Risk and wealth effects of U.S. firm joint venture activity

Using a sample of US firms engaged in joint venture activity primarily in the 1990s, we test the hypothesis that joint venture activity is motivated by a desire for efficient risk sharing. We find that approximately ninety-six percent of our sample experiences a risk change in response to joint venture activity. A significant proportion of these experience a reduction in beta. No market price response is evident in conjunction with this reduction. In addition, the average parent firm experiences a significant increase in firm risk, which we attribute to taking on the risky joint venture. This increase in risk is particularly pronounced for firms engaged in international joint ventures and is accompanied by a positive market response. Investment stake, pre-venture firm profitability, size and private risk increasing characteristics appear to influence the wealth character of the joint venture. We interpret that there may be a positive market premium for international diversification effects and/or for the flexibility that the real option joint venture opportunity provides.     

The impact of technology-motivated M&A and joint ventures on the value of IT and non-IT firms: a new examination

We extend Lee and Lim (Rev Quant Financ Account 27:111–123, 2006) who provide empirical evidence on the impact of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and joint ventures on the value of information technology (IT) and non-IT firms. Using technology-motivated transactions, we examine whether there are differences in market response to the announcement of M&As and joint ventures, and we consider the long-term performance of such firms. We find the market provides no (positive) reaction to joint ventures (M&As) at the announcement. We also present new evidence suggesting the market reacts more favorably to the announcement of technology M&As relative to joint ventures for our full sample, IT sample and non-IT sample. However, our examination of these firms’ long-term performance suggests the initial reaction is not fully supported. The findings suggest improved (declining) operating performance for joint venture (M&A) firms, and evidence to conclude joint venture firms achieve superior long-term performance changes for both accrual- and cash-based measures. To explain these inconsistencies, we employ a set of control variables previously documented as determinants of the innovation ownership decision. For joint venture firms, we find that, while the market fails to consider the importance of the firms’ R&D intensity and growth prospects in its initial reaction, these are ultimately key indicators of their future performance. The evidence also suggests the market overreacts to M&A announcements because it over-weights the impact of R&D intensity on the firms’ future performance in its initial response.     

The potential for expropriation through joint ventures

We examine the potential expropriation of a firm's intellectual capital that results from joint venture agreements when a firm's joint venture partner becomes the target of an acquisition attempt. We find that: (1) non-targeted joint venture partners often suffer losses in value upon the announcement of the acquisition; (2) the magnitude of the loss increases with the R&D intensity of the non-targeted joint venture partner; and (3) average bidder returns are less negative for acquirers if the affected joint venture partners report R&D spending and are in the same line of business as the acquirer. Our estimate of the average loss is $843 million per firm, roughly 3% of the non-targeted firm's pre-announcement equity value. Our evidence suggests a previously unrecognized merger motive in that joint ventures expose a firm's intellectual capital to the risk of expropriation.     

THE USE OF ACQUISITIONS AND JOINT VENTURES BY U.S. BANKS EXPANDING ABROAD

We examine international bank expansions, which are classified as banking (scale related) or nonbanking (complementary) moves into developed or developing markets. The market responds favorably to expansions through joint ventures by U.S. banks, and insignificantly to expansions through acquisitions. Accounting and operating performances (for joint venture banks) and long‐period holding returns (for acquisitions) show improvement in the two years following the announcement. Systematic risk declines for the sample overall, for acquisitions, and for expansions into developing countries. In general, scale or developing expansions are better pursued through acquisitions, whereas complementary or developed expansions are best pursued through joint ventures.     

The Evidence on Product-Market Diversifying Acquisitions and Joint Ventures by U.S. Banks

We examine the acquisition and joint venture strategies of U.S. banks from 1980 to 1998 to diversify into non-banking sectors. We find that the market responds favorably to both types of expansions, with the gains being shared between acquiring banks and their targets and venture banks and their non-bank partners, respectively. Acquisitions expose acquiring banks to significant increases in nonsystematic, market, and total risk, while joint ventures result in significant decreases in the nonsystematic and total risk measures for participating banks. Our results suggest that product-market expansions, in general, provide U.S. banks with value-enhancing opportunities, and that joint ventures may improve both the return and risk characteristics of the partner banks.     

The value captor's process: getting the most out of your new business ventures

The high failure rate among new business ventures is usually chalked up to the fundamental uncertainty of the process. In actuality, say McGrath and Keil, flawed ways of assessing and managing ventures may account for the disappointing amount of value they generate. Instead of taking the go/no-go approach, whereby a project either advances toward launch or is killed, decision makers should consider a range of alternatives: recycling the venture by aiming it at a new target market; spinning it off to other owners or a joint venture; spinning it in to an established business unit; or salvaging useful elements such as technologies, capabilities, knowledge, and patents. Firms that excel in value extraction--the "value captors" whose practices and mind-set this article explores--have created formal processes to systematically mine successes, failures, and everything in between. They know that a venture should be treated like a scientific experiment, in which learning plays a critical role. They are ready to seize new opportunities if a venture falters on its original course. They foster networks to promote cooperation and collaboration between established business leaders and venture teams and involve people from throughout the company in the venture review process. They don't allow financial criteria to dominate the reviews, and they recognize that the best people to launch a business may not be the ones who developed the idea. If your innovation pipeline is dry, your promising projects are being strangled for lack of a speedy payback, or someone else has made a fabulous business out of a slightly altered idea that you abandoned, consider the value captor's path.     

Domestic and International Equity REIT Joint Ventures: Structuring Corporate Options

We examine a sample of 185 Joint Ventures parented by publicly-traded Equity Real Estate Investment Trusts 1994–2001. These transactions are found to be motivated by a wide variety of corporate strategies. Shareholder returns for REIT parents are significantly positive, which is consistent with wealth effects previously reported for joint ventures formed by non-REIT real estate firms. In a subsample of joint ventures formed to structure partial dispositions of property, however, abnormal returns are significantly negative, which is consistent with the free cash flow theory of Jensen. REIT joint venture experience in Asia has been neutral for value, but may improve in the future if early ventures have created options for more efficient partnerships later.     

Corporate focus versus diversification: the role of growth opportunities and cashflow

We examine the valuation impact of corporate diversification strategies through an analysis of a set of international joint ventures which contain both focus-decreasing and focus-increasing investments. Consistent with previous findings reported for US firms, we find that focus-increasing joint ventures create value for shareholders. However, we do not find that corporate diversification uniformly reduces shareholder value, either at the announcement of the project or in the long-run. Diversifying joint ventures negatively impact shareholder wealth only when the investing firms have poor growth opportunities and a weak cashflow position. After controlling for the q and cashflow effects, we find no significant difference in the market reaction to focus-increasing and -decreasing joint ventures. Such a result implies that the impact of diversification on shareholder wealth is not absolute, but rather is conditional upon the financial resources and growth opportunities available to the firm.     

Early-stage financing and firm growth in new industries

This paper shows that active investors, such as venture capitalists, can affect the speed at which new ventures grow. In the absence of product market competition, new ventures financed by active investors grow faster initially, though in the long run those financed by passive investors are able to catch up. By contrast, in a competitive product market, new ventures financed by active investors may prey on rivals that are financed by passive investors by “strategically overinvesting” early on, resulting in long-run differences in investment, profits, and firm growth. The value of active investors is greater in highly competitive industries as well as in industries with learning curves, economies of scope, and network effects, as is typical for many “new economy” industries. For such industries, our model predicts that start-ups with access to venture capital may dominate their industry peers in the long run.     

VALUE CREATION AT ANHEUSER-BUSCH: A REAL OPTIONS EXAMPLE

The management of Anheuser-Busch created $11.5 billion of shareholder value between 1996 and 1998, a period in which U.S. demand for beer was flat and the company's profits grew only modestly. Of that $11.5 billion, the authors estimate that nearly $10 billion can be attributed to the growth options created or expanded by the company during that period. While divesting itself of unrelated businesses, such as snack foods, Busch stadium, and the St. Louis Cardinals baseball franchise, the company began purchasing minority equity interests in brewing concerns in markets with growing demand for beer, including Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and the Philippines.
The main undertaking of the paper is to use the real options valuation method to estimate the growth option value that Anheuser-Busch has created through its investments in joint ventures in foreign markets. The authors focus specifically on a joint venture in the Argentina/Chile market, and argue that this arrangement gives the company the flexibility to invest in a complete brewing and distribution system in that market after learning about the market's potential. In other words, the joint venture creates a call option on the Argentina/Chile market. Traditional DCF analysis, which ignores the flexibility in the strategy, assigns a negative NPV to the joint venture. But explicit recognition of the "option-ality" built into the investment results in a very different valuation—as well as a plausible explanation of the growth option value in the company's stock price.
As the Anheuser-Busch example also illustrates, valuation of the real option depends critically on the assumption about the volatility of the future value of the investment projects. The authors provide an intuitively useful way for managers to examine their own volatility assumptions—one that draws on the probability assessments that are part of the well-known Black-Scholes model.     

Evidence on Value Creation in the Financial Services Industries through the Use of Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances

While an extensive body of literature has examined merger, acquisition, and consolidation activity in commercial banks and other financial services firms, little attention has been paid to examining how these institutions use the cooperative activities of joint ventures and strategic alliances to accomplish their growth objectives. We analyze the effects of the use of joint ventures and strategic alliances by a sample of firms in the banking, investment services, and insurance industries. Our results show that commercial banks, investment services firms, and insurance companies experience significant abnormal returns of 0.66% on average when they announce their participation in a joint venture or strategic alliance. These abnormal returns are significantly positive across the four strategic motives of domestic, international, horizontal, and diversifying cooperative activities. Using a matched sample, we also show that our sample firms enjoy significant, positive, abnormal returns for holding periods of six, 12, and 18 months after the announcement of the cooperative activity.     

The Wealth Effect of Domestic Joint Ventures: Evidence from Taiwan

This study presents important international evidence by examining the wealth effect of domestic joint ventures by Taiwanese firms. In opposite to United States evidence, we find that announcements of domestic joint ventures by Taiwanese firms are, on average, associated with significantly negative abnormal stock returns. We also find that the stock market response to announced domestic joint ventures is significantly positively related to the announcing firms' investment opportunities, size of investment and debt ratio, and is significantly negatively related to the business relatedness variable. In contrast, free cash flow, firm size, relative firm size and managerial ownership are found to have no significant power in explaining the market response. Our results support the investment opportunities, synergy and complementarity hypotheses as well as a broad interpretation of the free cash flow hypothesis, but reject the absolute size, relative size and alignment-of-interests hypotheses. This study makes valuable contributions to the literature by providing the first direct evidence on the role of investment opportunities, synergy and alignment-of-interests in explaining the wealth effect of domestic joint ventures     

What makes a joint venture: Micro‐evidence from Sino‐Italian contracts

This paper provides new contract-level evidence on control rights allocation in order to define what makes a joint venture. Property rights theory of the firm identifies circumstances under which joint control alleviates investment distortions due to contract incompleteness. We compare predictions of the theoretical literature with actual governance structures of Sino-Italian joint ventures, as reported in a questionnaire submitted to the entire population of Italian enterprises operating in China. With an exceptional response rate of 60%, our evidence confirms most of the theoretical predictions and helps select among competing approaches to model joint ventures.     

“达能·娃哈哈”未了局：合资模式的新考验

中国合资企业存在的问题是如此之多，以致外国律师讨论最多的不是如何使合资协议尽可能定得完美，而是除合资外是否已经没有其他经营方式可选择了。     

An empirical study of the value-relevance of using proportionate consolidation accounting for investments in joint ventures

This research examines bond risk premiums to determine whether creditors of companies with investments in joint ventures reflect legal or implicit measures of the debts of joint ventures. The legal view suggests that the amount of potential loss from an investment in a joint venture is limited to the investment. The implicit view suggests that the operations of the joint venture and the venturer are interdependent. Equity method accounting reflects the legal view and proportionate consolidation reflects the implicit view.The study examines whether bond risk premiums are more highly associated with accounting numbers from proportionate consolidation than equity method accounting. The study uses data from 10Ks, the Wall Street Journal, and Moody's Bond Record from May 1, 1995 through April 30, 1998. These 4 years are used because US interest rates were fairly stable during this period, which is an important factor when examining bond risk premiums. Additionally, the companies in the study needed to remain stable across the window of study – no mergers, acquisitions, buy-outs, or liquidations – in order to maintain a comparative sample over the entire time period. The risk premium model uses measures of default that change between equity method accounting and proportionate consolidation. Differences in the explanatory power of the model determine how creditors view the joint venture debts.The study shows that approximately half of equity investments represent investments in joint ventures. Furthermore, the average joint venture uses debt to finance about two-thirds of the assets. The results show that proportionate consolidation fails to improve the explanatory power of the model when examining the entire set of companies that invest in joint ventures. However, the data reject the null hypothesis of no improvement with proportionate consolidation when examining companies who guarantee the debt of their joint venture. The policy implication of this study indicates that a change to proportionate consolidation would provide more value-relevant information to creditors when companies guarantee the debt of the joint venture.     

The Role of Knowhow Acquisition in the Formation and Duration of Joint Ventures

We analyze the role of knowhow acquisition in the formationand duration of joint ventures. Two parties become partnersin a joint venture to benefit from each other’s knowhow.Joint operations provide each party with the opportunity toacquire part of its partner’s knowhow. A party’sincreased knowhow provides the impetus for the dissolution ofthe joint venture. We characterize the conditions under whichdissolution takes place, identify the party that buys out itspartner, determine the time to dissolution, establish its comparativestatics, and examine the implications of knowledge acquisitionfor the desirability of joint venture formation. (JEL code:G34)     

The Decline and Fall of Joint Ventures: How JVs Became Unpopular and Why That Could Change

The peak year for joint venture formation was 1995, which saw almost 5,700 new ventures. Since then, however, JV activity has gone into a sharp decline, with 2004 setting a new 10‐year low of just over 700 new deals, and many executives have completely dismissed joint ventures as a vehicle for growth. But is this the right conclusion? Perhaps for some companies. But for most, the answer may be to use the lessons from past failures to improve their ability to negotiate and manage joint ventures. This article offers five main pieces of advice: ? Don't rely too much on experience from negotiating acquisitions. JVs require a more balanced, less competitive negotiating style that can help set the tone for a good relationship. ? Don't allow the contract to dominate the relationship. If JV agreements are crafted more with the aim of building trust and achieving a shared understanding than designing explicit provisions for all contingencies, the parties will have stronger incentives to seek business solutions instead of legal remedies. ? Weigh carefully the value of commitment versus the value of flexibility. Although the ability to exit a bad deal clearly has option value, there may be greater value from the stability achieved by locking oneself into a relationship. ? Resist the urge for certainty in termination clauses. A “process‐oriented” approach will typically be more fair, resulting in smoother negotiations and a better working relationship, than an “outcome‐oriented” approach. ? Recognize when a JV has outlived its useful life, and do something about it before value is destroyed.     

Do joint ventures and strategic alliances create value for bondholders?

This paper investigates whether joint ventures and strategic alliances create value for bondholders by examining the bond market’s reaction to announcements of these two types of cooperative business activities. Based on 2964 announcements from 1985 to 2011, we find that joint ventures and strategic alliances create significant value for bondholders. The average two-month abnormal bond return is 0.64% for joint ventures and 0.70% for strategic alliances. We find no evidence of a wealth transfer between the bondholders and stockholders. We further explore the determinants of bond value creation through hypotheses on the synergy effect, the alleviation of financial constraints, and real options. The results of our study show that financial synergy is a main driver of bondholder wealth effects in joint ventures, while operating synergy is a dominant factor in strategic alliances. We also find evidence to support the real option hypothesis for both events. Finally, we show that the structure of bond contracts plays an important role in the link between synergy and abnormal bond returns.     

Why Manufacture Offshore? An Empirical Analysis of Valuation Effects

In this study, announcements by U.S. firms of offshore joint venture manufacturing during the 1980s are used to provide more comprehensive evidence than past studies on the wealth effects of offshore joint ventures. Evidence shows that the target country's level of economic development and political stability, currency strength of the originating country (U.S. in this study) relative to that of the target country, U.S. firm's mode of entry, and the relative value of the U.S. firm's investment in the joint venture affect the wealth of U.S. firms which engage in offshore joint ventures. The target country's level of economic development, its political stability, and the currency strength of the originating country relative to the target country are shown to be the dominant economic factors. Of particular importance, evidence indicates that the target country's level of economic development is a more important determinant of excess returns than is its political stability.     

Corporate Combinations and Common Stock Returns: The Case of Joint Ventures

The gain to stockholders from mergers is well documented. However, there is little evidence as to whether the source of the gain is due to synergy or management displacement. Merger is just one of an almost limitless variety of ways in which firms combine resources to accomplish some objective. A joint venture is another. In addition to being of interest as an independent phenomenon, because the original managements of the parent firms remain intact under a joint venture, investigation of wealth gains from joint ventures provides an opportunity to isolate the management displacement hypothesis from the synergy hypothesis as the source of gains in corporate combinations. Our results are 1) there are significant wealth gains from joint ventures, 2) the smaller partner earns a larger excess rate of return while the dollar gains are more equally divided, and 3) the gains, scaled by resources committed, yield “premiums” similar to those in mergers. We are inclined to interpret our results as supportive of the synergy hypothesis as the source of gain from corporate combinations.