Rents, military elites, and political democracy

In autocratic regimes the military elite is in a position to extract rents, because without the support of the military the government is in general not able to sustain itself. In this paper, we empirically confirm the negative relation between transfers to the military and the degree of democracy for developing countries. We use an instrumental variable approach to account for the simultaneity that arises since the degree of democracy is itself a function of transfers to the military.     

Military expenditure and economic growth across different groups: A dynamic panel Granger-causality approach

Applying GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991) to panel data of 90 countries spanning over 1992–2006, this paper explores possible relationships between military expenditure and economic growth. Based on the definitions of income levels by the World Bank – high, middle and low – our results indicate military spending leads negatively economic growth for the panels of low income countries with a marginally significance level of 10%. Of four different regional panels (Africa, Europe, the Middle East–South Asia and Pacific Rim), a negative but stronger (5% significance level) causal relationship from military expenditure to economic growth is found for the Europe and Middle East–South Asia regions.     

Tests of Financial Intermediation and Banking Reform in China

We develop tests of financial intermediation by national banking systems based on the expectation that, in commercial systems, financial intermediation should not be overly influenced by policy variables; should be greater in richer, faster growing industrial areas; and should direct funds to the best projects regardless of where deposits originate. Using Chinese provincial data from 1991 to 1997, we test whether financial reforms in the mid-1990s increased efficient intermediation by different financial institutions. We find that the importance of policy lending by state banks did not fall during the recent period and that lending by financial institutions did not respond to economic fundamentals. J. Comp. Econ., December 2001, 29(4), pp. 608–644. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109; and Department of Government, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755. © 2001 Elsevier ScienceJournal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21, O16, O53, P34.     

Efficiency Wages and Work Incentives in Urban and Rural China

This paper examines incentive-wage effects for production and for managerial/technical workers in both urban and rural Chinese nonagricultural enterprises. We report strong evidence of productivity-enhancing wage behavior among enterprises in all ownership categories. There is also evidence that firms paying higher efficiency wages experience less shirking among their employees. We find that the profit-maximizing potential of incentive-wage setting is not fully exploited, although there is weak evidence that joint ventures come closer to profit-maximizing behavior at this margin of wage/employment behavior than do collectives or state-owned enterprises. J. Comp. Econ., December 2001, 29(4), pp. 645–662. The Ohio State University, 1945 North High St., Columbus, OH 43210 and University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822. © 2001 Elsevier ScienceJournal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: P23, J31, O15.     

Does a Switch of Budget Regimes Affect Investment and Managerial Discretion of State-Owned Enterprises? Evidence from Italian Firms

We investigate the investment decisions of Italian state-owned enterprises (SOEs) across budget constraint regimes and carry out a natural experiment that exploits a regime switch in 1987. Drawing on the theory of capital market imperfections, we apply an empirical framework for investment analysis to a panel of manufacturing SOEs in competitive industries. We identify parallels between SOEs and widely held, quoted companies afflicted by agency problems, managerial discretion, and overinvestment. We argue that, in the case of SOEs, the soft budget regime increases managerial discretion, facilitates collusion with vote-seeking politicians, and results in wasteful investment. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the regime switch disciplines SOE's investment behavior. Following a hardening of the budget constraint, managers lose discretion to indulge in collusion and overinvestment. J. Comp. Econ., June 2002 30(4), pp. 787–811. London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom; and CERIS–CNR, Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth, National Research Council, Via Avogadro, 8, 10121 Turin, Italy. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E32, G31, G32, L32, M40.     

Sovereign default: Which shocks matter?

This paper analyses a small open economy that wants to borrow from abroad, cannot commit to repay debt but faces costs if it decides to default. The model generates analytical expressions for the impact of shocks on the incentive compatible level of debt. Debt reduction generated by severe output shocks is no more than a couple of percentage points. In contrast, shocks to world interest rates can substantially affect the incentive compatible level of debt.     

Biogeographical conditions, the transition to agriculture and long-run growth

We use new data on the timing of the transition to agriculture, developed by Putterman and Trainor (2006), to test the theory of Diamond (1997) and Olsson and Hibbs (2005) that an earlier transition is reflected in higher incomes today. Our results confirm the theory, even after controlling for institutional quality and other geographical factors. The date of transition is correlated with prehistoric biogeography (the availability of wild grasses and large domesticable animal species). The factors conducive to high per capita incomes today are good institutions, an early transition to agriculture, access to the sea and a low incidence of fatal malaria. Geographical influences have been at work in all of these proximate determinants of per capita income.     

Premium auctions and risk preferences

In a premium auction, the seller offers some “payback”, called premium, to a set of high bidders at the end of the auction. This paper investigates how the performance of such premium tactics is related to the bidders? risk preferences. We analyze a two-stage English premium auction model with symmetric interdependent values, in which the bidders may be risk averse or risk preferring. Upon establishing the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium, we show that the premium causes the expected revenue to increase in the bidders? risk tolerance. A “net-premium effect” is key to this result.     

The robustness of robust implementation

We show that a mechanism that robustly implements optimal outcomes in a one-dimensional supermodular environment continues to robustly implement ε-optimal outcomes in all close-by environments. Robust implementation of ε-optimal outcomes is thus robust to small perturbations of the environment. This is in contrast to ex-post implementation which is not robust in this sense as only trivial social choice functions are ex-post implementable in generic environments.     

Are there dual labor markets in Chile?: empirical evidence

In this paper we use a switching regression method to test the hypothesis that segmentation in the Chilean labor market exists. The results support the labor segmentation hypothesis and consequently they contradict those of Corbo and Stelcner (1983). The explanation for this is that we do not make any a priori definition of the population, as Corbo and Stelcner do. In fact, our results show that any a priori definition of the sample will lead to rejecting the segmentation hypothesis.     

Growth, welfare and optimal trade taxes: a fallacy of composition

Optimal export taxation rules out the possibility of immiserizing growth in a two-country world. Thus, productivity increases in the exporting sector must be welfare improving. This paper shows that in a multicountry world such reasoning commits a fallacy of composition. Simultaneous growth of exporting nations can lead to welfare losses in the presence of unilaterally optimal export taxes. Also, optimal export taxes can decline in response to such growth. This result further strengthens the possibility of perverse welfare movements. Thus, standard policy recommendations of increasing productivity in the exporting sector may lead to unintended and self-defeating outcomes.     

On the credibility of harassment in the insider—outsider model

In a well-known version of the insider-outsider model, the decision by outsiders not to underbid follows from the threats made by insiders to harass new entrants, thereby raising the entrants' disutility of work. It has been argued, however, that the harassment threat is not credible, at least in the one-period case. In the current paper we explore this claim, concluding that the existence of a social convention, together with associated social pressure effects, provides a possible explanation of the credibility of the harassment threat. Moreover, we suggest that such a convention is likely to play a role even in a multi-period analysis.     

Non-cooperative solutions for estate division problems

In an estate division problem an estate has to be divided among several players whose total entitlement to the estate exceeds its size. This paper extends the non-cooperative approach through a claim game, as initiated by O?Neill (1982), by allowing players to put multiple claims on the same part of the estate, and by considering the case where individual entitlements may exceed the estate. A full characterization of the set of Nash equilibria of the claim game is obtained both for restricted estate division problems, where individual entitlements do not exceed the estate, and for the general case. Variations on the claim game are considered, which result in proportional division in equilibrium.     

Stochastic evolutionary selection in finite populations

We primarily focus on a wide range of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics between two strategies which are characterized by a condition we call monotonicity: the sign of the difference between the probabilities of increasing and decreasing an A-individual completely depends on the difference of payoffs based on different strategies. When mutations are excluded, we provide sufficient conditions for selection to favor one strategy over the other and necessary conditions for selection to favor or oppose change, respectively. Moreover, we discuss which strategy will be favored in case of rare mutations and give a simple rule to determine evolutionary selection of strategies for large populations under some specific stochastic mutation–selection dynamics.     

Optimal size, optimal timing and optimal financing of an investment

Corporate investment is an important determinant of economic well-being. The existing literature identifies optimal investment size and timing without the possibility of debt financing, as well as the effect of debt financing on investment timing without the option to choose investment size. This paper contributes to the literature by identifying the optimal size, optimal timing and optimal financing for an investment when the firm controls all three decisions (as it usually does in practice). The investment size and investment trigger are generally positively related: when investment is delayed (accelerated) it is larger (smaller) in size, thus the overall effect on investment is ambiguous. However, when tax rate or bankruptcy cost is increased, the trigger rises and size falls, hence the effect on investment is unambiguously negative. The effect of debt financing on investment depends on the amount of debt used; with the optimal amount of debt, investment is delayed relative to the no-debt case, and this delay can be economically significant; however, the investment, when eventually made, will be larger in size. Overall, it is not appropriate to ignore either the firm’s ability to choose investment size or its option to use debt financing, when modeling the investment decision.     

Optimal advertising of auctions

We study a symmetric independent private values auction model where the revenue-maximizing seller faces a cost cn of attracting n bidders to the auction. If the distribution of valuations possesses an increasing failure rate (IFR), the seller overinvests in attracting bidders compared to the social optimum. Conversely, if the distribution is DFR, the seller underinvests compared to the social optimum. If the distribution of valuations becomes more dispersed, both, a revenue- and a welfare-maximizing seller, attract more bidders.     

Evolutionary selection of ‘chivalrous’ conventions in coordination games without common expectations

We study an evolutionary game-theoretic model where players have to choose within a predetermined set of mixed strategies in a coordination game. Players are of two different kinds, male and female. No common expectations assumption is made; players tend therefore to adopt the strategy that yields larger than average expected payoffs for their kind. In this framework, every stable stationary point of the population dynamics can be interpreted as the emergence of a particular convention. A classification of the possible conventions is provided; conditions for their emergence are determined.     

The empirical validity of the New Keynesian Phillips curve using survey forecasts of inflation

This paper investigates the performance of the New Keynesian Phillips curve when survey forecasts of inflation are used to proxy for inflation expectations. Previous authors such as Brissimis and Magginas (2008) have applied survey measures of inflation expectations to the NKPC, and have concluded that these estimates are superior to those estimated using actual data on future inflation. However this approach employs the use of the labor income share as the proxy for real marginal cost, something which is highly problematic once we consider the countercyclicality of this variable. This paper develops and tests a procyclical marginal cost variable alongside various survey measures of inflation forecasts in the NKPC, while recognizing the problem of weak instruments that occurs when estimating the model using conventional GMM. We find that the NKPC produces a counter-intuitive negative and significant coefficient on procyclical marginal cost when surveys of inflation forecasts are used, which casts serious doubt on the empirical viability of the NKPC model, even when estimated with survey inflation forecasts.     

Public pricing of final and intermediate goods in the presence of externalities

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of externalities on pricing decisions by a public or a private regulated firm selling both final and intermediate goods. The externalities generate feedbacks in demand that affect both consumers and producers. The model is very general in that it does not impose constant returns to scale on private production, allows for distributional effects of both the publicly determined prices and private sector profits, and captures the general equilibrium effects of public pricing. Socially optimal pricing rules are derived, and the relation of the results with previous models of pricing in the presence of externalities is investigated.     

“Burden sharing” in sovereign debt reduction

We examine a concerted debt reduction deal between a sovereign debtor, a private creditor, and an official creditor, who insures the deposits of the commercial bank. Our results show that a weakening of the financial position of the commercial bank reduces the contribution of the commercial bank and increases that of the official creditor, without affecting the net terms faced by the debtor. This result is robust to changes in seniority. Moreover, leaving both creditor values unchanged requires that commercial banks retire debt at “unfairly” high prices, while official creditors make a net contribution.