohesion and sustainable patterns of development are unlikely to be resolved.     

Tax competition, excludable public goods, and user charges

This paper provides an explanation for the increasing reliance on revenue from user charges on excludable public goods. We develop a model with many identical countries. The government of each country imposes a source-based tax on capital and supplies an excludable public good to heterogeneous households. Without tax competition, the price on the public good is zero. Tax competition induces each country to choose a positive price. The reliance on user charges turns out to be increasing in the intensity of tax competition measured by the number of countries. A coordinated decrease in user charges is shown to raise welfare in all countries.      

Target's organisational form and returns to Australian bidders in cross‐border acquisitions

We present large sample evidence on return performances of Australian acquirers who bid for public and private targets in cross‐border acquisitions. While placing a particular emphasis on the method of payment and the shareholder protection offered by the target country, we analyse the impact of various bid, firm and foreign‐acquisition‐specific characteristics on bidding firms' abnormal returns. We find that Australian investors perceive cross‐border acquisitions as value‐creating exercises regardless of the organisational form of the target acquired. However, bidders for private targets earn higher return when the method of payment is stock and the targets are located in high investor protection countries. We further find that the abnormal returns are conditional to the relative size of the target, bid frequency, target country destination and the preacquisition financial performance of bidding firms.     

Mergers and Acquisitions in Latin America: Industrial Productivity and Corporate Governance

This article examines the impact of industrial productivity in the country of origin on transnationals M&As, directed from OECD countries toward Latin America in the period 1996–2010. It also analyzes the relationship between external mechanisms of corporate governance and transnational M&As. Employing a gravitational model at the industry level, we find that industry productivity in the country of origin promotes transnational M&A activity, although capital productivity affects it negatively. We also find evidence that higher standards of corporate governance in both origin and destination countries increase the likelihood of transnational M&As taking place.     

Free Immigration and Welfare Access: The Swedish Experience

With the expansion of the European Union from 15 to 25 member countries in 2004, fears of migrants’ excessive welfare use led 14 of the 15 older member countries to impose restrictions on the access of citizens of the new member countries – the A10 countries – to their welfare systems. Sweden was the only exception. This paper evaluates the net contribution of post‐enlargement A10 immigrants to Swedish public finances in 2007. On average, A10 immigrants generate less public revenue than the population on average, but they also cost less. The net result is a zero or small positive net contribution. In particular, A10 immigrants do not benefit more from basic social welfare than the population on average. The discounted net contribution over the A10 immigrants’ lifetimes may be positive or negative depending, for example, on their income assimilation rates and on future real interest rates.     

Social Transfers And Income Inequality In Old Age

Abstract

This paper examines variation in old-age income inequality between industrialized nations with modern welfare systems. The analysis of income inequality across countries with different retirement income systems provides a perspective on public pension policy choices and designs and their distributional implications. Because of the progressive nature of public pension programs, we hypothesize that there is an inverse relationship between the quality of public pension benefits and old-age income inequality—that is, countries with comprehensive, universal, and generous public pension systems will exhibit more equal distributions of income in old age.

Luxembourg Income Study data indeed show that cross-national variation in old-age income inequality is partly explained by differences in the percentage of seniors’ total income derived from public pension transfers. Sweden, for example, has the highest level of government transfers and the lowest level of old-age income inequality, while Israel and the United States have the lowest levels of dependency on government transfers and the highest levels of income inequality. A notable exception is Canada, where public transfers represent only a moderate portion of elderly income, yet old-age income inequality is relatively low. These findings suggest that quality of public pension benefits does indeed play a role in explaining differences in old-age income inequality between industrialized nations, yet these variations are also likely influenced by other factors.     

Impacts of Immigration on an Ageing Welfare State: An Applied General Equilibrium Model for France

Immigration is often seen as an instrument of adaptation for ageing countries. In this paper, we evaluate, using a dynamic general equilibrium model, the contribution of migration policy in reducing the tax burden associated with the ageing population in France. Four alternative scenarios, compared with a baseline scenario based on official projections, are simulated with the aim of quantifying the effects of immigration on French social protection finances. We show that the age and, to a lesser extent, the skill structure of immigrants are the key features that mainly determine the effects on social protection finances. Overall, these effects are all the more positive in the short to medium term if the migration policy is selective (in favour of more skilled workers). In the long term, the beneficial effects of a selective policy may disappear. But whatever the degree of selectivity of the migration policy, the financial gains from higher consequent migration flows are relatively moderate compared with the demographic changes implied by ageing.     

Withholding tax rates on dividends: symmetries versus asymmetries or single- versus multi-rated double tax treaties

Out of all double tax treaties (DTTs) in force in 2012, around 41% are symmetric (single-rated) and 59% are asymmetric (multi-rated), i.e., they prescribe different dividend withholding tax rates depending on the foreign investor’s ownership fraction. The paper investigates the reasons for this phenomenon, namely why some countries in their DTTs prefer homogenous withholding tax rates over separate rates for participation and portfolio dividends. In a theoretical model, I demonstrate why home countries may have an interest in a high withholding tax rate in the host country, even though they do not receive the revenue from this tax. Further, I find confirming evidence that a reason for having multi-rated withholding taxes on dividends is an existing spatial dependence on the rates of the countries’ peers that may be a driving factor for setting multi-rated taxes. Finally, I confirm that the spread itself (i.e., the difference between the portfolio and participation dividends negotiated in the tax treaty) is also affected by the peer countries.