CEO compensation structure and firm performance

The objectives of our study are to estimate a model of ‘efficient’ compensation structure based on firm characteristics and test the performance consequences of deviation from the efficient compensation structure. Our results are based on 3503 firm years for the period from 1999 to 2005. The results suggest that firms whose CEOs receive compensation inconsistent with their firm characteristics have a lower performance compared to those firms whose CEOs’ compensation is consistent with their firms’ characteristics. Our measure of performance is based on both accounting and market‐based performance measures. Overall, our study provides some important new insights into the links between CEO compensation structure and firm performance.     

Institutional investors,controlling shareholders and CEO pay‐performance relationship: evidence from China

Using a large sample of China’s listed firms between 2005 and 2015, we find that domestic mutual funds have a positive effect on the CEO pay‐performance relationship, and this effect becomes stronger when their ownership is higher and closer to the controlling shareholder’s ownership. This effect is stronger in non‐state‐owned enterprises (non‐SOEs), firms facing weaker industry competition incentives, and firms located in more developed regions. However, Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs) do not have such an influence. Overall, our study contends that the effectiveness of institutional investors’ monitoring role is subject to their identity, controlling shareholders and institutional environments.     

CEO risk incentives and firm performance following R&D increases

In this study we analyze how CEO risk incentives affect the efficiency of research and development (R&D) investments. We examine a sample of 843 cases in which firms increase their R&D investments by an economically significant amount over the period of 1995–2006. We find that firms with higher sensitivity of CEO compensation portfolio value to stock volatility (vega) are more likely to have large increases in R&D investments. More importantly, we find that high-vega firms experience lower abnormal stock returns and lower operating performance compared to their low-vega counterparts following the R&D increases. Our main results hold in a variety of robustness tests. The results are consistent with the conjecture that high-vega compensation portfolios may induce managers to overinvest in inefficient R&D projects and therefore hurt firm performance.     

Managerial ownership,board monitoring and firm performance in a family‐concentrated corporate environment

Using data from Hong Kong, a market that has family‐concentrated ownership structure, we examine the relation between managerial ownership, the board of directors and firm performance. We first conduct analysis on the managerial ownership and firm performance to derive the turning points where either ‘convergence of interest’ or ‘entrenchment’ effect of managerial ownership is dominant. Based on these estimated turning points, we find that at low and high level of ownership, effective board mitigates the entrenchment effect associated with managerial ownership; at medium level of ownership, board effectiveness is less demanded. These findings suggest that managerial ownership and board monitoring are substitutes in mitigating the agency problem between managers and shareholders. We also find that effective board curbs the excessive compensation by entrenched managers to themselves at low level of managerial ownership.     

The two sides of CEO option grants at the IPO

This paper examines the impact of CEO IPO option grants on IPO underpricing. Contrary to Lowry and Murphy (2007) who do not find a relationship between the two, this paper finds such a relationship when board independence, the power of the CEO and venture capitalists (VCs) are taken into account. The results are threefold. First, powerful CEOs are able to reap substantial gains from IPO options, to the detriment of the shareholders. Second, young, powerful VCs use IPO option grants to bribe the CEO to agree to an early IPO which will leave more of the existing shareholders' money on the table. Finally, IPO options only work as a value-enhancing incentive in the presence of strong boards.     

Flights of fancy: Corporate jets,CEO perquisites,and inferior shareholder returns

This paper studies perquisites of CEOs, focusing on personal use of company planes. For firms that have disclosed this managerial benefit, average shareholder returns underperform market benchmarks by more than 4% annually, a severe gap far exceeding the costs of resources consumed. Around the date of the initial disclosure, firms’ stock prices drop by an average of 1.1%. Regression analysis finds no significant associations between CEOs’ perquisites and their compensation or percentage ownership, but variables related to personal CEO characteristics, especially long-distance golf club memberships, have significant explanatory power for personal aircraft use.     

Us knows us in the UK: On director networks and CEO compensation

We analyze the relation between CEO compensation and networks of executive and non-executive directors for all listed UK companies over the period 1996-2007. We examine whether networks are built for reasons of information gathering or for the accumulation of managerial influence. Both indirect networks (enabling directors to collect information) and direct networks (leading to more managerial influence) enable the CEO to obtain higher compensation. Direct networks can harm the efficiency of the remuneration contracting in the sense that the performance sensitivity of compensation is then lower. We find that in companies with strong networks and hence busy boards the directors' monitoring effectiveness is reduced which leads to higher and less performance-sensitive CEO compensation. Our results suggest that it is important to have the ‘right’ type of network: some networks enable a firm to access valuable information whereas others can lead to strong managerial influence that may come at the detriment of the firm and its shareholders. We confirm that there are marked conflicts of interest when a CEO increases his influence by being a member of board committees (such as the remuneration committee) as we observe that his or her compensation is then significantly higher. We also find that hiring remuneration consultants with sizeable client networks also leads to higher CEO compensation especially for larger firms.     

CEO Bonus Compensation and Bank Default Risk: Evidence from the U.S. and Europe

We investigate the link between the incentive mechanisms embedded in CEO cash bonuses and the riskiness of banks. For a sample of U.S. and European banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that increases in CEO cash bonuses lower the default risk of a bank. However, we find no evidence of cash bonuses exerting a risk‐reducing effect when banks are financially distressed or when banks operate under weak bank regulatory regimes. Our results link bonus compensation in banking to financial stability and caution that attempts to regulate bonus pay need to tailor CEO incentives to the riskiness of banks and to regulatory regimes.     

Equity‐Based Incentives,Risk Aversion,and Merger‐Related Risk‐Taking Behavior

We find that post‐merger equity risk is negatively related to the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (vega), but is concentrated in CEOs with high proportions of options and options that are more in‐the‐money. The probability of industrial diversification also increases in vega. Additional tests show that the decline in post‐merger equity risk results in a significant decrease in shareholder wealth. This decrease is concentrated among firms with CEOs having the highest delta and the highest delta and vega. Our results suggest that the increased convexity provided by option‐based compensation does not necessarily increase risk‐taking behavior by CEOs.     

Equity‐Based Compensation for Employees: Firm Performance and Determinants

I examine the effect of employee equity‐based compensation (EBC) on firm performance and the determinants of EBC. Using two samples, I find that firms have come to rely more heavily on EBC than in the past. For both samples, I document a significant, positive relation between Tobin's q and the percentage of employee compensation that is equity based. For accounting returns, I find a positive relation with the earlier sample. However, for the later sample I find that greater use of EBC leads to lower levels of future accounting returns. I also find that the determinants of the proportion of EBC are different between the two samples.     

Mutual funds’ ownership and firm performance: Evidence from China

Mutual funds have emerged and rapidly developed since 2000 in China. This study tests empirically the impact of mutual funds’ ownership on firm performance in China, using a large sample for the period of 2001–2005. We find that equity ownership by mutual funds has a positive effect on firm performance. The result is robust to several measures of firm performance and various estimations. Our finding supports recent regulatory efforts in China to promote mutual funds as a corporate governance mechanism and suggests that pooling diffuse minority interests of individual shareholders who are prone to free-rider problems via mutual funds is beneficial.     

CEO Cash and Stock‐Based Compensation Changes,Layoff Decisions,and Shareholder Value

The chief executive officers (CEOs) of firms announcing layoffs receive 22.8% more total pay in the subsequent year than other CEOs. The pay increases result almost entirely from increases in stock‐based compensation and are found to persist. In addition, layoff announcements are accompanied by shareholder value increases averaging $40 million to $95 million. One‐time labor cost savings from layoffs average $65 million. We conclude that CEOs receive pay increases following layoffs as rewards for past decisions and to motivate value‐enhancing decisions in the future.     

Serial CEO incentives and the structure of managerial contracts

I explore CEOs’ incentives to select firm strategies and to acquire firm-specific skills when CEOs have job-hopping opportunities. Several features of managerial compensation, such as benchmarking of pay to larger and more prestigious companies, payments unrelated to past performance, unrestricted stock awards for highly paid CEOs, long-term incentives, and higher pay in companies granting long-term incentives, emerge in the optimal contract. I argue that the model can explain the change in the structure and the surge in US CEO compensation as well as differences across countries and across firms within a country.     

Stakeholder rights and economic performance: The profitability of nonprofits

This paper explores whether ownership matters in a fundamental sense by comparing the performance of stockholder-owned firms with the much less analyzed nonprofit firms. No stakeholder has residual cash flow rights in nonprofit firms, and the control rights are held by customers, employees, and community citizens. Accounting for differences in size and risk and comparing only firms in the same industry, we find that stockholder-owned firms do not outperform nonprofit firms. This result is consistent with the notin that the monitoring function of stockholders may be successfully replaced by other mechanisms. We find evidence that product market competition may play this role as a substitute monitoring mechanism.     

Firms’ performance under different bankruptcy systems: a Europe–USA empirical analysis

This study empirically analyses the effect that the bankruptcy law has on firms’ performance based on its financial situation. To do this, we considered the different types of efficiency and their influence on firms’ value. The study was carried out for Germany, Spain, the United States, France and the United Kingdom. We applied System‐GMM estimation to dynamic panel data. The main results show that under creditor‐oriented systems, there is a decrease in the value of both financially distressed firms and those filing for bankruptcy.     

Operating and stock market performance of state-owned enterprise privatizations: The Spanish experience

We investigate the operating and stock market performance of Spanish state-owned enterprises (SOEs) privatized through public share issue offerings (SIPs) from 1990 to 2001, when the last SIP was conducted. We compare the performance of SOEs and privately-owned firms. We find significant operating improvements in Spanish SOEs after the privatization. Specifically, they show significant increases in income efficiency, real sales and employment. Spanish governments tried to minimize the foregone proceeds when selling SOE shares and underpriced them lower than private firms. We relate these results with the pressure of the Maastricht Treaty fiscal criteria, as well as lower information asymmetries between firms and investors. Finally, we do not find long-term abnormal stock market performance after SIPs.     

CEO incentive plans and corporate liquidation policy

To investigate CEOs' incentives to liquidate their firms, we examine the effects of insider ownership and compensation in stock options on 30 voluntary liquidation decisions by industrial firms in the period 1975–1986. We find that liquidation decisions are influenced by CEO incentive plans and increase shareholder value. Firms with more outside board members, smaller market-to-book ratios, and attempts by outsiders to gain control are more likely to be liquidated. Although few top executives of liquidating firms subsequently take comparable jobs, at least 41% of CEOs who downsize are made better off by liquidation.     

Implications of power: When the CEO can pressure the CFO to bias reports

Building on archival, anecdotal, and survey evidence on managers? roles in accounting manipulations, I develop an agency model to examine the effects of a CEO?s power to pressure a CFO to bias a performance measure, like earnings. This power has implications for incentive compensation, reporting quality, firm value, and information rents. Predictions from the model provide potential explanations for the differing results from recent empirical studies on the impact of regulatory interventions like SOX and the extent to which the CEO?s or CFO?s incentives significantly impact on earnings management. The model also identifies conditions under which either a powerful or a non-powerful CEO can extract rents, which can help explain mixed empirical results on the association between CEO power and “excessive” compensation.