排污的外部性与排污收费

排污外部性的实质是私人成本小于社会成本,它是形成各种环境问题的深层次经济根源。解决排污外部性问题必须由排污者承担排污产生的外部成本。为此,本文在介绍经济学关于外部性理论的基础上,对排污的外部性进行了简要描述,提出了外部成本内在化的排污收费理论模型,并对其功能进行了简要分析,认为在制定排污收费的实践中掌握排污外部成本十分困难,可采用处理费用分摊法、污染边际处理费用（成本）法、污染边际损失费用法和迭代法（试错法）将排污外部成本内在化。     

排污的外部性与排污收费

排污外部性的实质是私人成本小于社会成本,它是形成各种环境问题的深层次经济根源。解决排污外部性问题必须由排污者承担排污产生的外部成本。为此,本文在介绍经济学关于外部性理论的基础上,对排污的外部性进行了简要描述,提出了外部成本内在化的排污收费理论模型,并对其功能进行了简要分析,认为在制定排污收费的实践中掌握排污外部成本十分困难,可采用处理费用分摊法、污染边际处理费用（成本）法、污染边际损失费用法和迭代法（试错法）将排污外部成本内在化。     

西部农业的外部性损害与产权保护

外部性也叫外在性，包括外部（在）经济和外部（在）不经济，是指“一个或多人的自愿行为在未经第三方同意的情况下强加于或给予他们的成本或收益。”外部性的最大危害是使私人成本和社会成本发生分离。当外部经济存在时，会使私人成本大于社会成本，意味着外部性的制造者给社会提供了不能补偿的收益，等于是代为他人取得收益支出了成本。反之，当外部不经济存在时，会使私人成本小于社会成本，意味着外部性的制造者无偿取得了来自于社会的收益，等于是别人代为他取得收益而支出了成本。外部性存在的时候，如果社会缺乏一套有效的产权保护机…     

高校贫困生社会资助必要性和资助形式研究

一、社会资助贫困生的理论支持 （一）高等教育的性质和外部性特征 高等教育是准公共产品，个人接受高等教育在使自身获益的同时，也会对他人和社会产生正的外部性。一方面，个人接受高等教育的社会边际收益MRS，高于私人边际收益MRP，高等教育对社会存在正的外部性；而另一方面，由于高等教育的外部性受益范围很广，私人之间通过市场交易使外部效应内部化的交易成本往往高于溢出的边际收益，足以抵消这种交易的好处，自由交换的市场机制在这里失效。     

基于边际机会成本的石油定价模型研究

石油资源具有稀缺性,其生产过程具有较强的外部性,因此其定价模型必须考虑机会成本。文章将边际外部成本划分为边际代际成本和边际环境成本两部分,并据此构建了新的石油定价模型。随后利用此模型计算了考虑代际和环境补偿后的石油价格,并将其与现实石油市场价格进行比较。结果表明:按照市场价格计算的石油价格未能反映出其真实价值,而且对资源产出地的补偿远远不够。     

由外生到内生的经济长期增长动力机制研究

新古典增长理论发现了技术进步的作用,找到经济长期增长的进路与方向。但是圉于经典的资本边际效率递减理论,技术进步的作用被看作是外生的。20世纪80年代,学者们发现对于研究工作和人力资本的投资,具有经济外部性,确立了经济内生增长的基础。它们具有总的边际报酬不变,甚至递增规律,保证了经济的长期增长,而相当大的外部性又不致引起私人垄断的存在。在贸易理论和分工理论之后,新增长理论成为世界经济和区域经济一体化的新动力。     

最优化经济数学模型在物流成本评价的应用

本文研究了边际分析理论与最优化经济数学模型在物流成本方面评价的应用,优化了物流行业的运作,从而实现物流系统整体效益的最大化。     

交通运输业发展的负面作用分析

交通运输作为一个国家经济的基础,直接影响着国家经济的持续发展。加快交通运输业的发展,构建现代交通运输网络,是促进经济发展的前提和基础。但交通运输发展带来能源消耗剧增、环境污染日益严重、土地资源消耗急剧增加以及交通拥堵、交通事故频发的负面效应日渐显现,最终导致交通成本和社会成本的增加。分析交通运输发展对经济系统的负面作用,有助于控制由交通运输带来的社会成本增加。     

包装生产与消费的外部性分析

私人成本与社会成本不一致,产生外部性,外部性分为正外部性与负外部性。包装生产与消费均有正外部性与负外部性,但负外部性远大于正外部性。这就造成过度包装泛滥,政府必须通过各种手段使包装的外部成本内部化。     

杭州市地铁一号线最优定价问题研究——基于社会经济综合效益最大化的视角

针对消费者普遍反映杭州地铁一号线现行票价方案价格略高的现象,分析了传统定价模型平均成本定价和边际成本定价的缺陷。介绍了高峰定价法理论,综合考虑乘客、运输企业和政府三方面的利益,依据拉姆塞定价理论,建立基于社会经济综合效益最大化的高峰定价模型,并通过实证研究提出最优的杭州地铁一号线高峰定价方案。     

General equilibrium trade modelling with Canada–US transportation costs

Transportation costs are an important topic in international trade, but seldom have researchers paid attention to general equilibrium trade modelling with transportation costs and explored their relevant effects. This paper uses numerical general equilibrium trade model structures to simulate the impacts of transportation costs on welfare and trade for a Canada–US country pair case. We compare two groups of model structures: Armington assumption models and homogeneous goods models. Within these two groups of models, we also compare balanced trade structures to trade imbalance structures and production function transportation costs to iceberg transportation costs. Armington goods models generate more absolute welfare gains from transportation cost elimination than homogeneous goods models. Welfare gains under balanced trade structures are larger in production function transportation cost scenarios than in iceberg transportation cost scenarios, but under trade imbalance structures, welfare gains are greater under iceberg transportation cost scenarios. Canada's welfare gains in the iceberg transportation cost scenario are significantly larger than gains in the production function transportation cost scenario. On trade effects, homogeneous goods models generate more export and import gains, balanced trade structures have more trade variations, and iceberg transportation costs generate more trade effects.     

基于规制者"主动猎获"视角的规制外部性研究

从规制俘获视角看,规制俘获理论包括公共利益规制理论、传统规制俘获理论、新规制经济学俘获理论几个主要理论阶段。规制具有外部性,主动猎获规制导致社会生产率和社会福利的损失,造成社会分配的不公平,引发社会道德危机。人性恶的假设、"国家掠夺论"的政府本质说以及制度的缺陷和权力的滥用都是主动猎获规制外部性产生的原因。本文首次从规制者"主动猎获"的新视角研究规制外部性,揭示了规制外部性可能导致的经济、政治和文化上的危害,拓宽了规制外部性的研究视野。     

Asymmetric Payoffs and Spatial Competition

We investigate the location choice of two firms whose objectives are the weighted average of their own profit and social welfare, in which they simultaneously decide their locations before setting their prices. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the asymmetric locations are influenced by the asymmetry of the firms’ objectives or by the asymmetry of firms’ marginal costs. We show that, when both firms have the same marginal cost, the equilibrium locations are always symmetric even in the case of the asymmetric objectives. On the other hand, the cost differences lead the asymmetric locations in equilibrium. That is, the asymmetric locations are a result of the cost asymmetry, but not the asymmetry of the firms’ objectives. We also demonstrate that the pursuit of profit by the cost-inefficient firm may increase consumer surplus.     

A Generalized Oligopoly Model

This paper generalizes and unifies the traditional quantity competition oligopoly models of Cournot and Stackelberg. Traditional oligopoly models predict that, under constant marginal costs, there will only be one market share (Cournot) or a single firm with a large market share and all others with the same market share (Stackelberg). Without altering the basic assumption set, in particular the assumptions of common marginal cost functions, perfect information and linear demand, the paper presents a general model that may be useful to explain many real‐life situations of oligopoly competition, where many different market shares may coexist. Finally, it is shown that certain existing social welfare results are robust to the generalization.     

从市场交易费用看我国农村流通网络建设

本文认为,市场交易费用的高低是决定我国农村市场扩张或萎缩的重要因素。当前我国农村流通市场交易场所数量少,分布松散;流通组织规模小,流通成本高,竞争无序;农村基础设施薄弱,消费环境较差;交易方式和手段落后,获取信息的渠道狭窄。受这些因素影响,我国农村流通市场交易费用较高。文章提出,为减少市场交易费用,在构建我国农村流通网络过程中,应加大农村流通基础设施建设力度,加快农产品与工业消费品流通网络建设步伐,构建社会化物流配送体系,提高交易主体合作化程度,加快市场法规建设。     

交通基础设施对“一带一路”沿线国家企业出口的影响——基于世界银行企业调查数据的实证研究

文章基于世界银行2004~2017年45个"一带一路"沿线国家的企业调查数据,利用双重差分模型分析了交通基础设施对企业出口的影响。结果发现:(1)基础设施对企业出口影响显著,基础设施越完善,企业从事出口经营可能性越大,出口比例也会越大。(2)交通基础设施合作可通过降低企业出口障碍、减少企业出口所需时间成本来改善当地出口,提高企业的出口可能性及出口比例。(3)相对于陆路运输,港口建设改善了沿线国家的交通类基础设施,并推动了当地企业的出口。此外,对于外资企业或外国投资占比较大的企业而言,交通基础设施改善对企业出口有更大的促进作用。     

Profit Shifting in Two‐Sided Markets

We investigate how multinational two‐sided platform firms set their prices on intra‐firm transactions. Two‐sided platform firms derive income from two customer groups that are connected through at least one positive network externality from one group to the other. A main finding is that, even in the absence of taxation, transfer prices deviate from marginal cost of production. A second result of the paper is that it is inherently difficult to establish arm’s length prices in two‐sided markets. Finally, we find that differences in national tax rates may be welfare enhancing, despite the use of (abusive) transfer prices as a profit‐shifting device.     

The Relationship Between Competition and Incumbent’s Innovation

A static model is developed to analyse the incumbent’s innovation strategy under monopoly and duopoly. A number of potential objectives for the incumbent are modelled here, including the maximization of revenue, profit, and welfare (which are common among the network industries). Its marginal cost depends upon investment in new technologies and processes. The incumbent chooses its price and its level of investment in innovation. The incumbent’s elasticity of demand under both market structures and the incumbent’s market share under duopoly determine which market structure creates more incentives to innovate. For certain values of these variables, duopoly provides more incentives to innovate than monopoly. As expected, the incentives to innovate increase when the incumbent places greater weight on social welfare.     

Third-Degree Price Discrimination, Consumption Externalities, and Market Opening

This study investigates the effects of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination on market opening in the presence of consumption externalities between separate markets. Assuming symmetric interdependent linear demands and constant marginal cost, we indicate the possibility that with negative externalities a monopolist can do better by closing the relatively small market from the social welfare viewpoint, while it prefers opening that market if price discrimination is feasible. This result contradicts the previous literature on third-degree price discrimination and market opening which asserts that, in the case of non-increasing marginal cost, price discrimination improves social welfare if it opens new markets that are closed under uniform pricing.     

网络通达、金融发展与企业融资费用研究

鉴于“新基建”和“降成本”的现实背景，选取2000—2018年中国31个省级数据实证分析区域网络通达、金融发展与企业融资费用的影响关系。研究发现，区域交通网络通达与金融发展呈正相关，通信网络通达与金融发展呈负相关且通信网络硬件建设与金融发展存在倒U型关系，区域金融发展与企业融资费用呈负相关。在金融发展约束下，区域交通网络通达与企业融资费用呈负相关，通信网络通达对企业融资费用影响具有长短期不一致性，通信网络硬件建设短期内对企业融资具有挤出效应，通信网络软性使用长期对企业融资具有间接竞争加剧效应。网络通达下技术创新与企业融资费用呈负相关且存在倒U型关系。各地区推进新型基础建设投资和降成本中需注意“挤出效应”和“拐点效应”的长短期影响。