CEO compensation structure and firm performance

The objectives of our study are to estimate a model of ‘efficient’ compensation structure based on firm characteristics and test the performance consequences of deviation from the efficient compensation structure. Our results are based on 3503 firm years for the period from 1999 to 2005. The results suggest that firms whose CEOs receive compensation inconsistent with their firm characteristics have a lower performance compared to those firms whose CEOs’ compensation is consistent with their firms’ characteristics. Our measure of performance is based on both accounting and market‐based performance measures. Overall, our study provides some important new insights into the links between CEO compensation structure and firm performance.     

Are perks purely managerial excess?

A widespread view is that executive perks exemplify agency problems—they are a route through which managers misappropriate a firm's surplus. Accordingly, firms with high free cash flow, operating in industries with limited investment prospects, should offer more perks, and firms subject to more external monitoring should offer fewer perks. The evidence for agency as an explanation of perks is, at best, mixed. Perks are, however, offered in situations in which they enhance managerial productivity. While we cannot rule out the occasional aberration, and while we have little to say on the overall level of perks, our findings suggest that treating perks purely as managerial excess is incorrect.     

Executive stock options,differential risk-taking incentives,and firm value

The sensitivity of stock options' payoff to return volatility, or vega, provides risk-averse CEOs with an incentive to increase their firms' risk more by increasing systematic rather than idiosyncratic risk. This effect manifests because any increase in the firm's systematic risk can be hedged by a CEO who can trade the market portfolio. Consistent with this prediction, we find that vega gives CEOs incentives to increase their firms' total risk by increasing systematic risk but not idiosyncratic risk. Collectively, our results suggest that stock options might not always encourage managers to pursue projects that are primarily characterized by idiosyncratic risk when projects with systematic risk are available as an alternative.     

CEO pay incentives and risk-taking: Evidence from bank acquisitions

We analyze how the structure of executive compensation affects the risk choices made by bank CEOs. For a sample of acquiring U.S. banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that CEOs with higher pay-risk sensitivity engage in risk-inducing mergers. Our findings are driven by two types of acquisitions: acquisitions completed during the last decade (after bank deregulation had expanded banks' risk-taking opportunities) and acquisitions completed by the largest banks in our sample (where shareholders benefit from ‘too big to fail’ support by regulators and gain most from shifting risk to other stakeholders). Our results control for CEO pay-performance sensitivity and offer evidence consistent with a causal link between financial stability and the risk-taking incentives embedded in the executive compensation contracts at banks.     

The determinants and effects of CEO–employee pay ratios

We study the determinants and effects of the relative compensation of top executives and lower-level employees. First, we show that CEO–employee pay ratios depend on the balance of power between the CEO (relative to the board) and ordinary employees (relative to management). Second, our results suggest that employees do not perceive higher pay ratios as an inequitable outcome to be redressed via costly behaviors that lower productivity. We do not find a negative relation between relative pay and employee productivity, either in our full sample or in subsamples where employees are well-informed about executive pay and are protected against career retributions. Rather, we find that productivity increases with relative pay when the firm has fewer employees who are well-informed, and when promotion decisions are predominantly merit-based. We also find that firm value and operating performance both increase with relative pay. We conclude that ordinary employees appear to perceive an opportunity in higher pay ratios but the extent to which such perception incentivizes them depends on the likelihood of success in a series of sequential promotion tournaments.     

Flights of fancy: Corporate jets,CEO perquisites,and inferior shareholder returns

This paper studies perquisites of CEOs, focusing on personal use of company planes. For firms that have disclosed this managerial benefit, average shareholder returns underperform market benchmarks by more than 4% annually, a severe gap far exceeding the costs of resources consumed. Around the date of the initial disclosure, firms’ stock prices drop by an average of 1.1%. Regression analysis finds no significant associations between CEOs’ perquisites and their compensation or percentage ownership, but variables related to personal CEO characteristics, especially long-distance golf club memberships, have significant explanatory power for personal aircraft use.     

Capital structure and executive compensation contract design: A theoretical and empirical analysis

Compensation contracts including incentive instruments not only provide executives with positive incentives to increase shareholder wealth, but also create a negative value-dilution effect for existing shareholders. This study investigates this dilemma by conducting a benefit-cost analysis under a proposed structural form valuation framework. Our design mechanism shows that, given their firms’ current capital structure, shareholders are always capable of designing an optimal compensation contract to maximize their wealth. Due to the different research issue and assumptions, unlike findings of most previous studies, our model proposes that in a firm with a higher leverage ratio shareholders should provide a contract with higher incentive intensity for managers, and this proposition is supported by the empirical analyses which examine the sample of S&P index firms over the period 1992-2006 after adopting an updated fixed effects model.     

Equity‐Based Compensation for Employees: Firm Performance and Determinants

I examine the effect of employee equity‐based compensation (EBC) on firm performance and the determinants of EBC. Using two samples, I find that firms have come to rely more heavily on EBC than in the past. For both samples, I document a significant, positive relation between Tobin's q and the percentage of employee compensation that is equity based. For accounting returns, I find a positive relation with the earlier sample. However, for the later sample I find that greater use of EBC leads to lower levels of future accounting returns. I also find that the determinants of the proportion of EBC are different between the two samples.     

Real options and earnings-based bonus compensation

This study extends the works of Mauer and Sarkar (2005) and Andrikopoulos (2009) by incorporating a regime-dependent earnings-based bonus into managerial compensation. Examining the individual effects of ownership shares and earnings-based bonus compensation, we find that the former provides managers with incentives to issue debt, whereas the latter induces the opposite result, although consistent impacts are found for the two types of compensation on both agency costs and the optimal investment decisions of managers. When managerial compensation comprises both ownership shares and an earnings-based bonus, there are significant differences in the effects of these two types of performance compensation on managers’ optimal investment and financing decisions, agency costs, optimal debt ratios and credit spreads, as a result of the specific interactions between the investment and financing decisions.     

Us knows us in the UK: On director networks and CEO compensation

We analyze the relation between CEO compensation and networks of executive and non-executive directors for all listed UK companies over the period 1996-2007. We examine whether networks are built for reasons of information gathering or for the accumulation of managerial influence. Both indirect networks (enabling directors to collect information) and direct networks (leading to more managerial influence) enable the CEO to obtain higher compensation. Direct networks can harm the efficiency of the remuneration contracting in the sense that the performance sensitivity of compensation is then lower. We find that in companies with strong networks and hence busy boards the directors' monitoring effectiveness is reduced which leads to higher and less performance-sensitive CEO compensation. Our results suggest that it is important to have the ‘right’ type of network: some networks enable a firm to access valuable information whereas others can lead to strong managerial influence that may come at the detriment of the firm and its shareholders. We confirm that there are marked conflicts of interest when a CEO increases his influence by being a member of board committees (such as the remuneration committee) as we observe that his or her compensation is then significantly higher. We also find that hiring remuneration consultants with sizeable client networks also leads to higher CEO compensation especially for larger firms.     

Peer choice in CEO compensation

Current research shows that firms are more likely to benchmark against peers that pay their Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) higher compensation, reflecting self serving behavior. We propose an alternative explanation: the choice of highly paid peers represents a reward for unobserved CEO talent. We test this hypothesis by decomposing the effect of peer selection into talent and self serving components. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the association between a firm's selection of highly paid peers and CEO pay mostly represents compensation for CEO talent.     

CEO EQUITY PORTFOLIO INCENTIVES AND LAYOFF DECISIONS

CEOs with higher equity‐based compensation are widely believed to be more likely to act in shareholders' interests. Unlike less common acquisitions, voluntary liquidations, or seasoned equity offerings, layoffs are comparatively common elements of firms' operating strategies. We find that CEOs with at least one year of tenure who possess greater incentives from portfolios of restricted stock and stock option grants are more likely to announce layoffs, and that these layoffs create shareholder value. We conclude that accumulated portfolios of restricted stock and stock option grants encourage CEOs to adopt operating strategies that improve operating profits and stock performance.     

Neighborhood matters: The impact of location on broad based stock option plans

We find that fixed effects related to the location of firms’ headquarters explain variation in broad based option grants after controlling for industry effects and firm characteristics traditionally known to affect option granting. Location matters because of local labor market conditions and social interaction with neighboring firms. Broad based option grants are higher: (i) when a firm's stock prices co-move more with stock prices of other firms located in that Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA); (ii) in states that are less likely to enforce non-compete agreements; and (iii) in MSAs where employees prefer options because stocks there experience abnormally high returns.